Transfer-pricing treatment of ITeS margins excludes pass-through tax recoveries and separate delayed-receivables interest after working-capital adjust...
Capacity-utilisation adjustments under TNMM can neutralise substantiated COVID-related idle costs where underutilisation materially affects profitabil...
TNMM functional comparability requires excluding rice manufacturers from a pure Basmati rice trader's benchmark and recognising operating export recei...
Working-capital adjustment subsumes delayed-receivable effects in TNMM benchmarking of captive software-development services, avoiding separate notion...
Transfer-pricing comparability requires exclusion of financially illogical super-profit comparables and correction of unsupported annual-report and ma...
Charitable character assessment preserves Section 80G approval despite inclusive spiritual teachings and incidental religious expenditure within the s...
Penalty proceedings for cash-loan acceptance require assessment proceedings and recorded Assessing Officer satisfaction; absent these, the proceedings...
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Responsibility of the Managing Director - Unlawful gains by fraudulent and manipulative strategy made by Reliance Company - There is a distinction between “offence” and “contravention” - Section 27 of the SEBI Act as it stood prior to the amendment did not apply to civil liability and, therefore, the Managing Director could not be penalised by SEBI u/s 27 of the Act. - The limited role played by the Board was only to take note of the transactions after they had been executed by the two senior executives. - AT
Responsibility of the Managing Director - Unlawful gains by fraudulent and manipulative strategy made by Reliance Company - There is a distinction between “offence” and “contravention” - Section 27 of the SEBI Act as it stood prior to the amendment did not apply to civil liability and, therefore, the Managing Director could not be penalised by SEBI u/s 27 of the Act. - The limited role played by the Board was only to take note of the transactions after they had been executed by the two senior executives. - AT
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