Issues: (i) Whether a first appellate order rejecting an appeal for non-appearance without adjudicating input tax credit entitlement is sustainable? (ii) Whether the GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch for FY 2017-18 and the Chartered Accountant certificate were required to be examined under the prescribed verification procedure?

Issue (i): Whether a first appellate order rejecting an appeal for non-appearance without adjudicating input tax credit entitlement is sustainable?

Analysis: The rejection rested on non-appearance and did not address the substantive input tax credit dispute or determine the tax liability on merits. The medical explanation constituted sufficient cause in the circumstances. Principles of natural justice require a reasoned, merits-based adjudication where eligibility depends upon documentary material.

Conclusion: Rejection without a substantive determination was unsustainable; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch for FY 2017-18 and the Chartered Accountant certificate were required to be examined under the prescribed verification procedure?

Analysis: Input tax credit eligibility under Section 16(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires documentary verification of invoices, receipt of supplies, payment records and supplier-side tax compliance. The prescribed circular applies to pending FY 2017-18 proceedings and requires examination of the underlying transactions rather than treating a numerical GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A mismatch as conclusive. A Chartered Accountant certificate issued subsequently may be treated as corroborative evidence where its contents can be correlated with contemporaneous books, invoices and returns.

Conclusion: The mismatch must be reconsidered through documentary verification under the prescribed circular, with the Chartered Accountant certificate taken into account; credit cannot be denied on the mismatch alone. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders and consequential demand were set aside, requiring fresh determination of the input tax credit claim after considering the certificate, invoices, ledger records and reconciliation material.

Ratio Decidendi: In pending FY 2017-18 input tax credit mismatch proceedings, a numerical discrepancy between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A cannot alone justify denial of credit; eligibility must be determined through verification of underlying transactional evidence under the applicable circular.

Issues: Whether interest could be collected on integrated goods and services tax levied under Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in the absence of a charging provision authorising such interest.

Analysis: The levy concerned imports made between October 2017 and March 2018. The challenge was governed by the absence of a charging provision under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or the Customs Act, 1962 for imposition of interest on the integrated goods and services tax so levied. The issue stood covered by prior decisions of the Court.

Conclusion: Collection of interest on the integrated goods and services tax levy without a charging provision was impermissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Classification of the three consignments as stainless-steel scrap under CTH 7204 2190 or prime material under CTH 7220 2090, and the consequential enhancement of value; (ii) Sustainability of absolute confiscation and penalties imposed in relation to the three consignments, including penalties on the directors; and (iii) Entitlement to waiver of demurrage and detention charges for the detained consignments.

Issue (i): Classification of the three consignments as stainless-steel scrap under CTH 7204 2190 or prime material under CTH 7220 2090, and the consequential enhancement of value.

Analysis: Paragraph 2.32 of the Foreign Trade Policy and Paragraph 2.51(d) of the Handbook of Procedures permit import of metallic scrap in unshredded form, subject to the prescribed conditions. The accredited pre-shipment inspection certificates described all consignments as stainless-steel melting scrap and were neither disproved nor found fabricated. For the first consignment, the Chartered Engineer's certificate was accepted at clearance and no subsequent chemical test contradicted it. Statements relied upon for a contrary classification lacked admissibility because the procedure under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 was not followed; moreover, testing or reports for subsequent consignments could not establish the nature of an earlier separately assessed consignment.

Analysis: For the second and third consignments, the Chartered Engineer's visual reports required laboratory confirmation, while the laboratory reports did not disclose testing against the requisite BIS parameters or a reliable chemical basis for treating the goods as prime material. Uniform size, orderly stacking, and physical appearance do not by themselves exclude scrap classification. The burden of proof remained unmet, and no evidence established that the declared transaction value was inaccurate or that any additional consideration had been paid.

Conclusion: All three consignments are stainless-steel scrap classifiable under CTH 7204 2190, not prime material under CTH 7220 2090; the enhanced values are unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Sustainability of absolute confiscation and penalties imposed in relation to the three consignments, including penalties on the directors.

Analysis: The first consignment had been released after assessment and was unavailable for confiscation. The failure to establish misclassification, prohibited import, or undervaluation also removed the basis for confiscation and penalties for all consignments. No specific material established the directors' personal role or justified penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The orders of absolute confiscation and all penalties against the importer and the directors are set aside. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Entitlement to waiver of demurrage and detention charges for the detained consignments.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 prohibits a Customs Cargo Service Provider from charging rent or demurrage on goods detained by the proper officer, subject to other applicable law. The detained status of the consignments attracted this protection.

Conclusion: Complete waiver of demurrage and detention-related charges is required to be issued for the detained consignments. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The goods retain their declared scrap classification, the valuation, confiscatory, and penal consequences fail, and the third consignment may be presented for clearance for home consumption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where unrebutted pre-shipment certification supports classification as scrap and the Revenue produces no reliable parameter-based chemical testing or admissible corroborative evidence, reclassification as prime material and the consequential enhancement of value, confiscation, and penalties cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether a secured creditor validly and timely exercised its option to realise its security interest outside the liquidation estate despite the entries in its claim form, participation in the stakeholders' consultation committee, and a subsequent communication after rejection of a compromise scheme.

Analysis: Section 52 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 distinguishes the existence of a security interest from the secured creditor's statutory election to realise that security outside liquidation. Regulation 21A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 required a clear communication of that election within thirty days from the liquidation commencement date, failing which the secured assets were deemed relinquished to the liquidation estate. The claim form disclosed 'NIL' against details of security, while the response of 'No' to relinquishment did not clearly communicate an election to realise the security. The first clear written request for exclusion and delivery of the assets was made more than six months after liquidation commenced and after the compromise scheme had failed.

Analysis: Participation and voting in the stakeholders' consultation committee were relevant conduct when read with the incomplete claim-form disclosure and delayed communication. Under Regulation 31A(2), a secured creditor that has not relinquished its security interest cannot be part of the committee. Consideration of a compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, including under Regulation 39BA, did not suspend or extend the period for exercising the statutory option. Absence of competing claims over the assets did not excuse non-compliance with the prescribed election and timeline.

Conclusion: The secured creditor did not validly exercise its option to realise the secured assets outside the liquidation estate within the prescribed period; its belated communication could not revive that option, and the assets were rightly treated as part of the liquidation estate.

Issues: (i) Whether civil work executed by a contractor through its own workers and billed on measured-work rates constituted Manpower Supply Service liable to service tax under the Reverse Charge Mechanism; (ii) Whether the confirmed demand was barred by limitation in the absence of suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether civil work executed by a contractor through its own workers and billed on measured-work rates constituted Manpower Supply Service liable to service tax under the Reverse Charge Mechanism.

Analysis: Reverse-charge liability depended on the true character of the contracted service. The work order required execution of civil works at the railway siding, engaged the contractor's own workers, and prescribed payment according to the quantity of work completed, including cubic-metre rates. It did not provide for consideration based on the number of workers or man-days supplied. These features established a works-execution arrangement rather than supply of manpower.

Conclusion: The service was not Manpower Supply Service, and the service-tax demand under the Reverse Charge Mechanism was unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the confirmed demand was barred by limitation in the absence of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The transactions were recorded in the assessee's books of account, from which the demand was quantified. Further, as the assessee manufactured dutiable goods, service tax paid under reverse charge would have been available as Cenvat credit, rendering the exercise revenue-neutral. These circumstances did not support suppression of facts.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was unavailable and the demand was time-barred. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax liability was unsustainable both because the contracted activity was not manpower supply and because invocation of the extended limitation period was unjustified.

Ratio Decidendi: Reverse-charge service-tax liability cannot be sustained where contractual and billing evidence establishes execution of measured civil work rather than supply of manpower, and the extended limitation period cannot be invoked without suppression of material facts.

Issues: (i) Whether fund allocations received through NEC constituted consideration for taxable services rendered by the appellant; (ii) Whether amounts relating to work performed for NTPC were liable to service tax; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether fund allocations received through NEC constituted consideration for taxable services rendered by the appellant.

Analysis: The allocations were funds transmitted by the Ministry of Water Resources through NEC for the appellant's activities. No service provider-recipient relationship existed between the appellant and NEC, and the allocations could not be characterised as consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The demand based on fund allocations through NEC was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether amounts relating to work performed for NTPC were liable to service tax.

Analysis: Circular No. 96/7/2007-ST dated 23.08.2007 clarifies that statutory and sovereign functions performed by public authorities, with prescribed fees remitted to the Government, are not services rendered for consideration. The appellant performed sovereign functions, remitted the collections to the Government, and retained no amount; NTPC had also not paid the service-tax amount shown in the invoices.

Conclusion: The demand arising from the NTPC transactions was not legally sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Analysis: The appellant, being part of the Ministry of Water Resources, entertained a bona fide belief that its sovereign functions were outside service-tax liability. The principal demand related to governmental grants, and service tax had not been collected in the NTPC transactions. These circumstances did not establish suppression of facts.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax demands failed on merits and, independently, insofar as raised for the extended period, on limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether Bhujia and Cheese Balls cleared in sealed retail packages qualify for the specific nil-rate exemptions under Sl. No. 29 of Notification No. 03/2006-C.E. dated 01.03.2006 and Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether classification under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 excludes the goods from exemption entries referring to Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90.

Issue (i): Whether Bhujia and Cheese Balls cleared in sealed retail packages qualify for the specific nil-rate exemptions under Sl. No. 29 of Notification No. 03/2006-C.E. dated 01.03.2006 and Sl. No. 37 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Sl. No. 29 and Sl. No. 37 specifically cover Bhujia, namkeen and similar edible preparations in ready-for-consumption form without imposing a restriction concerning sealed-container clearances. Bhujia is expressly named in Sl. No. 37. Cheese Balls, having the character of savoury ready-to-consume preparations, answer the description of namkeen or similar edible preparations under the common parlance test.

Analysis: On the specific-over-general principle, the residual entries for ready-to-eat packaged food under Sl. No. 30 and food preparations not cleared in sealed containers under Sl. No. 38 apply only where the goods do not satisfy the specific exemption description. The sealed-container condition expressly confined to Sl. No. 38 cannot be imported into Sl. No. 37. The Board circular under the earlier notification likewise recognises that packaged goods covered by the specific description retain the nil rate.

Conclusion: Bhujia and Cheese Balls qualify for the respective nil-rate exemptions notwithstanding their clearance in sealed retail packages; the duty demands and consequential interest and penalties are unsustainable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether classification under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 excludes the goods from exemption entries referring to Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90.

Analysis: Under the tariff classification hierarchy, Tariff Item 2106 90 99 forms part of Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90 and is not mutually exclusive of it. Supplementary Note 6 to Chapter 21 confirms that Tariff Item 2106 90 99 includes namkeen, Bhujia and related preparations. The use of the broader sub-heading in the exemption entries does not justify importing an exclusion for goods classified under its eight-digit tariff item.

Conclusion: Classification under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 does not prevent the goods from falling within the reference to Tariff Sub-heading 2106 90 in the specific exemption entries. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption scheme assigns the nil rate to specifically described savoury and similar ready-for-consumption preparations, while the residual packaged-food entries operate only for goods outside those specific descriptions.

Ratio Decidendi: A specific nil-rate exemption for named or similar ready-for-consumption edible preparations prevails over residual entries, and a sealed-container restriction stated only in a separate entry cannot be imported into that specific exemption; an eight-digit tariff item remains within its parent tariff sub-heading.

Issues: Whether a secured creditor with a security interest registered with CERSAI has priority over an unregistered CGST charge and whether the restraint on issuance of NOC for the secured assets was valid.

Analysis: Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 accords first priority to the dues of a secured creditor whose security interest is registered with CERSAI. The petitioner bank's security interest stood registered from 20.12.2020, whereas the revenue authority failed to establish registration of its charge with CERSAI. The provisional attachment under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 did not displace the bank's statutory priority.

Conclusion: The petitioner bank's registered security interest has priority over the revenue dues, and the letter restraining issuance of NOC in respect of the secured flats was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's deferral direction concerning delayed adjudication required the writ petition to remain pending; (ii) Whether, following the adjudication orders, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's deferral direction concerning delayed adjudication required the writ petition to remain pending.

Analysis: The deferral direction was issued in the context of matters concerning pending adjudication and the larger issue of delay. The provisional assessments in question had culminated in adjudication orders, including an order that pre-dated the writ petition. The controversy was therefore no longer confined to delayed finalisation of provisional assessments.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in the negative; the writ petition was not required to remain pending awaiting the Supreme Court proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether, following the adjudication orders, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 provides an efficacious appeal against the adjudication orders. The appellate forum can consider the legality of those orders, the legal effect of the alleged delay, and consequential claims concerning the securities furnished. No exceptional circumstance justified bypassing that remedy. The material non-disclosure of the pre-existing adjudication order also supported refusal of discretionary writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in the affirmative; the challenges and available contentions must be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The legality of the adjudication orders, the consequences of any delay in their making, and related claims concerning bank guarantees remain open for determination by the competent appellate forum in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where appealable adjudication orders have been passed and no exceptional circumstance is shown, writ jurisdiction should not bypass an efficacious statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether interest on the refund of amounts deposited during investigation is payable from the date of deposit until the date of refund, notwithstanding that the Revenue's challenge to the order setting aside the demand was dismissed subsequently.

Analysis: The confirmed demand had been set aside, with the result that the investigation deposit was not payable from inception. The amount was deposited in 2008 and retained until its refund in 2024. Applying the established principle governing interest on delayed refund of investigation deposits, the subsequent dismissal of the Revenue's challenge did not justify retention of money that was never lawfully due without interest for the period of such retention.

Conclusion: Interest is payable to the assessee on the refunded investigation deposit from the date of deposit until the date of refund.

Issues: Whether the Supreme Court ruling concerning State legislative competence over intoxicating liquors supported an additional ground challenging the service-tax demand on job-work production.

Analysis: The constitutional ruling relied upon concerned the respective legislative fields relating to intoxicating liquors, including the scope of State power under Entry 8 of List II and Parliamentary control over industries under Entry 52 of List I. It did not determine the levy of service tax on services used for production of goods on a job-work basis. A precedent governs what it actually decides and cannot be extended to a distinct service-tax issue not considered therein. Reliance on an otherwise relevant decision could also be made during hearing without a separate application.

Conclusion: The cited constitutional ruling did not establish that the service-tax demand or jurisdiction to levy service tax on the job-work service was invalid.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal concerning gold chains brought into India by an international passenger.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 129A(1) expressly excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. The gold chains were brought by the appellant as an arriving international passenger; their recovery from his person, alleged non-declaration, intended use, concealment, invoice, or duty-evasion allegations concern the merits and do not change the goods' character as baggage. Section 129DD provides revision before the Central Government for such orders.

Conclusion: The impugned order related to goods imported as baggage, and the Tribunal therefore lacked appellate jurisdiction; the available recourse is revision under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether e-governance portal and data-digitisation services provided to government departments and educational institutions were taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions after 1 July 2012 were exempt from service tax; and (iii) Whether interest earned on fixed deposits from temporarily retained collections was liable to service tax.

Issue (i): Whether e-governance portal and data-digitisation services provided to government departments and educational institutions were taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: OIDAR requires the service provider to provide access to data possessed by it. The appellant merely created and operated a network enabling government officers and citizens to access data owned by the State Government; it did not provide access to its own data. The support rendered to State departments, universities, and educational institutions was directed to governmental and educational functions and was not supplied to entities engaged in business or commerce.

Conclusion: The services were not taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services for the pre-negative-list period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions after 1 July 2012 were exempt from service tax.

Analysis: Although services were generally taxable after the negative-list regime commenced, portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions fell within Entry 9(d) of Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Conclusion: The portal services provided to universities and educational institutions were exempt from service tax after 1 July 2012, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest earned on fixed deposits from temporarily retained collections was liable to service tax.

Analysis: The fixed-deposit interest arose because amounts collected towards government fees, educational fees, utility bills, and premiums were remitted after the stipulated short interval. Interest represented the time value of money paid by the bank for the deposits and was not consideration for any service rendered by the appellant.

Conclusion: Fixed-deposit interest was not exigible to service tax under either the pre-negative-list or post-negative-list regime, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed e-governance and educational-service receipts either did not constitute taxable services or were exempt, while fixed-deposit interest lay outside the charge of service tax.

Issues: (i) Whether separately billed food and beverages supplied by room/grand-room service were taxable restaurant or accommodation services; (ii) Whether consideration for exclusive branding and display of liquor brands constituted taxable sponsorship/promotional activity; (iii) Whether electricity charges recovered at actual consumption from tenants formed taxable consideration; (iv) Whether the demand beyond the normal limitation period was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether separately billed food and beverages supplied by room/grand-room service were taxable restaurant or accommodation services.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Finance Act, 1994 confined restaurant service to serving food or beverages in the premises of an air-conditioned restaurant licensed to serve alcohol. Hotel rooms were not restaurant premises, and the food was separately invoiced without evidence that its value formed part of the room tariff. Such separately charged food was a sale/transfer of goods excluded from service under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The room and grand-room food and beverage receipts were not taxable services. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether consideration for exclusive branding and display of liquor brands constituted taxable sponsorship/promotional activity.

Analysis: The agreements required exclusive branding and promotion of specified liquor brands and mandatory display of branded accessories. The receipts were therefore consideration for promotional and branding activity, rather than trade margins arising solely from liquor sales. For the pre-negative-list period, the arrangements fell within the statutory scope of sponsorship; for the post-negative-list period, they were services under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 and were not covered by Section 66D of that Act.

Conclusion: The branding-related receipts constituted taxable promotional activity and not mere trading income. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether electricity charges recovered at actual consumption from tenants formed taxable consideration.

Analysis: The charges represented actual electricity consumption recorded through sub-meters, collected from tenants and remitted to electricity suppliers. They were not consideration for renting services. Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules could not include such reimbursement in taxable value, having been held ultra vires.

Conclusion: Electricity charges recovered on actual-consumption basis were not taxable consideration. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the demand beyond the normal limitation period was sustainable.

Analysis: The notice did not invoke the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, and the record did not establish a deliberate act of suppression or other conduct evidencing intent to evade tax. Mere non-declaration or omission did not establish wilful suppression.

Conclusion: Recovery beyond the normal limitation period was unsustainable; the sponsorship-service demand could survive only for the normal period. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Only the service-tax liability on sponsorship/promotional activity for the normal limitation period survives; the remaining impugned demands are set aside.

Issues: (i) Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (ii) Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (iii) Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts; (iv) Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts; (v) Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation; (vi) Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Issue (i): Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Construction of a hospital is commercial or industrial construction service unless evidence establishes that it was intended to be a charitable hospital. The applicable abatement had already been extended, and the tax liability was correspondingly reduced wherever the recipient was required to discharge part of the tax.

Conclusion: The demand for the pre-July 2012 period was sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 permits exclusion of the actual value of goods where established, or valuation on the prescribed presumptive basis. The assessment had allowed the applicable abatement and reduced provider-side liability wherever reverse-charge liability applied. No material established that the actual value of goods exceeded the abatement already allowed.

Conclusion: The valuation and demand for the post-July 2012 works contract services were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts.

Analysis: Materials supplied free of cost by customers do not form part of the gross amount charged for determining the taxable value of a works contract.

Conclusion: The service tax demand attributable to free-of-cost customer-supplied materials was set aside; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts.

Analysis: The assertion that the services classified as exclusive service contracts were works contracts was unsupported by material in the appeal.

Conclusion: The classification and corresponding demand were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (v): Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation.

Analysis: The alleged deposits require verification as to whether they were paid as service tax.

Conclusion: Any amounts verified as service tax deposits shall be appropriated against the confirmed demand; in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (vi): Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Analysis: The assessee neither paid service tax nor filed returns or declared the services, and the transactions emerged only through investigation.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustained; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax component attributable to customer-supplied free-of-cost materials is excluded, while the remaining valuation, classification, and penalty findings stand, with adjustment of verified tax deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Free-of-cost materials supplied by the recipient cannot be included in the gross amount charged for valuation of works contract service.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to summons seeking information and documents during GST proceedings was premature.

Analysis: The summons sought information and documents, and the petitioner had responded by representation with copies of the relevant records. The record did not establish coercive recovery, a threat of arrest, or any adverse order arising from the impugned summons.

Conclusion: The writ challenge was premature and no interference with the summons was warranted.

Issues: Whether deletion of the addition under Section 69A, based on uncorroborated search and survey material and a retracted statement, gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: Although technical rules of evidence do not strictly govern income-tax proceedings, additions must rest on relevant material and cannot be founded on suspicion, conjecture or surmise. The underlying evidentiary principles and principles of natural justice require corroborative evidence for an adverse inference. The material obtained in the brokers' search related to a period preceding the relevant financial year; the prompt retraction of the survey statement was not displaced by independent evidence; and the alleged cash-loan entries were unsupported by statements of the identified brokers or other material establishing investment or interest income. The factual finding that the documentary material did not corroborate the alleged unexplained money was neither irregular nor perverse.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the deletion of the Section 69A addition was sustained.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's deletion of the addition under Section 68 in respect of unlisted-share sale proceeds gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260A.

Analysis: Section 260A permits interference only on a substantial question of law and does not authorise reassessment of evidence or substitution of a plausible factual view reached by the Tribunal. A factual finding is open to interference only where it is perverse, based on no evidence, ignores material evidence, or rests on inadmissible material. The Tribunal evaluated the disclosed investments, sale and purchase documents, bank records, purchaser confirmations, financial statements, income-tax returns and replies to notices under Section 133(6). The Revenue did not establish that this material was unreliable or that the sale proceeds represented the respondent's undisclosed money. Although surrounding circumstances and the test of human probabilities are relevant to a Section 68 inquiry, they cannot sustain an addition founded only on suspicion or general allegations. Earlier acceptance of investments was not treated as an estoppel, but as relevant evidentiary material along with the entire record.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the deletion of the Section 68 addition stood affirmed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether refund of customs duty paid twice can be denied for non-production of the first challan, where the challan was not generated because of a system failure, and whether statutory interest is payable on the delayed refund.

Analysis: Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Public Notice No. 62/2012 treat a double or multiple duty payment, after acceptance in the system, as a deposit refundable through the prescribed procedure. The Public Notice requires the importer to furnish banking and transaction documents, while verification through PAO/e-PAO and the ICEGATE challan inquiry is assigned to departmental officers. The documentary record established both payments against the same bill of entry and confirmed that the first payment was never reversed. Requiring production of a challan that the ICEGATE system itself failed to generate imposed an impossible condition and was not a requirement under the Public Notice. Interest on an eligible refund is governed by Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 where payment is not made within the statutory period.

Conclusion: The importer is entitled to refund of the unadjusted first payment of customs duty with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: (i) Whether the monitoring committee was a person aggrieved entitled to maintain the appeal and whether the appellate forum could consider the Supreme Court judgment not placed before the adjudicating authority; (ii) What legal effect the Supreme Court judgment had on the landholding special-purpose company, its leasehold land and the project; (iii) Whether a distinct subsisting default existed on the admission date to support a separate corporate insolvency resolution process and whether the earlier threshold ruling precluded that inquiry; and (iv) Whether continuing that process was compatible with the restored resolution plan and the Code.

Issue (i): Whether the monitoring committee was a person aggrieved entitled to maintain the appeal and whether the appellate forum could consider the Supreme Court judgment not placed before the adjudicating authority.

Analysis: Section 61(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits an appeal by any person whose legal rights or interests are prejudicially affected. The monitoring committee was constituted to supervise and implement the restored plan, while admission of the landholding entity to insolvency placed the project land under the interim resolution professional and the statutory moratorium. The binding Supreme Court judgment pre-dated the admission order and directly concerned the same project. Its binding force under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India required the appellate forum to give effect to it, notwithstanding that it had not been placed before the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The monitoring committee had standing as a person aggrieved, and the binding Supreme Court judgment was required to be considered.

Issue (ii): What legal effect the Supreme Court judgment had on the landholding special-purpose company, its leasehold land and the project.

Analysis: The Supreme Court had lifted the corporate veil on the finding that the holding company was the real driving force behind development and the landholding special-purpose company was only a front. The restored resolution plan was directed to proceed for completion of the project from the stipulated date. Lifting the corporate veil required the holding company and landholding entity to be treated as one economic entity for project resolution, thereby bringing the leasehold land and project within the restored plan.

Conclusion: The leasehold land and project stood comprehended within, and were required to be dealt with under, the restored resolution plan.

Issue (iii): Whether a distinct subsisting default existed on the admission date to support a separate corporate insolvency resolution process and whether the earlier threshold ruling precluded that inquiry.

Analysis: Admission under Section 7(5)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 requires a financial debt and a default; under Section 3(12), the debt must be due and payable and remain unpaid. Section 31(1) makes an approved resolution plan binding on creditors and stakeholders. The allottees' claims arose from the same project and were addressed through the restored plan, which provided for project completion and delivery of units. Following corporate veil lifting, no separate claim against the landholding entity survived independently of the claim resolved under that plan. The earlier ruling addressed only the threshold condition for filing under the second proviso to Section 7(1) and expressly left merits, including subsisting default at admission, open.

Conclusion: No distinct debt of the landholding entity was due and payable on the admission date, and thus no separate default existed to found another insolvency process; the earlier threshold ruling did not bar that determination.

Issue (iv): Whether continuing that process was compatible with the restored resolution plan and the Code.

Analysis: Admission triggered the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), vested management and control of the landholding entity in the interim resolution professional, and would lead to an independent resolution process over the same land. This conflicted directly with the binding direction for implementation of the restored plan over that very land. Enforcement of the restored plan and remedies for non-compliance lie before the adjudicating authority in the existing insolvency process under Section 60(5), rather than through a parallel process that fragments resolution of the same real-estate project.

Conclusion: Continuation of the separate insolvency process was incompatible with the restored resolution plan and could not be permitted.

Final Conclusion: The project, its leasehold land, and the allottees' claims are to be resolved under the restored plan as a consolidated insolvency resolution; remedies of allottees lie in enforcement of that plan within the existing insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a binding restored resolution plan, after lifting the corporate veil, comprehends the project land and allottee claims, no distinct default remains for a separate insolvency process against the landholding entity, and a parallel process that impedes implementation of the plan is impermissible.