Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory customs appeal as barred by limitation should be set aside and the appeal restored for consideration on merits despite expiry of the maximum condonable period under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 prescribes sixty days for filing an appeal, with a further condonable period of thirty days. The appeal was filed approximately twelve days beyond the aggregate ninety-day period, and the Commissioner (Appeals) lacked statutory authority to condone that delay. The delay was attributed to the undisputed medical condition of the counsel handling the matter. As the underlying dispute concerning classification of the imported goods required merits adjudication, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was invoked in the exceptional circumstances.

Conclusion: The limitation dismissal was set aside and the statutory appeal was restored for adjudication on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be invoked for alleged short-payment of IGST on the imported goods; (ii) Whether the availability of an appellate remedy barred exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be invoked for alleged short-payment of IGST on the imported goods.

Analysis: Section 28(1) governs recovery of duty short-paid for reasons other than collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, whereas Section 28(4) permits the extended limitation only where those specified ingredients are established. The importer declared the goods as rice bran, disclosed the tariff classification, and expressly claimed the notification benefit in the Bill of Entry, which was accepted by the proper officer. No material established concealment, deliberate false declaration, or suppression intended to evade duty. A subsequent departmental disagreement on classification or exemption eligibility, and a bare allegation of wilful misstatement, do not establish the jurisdictional facts necessary for Section 28(4).

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 28(4) was invalid and the demand founded on the extended period could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of an appellate remedy barred exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: Although Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 provides an appellate remedy, the alternative-remedy rule is not absolute where the statutory conditions for assumption of jurisdiction are absent or the proceedings suffer from patent illegality. Since the essential preconditions for invoking Section 28(4) were not satisfied, relegation to the appellate remedy was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The alternative-remedy objection did not bar writ jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The extended-period recovery lacked a valid jurisdictional basis; any further action remains governed by the applicable limitation period and statutory requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation under Section 28(4) may be invoked only on material establishing collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts; absent those jurisdictional facts, an alternative statutory appeal does not preclude writ review.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty for abetment under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained against a Customs Broker without material proving knowledge, conscious involvement or collusion in the attempted export of prohibited goods; (ii) Whether the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962 precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for abetment under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained against a Customs Broker without material proving knowledge, conscious involvement or collusion in the attempted export of prohibited goods.

Analysis: Filing shipping bills, arranging containers and processing documents supplied by the exporter are acts performed in the ordinary course of a Customs Broker's functions. Although a Customs Broker must exercise due diligence as to the correctness and completeness of information furnished to Customs, a failure to verify the source of goods or question their movement does not by itself establish the requisite mens rea for abetment. Material establishing knowledge of the actual nature of the goods, conscious involvement, or collusion with the exporter was absent.

Conclusion: The penalty for abetment was unsustainable in the absence of proof of knowledge, conscious involvement or collusion; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962 precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative statutory appeal does not bar writ jurisdiction in an appropriate case. As the penal finding lacked material demonstrating culpable abetment by the Customs Broker, relegating it to the appellate remedy was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The alternative appellate remedy did not preclude writ jurisdiction; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penal liability and the appellate affirmation thereof lacked a factual foundation establishing culpable abetment by the Customs Broker.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for abetment under the customs law requires material proving knowledge and conscious participation or collusion; a Customs Broker's procedural acts or lack of further inquiry, without such proof, do not establish abetment.

Issues: (i) Validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, insofar as it conditions input tax credit upon payment of tax by the supplier; (ii) Exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the demand proceedings despite the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, insofar as it conditions input tax credit upon payment of tax by the supplier.

Analysis: The condition requiring a recipient to establish through cogent material that tax charged by the supplier has actually been deposited has been upheld as neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. A supplier's default does not warrant reading down the statutory condition.

Conclusion: The constitutional challenge to Section 16(2)(c) fails; the issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the demand proceedings despite the statutory appeal.

Analysis: Questions concerning actual receipt of goods, payment of tax by suppliers, adequacy of the hearing, alleged non-application of mind, overlap under Section 6(2)(b), and duplication of demand require scrutiny of underlying material. Such factual and mixed questions are appropriately addressed in the statutory appeal under Section 107. Any alleged hearing infirmity is curable and does not establish a jurisdictional defect warranting recourse to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction will not be exercised; the petitioner must pursue the statutory appeal, in which all objections remain open for independent determination. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) remains enforceable, while the merits of the input tax credit claim, hearing objection, alleged statutory bar, and asserted duplication remain undecided.

Outcome: The Civil Appeal was dismissed following dismissal of an identical appeal.

Issues: Whether settlement applications filed by 30.09.2021 had to be considered on merits where live notices under Section 153A or Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were pending on the filing date, despite the prior-eligibility condition in paragraph 4(i) of the CBDT Order dated 28.09.2021.

Analysis: Section 245A(b) defines a case as an assessment proceeding pending on the date of the settlement application, and Section 245C permits an application at any stage of that case. Section 245C(5) fixes an outer date for making an application but does not prescribe an earlier date by which eligibility must have arisen. The power under Section 119(2)(b) to relieve genuine hardship permits extension of time but cannot impose a substantive disqualification absent from the statute.

Analysis: Pendency depended upon issuance of the statutory notice, an act exclusively within the Revenue's control. Denial of settlement access because of departmental delay would permit the Revenue to benefit from its own default. Treating assessment years arising from the same search differently solely because notices were issued on different dates also lacked an intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the statutory object, offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The requirement of eligibility as on 31.01.2021 in paragraph 4(i) of the CBDT Order dated 28.09.2021 and the corresponding Press Release is read down and cannot bar an assessee who had a live and unadjudicated notice under Section 153A or Section 143(2) on the filing date and applied by 30.09.2021. The affected settlement applications must be treated as pending and decided on merits by the Interim Board for Settlement.

Issues: (i) Whether concessional duty under Sr. Nos. 319, 320 and 321 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs applies to imported lithium-ion cells that are scrapped during manufacture of a battery or battery pack; (ii) Whether, if not, the exemption must be reversed only in proportion to the sale value of the scrap.

Issue (i): Whether concessional duty under Sr. Nos. 319, 320 and 321 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs applies to imported lithium-ion cells that are scrapped during manufacture of a battery or battery pack.

Analysis: The concession is conditional upon end use under the Customs (Import of Goods at Concessional Rate of Duty or for Specified End Use) Rules, 2022. Manufacture under Rule 3(1)(i) requires emergence of a new product having a distinct nature, character, use or name. Cells damaged or rejected in the production line and sold as scrap do not result in the specified manufactured product. In the absence of any prescribed process-loss or wastage tolerance, such cells fall within unutilised or defective goods under Rule 10.

Conclusion: No. The concessional duty benefit is unavailable for lithium-ion cells scrapped during manufacture; they are to be treated as unutilised or defective goods. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether, if not, the exemption must be reversed only in proportion to the sale value of the scrap.

Analysis: Rules 10(3) and 11 require recovery of the differential between the duty otherwise payable at import and the concessional duty paid, together with interest under Section 28AA of the Customs Act, 1962. The calculation is based on the imported goods' assessed quantity and value, not on the subsequent sale proceeds of scrap.

Conclusion: No. The exemption is to be reversed in full through payment of differential duty with applicable interest, and not in proportion to the scrap sale value. This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Imported cells that fail to result in the specified battery or battery pack because they are damaged and scrapped are governed by the consequences applicable to unutilised or defective goods under the concessional-duty regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an end-use-based customs concession is governed by the IGCR Rules and no process-loss tolerance is prescribed, imported inputs scrapped without resulting in the specified manufactured product are unutilised or defective goods subject to differential-duty recovery with interest.

Issues: (i) Whether transportation and delivery of manufactured gases through hired transporters constituted cargo handling service or goods transport agency service; (ii) Whether service tax could be levied on collection and delivery charges forming part of the sale price on which central sales tax/VAT had been paid.

Issue (i): Whether transportation and delivery of manufactured gases through hired transporters constituted cargo handling service or goods transport agency service.

Analysis: Under the Finance Act, cargo handling service requires a service provided by a cargo handling agency. The activity involved delivery of the manufacturer's own gases to purchasers under contracts of sale, while transportation was arranged through transporters. Service tax on the freight had already been discharged under the goods transport agency category on reverse charge basis and accepted as such. No factual distinction from the earlier determination on identical activity was established.

Conclusion: Delivery of the manufacturer's own goods through hired transporters is not cargo handling service and cannot be taxed under that category.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax could be levied on collection and delivery charges forming part of the sale price on which central sales tax/VAT had been paid.

Analysis: The collection and delivery charges formed part of the contractual sale price of the gases and had borne central sales tax/VAT. Service tax and sales tax/VAT operate in mutually exclusive fields; a consideration treated and taxed as the price of goods cannot, on the same basis, be subjected to service tax as consideration for a service.

Conclusion: No service tax is leviable on the collection and delivery charges forming part of the VAT/CST-paid sale price.

Final Conclusion: Collection and delivery charges retained their character as components of the sale consideration and were outside the charge for cargo handling service.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delivery charges form part of the VAT/CST-paid sale price, a manufacturer's delivery of its own goods through transporters is not a cargo handling service liable to service tax.

Issues: Whether an assessee who voluntarily pays the tax demanded in a notice issued for fraudulent transactions under Section 74 can avoid the consequential levy of interest and penalty by relying on such payment and alleging non-compliance with Section 74(5).

Analysis: The assessee did not dispute the allegations in the original notice issued under Section 74(1) and voluntarily deposited the entire tax demand without objection. Such acquiescence amounted to acceptance of the allegations and findings in the notice, leaving no requirement for a further determination of fraud. The later notices were confined to computation and recovery of interest and penalty; the reply merely referred to the tax payment and did not challenge the basis for invoking Section 74. Payment of tax did not extinguish the statutory consequential liability for interest and penalty.

Conclusion: The levy of interest and penalty under Section 74(9) was valid, and there was no violation of Section 74(5). The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail in a prosecution alleging fraudulent issuance of invoices and wrongful availment and passing of input tax credit under Section 132 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The allegations concerned a network of entities issuing invoices without underlying supplies and generating substantial inadmissible input tax credit. The application recorded completion of investigation and filing of the charge sheet, as well as the period of judicial custody. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, discretionary bail was found appropriate.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to be released on bail.

Issues: Whether a writ order founded solely on a precedent subsequently reversed could stand when additional grounds had not been adjudicated.

Analysis: The sole basis on which the writ petition had been allowed no longer survived after the appellate reversal of the precedent relied upon. The remaining substantive grounds challenging the show-cause notice had not been addressed and required adjudication.

Conclusion: The writ order could not stand, and the unadjudicated grounds require determination by the Single Judge.

Issues: (i) Whether the amended formula under Rule 89(5) applies retrospectively to refund or rectification applications concerning earlier tax periods; (ii) Whether supplementary or differential refund claims for periods in respect of which original refund claims were processed are maintainable; (iii) Whether Notification No. 09/2022-Central Tax (Rate) can deny refund of eligible input tax credit accumulated before its effective date; (iv) Whether the refund claims were barred by limitation under Section 54.

Issue (i): Whether the amended formula under Rule 89(5) applies retrospectively to refund or rectification applications concerning earlier tax periods.

Analysis: The amendment introducing input-service input tax credit into the refund formula was treated as curative and clarificatory. The adopted judicial interpretation recognised its retrospective application to refund or rectification applications filed within the statutory period, notwithstanding the contrary prospective clarification in the departmental circular.

Conclusion: The amended Rule 89(5) formula applies retrospectively to the timely refund claims. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether supplementary or differential refund claims for periods in respect of which original refund claims were processed are maintainable.

Analysis: Neither Section 54 nor Rule 89 was found to contain a bar against a supplementary claim for a legally admissible differential amount. A prior refund application or a technical restriction in the electronic filing process cannot defeat a timely claim where substantive eligibility remains to be verified.

Conclusion: Supplementary or differential refund claims are maintainable, subject to verification of eligibility and quantum. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Notification No. 09/2022-Central Tax (Rate) can deny refund of eligible input tax credit accumulated before its effective date.

Analysis: The restriction effective from 18.07.2022 could not be extended through an administrative circular to deny refund of otherwise eligible input tax credit accumulated before that date. Statutory provisions prevail over an inconsistent departmental clarification.

Conclusion: The notification cannot be applied through the circular to deny refund of eligible pre-effective-date accumulated credit. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the refund claims were barred by limitation under Section 54.

Analysis: Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax excluded the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 while computing limitation. On applying that exclusion, the claims fell within the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The refund claims are within limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The directions for sanction of the eligible differential refunds after arithmetical verification remain operative.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative amendment to the GST refund-computation formula applies to timely refund or rectification claims notwithstanding a contrary administrative circular.

Issues: (i) Applicability of the Rs. 20,00,000 monetary limit to the departmental appeal and computation of the disputed amount; (ii) Whether the Revenue established an exclusion from the monetary limit, including the effect of the Commissioner's approval under Section 112(3); (iii) Consequence of non-compliance with the monetary-limit regime for admission and maintainability of the appeal.

Issue (i): Applicability of the Rs. 20,00,000 monetary limit to the departmental appeal and computation of the disputed amount.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary limits for departmental litigation. Circular No. 2425008 dated 05.07.2024 prescribed a Rs. 20,00,000 threshold for appeals before GSTAT, and the subsequent litigation-management framework continued that policy. Under the prescribed methodology, where tax is in dispute, the aggregate tax amount is relevant. The disputed tax demand was Rs. 1,90,080.

Conclusion: The monetary limit applied and the disputed amount was below the prescribed threshold, against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue established an exclusion from the monetary limit, including the effect of the Commissioner's approval under Section 112(3).

Analysis: Once the disputed amount falls below the threshold, the Revenue must identify and substantiate a specified exception. Administrative authorisation to institute an appeal is distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy. Where reliance is placed on the Commissioner's residual discretion under Section 112(3), the record must disclose a case-specific and reasoned exercise of that discretion. No material established any enumerated exception, recurring issue, adverse observation, or recorded opinion warranting departure from the threshold.

Conclusion: No applicable exception was established, and a bare assertion of the Commissioner's approval was insufficient, against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Consequence of non-compliance with the monetary-limit regime for admission and maintainability of the appeal.

Analysis: The statutory right of appeal is subject to conditions governing its exercise. Compliance with the applicable monetary-limit regime is a threshold requirement that must be determined before entering the merits; an arguable merits issue cannot cure the absence of maintainability.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not eligible for admission for adjudication on merits.

Final Conclusion: The binding monetary-limit litigation policy precluded merits adjudication of the below-threshold departmental challenge, leaving the underlying tax dispute undecided.

Ratio Decidendi: A departmental appeal below a valid monetary threshold cannot proceed unless the Revenue specifically establishes a recognised exception; generic administrative approval by the Commissioner does not satisfy that requirement.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving a penalty below the prescribed monetary threshold can be admitted where no recognised exception to the monetary-limit policy is pleaded and established.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits prescription of monetary limits for departmental appeals. The applicable departmental circulars fix a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT and prescribe that, in a penalty-only dispute, the amount of penalty is to be considered. The disputed penalty of Rs. 88,074 was below that threshold. The monetary-limit framework remains operative through the subsequent litigation-management circular and is binding upon departmental officers. A statutory right of appeal under Section 112(3) is subject to the conditions regulating its exercise. Administrative approval or authorisation by the Commissioner does not, by itself, establish a recognised exception; the Revenue must identify the applicable exception and place material showing its application, including a specific recorded opinion where the residual exception is invoked. No such exception or case-specific exercise of residual discretion was established. Merits cannot be examined to cure a failure to satisfy the threshold condition for maintainability.

Conclusion: A departmental appeal below the prescribed monetary limit, without an established exception, is not maintainable and cannot be admitted for adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary threshold could be admitted when no recognised exception to the threshold was specifically established.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the applicable departmental circulars imposed a monetary threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for departmental appeals. The relevant disputed tax was Rs. 1,98,806, which was below that threshold. The burden of establishing a specified exception lay on the Revenue. A general approval or authorisation by the Commissioner did not establish compliance with the exception, since the record did not disclose a specific and reasoned exercise of the residual power under Section 112(3). The statutory right of appeal remained subject to the binding monetary-limit framework governing departmental litigation.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for admission because the disputed amount was below the prescribed monetary limit and no applicable exception was established.

Issues: Whether an appeal confined to restoration of fine could be maintained after the first appellate authority set aside confiscation proceedings and the penalty imposed under Section 130 for excess or unaccounted stock.

Analysis: Sections 35(1) and 35(6) of the CGST/UPGST enactments require maintenance of prescribed accounts and provide that tax on unaccounted goods is to be determined by applying Sections 73 or 74. Excess or unaccounted bricks and coal found during survey could therefore be proceeded against under Sections 73 or 74, and not through confiscation proceedings under Section 130. Since the foundational proceedings under Section 130 had been set aside, the fine imposed in those proceedings could not survive independently.

Conclusion: The question was answered in the negative. Fine could not be sustained separately after the confiscation proceedings and penalty under Section 130 had been quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment-stage proceedings could continue when information required to reconcile the portal figures with earlier assessment records had not been supplied.

Analysis: The discrepancy arose from unreconciled figures in the Risk Management Strategy portal and prior assessment and payee records. At the stage under Sections 148A(1) and 148A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the relevant details had not been furnished and the inquiry was limited. The correctness and legality of initiating reassessment proceedings were expressly left open.

Outcome: The matter was returned to the notice stage for supply of information, an additional response, personal hearing, and a fresh order.

Issues: Whether an order revoking cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be sustained without ensuring payment of interest, late fee and penalty in addition to tax.

Analysis: The proviso to Rule 23(1) makes furnishing of pending returns and payment of tax, interest, penalty and late fee a statutory precondition for revocation where registration was cancelled for failure to furnish returns. Verification limited to filing of returns and payment of principal tax did not address the full statutory liability and constituted a jurisdictional and substantive error. Interest and late fee remained recoverable under the applicable statutory provisions through the prescribed recovery mechanism, and liability to penalty also arose under Rule 23.

Conclusion: The revocation order was modified to account for the unpaid statutory dues. The Department may recover interest and late fee, and a penalty of Rs. 10,000 was imposed. The finding is in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether detention proceedings, tax and penalty under Section 129 could be sustained where no specific contravention of the Act or Rules was alleged or established and the proceedings were conducted in breach of natural justice.

Analysis: Section 129 authorises detention, seizure and consequential tax and penalty only where goods in transit are transported or stored in contravention of the Act or Rules. The show-cause notice, order-in-original and appellate order did not identify any particular statutory or rule-based contravention, nor specify the allegedly defective documents. A vague notice deprived the appellant of an effective opportunity to meet the case against it. The inculpatory statements relied upon for alleging diversion of goods were not supplied, and the appellant was denied an opportunity to cross-examine their makers. Further, although a personal hearing was fixed for a later date, the order-in-original was issued before that hearing and recorded no submissions. The appellate order failed to address these material procedural objections and contained factual confusion regarding the source of the statements.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 129, having been initiated without a specific established contravention and in violation of the principles of natural justice, were unsustainable; the orders imposing tax and penalty were set aside with consequential relief.

Issues: (i) Whether Kerala Water Authority is a "local authority" under section 2(69) of the CGST Act, 2017 and whether the works-contract services supplied to it qualify for GST at 12% rather than 18%; (ii) Whether interest on the differential tax is payable on the portion discharged through the Electronic Credit Ledger.

Issue (i): Whether Kerala Water Authority is a "local authority" under section 2(69) of the CGST Act, 2017 and whether the works-contract services supplied to it qualify for GST at 12% rather than 18%.

Analysis: Section 2(69) contains an exhaustive list of entities qualifying as local authorities for GST purposes. Although section 3 of the Kerala Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1986 deems Kerala Water Authority to be a local authority, it is a statutory body and does not fall within any category enumerated in section 2(69). Its GST registration classification does not alter that statutory position. The amended rate notification excluded works-contract services supplied to governmental authorities from the concessional rate available for supplies to local authorities.

Conclusion: Kerala Water Authority is not a local authority under section 2(69), and works-contract services supplied to it attracted GST at 18% from 01.01.2022. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on the differential tax is payable on the portion discharged through the Electronic Credit Ledger.

Analysis: Differential tax remaining unpaid attracts interest under section 50(1). The differential liability was discharged partly through the Electronic Credit Ledger and partly through the Electronic Cash Ledger; interest was confined to the portion paid through the Electronic Cash Ledger.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the differential tax discharged through the Electronic Cash Ledger, and the interest demand attributable to tax paid through the Electronic Credit Ledger is dropped. This issue is in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Final Conclusion: The concessional GST treatment is unavailable because the recipient is outside the statutory definition of a local authority, while the delayed-payment interest liability is limited to the cash-paid component of the differential tax.

Ratio Decidendi: An entity does not qualify as a local authority for GST merely because a State law so describes it; it must fall within the exhaustive statutory definition applicable under the CGST Act.