Burden of proof in customs confiscation cannot be reopened through reference when the dispute is only over evidence appreciation.

Where goods are not covered by Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Chapter IV-A is not invoked, the Department bears the heavy burden of proving the illicit nature of the import; the Tribunal applied that burden correctly and treated permissibility under OGL only as a supporting factor. The reference applications were then rejected because they sought a fresh evaluation of evidence, which is impermissible in reference proceedings. As no referable question of law arose from disagreement with the Tribunal's factual appreciation, the applications were not entertained.

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Issues: Whether any referable question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and whether the reference applications merely sought reappreciation of evidence.

Analysis: The Tribunal's reasoning showed that it had examined the evidence and applied the settled rule that, where the goods are not covered by Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Chapter IV-A is not invoked, the burden lies heavily on the Department to prove the illicit nature of the import. The order also treated the fact that the goods were permissible under OGL as only one factor strengthening the respondents' case, and the applications were found to seek a fresh evaluation of evidence, which is impermissible in reference proceedings.

Conclusion: No question of law arose for reference, and the reference applications were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference application cannot be used to obtain reappreciation of evidence, and where the Tribunal has applied the correct burden of proof in confiscation matters, no referable question of law arises merely because the applicant disagrees with the factual appreciation.

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