Issues: Whether reassessment-initiation steps could be sustained when the computation and material supporting the alleged undisclosed turnover, and other adverse propositions, were not disclosed before the determination under Section 148A(3).

Analysis: The statutory process requires that the assessee be notified of the definite information and propositions proposed to be relied upon and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond before a determination leading to reassessment proceedings. The notice identified alleged undisclosed turnover, but did not disclose its computation. The response explained that bank credits could not automatically be treated as turnover and offered further particulars. The subsequent determination additionally relied on allegations concerning use of firms for parking or rotating funds, unsecured loans, expenses and accounting practices, none of which formed part of the show-cause notice or was supported by disclosed material. Proceeding without supplying these details would convert reassessment into a roving enquiry. Approval is to be granted after examination of all relevant material.

Conclusion: The impugned reassessment-initiation order, approval and notice could not stand without disclosure of the computation and supporting material and a fresh reasonable opportunity to respond; the matter requires reconsideration in accordance with that process.

Issues: Whether an order treating a case as fit for reassessment under Section 148A(3) and the consequent notice under Section 148 could be sustained without examining the assessee's explanation and supporting material regarding the alleged undisclosed turnover.

Analysis: Section 148A(3) requires consideration of the response and documents furnished before forming an opinion that the case is fit for reassessment. The material explaining that the impugned credits comprised cash deposits, capital transactions, unsecured loans and advances towards land sales required examination to determine whether they constituted business turnover. A bare reference to absence of reconciliation and documentary evidence, without first undertaking that examination and recording cogent reasons, did not meet this requirement.

Conclusion: The order under Section 148A(3) and the consequent notice under Section 148 could not stand and were set aside for fresh consideration after due consideration of the explanation and material furnished.

Issues: Whether the contractor was entitled under Clause 42.1 of the contracts to reimbursement of CGST and SGST paid in relation to the contracted works.

Analysis: Clause 42.1 obligated reimbursement of Central and State sales and other taxes paid by the contractor upon proof of payment. The undisputed GSTR-3B documents established payment of CGST and SGST. The contractual clause remained binding notwithstanding the absence of Part-II of Schedule-A, since that omission was attributable to the department that drafted the agreement. Denial of reimbursement despite proof of payment was arbitrary, illegal and inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which requires fairness in governmental contractual dealings.

Conclusion: The contractor was entitled to reimbursement of the CGST and SGST paid under the subject contracts, with interest at 12% per annum from the respective dates of tax payment.

Issues: (i) Whether the original directors could be summoned to disclose assets under Section 477(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, notwithstanding an earlier order; (ii) Whether fresh e-bidding for Lot No. 1 was required because technical glitches prevented genuine bidders from participating.

Issue (i): Whether the original directors could be summoned to disclose assets under Section 477(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, notwithstanding an earlier order.

Analysis: Section 477(1) empowers the competent forum, after appointment of a provisional liquidator or a winding-up order, to summon persons suspected of possessing company property or capable of providing information concerning its affairs. The earlier order had addressed the request with reference to Section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, without considering Section 477(1). Consequently, the present exercise of power under Section 477(1) was not barred by res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Conclusion: The original directors shall be summoned to disclose, by personal affidavits, their movable and immovable assets, including assets acquired after the debentures were floated.

Issue (ii): Whether fresh e-bidding for Lot No. 1 was required because technical glitches prevented genuine bidders from participating.

Analysis: The acknowledged technical lag on the e-bidding platform had prevented certain bidders from participating. Direct acceptance of an individual bid could prejudice creditors and debenture holders, whereas a fresh bidding process would permit fair participation and protect the liquidation estate.

Conclusion: Fresh e-bidding proceedings for Lot No. 1 shall be initiated within the stipulated period.

Final Conclusion: Asset disclosures from the original directors and a renewed bidding process were directed to safeguard the interests of the company's creditors and debenture holders.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, leaving the petitioner at liberty to pursue the pending application before the NCLT in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether a service-tax demand for the extended period can be sustained solely on Form 26AS and income-tax return data without independent corroborative evidence of taxable services.

Analysis: Service-tax liability cannot be established merely from data received from the Income Tax Department. Form 26AS and income-tax returns do not, by themselves, prove the rendition of taxable services or the taxable value thereof. Independent evidence corroborating the nature of receipts and taxable services is necessary; mechanical reliance on such income-tax data is insufficient.

Conclusion: The demand for the extended period is unsustainable for want of corroborative evidence. Any service tax and interest lawfully payable for the normal period remains recoverable.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on furnace oil used in a captive power plant for generating electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty; and (ii) whether penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on furnace oil used in a captive power plant for generating electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty.

Analysis: Section 2(e) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the CENVAT credit scheme were applied in light of the accepted factual finding that the clinker unit, grinding unit and jetty formed part of the manufacture of the assessee's final products. The electricity generated by the captive power plant was supplied exclusively to those units and was neither sold nor diverted to outsiders. The distance between the units and their separate registration did not affect eligibility. Inputs could be directly used for producing intermediate electricity through a job-work arrangement, and failure to follow the prescribed procedure was only a procedural irregularity that could not defeat the substantive credit benefit.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on furnace oil used to generate electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty was admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were sustainable.

Analysis: Since the assessee was substantively entitled to the disputed CENVAT credit, the foundation for imposing penalty did not survive.

Conclusion: The penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Credit entitlement extends to inputs used for captive generation of electricity consumed in the connected manufacturing units and jetty where the electricity is not sold or diverted outside the manufacturing operations.

Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit cannot be denied for inputs used to generate electricity outside the immediate factory premises when the electricity is captively consumed in manufacturing final products, and a procedural lapse in following job-work formalities does not defeat substantive entitlement.

Issues: Whether an assessment confirming the show-cause proposals without the petitioner having availed a personal hearing warranted setting aside and fresh consideration.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires an effective personal hearing. Although hearing opportunities had been notified, the petitioner could not participate due to ill health and the failure of its consultant to attend the enquiry. The assessment was consequently passed by confirming the show-cause proposals without hearing the petitioner, offending the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment order could not stand and required fresh adjudication after an effective opportunity of personal hearing.

Issues: Whether a final electronic assessment passed without considering the assessee's timely response to the draft assessment order violated the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The assessment was made under the electronic-assessment framework in Sections 143(3), 143(3A) and 143(3B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The record established that the response was uploaded within the stipulated time, acknowledged on the e-filing portal, and confirmed by departmental email. The final assessment nevertheless proceeded on the incorrect premise that no reply had been furnished and made the proposed addition under Section 56(2)(viib). Such non-consideration of a timely response offended the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was vitiated for breach of the principles of natural justice and was set aside.

Issues: Whether reassessment action could be sustained where the order determining fitness for reassessment relied on propositions and material not disclosed in the notice or supplied to the assessee.

Analysis: Section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires that the assessee be informed of the material and propositions forming the basis for deciding whether reassessment proceedings should be initiated and be afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond. Although the initial notice was issued within the limitation under Section 149(1)(b), it only referred to alleged undisclosed turnover based on bank credits. The subsequent order additionally relied upon allegations concerning parking and rotation of funds through firms, unsecured loans, expenses and accounting practices, without disclosing the underlying information or furnishing the computation of the alleged turnover. Proceeding on such undisclosed matters would deny the assessee notice of the case to be met and permit a roving enquiry rather than an enquiry on definite aspects.

Conclusion: The reassessment action based on undisclosed propositions and undisclosed computation could not be sustained; the authorities must furnish the relevant computation and material and provide a reasonable opportunity before reconsidering the matter.

Issues: Whether an order determining the case fit for reassessment could be sustained when the assessee was not furnished the computation underlying the alleged undisclosed turnover or put to notice of further adverse propositions relied upon in the order.

Analysis: The pre-reassessment procedure under Sections 148A(1) and 148A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires meaningful notice and opportunity regarding the material and propositions forming the basis for determining fitness for reassessment under Section 147. The alleged undisclosed turnover was stated to arise from bank credits, but the computation and supporting information were not disclosed despite the assessee seeking those details and offering further clarification. The order additionally relied on propositions concerning parking and rotation of funds through firms, unsecured loans, minimal interest, claimed expenses, and accounting practices, none of which formed part of the show-cause notice. Proceeding on undisclosed material and allegations outside the notice would convert the reassessment exercise into a roving enquiry rather than an enquiry on definite disclosed aspects.

Conclusion: An order under Section 148A(3) based on an undisclosed computation and propositions not notified to the assessee cannot validly determine that the case is fit for reassessment; the assessee must be supplied the relevant material and afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2016-17 could be initiated beyond three years where the income alleged to have escaped assessment was below Rs. 50 lakh.

Analysis: The assessee's documented share in the sale consideration was Rs. 39.19 lakh, and, after allowing indexed cost, the Assessing Officer computed the alleged escaped long-term capital gain at Rs. 37.55 lakh. This amount was below the Rs. 50 lakh threshold under Section 149(1)(b). The assessee's non-response to the initial notices did not relieve the Assessing Officer of the obligation to apply the statutory limitation once the actual alleged escapement became known. The available TDS information and the material furnished during assessment showed that reassessment beyond three years was barred.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation beyond three years was without jurisdiction, since the alleged escaped income was below Rs. 50 lakh; the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) were invalid.

Issues: Validity of the order treating the case as fit for reassessment and the consequential reassessment notice.

Analysis: The statutory process requires the assessing authority to consider the assessee's response and supporting material before recording cogent reasons that the case is fit for reassessment and for issuance of notice. The explanation and bank records specifically identified the disputed credits as loans, capital transactions, debtor receipts, sale proceeds, cash deposits and refund interest. The explanation concerning the capital transaction was reflected in the balance-sheet schedule, but was not considered. Clarification on the perceived absence of an increase in capital or unsecured loans ought to have been sought before treating the credits as unexplained. The approval process was also required to ensure that no appearance of predetermination arose.

Conclusion: The order treating the case as fit for reassessment and the consequential reassessment notice were quashed, with the matter restored for fresh consideration after affording the assessee an opportunity to provide clarification.

Issues: Whether an erstwhile director of a struck-off company has locus standi to maintain an appeal on the company's behalf against the first appellate order.

Analysis: The company was struck off and had not participated before either the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority. The applicable approach permits a pre-emptive assessment of a struck-off company to protect revenue pending restoration of its name; however, an erstwhile director may contest matters concerning personal liability only in proceedings initiated under Section 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: An erstwhile director has no locus standi to maintain the appeal on behalf of the struck-off company. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether road-restoration charges paid by a business entity for permission-driven cutting and restoration of public roads constitute consideration for a taxable supply liable under reverse charge, or are a non-supply or exempt governmental function; (ii) Whether the show-cause notice and refund adjudication were invalid for vagueness, absence of a physical Document Identification Number, or breach of principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether road-restoration charges paid by a business entity for permission-driven cutting and restoration of public roads constitute consideration for a taxable supply liable under reverse charge, or are a non-supply or exempt governmental function.

Analysis: Section 7(1) read with Section 2(31) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covers a planned, request-driven arrangement in which payment is made for a specific restoration activity. The charges were linked to a reciprocal service of restoring roads opened for the business pipeline project, rather than unilateral compensatory damages for a breach or loss. Although road maintenance may fall within functions under Articles 243G and 243W of the Constitution of India, the bespoke repair service supplied to facilitate a private commercial activity was not treated as a sovereign public-welfare function. The non-supply treatment under Section 7(2)(b) and Notification No. 14/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as well as the exemption under Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), were therefore unavailable. Entry 6(d) of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) excludes services supplied by government or local authorities to business entities from the general exemption, while Notification No. 13/2017-Central Tax (Rate) places the tax liability on the recipient under reverse charge. Refund sanctions issued in other jurisdictions were not binding, and no evidence established payment of tax under forward charge for the same transaction.

Conclusion: The road-restoration charges were consideration for a taxable supply, taxable under reverse charge, and were neither a non-supply nor an exempt governmental service; the refund was not admissible. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the show-cause notice and refund adjudication were invalid for vagueness, absence of a physical Document Identification Number, or breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The notice sufficiently identified the factual and legal basis for the proposed refund rejection, and the detailed reply demonstrated that no prejudice or surprise resulted. The application, notice, reply, and orders were issued and recorded through the authenticated electronic GST portal, establishing their source and integrity. Mere absence of a physical Document Identification Number did not invalidate the electronic proceedings or establish a breach of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The proceedings were valid and did not suffer from vagueness, absence of a physical Document Identification Number, or breach of principles of natural justice. The finding is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Payment for a government authority's customised restoration of public roads to enable a business activity remains taxable under the statutory reverse-charge framework, and the refund adjudication is legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A government authority's customised road-restoration service supplied to facilitate a business entity's commercial activity for consideration is a taxable supply under reverse charge, not a sovereign public-welfare function entitled to non-supply treatment or exemption.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening under Section 148 after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was barred where the original assessment under Section 143(3) had been completed and all material facts were fully and truly disclosed; (ii) Whether reopening based on the discrepancy between TDS-certificate receipts and profit-and-loss-account receipts, already examined in the original assessment, was an impermissible change of opinion in the absence of fresh material.

Issue (i): Whether reopening under Section 148 after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was barred where the original assessment under Section 143(3) had been completed and all material facts were fully and truly disclosed.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 147 permits reopening beyond four years after an assessment under Section 143(3) only where escapement resulted from the assessee's failure to make a return or to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The receipt discrepancy had been specifically queried during the original assessment and answered directly. No withheld material fact was identified, and Explanation 1 to Section 147 was inapplicable because the information was not merely embedded in the books but had been specifically addressed.

Conclusion: The reopening notice was barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reopening based on the discrepancy between TDS-certificate receipts and profit-and-loss-account receipts, already examined in the original assessment, was an impermissible change of opinion in the absence of fresh material.

Analysis: The recorded reasons relied exclusively on material available during the original assessment, when the same receipt discrepancy was examined and accepted. Section 147 does not permit a review or reassessment through a subsequent reappraisal of material already considered; reopening requires fresh tangible material supporting a reason to believe that income escaped assessment.

Conclusion: The reopening was founded on a mere change of opinion and was invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory jurisdiction to initiate reassessment was absent, rendering the impugned reassessment initiation legally unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment was completed after full and true disclosure, reassessment beyond four years requires a failure of disclosure by the assessee and cannot rest merely on a fresh appraisal of material already examined.

Issues: Whether time-bound directions should issue for passing consequential orders pursuant to appellate decisions, and whether interim protection against recovery of the credited refund should continue pending adjudication.

Analysis: The revenue's schedule identified matters in which the time for consequential orders had expired, was to expire by 31 January 2027, or remained available until 31 March 2028. Timelines were prescribed for each group. The petitioner's contention that consequential orders in the first group were time-barred and that refund should consequently follow the returned income was expressly kept open.

Outcome: Timelines were directed for consequential orders, the interim protection against recovery of the refund was continued, and the petition was listed for further hearing without final adjudication of the refund-recovery challenge or limitation objection.

Issues: Whether, pending disposal of the first appeal and grant of stay, the Revenue could retain recoveries and refund adjustments exceeding 20% of the disputed demand.

Analysis: The applicable CBDT instruction and office memoranda standardised 20% of the disputed demand as the amount recoverable as a condition for stay pending the first appeal. The aggregate payments and adjustments made against the disputed demand exceeded that limit, notwithstanding the pending appeal, stay application, and subsequent stay order. The Revenue accepted that recovery or adjustment was required to be confined to 20%.

Conclusion: Recovery was restricted to 20% of the disputed demand, and the excess amount of Rs. 5,17,79,298 was directed to be refunded within four weeks.

Issues: Whether failure to record satisfaction for initiating penalty under section 271D for an alleged contravention of section 269SS rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, permitting revision under section 263.

Analysis: Revision under section 263 requires coexistence of an erroneous assessment order and prejudice to the Revenue. A contravention of section 269SS gives rise to an independent penalty consequence under section 271D and does not, by itself, affect computation of taxable income or tax liability. Under the statutory regime applicable to the relevant assessment year, penalty proceedings under section 271D were within the competence of the Joint Commissioner, and the assessment and penalty proceedings operated in separate statutory fields. The omission to record satisfaction in the assessment order could not, without more, constitute an error in that assessment.

Analysis: Penalty under section 271D is governed by the independent limitation under section 275(1)(c). Revision under section 263 cannot be used to create a fresh foundation for penalty proceedings or to circumvent the statutory limitation. Further, the alleged cash transactions were disputed in the quantum appeal, and the applicability of section 269SS was not free from doubt. In the presence of divergent judicial views, non-initiation of penalty represented a plausible view and could not be revised unless shown to be unsustainable in law.

Conclusion: The omission to record satisfaction or initiate penalty under section 271D did not render the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Section 263 could not be invoked to initiate or revive the independent penalty proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the 77-day delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned on sufficient cause; (ii) Whether a notice under Section 148 dated 12.04.2022 for Assessment Year 2015-16 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b).

Issue (i): Whether the 77-day delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned on sufficient cause.

Analysis: Medical documentation established that the family member responsible for attending to the assessee's legal affairs was incapacitated during the relevant period. The explanation was found to constitute sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under Section 148 dated 12.04.2022 for Assessment Year 2015-16 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b).

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2015-16, the limitation available under the pre-amendment regime expired six years after the end of the assessment year, on 31.03.2022. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) preserves that restriction for earlier assessment years. The fifth and sixth provisos regulate exclusion or extension in computing the amended three-year or ten-year limits and cannot extend the restriction imposed by the first proviso. The notice issued on 12.04.2022 was therefore beyond the surviving limitation period.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the notice under Section 148 was time-barred, invalid, and vitiated the consequential reassessment order.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment for Assessment Year 2015-16 could not be sustained because the jurisdictional notice was issued after expiry of the applicable limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: For assessment years covered by the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b), the earlier six-year limitation remains an absolute restriction on issuance of a reassessment notice and cannot be enlarged through the fifth or sixth provisos.