Issues: (i) Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate; (ii) Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms; and (iii) Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Issue (i): Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate.

Analysis: Sections 446(2)(b) and 446(2)(d), read with Section 456 of the Companies Act, 1956, empower the Company Court to take custody of property to which the company appears entitled and to determine the consequential question of title. The earlier determination of jurisdiction had attained finality and had not been disturbed in appeal.

Conclusion: The Company Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the paintings for purposes of the winding-up.

Issue (ii): Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms.

Analysis: The asset register, purchase vouchers, seizure record, police affidavits and gallery confirmation furnished a coherent and corroborated basis to identify the five paintings as company assets. The applicable standard was preponderance of probabilities. The rival claimant, despite repeated opportunities, adduced no evidence of title and declined to enter the witness box, warranting an adverse inference. The family consent terms concerned possession and enjoyment among family members, covered only the art then in dispute, and neither bound the company nor established title against it.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings form part of the liquidation estate, and the rival claim to them fails. No determination of title is made in respect of the remaining paintings.

Issue (iii): Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Analysis: Works of art require a specialised sale mechanism rather than a routine asset-auction platform. Engagement of an art expert and an appropriate art auction house would promote value maximisation and price discovery for the liquidation estate.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings may be sold through an expert-assisted art-auction process formulated by the Official Liquidator and the appointed expert.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate is entitled to realise the five identified assets for satisfaction of stakeholder claims, while competing claims concerning the remaining paintings are preserved for separate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In winding-up, the Company Court may determine title to property appearing to belong to the company on a preponderance of probabilities based on reliable corporate records and corroborative material, particularly where a rival claimant fails to substantiate title.

Issues: Whether the impugned properties could be retained under attachment as proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Sections 2(u), 2(1)(y), and 3 require property alleged to be proceeds of crime to have a demonstrable nexus with criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The payments received under the debenture subscription agreements, consultancy arrangements, and dairy-business sale arrangement were independent commercial transactions. Significant payments preceded the relevant bank disbursement, and no material established a link between the later payments and any alleged criminal proceeds. Official banking investments and loans, without material showing illegality or diversion, could not by themselves be treated as proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The amounts and the attached properties were not shown to constitute proceeds of crime; continuation of the attachment was unwarranted.

Issues: Whether cash receipts recorded in the regular books as collections from identified business debtors could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69A applies where money is established to be unexplained. The disputed receipts were recorded in the regular books and were supported by party-wise ledgers, identified debtor particulars, audited accounts, sales and purchase registers, stock records and VAT returns. No defect was identified in the underlying business records, the books were not rejected, and no independent verification was undertaken from the identified parties. The absence of debtor confirmations alone could not displace the documentary evidence or establish unexplained money. Acceptance of Specified Bank Notes during demonetisation, without contrary material connecting the receipts to undisclosed income, also did not establish an unexplained source. Suspicion could not substitute proof.

Conclusion: The receipts were not established to be unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification; (ii) Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification.

Analysis: Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to investments whose nature and source remain unexplained, while section 115BBE governs their taxation. The difference between the recorded cost of intangible assets and the supporting documents produced could not be determined without examining the books of account, invoices, agreements, ledgers, payment records, salary records, and evidence concerning software customisation and development. The depreciation disallowance was consequential to the addition.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained investment and the consequential depreciation disallowance are remitted for fresh verification and adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Analysis: Verification was required by comparing the original and revised returns, the intimation under section 143(1), the computation of income, tax audit report, and assessment order to ascertain whether the disputed expenses had already been disallowed and whether the assessment duplicated those disallowances.

Conclusion: The computation issue is remitted for verification and fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The disputed additions and computation adjustments must be reconsidered on verification of the relevant records after providing a reasonable opportunity to furnish supporting evidence and explanations.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption; (ii) Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, read with paragraphs 2.17(a) and 11.11 of the Handbook of Procedures, 2023, defines the date of import by reference to shipment or dispatch from the supplying country. For air imports, the relevant Airway Bill evidencing departure from the last airport in the exporting country is determinative. The Bill of Entry or out-of-charge date is relevant under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 for determining the rate of customs duty, but does not govern the applicability of an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy.

Conclusion: The relevant date of import for the import-policy restriction is the shipment or dispatch date determined under the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures, not the post-notification Bill of Entry or clearance date. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Analysis: A notification acquires legal force only upon its electronic Gazette publication and cannot operate retrospectively without statutory authority. The restrictive notification could therefore operate only prospectively and could not affect goods already dispatched and arrived before publication. Its clauses excluding transitional arrangements did not alter this position. A subsequent executive memorandum lacked statutory force and could neither override the policy-defined date of import nor retrospectively expand the notification's application; conditional import authorisations did not redress that entitlement.

Conclusion: No. The restrictive notification is inapplicable to goods dispatched and arrived before its electronic Gazette publication, notwithstanding subsequent filing of Bills of Entry. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Goods whose shipment or dispatch predates the effective publication of a restrictive import-policy amendment remain governed by the pre-existing import policy, and that position cannot be altered through a subsequent executive clarification.

Ratio Decidendi: For import restrictions under the Foreign Trade Policy, the policy-defined shipment or dispatch date governs the date of import; the customs clearance date applicable to duty assessment and an executive clarification cannot retrospectively vary that policy framework.

Issues: Whether cognizance for an alleged contravention of Section 217(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: At the cognizance stage, scrutiny is confined to the complaint and supporting material for determining whether a prima facie case exists; defence material and explanations cannot be evaluated through a mini-trial. The complaint and supporting documents disclosed allegations of non-cooperation with the investigation, and the cognizance order reflected application of mind to that material.

Conclusion: The cognizance and issuance of process for the alleged offence under Section 217(4), punishable under Section 217(6), of the Companies Act, 2013 were not liable to be quashed.

Outcome: The application for condonation of delay was rejected and the special leave petition was dismissed as time barred.

Issues: Whether draft and final assessment orders passed without granting the requested personal hearing through video conferencing were valid.

Analysis: Section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 incorporates the principles of natural justice in faceless assessment and contemplates a personal hearing through video conferencing where requested. The requested facility could not be availed owing to technical glitches and not due to any default of the assessee; yet the draft assessment order was passed without providing the requested hearing.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order and consequential final assessment order were invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the consequential assessment, demand and penalty notices issued against a company dissolved before issuance of the reassessment notice were valid.

Analysis: The company stood dissolved under Section 302(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 before the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued. Dissolution ended its existence as a juristic person. A valid notice under Section 148 is the foundation for assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147; therefore, no reassessment could be initiated or completed against the dissolved entity. Framing an assessment against a non-existent entity is a substantive jurisdictional illegality and not a procedural defect capable of cure under Section 292B.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 and all consequential reassessment proceedings, assessment order, demand notice and penalty notice were void and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interim protection against suspension of the appellant's operations was warranted pending the contemplated inquiry.

Analysis: A strong prima facie case for interim relief was found. The suspension was prima facie not warranted pending inquiry, and the prescribed timeline under Regulation 11(3) appeared not to have been complied with. The merits of any pending inquiry were directed to remain uninfluenced by the impugned appellate order.

Outcome: The appeal was admitted on substantial questions of law, and interim stay was granted against the suspension order and consequential public notice pending inquiry.

Issues: (i) Whether owners of seized gold sold without prior notice under Section 150(1) are, if successful in the confiscation proceedings, entitled to its fair market value on the date of release rather than the sale proceeds received by Revenue; (ii) Whether the value of the gold should be released immediately against bank guarantees while Revenue's statutory appeal remains pending.

Issue (i): Whether owners of seized gold sold without prior notice under Section 150(1) are, if successful in the confiscation proceedings, entitled to its fair market value on the date of release rather than the sale proceeds received by Revenue.

Analysis: Section 150(1) mandates prior intimation to the owner before disposal of seized gold. That requirement was admittedly not followed. Revenue cannot rely on the amount realised in the 2021 sale where the owners were deprived of the statutory prior-notice protection.

Conclusion: If the petitioners succeed in the confiscation proceedings, they are entitled to the fair market value of the gold as on the date of the appellate decision directing release, and not merely the historical sale proceeds. Revenue cannot re-agitate this valuation issue before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Issue (ii): Whether the value of the gold should be released immediately against bank guarantees while Revenue's statutory appeal remains pending.

Analysis: A departmental appeal under Section 129D(2) against the order declining confiscation remains pending. The merits of that appeal, including the objections concerning abatement and confiscation, were left for the appellate authority. An expedited determination with procedural safeguards was regarded as sufficient to balance the parties' interests.

Conclusion: The request for immediate disbursement against bank guarantees is rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) must determine the departmental appeal on or before 31 December 2026, following which the prescribed conditional payment directions will apply.

Final Conclusion: Disposal of seized gold without the mandated prior notice fixes the applicable valuation, upon the owners' eventual success, at the prevailing fair market value rather than the amount realised on sale; the unresolved confiscation dispute remains for appellate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized gold is disposed of without the statutory prior notice required to its owner, the owner who ultimately succeeds is entitled to its fair market value at the time release becomes due, rather than the historical sale realisation.

Issues: Whether an importer's written acceptance of enhanced assessable value prevents it from challenging the reassessment, and whether declared transaction value may be rejected solely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data without compliance with the prescribed valuation requirements.

Analysis: Under Section 17(5), an importer's written acceptance of reassessment relieves the proper officer only from issuing a speaking order; it does not waive or extinguish the statutory right to challenge the reassessment. Rejection of declared transaction value under Section 14 and Rule 12(2) requires formation and communication of reasonable doubt regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared value. The acceptance letters did not disclose the alleged contemporaneous-import data or furnish independent material supporting rejection of the declared value. Reassessment based solely on NIDB data, without cogent corroborative evidence and compliance with the sequential valuation rules, is unsustainable.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of enhanced value did not preclude the importer from contesting reassessment, and the enhancement of value without compliance with the mandatory customs-valuation requirements was unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether an importer's written acceptance of reassessment waives the statutory right to challenge enhancement of declared value; (ii) Whether transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with valuation rules.

Issue (i): Whether an importer's written acceptance of reassessment waives the statutory right to challenge enhancement of declared value.

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 confines the consequence of written acceptance of reassessment to dispensing with a speaking order. Such acceptance does not amount to abandonment of the statutory right to question the proper officer's formation of opinion or the merits of reassessment. Rule 12(2) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 does not contemplate waiver of that substantive right.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of enhanced value does not bar the importer from challenging reassessment; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with valuation rules.

Analysis: Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Rule 12(2) requires formation and communication of reasonable doubt regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared transaction value before proceeding to valuation under the sequential rules. Enhancement founded solely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data requires independent, cogent and justiciable material. An acceptance letter lacking particulars of comparable imports does not establish compliance with those requirements.

Conclusion: Rejection of transaction value and enhancement solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an unsupported acceptance letter, without compliance with the valuation framework, is unsustainable; decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory right to contest reassessment remains intact, and any departure from declared transaction value must rest on communicated reasons and verifiable material satisfying the customs valuation framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Written acceptance under Section 17(5) only dispenses with a speaking order and does not extinguish the statutory right to challenge reassessment; enhancement of declared value must comply with the mandatory requirements governing rejection of transaction value and cannot rest solely on uncorroborated external data.

Issues: Whether an ex parte assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the scheduled hearing date and no notice of the subsequent hearing date was served.

Analysis: In exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the validity of an assessment order issued under Section 73 of the GST Act was tested against the principles of natural justice. Where the authority neither decides the matter on the fixed date nor communicates the next date of hearing, an ex parte order results from denial of a fair opportunity of personal hearing.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice and was set aside, with a direction for fresh hearing and a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Issues: Validity of the general penalty imposed under Section 125 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, after the return was filed, tax liability discharged and late fee paid.

Analysis: The return had already been furnished, the applicable late fee had been paid, and the aggregate penalty of Rs. 50,000 exceeded the maximum limit prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable for exceeding the statutory maximum, and the impugned show-cause notice and penalty order were set aside.

Issues: Whether the generation of three digitally signed personal-hearing notices on the same date, bearing different numbers and fixing different hearing dates and times, required scrutiny of the State Tax portal and notice-generation process.

Analysis: The three notices were issued and digitally signed within minutes of each other while specifying separate dates and times for personal hearing. This was treated as a serious system lacuna capable of permitting manipulation. A report on the portal functioning and the process enabling such notices was directed from the Chief Commissioner of State Tax, and a fresh appellate order was directed.

Outcome: Report and fresh appellate order directed; matter listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2018-19, issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year with approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, was valid under the applicable reassessment regime.

Analysis: Under Sections 148, 148A and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, prior approval for issuing a reassessment notice is required from the authority specified in Section 151(ii), namely the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The notice dated 02.04.2022 was issued after the three-year period for Assessment Year 2018-19 had expired, but approval was obtained only from the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax. No extension of time for replying to the Section 148A(b) notice had been sought, and therefore exclusion of such time for limitation purposes was inapplicable. A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition does not attract the doctrine of merger or affirm the reasoning of the High Court.

Conclusion: The notice issued without sanction from the authority prescribed by Section 151(ii) was invalid; consequently, the reassessment lacked valid jurisdiction and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the final assessment order passed after DRP directions was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the MLI or its underlying spirit could be invoked to determine PE for assessment year 2020-21; and (iii) Whether the alleged PE and the 30% profit attribution could be sustained on the existing record.

Issue (i): Whether the final assessment order passed after DRP directions was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The retrospective amendment clarified that the limitation under Section 153 governs the passing of the draft assessment order, whereas the final assessment order following DRP directions is governed by Section 144C.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was not time-barred. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the MLI or its underlying spirit could be invoked to determine PE for assessment year 2020-21.

Analysis: The relevant MLI provisions were admittedly inapplicable to the assessment year. The existence of a PE must therefore be determined strictly under Article 5 of the India-United Kingdom Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement applicable for that year.

Conclusion: Neither the MLI nor its underlying spirit can be invoked to determine PE for the relevant year. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged PE and the 30% profit attribution could be sustained on the existing record.

Analysis: Determination of a dependent-agent PE requires examination of the actual contractual arrangements and conduct, including control over pricing, credit risk, contractual obligations, performance responsibility, and the Indian entity's role in soliciting, negotiating, securing and processing orders. Fixed-place and service PE require separate satisfaction of their respective treaty conditions; the Revenue bears the burden of establishing a PE. Acceptance of an earlier assessment concerning another group entity does not create an estoppel for the relevant year. If a PE is found, profit attribution must follow a functions, assets and risks analysis. Arm's-length remuneration does not determine PE existence, but may eliminate further attribution where it fully captures the relevant functions and risks; ad hoc attribution is impermissible.

Conclusion: The PE issue and related profit attribution were remitted for fresh treaty-compliant determination; no final finding on PE or attributable profits was made. In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Final Conclusion: The limitation challenge fails, while the PE inquiry and any profit attribution must be redetermined independently under the applicable treaty, without reliance on the MLI or an ad hoc percentage of receipts.

Ratio Decidendi: PE existence and resultant profit attribution must be determined independently for each year under the applicable treaty on the actual functions, assets, risks and conduct of the parties, and cannot rest on inapplicable MLI principles, prior group assessments or ad hoc attribution.

Issues: (i) Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act. (ii) Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) excludes mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 from business-expense deduction. That exclusion operates only in computing business income and does not bar an independent statutory deduction under Chapter VI-A where the payment otherwise qualifies as a donation under Section 80G.

Conclusion: Donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure were eligible for deduction under Section 80G, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction requires both an erroneous assessment order and prejudice to the interests of the Revenue. The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer sought particulars and supporting documents for Chapter VI-A deductions under Section 142(1), and the assessee furnished donation details and receipts. The claim was thus examined with application of mind. A different view on the deduction did not render the assessment erroneous.

Conclusion: The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; revision under Section 263 was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary order was quashed and the assessment allowing the Section 80G deduction for the qualifying corporate social responsibility donations remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an assessment, after inquiry and application of mind, adopts the legally sustainable view that disallowance of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 37(1) does not bar a qualifying Section 80G deduction.

Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the income declared in the original return and processed under Section 143(1) remained unchanged in reassessment without any addition or disallowance.

Analysis: Section 270A(2)(a) requires a comparison between the assessed income and the income determined on processing of the return to establish under-reporting. The original return disclosed income of Rs. 45,83,888, which was accepted on processing under Section 143(1). The same income was returned in response to reassessment proceedings and was ultimately accepted without any variation. The statutory conditions for treating the entire returned income as under-reported were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 270A was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.