Issues: Whether dismissal of the application to recall the ex parte order on the ground of delay was justified where the application was filed pursuant to liberty granted by the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: The recall jurisdiction over an ex parte procedural order must be exercised consistently with procedural fairness. The earlier application had mistakenly sought recall of the subsequent order rather than the original ex parte order; nevertheless, the reply had been taken on record and the subsequent application was filed pursuant to express liberty granted on 19.02.2026. Treating that application as considerably delayed adopted a hyper-technical approach, particularly as the substantive proceeding remained pending.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the appellant; the delay-based rejection could not be sustained, the ex parte order was recalled to the extent concerning the appellant, and the appellant was permitted to contest the pending proceeding.

Issues: (i) Whether Psyllium seeds procured through APMC/KUMS and later supplied without additional processing qualify as "fresh" seeds exempt under Entry No. 87 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025; (ii) Whether the Psyllium seeds qualify as goods of seed quality exempt under Entry No. 77 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025; (iii) Correct tariff classification and GST rate applicable to the Psyllium seeds.

Issue (i): Whether Psyllium seeds procured through APMC/KUMS and later supplied without additional processing qualify as "fresh" seeds exempt under Entry No. 87 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: The exemption under Entry No. 87 applies only where goods of heading 1211 are fresh or chilled at the time of supply by the supplier. Applying the distinction between fresh and dried produce stated in Circular No. 163/19/2021-GST, and the common parlance understanding of fresh agricultural produce, the Authority treated storage in a dry ventilated godown, without evidence of the duration or condition of storage, as imparting a dried character to the seeds. The condition of the goods at the subsequent supply stage, rather than at procurement from cultivators, was treated as determinative.

Conclusion: No. The seeds are not fresh Psyllium seeds eligible for exemption under Entry No. 87; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Psyllium seeds qualify as goods of seed quality exempt under Entry No. 77 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: Entry No. 77 exempts goods of seed quality under Chapter 12, while Entry No. 87 specifically addresses Psyllium seeds under heading 1211 when supplied fresh or chilled. Having found that the goods supplied were dried and did not satisfy the fresh-or-chilled condition, the Authority rejected the alternative claim under Entry No. 77.

Conclusion: No. The seeds do not qualify for exemption as goods of seed quality under Entry No. 77; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Correct tariff classification and GST rate applicable to the Psyllium seeds.

Analysis: Psyllium seeds are specifically enumerated under tariff item 1211 90 13 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. As the seeds supplied were held to be dried and are used in pharmacy, they fall within Entry No. 71 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, covering dried plants and parts of plants of heading 1211.

Conclusion: Psyllium seeds are classifiable under tariff item 1211 90 13 and taxable at 5% GST under Entry No. 71; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Psyllium seeds supplied after storage in the stated conditions are treated as dried goods under heading 1211 and attract GST at 5% rather than exemption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where competing GST entries distinguish fresh or chilled goods from dried goods, taxability is determined by the condition of the goods at the time of supply, and goods treated as dried cannot claim the exemption reserved for fresh or chilled goods.

Issues: (i) Whether reduction of the penalties imposed for collecting service tax but failing to deposit it was sustainable; (ii) Whether remand for determination of the correct assessable value of housekeeping services was warranted; and (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether reduction of the penalties imposed for collecting service tax but failing to deposit it was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty for delayed payment of tax is a civil consequence, and mens rea need not be separately established where the statutory default is proved. The admissions under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 that service tax had been collected but not remitted constituted substantive evidence. Customs officers are not police officers, the inquiry is deemed a judicial proceeding, and no contemporaneous retraction displacing the admissions was shown. The deliberate non-remittance established evasion.

Conclusion: The reduction in penalties was unsustainable, and the original penalty determination was restored. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether remand for determination of the correct assessable value of housekeeping services was warranted.

Analysis: Taxability of the housekeeping services was not disputed. The assessable value required verification from the underlying invoices, particularly when there was no allegation that invoices were not issued or that their declared values were incorrect. No material was shown to displace the direction for verification and re-determination.

Conclusion: Remand for fresh determination of the assessable value of housekeeping services was justified. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable.

Analysis: Collection of service tax followed by deliberate failure to remit it, together with the admissions made during investigation, constituted wilful suppression with intent to evade payment of tax. Such conduct satisfied the conditions for invoking the extended period of limitation.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The original penalty determination remains operative; valuation of housekeeping services requires re-determination on invoice material, while extended-period recovery is sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Deliberate collection and non-remittance of service tax constitutes wilful suppression with intent to evade, supporting statutory penalties and invocation of the extended period.

Issues: Whether an adverse GST adjudication order could be sustained without affording the assessee an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 mandates an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. It was undisputed that no personal hearing had been granted before the impugned order was made. The established application of the provision required the adjudication to conform to principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adverse order could not be sustained without a personal hearing; fresh proceedings may be undertaken only after affording the assessee due opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the BPO segment of Datamatics Financial Services Ltd. was a reliable comparable under TNMM despite unverified allocation of common expenses; (ii) Whether the ITeS segments of Accentia Technologies Ltd. could be retained as comparable despite its separate software-development activity.

Issue (i): Whether the BPO segment of Datamatics Financial Services Ltd. was a reliable comparable under TNMM despite unverified allocation of common expenses.

Analysis: Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits collection of information from a proposed comparable, but the source of the information does not itself establish the reliability of segmental profitability. Under TNMM, where the OP/OC margin is applied as the Profit Level Indicator, reliable allocation of operating costs to the relevant segment is essential. Certain common operating expenses reflected in entity-level accounts were not allocated to the BPO segment, without any demonstrated allocation basis. This could understate segmental costs and overstate the margin. Earlier findings concerning improper allocation of common expenses for the same assessment year reinforced the unreliability of the segmental data for comparability analysis.

Conclusion: The BPO segment was rightly excluded from the final set of comparables; the conclusion is against Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the ITeS segments of Accentia Technologies Ltd. could be retained as comparable despite its separate software-development activity.

Analysis: Functional comparability is determined by the activity or segment whose financial results are used for benchmarking. The software-development segment was excluded from the comparison, while only the relevant ITeS segments were used. No material established that the retained segments themselves involved software-development activity or were otherwise functionally dissimilar. The presence of a different activity at the entity level does not, by itself, invalidate a comparable where distinct and functionally comparable segmental results are available.

Conclusion: The relevant ITeS segments were rightly retained as comparable; the conclusion is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing treatment excluding the unreliable BPO segment comparable and retaining the separately identified ITeS segment comparable remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Information obtained under Section 133(6) may be used for transfer-pricing benchmarking only when the relevant segmental financial data, including allocation of common operating expenses, reliably reflects that segment's profitability.

Issues: Whether diary notings of advances, surrendered in a statement recorded during search, constituted undisclosed income within the Explanation to section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to attract penalty under section 271AAB(1)(a).

Analysis: Penalty under section 271AAB is chargeable only upon income satisfying its exhaustive statutory definition of undisclosed income. As a penal provision, it requires strict construction, and the Assessing Officer must independently establish and record that the amount falls within that definition; a search-statement admission or surrender alone is insufficient. The diary contained vague notings of advances without particulars of the parties, dates, purpose, terms, corroborative transactions, matching undisclosed assets, or an identified source of unaccounted earnings. Advances represent an application or outflow of funds, whereas the statutory definition requires income represented by an unrecorded inflow, asset, entry, or transaction found during search. The deeming provisions concerning unexplained income could not be imported into section 271AAB, which contains its own self-contained definition.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the sum of Rs. 14,15,00,000 reflected in the diary notings did not constitute undisclosed income under section 271AAB, and the penalty relating to that amount was rightly deleted.

Issues: Whether the appellants were liable to penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 for their involvement in smuggling concealed gold and cigarettes, and whether the quantum of penalty warranted reduction.

Analysis: The unsubstantiated claim that one appellant had retracted his statement was rejected. The evidence was not confined to statements of a co-noticee: the statements of the customs broker, transporter, operational personnel and driver consistently connected both appellants with control of the importer's affairs, and those witnesses maintained their position on cross-examination. Financial transactions, advances, control of the importer's bank account, coordination of customs clearance and transportation, and an email concerning movement of the containers independently corroborated their involvement. Statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were admissible, and the opportunity for cross-examination satisfied the requirement of natural justice. The evidence established that both appellants controlled the importing entity and participated in the smuggling activity. Although the penalty was legally sustainable, the original amount was found excessive in the overall circumstances.

Conclusion: The appellants were liable to penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962; the penalty on each appellant was reduced from Rs. 2 crore to Rs. 15 lakh.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for abetment of customs smuggling may be sustained where cross-examined witness statements are corroborated by independent documentary evidence, notwithstanding a belated and unsubstantiated retraction.

Issues: Whether the assertion that proceedings under Rule 88C had concluded upon acceptance of the response required determination before adjudication under Section 73 could be sustained.

Analysis: The asserted culmination of the Rule 88C process had not been verified or examined. A response setting out the relevant details was required to determine whether that process had concluded in the petitioner's favour and, if so, its effect on the sustainability of the Section 73 proceedings.

Outcome: The adjudication order was quashed and the matter was restored for reconsideration.

Issues: Whether the deletion of addition for alleged unexplained cash deposits under Section 69A was justified.

Analysis: Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies where the assessee fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nature and source of money. The assessee explained that cash deposited during demonetisation represented business cash, including advances returned by agents engaged for paddy procurement. The explanation was supported by the cash book, financial statements, details of agents and comparative cash-deposit figures. The books of account were not rejected, and the available agents were not examined beyond one agent, whose statement supported the stated business practice. The Tribunal's factual finding that the source stood explained was therefore neither infirm nor perverse, and raised no substantial question of law under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were satisfactorily explained; no addition under Section 69A was warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Section 9 application was maintainable where the claimed outcome-based professional fee was subject to a genuine pre-existing dispute concerning its crystallisation, contractual entitlement and enforceability.

Analysis: Under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, an application cannot be admitted where the corporate debtor demonstrates a plausible pre-existing dispute requiring further investigation rather than a patently feeble or moonshine defence. Contemporaneous correspondence and invoice rejections showed that entitlement to the success fee, the meaning of contractual success, and the effect of pending GST proceedings had been disputed before the statutory demand notice. The GST order forming a substantial basis of the claimed fee had also been set aside, and questions regarding the capacity in which professional services were rendered and the permissibility of an outcome-based fee under the applicable regulatory framework required adjudication beyond the limited Section 9 jurisdiction.

Conclusion: A genuine and bona fide pre-existing dispute existed, and the claimed operational debt was not established as an undisputed crystallised debt capable of admission under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on countervailing duty paid at the concessional rate under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Rule 3(1)(vii) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 permits credit of additional duty levied under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, where such duty is equivalent to the specified excise duty. The concessional rate of countervailing duty was prescribed through an exemption issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The reduced 2% countervailing duty paid under the Customs notification remained duty equivalent to the applicable excise duty for purposes of Rule 3(1)(vii). The restriction associated with Notification No. 12/2012-Central Excise dated 17.03.2012 did not apply to credit of countervailing duty paid under the separate Customs notification.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of the 2% countervailing duty paid under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012 is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a works contractor is entitled to reimbursement from the State of the differential GST liability incurred due to the introduction of the GST regime during the currency of the contract.

Analysis: The introduction of GST replaced the earlier VAT regime and imposed an additional tax burden in relation to the works contract. The recipient of the works contract service is liable to bear the differential tax attributable to the introduction of GST. Having discharged that differential liability, the contractor acquired a corresponding right to reimbursement, subject to verification of the relevant records and calculations.

Conclusion: The contractor is entitled to determination and reimbursement by the State authorities of the differential GST liability attributable to the introduction of the GST regime.

Issues: Whether, for a non-searched person, the six- and ten-assessment-year block under the search-assessment regime is to be computed from the date of the original search or from the date on which the seized material is received by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The First Proviso to Section 153C(1) creates a deeming fiction concerning the date of search for a non-searched person. Although a literal reading of the post-2017 provisions was viewed as supporting computation from the actual date of search, the jurisdictional High Court had authoritatively ruled that the commencement point for computing both the six-year block and the extended ten-year block is the date of receipt or handover of seized books, documents or assets by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over that other person. Judicial discipline required adherence to that binding precedent, which had not been stayed notwithstanding the pendency of a challenge before the Supreme Court. The satisfaction note and notice having been issued in financial year 2021-22, the relevant assessment year was 2022-23; the ten-year period under Explanation 1 to Section 153A(1) consequently extended only from assessment year 2013-14 to assessment year 2022-23.

Conclusion: Assessment year 2012-13 lay outside the permissible ten-year block under Section 153C read with Section 153A; therefore, the assessment for that year could not be sustained. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee, with both parties bound by the outcome of the pending Supreme Court proceedings concerning the governing precedent.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order was invalid for failure to afford the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing as required by law.

Analysis: The last three hearing dates were not intimated to the petitioner through the common portal, a fact not disputed by the revenue. The mandatory requirement of personal hearing under Section 75(4) was therefore not complied with.

Conclusion: The statutory requirement of personal hearing was breached, and the petitioner was entitled to fresh adjudication after adequate advance notice of hearing.

Issues: Whether the claim for deduction under Section 10AA required fresh merits adjudication following the earlier directions concerning Form 56F.

Analysis: The earlier direction to consider the manually filed Form 56F had attained finality and could not be reopened in these proceedings. Since the assessee had not complied before the Assessing Officer and no remand report had been obtained by the appellate authority, verification of the deduction claim and supporting evidence was required afresh.

Outcome: The matters were remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication of the deduction claim.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for alleged variation in proprietor's capital account could be sustained; (ii) Whether alleged cash on-money payment for immovable property was taxable under section 69A; (iii) Whether aggregate sundry creditors could be treated as unexplained cash credits under section 68; and (iv) Whether recorded sundry debtors could be taxed as unexplained income.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for alleged variation in proprietor's capital account could be sustained.

Analysis: The corrected opening capital was directly traceable to the accepted closing capital of the preceding assessment year. The figure relied upon for the addition was only an intermediate reconciled balance and was improperly compared with an erroneous figure in the originally filed balance sheet. An opening balance is not current-year income unless a fresh unexplained accretion or transaction during the relevant year is identified. A demonstrable accounting error may be corrected in assessment proceedings where supported by records.

Conclusion: The alleged capital difference was not unexplained income of the relevant year; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged cash on-money payment for immovable property was taxable under section 69A.

Analysis: The registered instrument recorded the consideration, while the alleged additional payment rested on a vendor's subsequently retracted statement and cash deposits in vendor-side bank accounts. No receipt, cash trail, source or availability of cash, or other independent material connected the assessee with the alleged payment. Third-party deposits without a connecting nexus do not establish payment by the purchaser. Further, the statutory condition under section 69A that the assessee be found owner of unexplained money was absent. The deletion of the corresponding receipt-side addition in the co-vendor's case reinforced the evidentiary deficiency.

Conclusion: The alleged on-money payment was not proved and section 69A was inapplicable; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether aggregate sundry creditors could be treated as unexplained cash credits under section 68.

Analysis: Section 68 requires identification of a sum credited during the relevant previous year; an aggregate closing balance cannot automatically be treated as a current-year credit. The creditor balance comprised an internal appropriation, a brought-forward rent advance, and a chit liability. The opening balances were outside the scope of section 68 for the year. The chit liability arose from identified contractual chit transactions supported by third-party ledger accounts and banking channels, without material showing that the creditor or transactions were fictitious. An unpaid contractual liability does not become unexplained income merely because it remains outstanding.

Conclusion: The sundry creditor balance was not taxable under section 68; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether recorded sundry debtors could be taxed as unexplained income.

Analysis: Sundry debtors are debit balances and receivables recorded as assets, whereas section 68 applies only to sums credited in the books. Section 69 likewise did not apply because the balances were recorded in the accounts and were not unrecorded investments. Doubts about confirmations, recoverability, source, or business purpose of individual advances do not by themselves create taxable income. No specific unexplained advance, corresponding credit, suppressed receipt, or unrecorded investment was identified.

Conclusion: Recorded sundry debtors could not be taxed as unexplained income under sections 68 or 69; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The four additions lacked the statutory foundation and evidentiary support required to treat the respective balance-sheet items or alleged property payment as taxable income.

Ratio Decidendi: A deeming addition requires proof of the statutory jurisdictional facts in the relevant year; a brought-forward balance, explained contractual liability, recorded debit balance, or uncorroborated allegation cannot be taxed merely because its documentation is considered insufficient.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be released on bail after filing of the charge-sheet.

Analysis: The charge-sheet had been filed, and no further custodial interrogation was required. The petitioner had remained in custody for nearly three months and had no stated criminal antecedents.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to be released on bail, and the Special Leave Petition was disposed of.

Issues: Whether TDS credit reflected in the assessee's Form 26AS could be denied because the corresponding fixed-deposit interest was clubbed in the spouse's income.

Analysis: Rule 37BA(1) grants TDS credit to the deductee on the basis of deduction information furnished by the deductor. Credit can be shifted to another person under Rule 37BA(2)(i) only where the deductee files the prescribed declaration with the deductor and the deductor reports the deduction in that other person's name. Since no such declaration was filed and the TDS continued to be reflected in the assessee's Form 26AS, the transfer mechanism was not attracted. Section 64 resulted in clubbing of the interest income in the spouse's hands but did not, without compliance with Rule 37BA(2)(i), displace the assessee's entitlement to the reflected TDS credit. The discrepancy between the claimed and recorded TDS amounts required fresh factual verification.

Conclusion: TDS credit was in principle allowable to the assessee as the deductee; the claim is to be redetermined after verification of the correct TDS amount in accordance with Section 199 and Rule 37BA.

Issues: Whether registration could be cancelled on the basis that the enterprise appeared in a list of fake entities, without physical verification of its business premises.

Analysis: Cancellation under Section 29(2)(e) requires the proper officer to form an opinion that registration was obtained through fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, after due opportunity. Where the proposed action is founded on a list identifying entities as fake, physical verification under Rule 25 is necessary to ascertain whether the registered person is genuinely carrying on business, particularly where the response includes material concerning proceedings initiated by State authorities.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and cancellation order, founded solely on the list without physical verification, could not be sustained. Fresh action may be taken after verification in accordance with Rule 25.