Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.

Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.

Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.

Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.

Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.

Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.

Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.

Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.

Issues: Whether a CIRP admitted under Section 9 can be closed by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a settlement reached after admission, before constitution of the Committee of Creditors.

Analysis: The settlement was executed after commencement of CIRP and expressly recognised that closure was subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amended Section 12A imposes a non obstante statutory framework for withdrawal of an admitted application and bars withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The authorities relied upon concerned settlements completed before admission of CIRP and predated or did not attract the amended statutory position.

Conclusion: The post-admission settlement could not justify closure of CIRP in the appeal; the IRP may seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit under Section 35FF is payable for the entire period from the date of deposit until the actual refund, including the period attributable to the appellant's delay in seeking refund.

Analysis: Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on a pre-deposit required to be refunded consequent to an appellate order, running from the date of payment until the date of refund. The provision does not qualify this entitlement by reference to the cause of delay in refund. Although the appellant delayed for over five years in furnishing the High Court judgment and seeking refund, the statutory language governs regardless of hardship, fairness, neglect, or the party responsible for the intervening delay.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 35FF is payable to the appellant for the entire period from the date of pre-deposit until the date of actual refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service.

Analysis: The appellant was constituted under statute to undertake welfare activities for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated deployment of guards and collected remuneration for onward payment to them, without earning profit or carrying on commercial business. Fees collected by a public authority in discharge of statutory functions were not liable to service tax. The activity did not satisfy either the definition of security agency or the taxable category of security agency service.

Conclusion: The appellant did not render taxable security agency service; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Analysis: The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief arising from legal interpretation, which justified waiver of penalty, negated the ingredients required for the extended period. Revenue did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands fail both because the activity was outside the taxable security-agency category and because the extended limitation period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory welfare body which merely facilitates deployment of personnel and passes remuneration to them without commercial profit-making activity is not a security agency; a bona fide interpretative belief and absence of suppression preclude invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Issue (i): Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: During the relevant period, the taxable entry for selling of space for advertisement required a service to be provided by a person. A sovereign local body was not covered by the term "person" before that expression was defined under the service-tax law. Further, the amount collected under the municipal law for display of advertisements was advertisement tax, a statutory levy authorised by Article 243X of the Constitution of India, and not consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation was not liable to service tax on the advertisement tax or licence fee collected during the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the charging provisions, and no suppression with intent to evade tax could be attributed to a government local body. The adopted ruling held that the extended limitation period was therefore unavailable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable; consequently, no interest or penalties could survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Before the relevant statutory definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax as a statutory levy was not providing a taxable service, and extended limitation cannot rest on alleged suppression in such an interpretative dispute.

Issues: Whether collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State-regulated bus terminals under a concession agreement constitutes taxable Support Services of Business or Commerce.

Analysis: Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual nexus between the service provider and the recipient. The concession arrangement was between the appellant and the State Government/PUNBUS; no contract existed between the appellant and individual bus operators. The bus terminals were public-utility infrastructure developed and operated under State regulation, and the appellant's collection of adda-fee was authorised under the concession arrangement in consideration of its investment, rather than consideration for support provided to bus operators. The applicable precedent had determined that such collection, absent a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, is not Business Support Service.

Conclusion: Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement did not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce; service tax was not payable by the appellant.

Issues: Whether the notional cost of buyer-supplied drawings and designs, and royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator, is includible in the assessable value of automobile components under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adoption of transaction value where the buyer and manufacturer are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only of the money value of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Buyer-supplied drawings or designs are includible only where they are used in, or necessary for, production and relieve the manufacturer of an expense otherwise required to be incurred by it.

Analysis: The drawings supplied at the vendor-selection stage were only specifications enabling prospective vendors to understand requirements and quote prices. They were not detailed manufacturing drawings used for production; the manufacturer remained responsible for preparing the detailed designs required for manufacture. No consideration in addition to the agreed price flowed from the buyer after selection of the manufacturer. The buyer's royalty payment to its foreign collaborator was not consideration flowing to the manufacturer and had no nexus with the manufacture or clearance of the components.

Conclusion: The notional value of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment are not includible in the assessable value; the demand, interest and penalty based on such inclusion cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased; (iii) Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Issue (i): Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset.

Analysis: The registered sale deed described the land as industrial-purpose land, the revenue record showed it as uncultivated, and the purchaser acquired it for non-agricultural use. The assessee had also returned the gain from its sale as capital gain. Applying the test concerning the actual and intended use of land, these circumstances established that its character at the time of sale was non-agricultural.

Conclusion: The land was a capital asset and not agricultural land; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased.

Analysis: The purchased land was classified in the registered purchase deed as industrial-purpose land. Further, the sold land had not been used for agricultural purposes during the prescribed preceding period, as reflected by the revenue record and its established industrial character. The statutory conditions for the deduction were therefore not met.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54B was not allowable; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Analysis: The revision order had not been independently challenged. The appeal arose from the appellate order concerning the consequential assessment, and did not permit a challenge to the unappealed revision order.

Conclusion: The challenge to the revision order was barred in these proceedings; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment treating the transferred land as a taxable capital asset and denying the claimed agricultural-land reinvestment relief remains sustained, and the unchallenged revision order cannot be assailed collaterally.

Ratio Decidendi: Land is not excluded as agricultural land where the cumulative evidence of its recorded status, contractual description, use and intended non-agricultural exploitation establishes its non-agricultural character; deduction for reinvestment in agricultural land requires satisfaction of the prescribed agricultural-use conditions.

Issues: Whether investment in two separately registered residential flats on different floors of the same wing and building qualified as investment in one residential house for deduction under section 54F.

Analysis: Section 54F requires acquisition of a residential house and does not mandate that residential accommodation must comprise a single physical unit, be on one floor, or be acquired under one registered instrument. The applicability of the deduction depends on the substance and functional character of the accommodation rather than separate entrances, separate identification, or separate payment of stamp duty. The two flats were purchased simultaneously from the same developer, in the same building and wing, and were intended for use as a single family residence. These circumstances established that they constituted one residential house.

Conclusion: The two flats constituted one residential house for section 54F purposes; the assessee was entitled to deduction in respect of both flats.

Issues: Whether a consolidated assessment proceeding and order covering more than one financial year is permissible under the GST regime.

Analysis: The GST framework requires show cause notices to be issued with reference to the applicable tax period. Where annual returns have been filed, the relevant financial year constitutes the tax period; before such filing, proceedings may be based on monthly returns. A show cause notice or order cannot be clubbed for multiple financial years. The challenged proceedings covered several financial years and were therefore issued without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice or assessment order for more than one financial year is impermissible and jurisdictionally invalid; the challenged assessment and consequential rectification-rejection orders were quashed, with liberty to initiate separate proceedings for each financial year.

Issues: Whether refund arising after an assessment under Section 201 or an appellate order can be made conditional upon filing Form 26B or withheld against outstanding demands without an order under Section 245.

Analysis: Section 201 concerns assessment of tax deducted at source, whereas Section 200A, Rule 31A and Form 26B govern processing and adjustment of TDS statements at the CPC stage before assessment. A refund quantified upon an assessment under Section 201 or pursuant to an appellate order is a vested and crystallised entitlement, with applicable interest. The Form 26B procedure does not govern such refund. Withholding or adjustment of the quantified refund is permissible only through a legally passed order under Section 245; outstanding demands, including demands relating to associated TANs, cannot by themselves justify non-payment.

Conclusion: Form 26B cannot be compelled for refund arising from an assessment under Section 201 or an appellate order, and the refund cannot be withheld absent a lawful order under Section 245. The assessee is entitled to payment of the quantified refund with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: (i) Validity of an auction bid where the earnest-money deposit was short of the amount prescribed in the sale notice; (ii) Validity of the auction where the balance consideration was deposited after the stipulated period; and (iii) Borrower's entitlement to interest on surplus sale proceeds retained in a non-interest-bearing account.

Issue (i): Validity of an auction bid where the earnest-money deposit was short of the amount prescribed in the sale notice.

Analysis: The proviso to Rule 8(6) permits the secured creditor to stipulate earnest money in a public auction notice; it does not prescribe the stated amount as a statutory condition. The sale-notice requirement served to exclude non-serious bidders. Both bidders deposited the same marginally deficient amount, the highest bidder deposited 25% of the sale price on the auction date as required by Rule 9(3), and the shortfall caused no prejudice to the other bidder, the borrower, or public interest.

Conclusion: The earnest-money shortfall did not invalidate the auction bid; the issue is resolved in favour of the auction-purchasers and the secured creditor.

Issue (ii): Validity of the auction where the balance consideration was deposited after the stipulated period.

Analysis: Rule 9(4) permits payment within fifteen days of confirmation of sale or within a further period agreed in writing. The sale notice also allowed a written extension. The secured creditor's written communication deferred the payment date during pending proceedings, and the balance was paid immediately after dismissal of the borrower's challenge.

Conclusion: The payment of the balance consideration was within the extended period and did not invalidate the auction; the issue is resolved in favour of the auction-purchasers and the secured creditor.

Issue (iii): Borrower's entitlement to interest on surplus sale proceeds retained in a non-interest-bearing account.

Analysis: Surplus sale proceeds remaining after adjustment of the secured debt belonged to the borrower. The secured creditor's failure to retain that surplus in an interest-bearing account could not operate to the borrower's detriment.

Conclusion: The borrower is entitled to refund of the surplus sale proceeds with interest at 7% per annum from 23.03.2010 until payment.

Final Conclusion: The auction sale remains valid, while the borrower must receive the surplus sale proceeds together with the directed interest.

Ratio Decidendi: A non-statutory earnest-money stipulation in a secured-asset auction may be relaxed where the bid substantially fulfils its purpose, the mandatory 25% sale-price deposit is timely made, and no prejudice results.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the bank-account freezing order; (ii) Whether the freezing order was invalid because of the authorised Assistant Director's competence, omission of reasons to believe from the order, alleged non-service, and the 17-day delay in transmitting records to the Adjudicating Authority; (iii) Whether writ relief against the freezing of the entire bank accounts was warranted before completion of statutory adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the bank-account freezing order.

Analysis: Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, territorial jurisdiction exists where a material part of the cause of action arises within the Court's territorial limits. The freezing order affected accounts maintained at Kozhikode, where the registered office was also situated; the resulting impact and consequences therefore arose within Kerala.

Conclusion: A part of the cause of action arose within Kerala, and the writ petition was maintainable before the High Court. This issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the freezing order was invalid because of the authorised Assistant Director's competence, omission of reasons to believe from the order, alleged non-service, and the 17-day delay in transmitting records to the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: Section 17(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 permits the Director or Deputy Director to authorise a subordinate officer for search and seizure. Section 17(1-A) permits that authorised officer to freeze property where seizure is impracticable, including bank records and accounts. The reasons to believe are required to be recorded by the Director or Deputy Director and forwarded, with the relevant material, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope under Section 17(2); they need not be incorporated in the freezing order. The order itself recorded service upon the concerned entity. Although transmission after 17 days could cause hardship, it did not vitiate the proceedings, particularly in view of the 30-day period for moving the Adjudicating Authority under Section 17(4).

Conclusion: The authorised Assistant Director was competent to issue the freezing order; the stated objections did not invalidate it. This issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether writ relief against the freezing of the entire bank accounts was warranted before completion of statutory adjudication.

Analysis: Sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 require the Adjudicating Authority to issue notice, consider the reply and material, hear the affected person and determine whether the frozen property is involved in money laundering. The scope of any continued restraint, including whether it should be restricted to the value of identifiable proceeds of crime, falls for determination in that enquiry. The statutory scheme also provides appeals under Sections 26 and 42. The statutory freezing power had been invoked, distinguishing the situation from a non-statutory direction to banks to restrict transactions.

Conclusion: Quashing of the freezing order and withdrawal of the debit freeze were declined. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to determine within 45 days the extent to which the freeze should continue and to limit any restraint to the value of proceeds of crime, if any. This issue was decided substantially against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The validity of the freezing action was left undisturbed, while the statutory adjudication was required to promptly determine and confine any continuing restraint to identifiable proceeds of crime.

Ratio Decidendi: A duly authorised subordinate officer may freeze bank accounts under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, and reasons to believe need not be recorded in the freezing order; disputes concerning the extent of a continuing freeze must ordinarily be resolved through the statutory adjudication mechanism.

Issues: Whether an assessee can be denied credit for tax deducted at source from salary merely because the employer-deductor failed to deposit the deducted tax, resulting in demands under Sections 143(1) and 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Tax deducted by the employer from the assessee's salary constitutes credit legitimately available to the assessee. The deductor's failure to deposit the deducted amount cannot be attributed to the assessee or deprive the assessee of such credit. Consequently, demands arising solely from denial of that credit cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: The demands were quashed to the extent attributable to non-grant of credit for tax deducted at source by the employer, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Eligibility of the applicant's education and training services for exemption as an educational institution; (ii) Exclusion of examination, registration and related fees collected and remitted for students from taxable value as pure-agent expenditure; (iii) Tax treatment of printed study materials and digital learning resources supplied with coaching; (iv) Taxability of retained foreign-exchange fluctuations on fees payable to foreign professional bodies; (v) Taxability of redemption of training fees received from universities.

Issue (i): Eligibility of the applicant's education and training services for exemption as an educational institution.

Analysis: Serial No. 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 applies to services supplied by an educational institution. The defined category covers education forming part of a curriculum for a qualification recognised by law, besides specified school and approved vocational education. The applicant supplies preparatory coaching, learning resources and academic support, but does not itself conduct the prescribed course examinations or award the relevant professional qualification or university degree. Recognition of the qualification awarded by another body does not convert the coaching provider into an educational institution.

Conclusion: The education and training services are not exempt under Serial No. 66 and are taxable at the applicable rate, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Exclusion of examination, registration and related fees collected and remitted for students from taxable value as pure-agent expenditure.

Analysis: Rule 33 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits exclusion only where the supplier acts under the recipient's authorisation as a pure agent, separately indicates the payment in the invoice, and meets the other prescribed conditions. The material did not establish authorisation by students or separate invoicing of the remitted amounts.

Conclusion: The remitted fees cannot be excluded from taxable value on the material placed on record; exclusion is available only upon fulfilment of all Rule 33 conditions, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Tax treatment of printed study materials and digital learning resources supplied with coaching.

Analysis: The study materials, recorded lectures, digital resources and related content are supplied only to enrolled students for one consolidated coaching fee and are not independently available. They are naturally bundled with commercial training and coaching, which is the principal supply. Under Section 8 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the composite supply takes the tax character of its principal supply.

Conclusion: Printed and digital study materials form part of taxable commercial training and coaching services and do not obtain a separate exemption for books, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Taxability of retained foreign-exchange fluctuations on fees payable to foreign professional bodies.

Analysis: Foreign-exchange gains or losses arising between collection and remittance of fees are not consideration for a distinct supply. An activity relating to conversion of money constitutes a service only where separate consideration is charged; fluctuating gains or losses retained in this arrangement lack the requisite nexus with a taxable supply.

Conclusion: Retained foreign-exchange fluctuation is not includible in taxable value and is not liable to GST; no SAC arises, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Taxability of redemption of training fees received from universities.

Analysis: The applicant supplies training, coaching, academic support and infrastructure to universities for consideration. It is not an educational institution eligible under Serial No. 66(a), and its support services do not fall within the specified services supplied to an educational institution under Serial No. 66(b). In the absence of agreement details, a precise six-digit SAC cannot be determined, though the service falls under Heading 9992.

Conclusion: Redemption of training fees is taxable as education services at 18%, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Preparatory coaching and allied supplies, including university training support, remain subject to GST; only foreign-exchange fluctuation unconnected with consideration for a supply remains outside the taxable value, while pure-agent treatment requires proof of the prescribed conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether student-enrolment services supplied to overseas universities qualify as export of services; (ii) Whether those services are intermediary services.

Issue (i): Whether student-enrolment services supplied to overseas universities qualify as export of services.

Analysis: Export of services under Section 2(6) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires, inter alia, that the place of supply be outside India. The applicant's services were found to be intermediary services. Until 29.03.2026, the place of supply of intermediary services was governed by Section 13(8)(b), under which it was the supplier's location in India. Following omission of that provision from 30.03.2026, Section 13(2) applies and fixes the place of supply at the overseas recipient's location.

Conclusion: The services do not qualify as export of services up to 29.03.2026, but qualify as export of services from 30.03.2026 onwards. The ruling is against the assessee for the earlier period and in favour of the assessee thereafter.

Issue (ii): Whether those services are intermediary services.

Analysis: The agreement appointed the applicant as the overseas university's representative and limited its authority to act independently. The applicant promoted programmes, assisted prospective students with applications and admission-related formalities, and received commission contingent on enrolment and receipt of tuition fees. The underlying supply was educational services by the university to students, while the applicant arranged and facilitated that supply without providing educational services on its own account. This arrangement met the three-party, two-supply structure of intermediary services recognised in CBIC Circular No. 159/15/2021-GST dated 20.09.2021.

Conclusion: Yes. The services supplied constitute intermediary services within Section 2(13) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The supply is characterised as intermediary service, with its export status changing from 30.03.2026 upon the applicable place-of-supply provision.

Ratio Decidendi: A person appointed as a foreign university's agent to arrange or facilitate the university's educational supply to students, without supplying that education on its own account, is an intermediary; export treatment depends on the applicable place-of-supply rule.

Issues: Whether reassessment notices issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year were valid when sanctioned by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: Notices under section 148 were issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, when section 151(ii) required prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General. Approval by the Principal Commissioner was therefore not jurisdictionally competent. The authority competent to grant approval is determined with reference to the date of issuance of the notice, not the date on which approval was obtained. The proviso to section 151 inserted with effect from 01.04.2023 could not be applied retrospectively to exclude the period allowed for a reply to the notice under section 148A(b).

Conclusion: The reassessment notices issued with approval of the Principal Commissioner were invalid and quashed; the consequential reassessment orders were vitiated, in favour of the assessees.