Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to deny CENVAT credit for July 2012 to March 2015.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) required a positive act of suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud or similar conduct with intent to evade tax. Self-assessment and detection of irregular credit during audit, without more, did not satisfy those requirements. The assessee was registered, regularly filed ST-3 returns disclosing the CENVAT credit, and furnished records during audit. No evidence established any mala fide intent to evade tax; its status as a State instrumentality also negated the allegation of suppression or fraud.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the confirmed demand was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the duty demand despite the Revenue's knowledge of the appellant's clearances and duty-payment position.

Analysis: The relevant clearances and duty-payment structure had been disclosed through repeated correspondence. The Revenue had acknowledged the appellant's position, issued related communications, and conducted periodical audits up to September 2011. Since the material facts and activities were within the Revenue's knowledge, the demand could not be sustained by invoking the extended period; the show-cause notice was admittedly issued beyond the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The entire demand was time-barred and was set aside; no penalty was imposable on the assessee.

Issues: (i) Proper quantum of expenditure disallowable under section 14A in relation to exempt interest where Rule 8D was inapplicable; (ii) Entitlement to a tax adjustment for unrealised interest previously offered to tax and subsequently reversed under applicable prudential norms; (iii) Taxability of recoveries of debts written off in earlier years where deduction may have been allowed under section 36(1)(vii) or section 36(1)(viia); (iv) Taxability in India of income attributable to foreign branches constituting permanent establishments abroad; and (v) Method for adjusting an earlier refund while computing interest under section 244A.

Issue (i): Proper quantum of expenditure disallowable under section 14A in relation to exempt interest where Rule 8D was inapplicable.

Analysis: Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was introduced from assessment year 2008-09 and did not apply to the relevant assessment years. The consistent approach in the assessee's earlier years required a reasonable estimate of expenditure under section 14A at 1% of exempt income.

Conclusion: The section 14A disallowance shall be restricted to 1% of exempt income, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to a tax adjustment for unrealised interest previously offered to tax and subsequently reversed under applicable prudential norms.

Analysis: Section 43D governs the timing of taxation of interest on bad or doubtful debts and does not prohibit recognition of a subsequent reversal of interest already taxed. A reversal of interest that was previously included in taxable income must be given effect if the amount remained unrealised and was actually reversed in accordance with applicable prudential norms. Verification is required regarding prior taxation, unrealisation, the identity of the reversed amount, and any subsequent recovery.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction or reduction of the reversed interest to the extent its prior taxation, subsequent unrealisation, and actual reversal are established, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Taxability of recoveries of debts written off in earlier years where deduction may have been allowed under section 36(1)(vii) or section 36(1)(viia).

Analysis: Section 41(4) applies only where a deduction for the relevant debt was previously allowed under section 36(1)(vii). A deduction for a provision for bad and doubtful debts under section 36(1)(viia) does not, by itself, satisfy that condition. Verification of the nature of the earlier deduction is necessary.

Conclusion: Recovery is taxable under section 41(4) only to the extent corresponding deduction was earlier allowed under section 36(1)(vii); recovery linked solely to a deduction under section 36(1)(viia) is not taxable under section 41(4), in favour of the assessee subject to verification.

Issue (iv): Taxability in India of income attributable to foreign branches constituting permanent establishments abroad.

Analysis: Under Article 7(1) of the applicable double taxation agreements, income attributable to a foreign branch constituting a permanent establishment abroad is taxable in the branch jurisdiction and is not taxable in India. CBDT Notification No. 91/2008 dated 28.08.2008 applies prospectively from assessment year 2009-10 and does not govern the relevant years.

Conclusion: Income attributable to foreign branches constituting permanent establishments abroad is not taxable in India, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Method for adjusting an earlier refund while computing interest under section 244A.

Analysis: For computation of interest under section 244A, an earlier refund must first be appropriated against the interest component and only the remaining balance against the principal tax component.

Conclusion: Interest under section 244A shall be recomputed by first adjusting the earlier refund against interest and thereafter against principal tax, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessments require recomputation by restricting the expenditure disallowance and by excluding foreign-branch income from Indian taxation, while the claims concerning reversed interest and bad-debt recoveries require factual verification in accordance with the stated legal standards.

Issues: Whether the appeal involves a question of law under Section 109(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, requiring hearing by a Division Bench.

Analysis: Under Section 109(8), an appeal can be heard by a Single Member only where the disputed amount does not exceed the prescribed limit and no question of law is involved. The dispute requires interpretation of the statutory interplay between Section 16(2), Section 18(3), and Rule 41 concerning availment or transfer of input tax credit following merger or amalgamation. The grounds of appeal themselves assert that the mechanism under Section 18(3) read with Rule 41 is mandatory for valid transfer and availment of credit, making the controversy one of statutory eligibility and manner of availment rather than a mere factual dispute.

Conclusion: A question of law is involved in the appeal; it is required to be heard by a Judicial Member and a Technical Member sitting as a Division Bench.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST demand based on a mismatch in returns should be set aside for fresh adjudication where the claimed payment of disputed tax was not clearly verifiable.

Analysis: The claimed payment was not clearly demonstrable from the annual return, while the demand had been confirmed without a reply to the show-cause notice. No determination of the tax liability on merits was made.

Outcome: The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication upon deposit of 10% of the disputed tax and submission of a reply with supporting documents.

Issues: Whether additions for unsecured loans under Section 68 and corresponding interest disallowances under Section 69C could be made in completed or unabated assessments under Section 153A without incriminating material found during the search having a direct nexus with those additions.

Analysis: Section 153A enables assessment following a valid search, but a completed or unabated assessment can be disturbed only on the basis of incriminating material found during the search that reveals undisclosed income and bears a direct nexus to the proposed addition. The unsecured loans were disclosed in the books and came to notice from details furnished during assessment proceedings, not from seized material. Statements recorded during search did not admit that the loans were fictitious, involved cash exchange, or represented unaccounted funds. The spot verification merely showed that a lender was not found at its registered address on a particular visit and yielded no material concerning the impugned loans. The third-party statement, KYC records, bank statements, fund-flow analysis and financial inquiry were obtained in a subsequent third-party search or during assessment proceedings and could not supply the foundational requirement of incriminating material found in the assessee's search. An alleged failure to establish a credit under Section 68 cannot itself be treated as incriminating material. No independent year-specific incriminating material was identified for any of the assessment years.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 68 and the corresponding interest disallowances under Section 69C were outside the permissible scope of the completed or unabated assessments under Section 153A and were deleted; the merits of the loan transactions were left open.

Issues: Validity of cancellation of GST registration where the show-cause notice was not received and revocation could not be sought on the portal after expiry of the prescribed period.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The cancellation order referred to a show-cause notice that was not received, while the portal did not permit a revocation application after limitation had expired. The established remedial directions applicable to analogous GST-registration cancellation matters were applied.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside and quashed. The assessee must file outstanding returns within the stipulated period and pay the applicable tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Issues: (i) Whether the permanent establishment relating to the Baglihar project could, by applying the force of attraction rule, be treated as connected with receipts from the other contracts. (ii) Whether receipts from the other consultancy contracts were taxable as business profits through a permanent establishment or as fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether the permanent establishment relating to the Baglihar project could, by applying the force of attraction rule, be treated as connected with receipts from the other contracts.

Analysis: Earlier orders for the assessee's preceding assessment years had determined that the Baglihar project permanent establishment neither played a role in nor was involved with the other contracts. The same factual position applied for the years under consideration, and the Revenue did not establish any nexus warranting application of Article 7 or the force of attraction rule.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the Baglihar project permanent establishment could not be extended to the other contracts through the force of attraction rule.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from the other consultancy contracts were taxable as business profits through a permanent establishment or as fees for technical services.

Analysis: Personnel did not visit India for certain contracts, and their presence for the remaining contracts was limited to 44 days and 35 days respectively. The services were consequently rendered in India for less than 183 days. The conditions under Articles 5(2) and 15(2) for taxation through a permanent establishment were therefore not met, while the consultancy receipts fell under Article 12.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the receipts were taxable as fees for technical services under Article 12 at 10%, and not as business profits attributable to a permanent establishment.

Final Conclusion: The consultancy receipts from the contracts other than the Baglihar project are chargeable under Article 12 at the applicable fee-for-technical-services rate for both assessment years.

Ratio Decidendi: A permanent establishment created for a distinct project cannot attract receipts from separate contracts unless its involvement or nexus with those contracts is established; consultancy receipts without the requisite threshold presence are taxable as fees for technical services under the treaty.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice founded on information arising from a search of another person was valid where the procedure under Section 148A was followed and approval was obtained only for an order under Section 148A(d), without independent prior approval for issuance of notice under Section 148.

Analysis: Information forming the basis of reassessment arose from material unearthed during the search of another person. Such cases fell within the category under clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to Section 148 read with clause (c) of the proviso to Section 148A, for which the ordinary Section 148A procedure was excluded. The approval on record was confined to the proposed order under Section 148A(d), and no independent approval for issuing the Section 148 notice was established. Compliance with the prescribed jurisdictional route and approval requirement was mandatory and could not be substituted by approval under an inapplicable procedure.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 suffered from a foundational jurisdictional defect; the consequent reassessment proceedings and assessment were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the first appellate authority could reject fresh evidentiary material and sustain additions and disallowances without examining that material or obtaining factual verification.

Analysis: Under Section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the appellate powers of the first appellate authority are coterminous with those of the assessing authority. Fresh material produced in support of the assessee's case could be examined, and factual verification or a remand report could be obtained where required. The material was rejected solely because it had not been furnished to the assessing authority, although the additions and disallowances arose from factual discrepancies requiring verification.

Conclusion: The fresh material must be considered and the discrepancies factually verified after providing reasonable and adequate opportunity before determining the additions and disallowances.

Issues: (i) Whether the 195-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be refused when donations received and expenditure towards charitable objects were recorded in the books of account.

Issue (i): Whether the 195-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: Section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits admission of a delayed appeal upon sufficient cause. The delay arose after a subsequent application was filed and rejected, following which legal advice was obtained to challenge the earlier rejection. The explanation disclosed no mala fides or deliberate delay. Substantial justice was preferred over technicality.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be refused when donations received and expenditure towards charitable objects were recorded in the books of account.

Analysis: For registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the inquiry is confined to the genuineness of the trust's activities and compliance with material requirements of other applicable laws. The recorded donations and expenditure towards the stated charitable objects established that activities had commenced. Concerns relating to the mode, amount, or verifiability of donations did not justify treating the matter as an assessment of income, particularly where no finding of non-genuine activities was recorded.

Conclusion: Refusal of registration lacked merit; registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was directed to be granted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory registration application is required to be granted on the basis of the recorded charitable activities.

Ratio Decidendi: Registration proceedings are confined to verifying the genuineness of charitable activities and material legal compliance, and cannot be converted into an assessment of income based merely on the mode or quantum of donations.

Issues: (i) Whether interim stay of the suspension of the insolvency professional's registration should be granted pending the appeal; (ii) Whether suspension of registration affects the professional's eligibility to continue in other ongoing insolvency processes and permits intimation to their Committees of Creditors.

Issue (i): Whether interim stay of the suspension of the insolvency professional's registration should be granted pending the appeal.

Analysis: The challenges concerning Form-H disclosure, valuation, recourse under Section 19(2), compliance with the CIRP timeline, and the procedure under Sections 218 to 220 were held to be triable matters requiring examination of the complete record at final hearing. The completion and implementation of the CIRP did not alter the regulatory consequence of suspension, which operates upon the professional's registration. The possible replacement in other assignments was an ordinary consequence of suspension and did not establish irreparable injury. The Appellant failed to show a sufficiently strong prima facie case or that the balance of convenience favoured interim protection.

Conclusion: Interim protection against the suspension was declined, against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether suspension of registration affects the professional's eligibility to continue in other ongoing insolvency processes and permits intimation to their Committees of Creditors.

Analysis: Registration is the statutory basis for rendering services as an insolvency professional; consequently, suspension affects eligibility to act in every insolvency process and is not confined to the assignment in which misconduct was found. Regulation 13(7) mandatorily requires communication of the suspension order to the Committees of Creditors and the Adjudicating Authority. This communication operationalises the suspension and is distinct from the Committee of Creditors' separate power under Section 27 to appoint a replacement in exercise of its commercial wisdom.

Conclusion: The Board is entitled and required to intimate the suspension to the Committees of Creditors in other ongoing processes, and the suspended professional has no right to continue as resolution professional in those assignments, against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The suspension and the statutory mechanism for communicating it to other ongoing insolvency processes remain operative pending an independent final determination of the main appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Suspension of an insolvency professional's registration operates upon the professional's statutory eligibility across all insolvency assignments, and mandatory intimation under Regulation 13(7) gives effect to that suspension without displacing the Committee of Creditors' separate authority to appoint a replacement.

Issues: Whether the GST Common Portal should disclose the date on which an assessment or adjudication order is uploaded, so as to safeguard limitation and appellate rights.

Analysis: GSTN's instructions stated that the portal permits an order passed on any date to be uploaded through DRC-07 either on the same date or subsequently. Delayed uploading may enable orders to be uploaded after expiry of limitation and may impair the taxpayer's right of appeal. Further instructions were therefore required regarding compliance with the directions governing disclosure of upload dates.

Outcome: Two weeks' time was granted for further instructions and the matter was listed for further hearing; no final adjudication was made.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns should be set aside where the taxpayer had not sought revocation within the prescribed period.

Analysis: Cancellation was initiated under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for admitted non-filing of returns required by Section 39. Although the statutory period for seeking revocation under Section 30 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had expired, the approach applicable to comparable cancellation cases warranted annulment of the cancellation while requiring compliance with outstanding return and payment obligations. The limitation periods under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) were directed to run from the judgment, with the specified treatment for financial year 2025-26 under Section 44.

Conclusion: The registration-cancellation order was quashed; the taxpayer must furnish all outstanding returns within 30 days and remains liable for tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-filing of returns should be set aside and the registration restored subject to compliance.

Analysis: The cancellation rested solely on non-filing of returns, without any allegation of a dubious process for tax evasion. Continued cancellation would prevent issuance of invoices and carrying on business, thereby impairing recovery of tax. Filing of pending returns was necessary for determination of the final tax liability.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration is set aside subject to filing returns for the entire default period and payment of the requisite tax, interest, fine and penalty within four weeks. Upon compliance, the jurisdictional officer must restore the registration.

Issues: (i) Whether interest on refinanced borrowings was deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the original borrowing funded construction of the let-out property; (ii) Whether a disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made where no exempt income was earned; (iii) Whether interest attributable to borrowings used for investment could be capitalised.

Issue (i): Whether interest on refinanced borrowings was deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the original borrowing funded construction of the let-out property.

Analysis: Section 24(b) permits deduction of interest attributable to capital borrowed for construction or acquisition of house property. The record showed that an identified portion of the original borrowing had been used for construction and that the corresponding interest allocation had been accepted in earlier assessments. Refinancing of that borrowing retains its character where a direct nexus between the original construction borrowing and the subsequent refinancing is established. Consistency in tax assessments precluded a contrary treatment without any demonstrated change in the nature or use of the funds, though the original utilisation and loan nexus required verification from corroborative evidence.

Conclusion: Interest on refinancing is allowable under Section 24(b) to the extent it is directly linked to the verified original borrowing used for construction; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee subject to factual verification.

Issue (ii): Whether a disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made where no exempt income was earned.

Analysis: A disallowance in absence of exempt income is not warranted. The application of Rule 8D cannot be sustained merely because investments are capable of generating exempt income when no exempt income was actually earned during the relevant year.

Conclusion: No disallowance under Section 14A is permissible in the absence of exempt income; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest attributable to borrowings used for investment could be capitalised.

Analysis: Capitalisation of interest expenditure attributable to investment depends upon verification of the actual use of the borrowed funds and the corresponding interest allocation.

Conclusion: Interest attributable to borrowings verified as used for investment shall be allowed to be capitalised; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee subject to factual verification.

Final Conclusion: The interest claim must be apportioned according to the proven utilisation of borrowed funds, while Section 14A cannot be invoked without exempt income.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest on a refinancing borrowing retains the character of interest on capital borrowed for construction under Section 24(b) where a direct and verified nexus with the original construction borrowing is established.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2015-16 issued after 1 April 2021 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The applicable limitation framework for reassessment proceedings required notices concerning Assessment Year 2015-16 issued after the cut-off date of 1 April 2021 to be dropped. The first notice was issued on 30 June 2021 and the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) was made on 28 July 2022, both after the prescribed cut-off date.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid; the notice was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether imported polyester knitted fabrics covered by a valid Special Advance Authorization remained eligible for customs-duty exemption despite the Minimum Import Price restriction, and whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalty could consequently be sustained.

Analysis: Paragraph 4.04A of the Foreign Trade Policy permits duty-free import of fabrics under the Special Advance Authorization Scheme for manufacture and export of apparel. Notification No. 27/2023 grants the corresponding customs-duty exemption for imports against a valid authorization. The subsequent DGFT notification extending the Minimum Import Price condition expressly recognised imports by Special Advance Authorization holders, subject to the condition concerning sale of imported inputs in the Domestic Tariff Area. The existence of the Minimum Import Price condition did not, by itself, negate exemption for goods imported under a valid authorization.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the duty exemption. The finding of ineligibility, and the consequential confiscation, redemption fine and penalty, were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice issued under Section 148 to an assessee who had died before its issuance is valid.

Analysis: A notice under Section 148 issued in the name of a deceased assessee is invalid unless the legal representative submits to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer without objection. Mere intimation of the assessee's death or registration of the legal representative on the income-tax portal does not amount to submission to jurisdiction. Although the legal heir was subsequently recognised by the Revenue, no notice was issued to that person in the capacity of legal representative. Section 159 permits proceedings against a legal representative in accordance with law but does not validate a notice issued to a deceased person.

Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee was invalid and was quashed.

Issues: Whether renewal of registration under section 12AB can be rejected solely because a religious-charitable institution, created otherwise than under a formal instrument, cannot furnish a trust deed or memorandum of association.

Analysis: Rule 17A(2) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 distinguishes between applicants created under an instrument and those created otherwise than under an instrument. For the latter category, Rule 17A(2)(b) requires documents evidencing creation or establishment, while Rule 17A(2)(c) independently recognises registration with the Registrar of Public Trusts. Treating a formal trust deed or memorandum as mandatory in every case would render Rule 17A(2)(b) otiose. Registration under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 does not by itself establish entitlement to renewal; nevertheless, the available registration and establishment records must be examined along with material concerning objects, activities and statutory compliance for the satisfaction required under section 12AB.

Conclusion: Renewal of registration cannot be denied solely for non-production of a formal trust deed or memorandum where the institution was created otherwise than under an instrument; renewal under section 12AB is to be granted in accordance with law.