Issues: (i) Whether a 100% penalty under Section 129 could be imposed solely because Part-B of the e-way bill was not populated before movement, despite genuine invoices, Part-A particulars and no proof of intent to evade tax; and (ii) Whether failure to issue a final speaking order in Form GST MOV-09 under Section 129(3) vitiated the penalty demand.

Issue (i): Whether a 100% penalty under Section 129 could be imposed solely because Part-B of the e-way bill was not populated before movement, despite genuine invoices, Part-A particulars and no proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129 was construed as penal in character and not as imposing mechanical liability for every documentation lapse. A technical omission in Part-B cannot by itself establish an intention to evade tax. The genuine invoices, valid Part-A particulars, identifiable destination, tax-paid transaction and absence of evidence of diversion or evasion demonstrated that the lapse was inadvertent. Legacy check-post decisions applying absolute statutory regimes were distinguished from the GST framework, in which penalties require examination of the surrounding facts and deliberate tax evasion.

Conclusion: The 100% penalty under Section 129 was unsustainable in the absence of proven intent to evade tax and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to issue a final speaking order in Form GST MOV-09 under Section 129(3) vitiated the penalty demand.

Analysis: Section 129(3) requires a final speaking adjudication quantifying tax and penalty after considering objections and affording an opportunity of hearing. Non-issuance of Form GST MOV-09 bypassed this mandatory adjudicatory safeguard and prejudiced the assessee's statutory rights.

Conclusion: Failure to issue the mandatory final order in Form GST MOV-09 vitiated the penalty demand and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A penalty for an unfilled Part-B of the e-way bill cannot be sustained where intentional tax evasion is unproved and the mandatory statutory adjudication procedure has not been followed.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 129 requires proof of an intention to evade tax; a bona fide technical documentation lapse, unsupported by such proof, cannot attract penal consequences.

Issues: Whether non-updation of Part-B of an e-way bill, despite genuine transaction documents and absence of evidence of intended tax evasion, can independently justify penalty under Section 129(3).

Analysis: Section 129(3) was applied in the context of the digital GST framework as a measure directed against intentional tax evasion, not an inadvertent clerical or portal-related documentation lapse. Precedents arising from manual check-post regimes were distinguished. Where the tax invoice, Part-A e-way bill, goods particulars and underlying transaction were genuine and accounted for, an unupdated Part-B did not establish an attempt to evade tax. The burden lay on the Revenue to record and support a positive finding of such intent before imposing the penal consequence.

Conclusion: In the absence of a positive finding or evidence of intent to evade tax, non-updating of Part-B alone cannot attract penalty under Section 129(3); the penalty order and its appellate confirmation were legally unsustainable.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bill had expired owing to an erroneous entry of the consignor's pin code.

Analysis: Section 129 is a machinery provision intended to prevent tax evasion; mens rea must therefore be established before imposing penalty for a breach during transit. The binding departmental instructions distinguish substantive violations from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by an e-way bill and delivery challan, physical verification matched the goods with the documents, and the incorrect pin code reduced the e-way bill validity by recording a shorter distance. No intention to evade tax was alleged or established.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 and the consequential penalty were invalid and unjustified; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to avail the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons; (ii) Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects; (iii) Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance; and (iv) Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires a meaningful hearing where it is requested in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated. Section 75(6) requires the order to state relevant facts and the basis of decision. The requested post-reply hearing was not afforded, and the order merely treated the explanation as unsatisfactory without addressing the asserted single supply, duplicate generation, or evidentiary basis for an additional taxable transaction. The statutory audi alteram partem requirement and duty to give reasons were therefore not met.

Conclusion: The original adjudication was vitiated by breach of Sections 75(4) and 75(6), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects.

Analysis: A statutory hearing denied at the original adjudicatory stage is not automatically cured by hearings before appellate forums. The original-stage hearing was material because disputed factual questions required evaluation of the explanation, primary records, and departmental data by the proper officer in the first instance.

Conclusion: The subsequent hearings did not cure the original denial of statutory hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance.

Analysis: The existing notice was founded on duplicate e-way bills against the same invoice and the alleged unpaid tax on an additional transaction. Rule 138(9) was relevant to assess the defence that one e-way bill did not represent actual movement; it did not introduce a new charge. Non-cancellation is a material circumstance, but does not alone establish an additional supply. The issue requires a cumulative assessment of evidence, including the burden of proof and any adverse inference arising from non-production of primary records.

Conclusion: Rule 138(9) does not create a new charge, and non-cancellation is relevant but not conclusive; the issue is partly against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Section 113(1) permits referral for fresh adjudication where necessary. The duplicate e-way bills, the unexplained invoice discrepancy, the asserted technical or clerical causes, and the absence of primary invoice, return, books, and transport records left disputed factual matters unresolved. The demand could neither be annulled solely on unsupported assertions nor sustained through appellate fact-finding in substitution of the denied original hearing.

Conclusion: Fresh adjudication confined to the existing notice, after production of relevant evidence, a meaningful personal hearing, and a reasoned speaking order, is required; this procedural relief is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning the surviving transaction cannot stand without compliance with statutory hearing and reasoned-decision requirements; whether any additional taxable supply occurred remains open for determination on the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Denial of a requested statutory personal hearing and failure to give adequate reasons at the original adjudicatory stage are not automatically cured by later appellate hearings where disputed factual evidence requires first-instance determination.

Issues: (i) Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST; (ii) Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference; (iii) Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit; (iv) Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand; (v) Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST.

Analysis: Section 16(2)(aa) was not applicable to FY 2018-19. A GSTR-2A mismatch was a trigger for verification and not an independent basis for denial; however, the Substantive Conditions for Input Tax Credit under Section 16 and the Burden of Proof under Section 155 remained applicable. Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied in principle to invoices bearing a registered recipient's GSTIN but wrongly reported as B2C, but a supplier certificate under the Circular was evidentiary material and not conclusive proof.

Conclusion: ITC could not be denied solely because of non-reflection in GSTR-2A, in favour of the assessee on that legal proposition; eligibility nevertheless remained dependent on proof of the statutory conditions.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference.

Analysis: The invoices, ledger and transport material supported the existence of commercial transactions and movement of goods, but did not sufficiently establish the asserted supplier-side B2C reporting error or payment of tax through the supplier's GSTR-3B. The later supplier certificate lacked objective return-level corroboration, particularly for the high-value invoice capable of invoice-wise B2CL reporting. The three invoices also accounted for only part of the disputed IGST, leaving the balance unsupported by any identified invoice or reconciliation.

Conclusion: The claimed ITC was not established for the three invoices, and the residual IGST difference remained unexplained, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit.

Analysis: IGST, CGST and SGST are distinct tax heads governed by the statutory utilisation mechanism. No transaction-level reconciliation showed that the apparent short-availment under CGST or SGST arose from the same transactions or constituted a legally permissible Cross-Head Set-Off.

Conclusion: The alleged CGST/SGST shortfall could not be netted against excess IGST credit, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand.

Analysis: The material relied upon had not been tendered before the adjudicating authority, while the first appellate forum afforded two hearing opportunities that were not used. The available material was assessed on merits, and Rule 45 restricted the Admission of Additional Evidence before the Tribunal. The statutory bar on remand by the first appellate authority and the discretionary remand power of the Tribunal did not warrant another factual inquiry after repeated opportunities had been provided.

Conclusion: No breach of Natural Justice or basis for Discretionary Remand was established, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (v): Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Utilisation of the disputed credit was undisputed, and no specific challenge to the interest period or computation was made. Interest on Wrongly Availed and Utilised Input Tax Credit followed under Section 50(3) read with Rule 88B(3). The penalty represented the statutory minimum under Section 73(9) after the principal tax demand was sustained.

Conclusion: The interest and penalty were sustainable, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The historical Input Tax Credit Mismatch was tested against substantive proof requirements rather than resolved mechanically from return reflection; the record supplied no basis for the claimed credit, cross-head adjustment, or further fact-finding.

Ratio Decidendi: For FY 2018-19, non-reflection of ITC in GSTR-2A cannot alone justify denial, but the claimant must prove eligibility under Section 16 and discharge the burden under Section 155; a supplier certificate under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST is not conclusive where the asserted reporting error and tax-payment explanation remain inadequately substantiated.

Issues: Whether an interlocutory application seeking stay and priority listing could be substantively considered before the appeal completed scrutiny and was registered.

Analysis: Rule 29 permits interlocutory relief in a pending matter. As the appeal remained under scrutiny and had not been registered, consideration of the substantive relief was deferred until registration. The urgency shown warranted expeditious completion of scrutiny.

Outcome: The Registry was directed to expedite scrutiny, register the appeal if no deficiency was found, and place the interlocutory application before the Bench after registration.

Issues: Whether additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable on a first GST appeal filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Acts.

Analysis: Section 107(6) of the CGST/KGST Acts prescribes the payments required for maintaining a GST appeal. However, the State court-fee levy separately applies to appeals filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority. The settled position recognising the validity and applicability of the levy under Section 76 binds the State GST authorities and appellants filing appeals before them. The later notification relied upon by the appellant did not negate the existing liability to pay the applicable additional court fee.

Conclusion: Additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable for the first GST appeal; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether limited input tax credit relief based on amended GST records could be sustained despite retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, in the absence of transaction-specific evidence establishing ineligibility.

Analysis: Sections 16(2), 16(2)(c) and 155 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require ITC eligibility and the claimant's burden to be assessed with reference to the facts and evidence relating to particular transactions. Retrospective cancellation of a supplier's registration, without specific material showing that the invoices were fictitious, supplies were not received, or the limited credit was otherwise inadmissible, was insufficient to displace relief granted after examination of identified GST-record amendments. Discrepancies in return figures likewise did not establish inadmissibility of the specific credit. Section 75(7) of the respective Acts also confined the demand to the grounds forming the basis of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The limited ITC relief of Rs. 76,750.20 was sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions; (ii) Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit; and (iii) Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Issue (i): Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions.

Analysis: The governing methodology for real-estate projects rejects a comparison of input tax credit with turnover because construction expenditure, credit accrual and buyer collections do not have a direct correlation throughout a project. It requires the total GST-related saving for the project to be determined and allocated over the total project area to derive a uniform per square foot benefit. The revised computation quantified the additional input tax credit against project purchase value, determined the project-level saving, divided it by total area, and applied the resulting per square foot figure to the sold area. Purchase value was used to measure credit against project expenditure, not as a substitute for turnover or for allocating benefit according to buyer collections. Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 does not permit replacement of a fair and reasonable factual computation accepted by the specialised Tribunal absent jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or non-compliance with the binding remand directions.

Conclusion: The methodology was consistent with the remand directions and was validly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns the benefit of input tax credit actually accruing to the supplier and its passing on to recipients. The pre-GST returns recorded nil CENVAT credit actually availed, while substantial GST input tax credit was availed after GST. A credit that was only legally available but remained unclaimed cannot be treated as having reduced the pre-GST tax incidence, since that would compare actual post-GST benefit with a hypothetical pre-GST benefit. The benefit was not restricted to credit on goods, as the post-GST credit on input services was also actually availed.

Conclusion: Unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit could not be notionally set off against the post-GST input tax credit; the determination based on actual availment was upheld, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Analysis: GST collected on the enhanced consideration resulting from non-passing of the tax benefit forms part of the profiteered amount because it represents tax collected on the additional realisation. The direction to pay interest at 18% was part of the statutory anti-profiteering consequence, and no independent jurisdictional infirmity was established.

Conclusion: Addition of GST at 12% to the profiteered amount and the direction for interest at 18% were valid, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The project-specific calculation founded on actually availed incremental input tax credit, allocated on a per square foot basis and inclusive of GST collected on the excess realisation, remains enforceable with interest payable to the affected recipients.

Ratio Decidendi: In real-estate anti-profiteering proceedings, incremental input tax credit actually availed after GST must be determined as project-level savings and allocated by area; unavailed pre-GST credit cannot be imputed as a notional offset.

Issues: Whether imposition of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bills had expired and their validity was not extended under Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 permits demand of tax and penalty for contraventions during transportation, while Rule 138(10) prescribes the validity period of an e-way bill. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST distinguishes serious and substantive contraventions from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by invoices, lorry receipt, e-way bills and a test certificate; the invoices charged integrated tax and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy in the goods. Expiry of the e-way bills was the sole defect, and no tax evasion or intention to evade tax was established. The explanation for the incorrect destination entry and consequential validity period was relevant while deciding whether Section 129 could be invoked.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the expired e-way bills was invalid and unjustified; the levy of integrated tax and penalty was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether employee recoveries for subsidised mandatory canteen facilities amount to a taxable supply. (ii) Whether input tax credit on canteen services is available and, if so, to what extent.

Issue (i): Whether employee recoveries for subsidised mandatory canteen facilities amount to a taxable supply.

Analysis: Section 7 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires a supply for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. The canteen facilities at the factory and research facility were obligatory under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948, while the corporate-office canteen was obligatory under Section 23 of the Gujarat Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2019. The facilities were governed by the employer's canteen policy and the employee deductions represented subsidised meal charges. Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST treats employment perquisites provided under the employer-employee arrangement as outside GST.

Conclusion: The recoveries from employees towards canteen facilities are not a supply and do not attract GST. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit on canteen services is available and, if so, to what extent.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 17(5)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, as clarified by Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST, applies to the whole of clause (b) and permits input tax credit where provision of the relevant facility is obligatory under law. Since the canteen facilities were statutorily mandatory, the blocked-credit restriction did not apply to the employer's cost. Credit attributable to the portion of canteen cost recovered from employees remains unavailable.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on canteen services is admissible only to the extent of the cost borne by the assessee; proportionate credit embedded in the amounts recovered from employees is disallowed. The issue is partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Statutorily mandated subsidised canteen facilities provided as part of the employment arrangement fall outside taxable supply, while the associated credit entitlement is confined to the employer-funded portion of the facility.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an employer provides a statutorily mandatory canteen under an employment arrangement, employee recoveries do not constitute taxable supply, and input tax credit is available only for the cost borne by the employer.

Issues: Whether the arrest of a person who appeared before the GST authorities pursuant to a pending court order prima facie violated personal liberty and overreached the judicial process.

Analysis: The person appeared with records at the stipulated time in compliance with the earlier direction. The arrest authorisation did not disclose that the appearance was pursuant to the pending proceedings, and the stated grounds for arrest were prima facie inconsistent with the person's presence and willingness to cooperate. The subsequent summons and recorded timing of arrest also indicated a prima facie irregularity requiring examination of the officers' conduct.

Outcome: Interim release was directed, with notice issued to the concerned officers to explain their conduct; the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay; (ii) Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74; (iii) Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Issue (i): Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provided an efficacious appellate remedy against the adjudication order. The challenge raised jurisdictional and factual matters capable of consideration in appellate proceedings. The petitioner allowed the period for appeal to lapse and invoked writ jurisdiction after substantial delay; pendency of a rectification application did not extend the period for challenging the original order or sufficiently explain the delay.

Conclusion: Exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not warranted in view of the unavailed alternative remedy and unexplained delay and laches (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) prevents parallel proceedings by different GST authorities only where they concern the same subject matter. The Section 73 proceedings concerned correct tax liability and admissibility of input tax credit under Section 16(2)(c), whereas the DGGI proceedings under Section 74 concerned fraudulent availment of input tax credit without actual supply and involved multiple noticees. An overlap in transactions or period, or a common factual background, did not establish identity of subject matter.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not on the same subject matter, and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) was not attracted (against the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Analysis: The DGGI proceedings against co-noticees were deemed concluded following payment by the principal noticee; no tax, interest, or penalty was imposed upon the petitioner in those proceedings. Section 75(13) requires a prior penalty upon the person for the same act or omission, which was not established. Closure of proceedings on a distinct statutory basis did not extinguish the independently determined liability.

Conclusion: Neither the conclusion of the DGGI proceedings nor Section 75(13) precluded the separate liability (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional and statutory objections did not invalidate the separate adjudication, while remedies available against any decision on the pending rectification application remained governed by law.

Ratio Decidendi: The prohibition on parallel GST proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) applies only where the proceedings concern an identical subject matter; common transactions, overlapping periods, or a common assessee are insufficient where the statutory basis and allegations materially differ.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits penalty proceedings against a legal representative to be commenced and determined after the death of the person alleged to have committed the contravention; (ii) Whether Section 93(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits penalty proceedings against a legal representative to be commenced and determined after the death of the person alleged to have committed the contravention.

Analysis: Section 93 expressly covers tax, interest and penalty determined after death. Its language does not condition post-death determination upon the issuance of a show-cause notice or commencement of adjudication during the deceased's lifetime. The substantive contravention remains to be established under the applicable penal provision; Section 93 is the mechanism for determining and enforcing the resulting liability through the legal representative. Where Section 93(1)(b) applies, recovery is confined to the deceased's estate and only to the extent the estate can meet the charge. Fair hearing requirements under Section 126(3) remain applicable.

Conclusion: Section 93 permits proceedings for determination of penalty to be commenced after death against the legal representative, subject to satisfaction of its conditions; issuance of notice during the deceased's lifetime is not a prerequisite.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 93(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 93(1)(b) preserves liability arising from the deceased's lifetime conduct without treating the legal representative as the wrongdoer. The provision provides a rational estate-representation mechanism, restricts recovery to estate assets, and retains adjudicatory safeguards, including an effective opportunity to contest the contravention, statutory basis and quantum. The representative's inability to personally explain the deceased's affairs cannot itself be treated as an admission, and an appellate remedy remains available.

Conclusion: Section 93(1)(b) is neither discriminatory nor manifestly arbitrary and is constitutionally valid under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: Post-death adjudication of fiscal liability is legally sustainable under Section 93, but the factual requirements for representative liability, proof of contravention, service, quantum and the effect of the adjudication order remain open for determination in the statutory process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal statute expressly authorises tax, interest or penalty to be determined after death and confines recovery to the deceased's estate, proceedings may be initiated against the legal representative after death without prior commencement against the deceased.

Issues: (i) Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017; (ii) Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Issue (i): Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138 was substituted by Notification No. 27/2017-Central Tax dated 30.08.2017, but its compulsory operational date for e-way bill compliance was subsequently notified. The nationwide mandatory requirement was brought into force from 1 April 2018, which was after the interception on 24 November 2017.

Conclusion: No; compulsory e-way bill compliance under Rule 138 did not apply on 24 November 2017. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Analysis: The goods corresponded with the tax invoice and transport documents, and no discrepancy was found in their quantity, weight or description. The buyer and seller were bona fide dealers, the vehicle was on its designated route, and no material established tax evasion or an intention to evade tax. Since the mandatory e-way bill requirement was not in force on the relevant date, proceedings under Sections 129 and 122 could not rest on its non-production.

Conclusion: No; detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill on that date were unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Non-production of an e-way bill before Rule 138 became compulsory could not constitute a breach supporting detention or penal action where the accompanying transaction documents were genuine and no tax-evasion intent was shown.

Ratio Decidendi: Detention and penalty for failure to carry an e-way bill cannot be sustained where the compulsory requirement under Rule 138 had not come into force on the date of movement and no tax evasion is established.

Issues: Whether penalty for transport of goods with an expired e-way bill containing details of a vehicle wholly different from the vehicle actually carrying the goods was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 68 requires prescribed documents to accompany goods in transit, while Explanation (2) to Rule 138(3) requires Part B of the e-way bill to contain correct vehicle particulars for a valid movement. The limited relaxation under Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST applies to minor errors in one or two digits or characters and does not extend to substitution of an entirely different vehicle. An incomplete or incorrect e-way bill gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of intention to evade tax; such intention may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Here, the e-way bill had expired, named a different vehicle, and the stated diversion and delay were unsupported by a timely explanation or credible material rebutting that presumption.

Conclusion: The penalty was validly imposed and the concurrent findings were sustained against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders; (ii) Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders.

Analysis: The requirement that a quasi-judicial authority record cogent reasons is integral to principles of natural justice, fairness, and effective appellate review. The appellate orders merely stated that insufficient evidence had been produced and confirmed the original orders, without addressing the material grounds raised or the authorities relied upon. Identical and conclusory orders in matters involving distinct evidentiary foundations did not constitute reasoned or speaking decisions and reflected a failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to record reasons and decide the material grounds of appeal; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.

Analysis: Although an appellate forum should ordinarily decide disputes on merits, a first appeal is a valuable right requiring adjudication of factual and legal grounds. Determination of the disputes directly at the second-appellate stage would deprive the aggrieved party of a statutory appellate level. The unresolved objections concerning the show-cause notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective personal hearing in the original proceedings also required consideration at the original adjudicatory stage.

Conclusion: Fresh original adjudication is required after identification and availability of relied-upon documents, reasonable opportunity to respond, an effective personal hearing, and a reasoned determination; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The demands cannot be sustained on unreasoned appellate affirmance, and the adjudicatory process must be undertaken afresh in compliance with procedural fairness and reasoned decision-making.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order that does not address material grounds and provide cogent reasons violates principles of natural justice; where such failure would deprive a party of an effective appellate level, fresh adjudication is warranted.

Issues: Whether delay in filing a GST appeal beyond the statutory limitation period could be condoned where the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not effectively served on the assessee through the designated GST portal tab.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 binds the appellate authority to the prescribed limitation. The show-cause notice had been uploaded under an additional, rather than the designated, notices-and-orders tab, and the assessee lacked effective knowledge of the proceedings and resulting demand. In these circumstances, refusal of adjudication on merits would cause substantial prejudice. The writ jurisdiction could therefore be invoked to grant relief notwithstanding the appellate authority's limited power to condone delay.

Conclusion: The delay of 121 days was condoned, the limitation-based appellate order was set aside, and the assessee was permitted to institute a fresh appeal within the stipulated period for adjudication on merits without objection as to limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter; (ii) Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice; and (iii) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Issue (i): Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars proceedings by a proper officer under the Central enactment only where proceedings under the State enactment were initiated earlier and both proceedings concern the same subject matter. The DGST proceedings arose from reconciliation of turnover declared in GSTR-3B returns, whereas the CGST proceedings were founded on search material concerning non-existent suppliers, wrongful availment of ITC, and issuance of invoices without corresponding supplies. The allegations, evidentiary material and defaults were therefore distinct.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 6(2)(b) did not bar the CGST proceedings, and the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not non est.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: Multiple hearing notices were sent through speed post and registered e-mail. The assessee neither appeared on the notified dates nor filed a substantive response to the show-cause notice, having only sought additional time and a hearing.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded, and the ex parte order was not vitiated by breach of natural justice.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Analysis: The provision had been held intra vires by a High Court, and that view was affirmed by a speaking order of the Supreme Court. The constitutional position was consequently treated as settled.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 remains intra vires and constitutionally valid.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar was inapplicable, no denial of hearing was established, and the constitutional challenge could not be sustained; the merits of the ITC demand remain unadjudicated.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings operates only when prior proceedings under the State enactment and the subsequent proceedings concern the identical subject matter; distinct allegations and evidentiary foundations preclude its application.