Issues: Whether the assessment order confirming tax and interest liabilities required fresh consideration in view of the asserted inadequate response regarding reverse-charge liability and the disputed input tax credit.

Analysis: The order noted that the liabilities concerning blocked credit and reverse-charge tax had been paid, while interest remained payable, and that the turnover-difference demand had been dropped. A further opportunity for adjudication was considered appropriate. No final determination was made on the tax, interest, or input tax credit liabilities.

Outcome: The impugned assessment order was quashed and the matter remitted for a fresh order on merits, conditional upon payment of the admitted interest liability and verification of the stipulated pre-deposit.

Issues: Whether rejection of an application seeking waiver under Section 128A solely for non-filing of Form GST DRC-03A, despite prior payment through Form GST DRC-03, was sustainable.

Analysis: Rule 164(2) requires payment of the tax demanded to be credited against the debit entry created by the order, and its second proviso requires Form GST DRC-03A where payment was made through Form GST DRC-03. Non-filing of Form GST DRC-03A was procedural where the amount already debited had not been utilised towards any other tax liability. Verification was required as to whether the equivalent amount remained available in the electronic credit ledger until the impugned order; upon such verification, post facto filing of Form GST DRC-03A could be permitted.

Conclusion: The rejection was set aside for fresh determination after verification of the availability of the tax amount and after permitting the petitioner to respond to the notice in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the maximum penalty for delayed filing of quarterly TDS statements was justified despite deposit of the deducted tax and absence of revenue loss.

Analysis: Delayed filing of the quarterly TDS statements attracted Section 271H(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, Section 271H(2) provides a discretionary range between the statutory minimum and maximum penalty; the maximum cannot be imposed mechanically. The deducted tax had been deposited in the Government treasury, the deductees' credits were regularised upon filing of the statements, and the delay arose in the circumstances of a Government educational institution without causing loss to the revenue. These circumstances rendered the maximum penalty disproportionate.

Conclusion: The maximum penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 for each quarter was unsustainable and was reduced to the statutory minimum of Rs. 10,000 for each quarter, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction for misdeclaration and offences under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a), 135(1)(b) and 135(1)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962 warranted interference in criminal revision; (ii) Whether the sentence required modification.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction for misdeclaration and offences under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a), 135(1)(b) and 135(1)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962 warranted interference in criminal revision.

Analysis: Although the container was certified at the factory as containing granite cobble stones, Customs interception disclosed red sander logs. The untraceable transport vehicle, fictitious intermediaries identified for the export transaction, and absence of a complaint regarding the alleged theft of the declared goods supported the concurrent factual findings. Those findings were not perverse and therefore did not warrant revisional interference.

Conclusion: The convictions for the offences under Sections 132 and 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 are affirmed; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the sentence required modification.

Analysis: Section 132 permits imprisonment, fine, or both. As the prohibited goods were not shown to be goods covered by Section 123, the applicable punishment for the Section 135 offences was under Section 135(1)(ii), carrying a maximum imprisonment of three years. The period already spent in custody and the substantial lapse of time since the occurrence justified modification of the custodial sentence.

Conclusion: Imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone, while fines totalling Rs. 3,50,000 are imposed with the stipulated default imprisonment; the issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The conviction remains operative, with the custodial punishment substituted by the period already undergone and the monetary sanction recalibrated.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent factual findings in criminal revision are not disturbed unless shown to be perverse.

Issues: (i) Whether rehabilitation-policy and agreement-based benefits could be enforced against the corporate debtor or its successor after approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the rejection of rehabilitation benefits on the ground that the petitioner was not a displaced person under the Madhya Pradesh Ki Adarsh Punarvas Niti, 2002 warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether rehabilitation-policy and agreement-based benefits could be enforced against the corporate debtor or its successor after approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 binds all stakeholders, including government authorities, to an approved resolution plan. Claims not forming part of that plan stand extinguished upon its approval. Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect over inconsistent policies, agreements and prior arrangements. The claimed rehabilitation liability was not included in the approved resolution plan.

Conclusion: The rehabilitation-policy and agreement-based claim is not enforceable against the corporate debtor or its successor.

Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of rehabilitation benefits on the ground that the petitioner was not a displaced person under the Madhya Pradesh Ki Adarsh Punarvas Niti, 2002 warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Under Clause 2.1(a) of Madhya Pradesh Ki Adarsh Punarvas Niti, 2002, eligibility depended on the claimant qualifying as a displaced person. The administrative finding, reached after inquiry, inspection, consideration of witness material and a hearing, was that the petitioner had not resided in the acquired area for the required period and was residing with his family elsewhere. Article 226 review does not permit appellate reappreciation of such material absent an apparent or jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: The rejection of rehabilitation benefits disclosed no apparent or jurisdictional error warranting writ interference.

Final Conclusion: The approved insolvency resolution plan extinguished the unprovided corporate liability, and the administrative determination of ineligibility under the rehabilitation policy remains legally undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim not incorporated in an approved resolution plan is extinguished under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and a fact-based administrative determination is not open to reappreciation in writ jurisdiction absent jurisdictional or apparent error.

Issues: Whether the impugned service-tax demand required fresh adjudication because another order appeared to confirm an identical demand for the same period.

Analysis: Two show-cause notices issued on the same date resulted in separate demand orders for the same tax period. The related order was already under statutory appeal, requiring verification of whether both demands concerned the same liability.

Outcome: The matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity to file a reply and to be heard.

Issues: Whether a declarant who made payment under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme within time and sought withdrawal of the pending appeal during the Scheme's currency could be denied a discharge certificate because proof of withdrawal was furnished after closure of the Scheme.

Analysis: Section 127(7) and Section 127(8), read with Rule 9, require payment of the determined amount and withdrawal of the pending appeal, with production of proof of withdrawal for issuance of Form SVLDRS-4. Payment and withdrawal are substantive conditions, whereas intimation or production of proof to the designated committee is procedural. The Scheme prescribed a timeline for payment but none for withdrawal. The payment was timely made and the withdrawal request was filed while the Scheme remained operative; delayed listing and withdrawal resulted from the COVID-19 disruption and lay within the Court's domain. The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit prevents prejudice from an act or delay of the Court. Satisfaction of essential conditions cannot be defeated by procedural or electronic-processing formalities.

Conclusion: Denial of Form SVLDRS-4 was invalid. The designated committee must manually process the request and issue the discharge certificate; the subsequent adjudication reviving the settled demand was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a District Magistrate may require a secured creditor to deposit or bear police-assistance expenses for taking possession of a secured asset under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Section 14 requires the Magistrate to assist a secured creditor in taking possession of secured assets and permits such steps and force as may be necessary to secure compliance. Police assistance, where necessary, forms part of that statutory mechanism. The provision contains no express authority permitting recovery of police-assistance expenses from the secured creditor or imposing such payment as a condition for implementation.

Conclusion: A condition requiring the secured creditor to deposit police-assistance charges under Section 14 is unauthorised and invalid; the condition was set aside and necessary police assistance was directed.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment disclosed a procedural irregularity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The impugned assessment was found free from procedural irregularity. Although the period for statutory appeal had expired, liberty to invoke the appellate remedy was granted upon verification of the stated recovery of the requisite disputed tax amount, with a direction for disposal on merits without reference to limitation.

Conclusion: No procedural irregularity in the assessment was established, and writ interference was declined.

Issues: Whether interference was warranted with the order confirming the GST demand where liability for blocked input tax credit and reverse-charge tax had been admitted, and where alleged unreported turnover was identified through comparison with Form 26AS.

Analysis: Tax liability on the first two discrepancies had been admitted and paid, leaving interest and penalty payable. The remaining discrepancy concerned turnover allegedly omitted from GST returns despite its reflection in Form 26AS. No detailed merits adjudication of that discrepancy was undertaken in the writ proceedings, for which the statutory appellate remedy remained available.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the appellate remedy for the turnover discrepancy.

Issues: (i) Whether an oral agreement between companies is legally barred under the Companies Act, 2013; (ii) Whether the pleaded authority of a company representative can be rejected for want of an authority letter at the Order VII Rule 11 stage.

Issue (i): Whether an oral agreement between companies is legally barred under the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: Section 46 of the Companies Act, 1956, which had been relied upon to require written execution, stood repealed and was not preserved by the savings provision. The Companies Act, 2013 contains no corresponding prohibition. Section 21 regulates authorization for signing written documents and does not impose a mandatory writing requirement for every corporate agreement. General contract law recognizes concluded reciprocal promises without requiring every agreement for sale to be written.

Conclusion: An oral agreement between companies is not barred by the Companies Act, 2013 and may be governed by general contract law.

Issue (ii): Whether the pleaded authority of a company representative can be rejected for want of an authority letter at the Order VII Rule 11 stage.

Analysis: The plaint specifically pleaded that the representative had been authorized to execute the agreement for the company. The correctness and validity of that pleaded authority require evidentiary determination and cannot be decided at the plaint-rejection stage.

Conclusion: Absence of an authority letter cannot defeat a specific pleading of authorization under Order VII Rule 11; the issue must be determined on evidence.

Final Conclusion: The objections based on an alleged mandatory writing requirement and lack of documentary proof of authority did not warrant rejection of the plaint, with the authority question remaining for evidentiary adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statutory bar or mandatory writing requirement, repeal of an earlier corporate-execution provision leaves oral agreements between companies governed by general contract law.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment required fresh adjudication in light of the asserted overlap with an earlier assessment concerning three demand heads.

Analysis: The petitioner had asserted that substantially identical demands relating to blocked input tax credit, commission income and reverse-charge freight had already been confirmed by the jurisdictional officer, and that the tax liability had been discharged. Fresh adjudication was directed after deposit of the interest and penalty imposed in the earlier assessment, with notice to the petitioner.

Outcome: The impugned assessment was quashed and remitted for fresh determination on merits upon compliance with the stipulated deposit.

Issues: Whether confiscation and penalties could be sustained for alleged smuggling of foreign-origin black pepper and socks that were not notified goods.

Analysis: The goods were not notified under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. The burden therefore remained on Revenue to establish that the goods were smuggled. Revenue failed to discharge that burden.

Conclusion: The goods were not liable to confiscation, and no penalties could be imposed.

Issues: Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of the Trust's properties as proceeds of crime or property of equivalent value was sustainable despite the asserted purchase and distribution of aids and appliances from the grant-in-aid.

Analysis: Sections 2(1)(u), 3, 5 and 8(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 govern identification of proceeds of crime, money-laundering conduct, provisional attachment and its confirmation. The material established that the claimed distribution camps had not been organised in the relevant districts, the supporting records carried forged official signatures, and the stated beneficiaries denied receiving the aids and appliances. The appellants produced invoices and bank records concerning purchase, but furnished no reliable material proving distribution to disabled persons or explaining the transfer of Rs. 20,82,795 from the Trust's account to its representative. The identified movable and immovable properties and bank balances were within the quantified value of the misused grant.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the provisional attachment of the identified properties as proceeds of crime or property representing their value was sustained.

Issues: Whether the provision of vehicles fitted with hydrogen cylinder skids for charges computed on a per-trip basis was taxable as supply of tangible goods service.

Analysis: Supply of tangible goods service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where tangible goods are supplied for use without transferring their possession and effective control. The per-trip basis of charges indicated transportation activity rather than renting of vehicles. The activity had already been found not classifiable as supply of tangible goods service; the subsequent examination also found that it did not meet the criteria of a goods transport agency.

Conclusion: The activity was not classifiable as supply of tangible goods service, and the service-tax demand under that category was set aside.

Issues: (i) Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; (ii) Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision; (iii) Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Issue (i): Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Analysis: Section 18 contemplates statutory conciliation before an adversarial dispute arises. A notice confined to calling a party for mediation does not create an adjudicatory lis; the dispute becomes adversarial only upon failure of conciliation. Judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 is therefore premature at the mediation stage.

Conclusion: The civil revision petition was not maintainable against the mediation notice, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision.

Analysis: The earlier challenge was withdrawn after the Council indicated that it would entertain a fresh claim. The subsequent notice was consequently not an exercise of review of the previous decision.

Conclusion: The fresh mediation notice did not amount to an impermissible review, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Analysis: The statutory remedy under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is an independent right available to a registered supplier. Parallel proceedings before a commercial court do not create a legal bar to the Council dealing with the statutory claim.

Conclusion: The pending commercial proceedings did not bar the supplier's claim before the Council, in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The statutory mediation process may continue, and the Council may entertain the supplier's claim notwithstanding the parallel commercial proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating statutory conciliation under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 creates no adjudicatory lis amenable to Article 227 review before conciliation fails, and the statutory remedy is not displaced by parallel civil proceedings.

Outcome: Assessment order quashed and matter remitted for fresh adjudication on stipulated pre-deposit and reply.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST assessment order warranted interference when the record showed service of the statutory pre-notice and show-cause notice.

Analysis: The record established that an intimation in Form GST DRC-01A and a show-cause notice in Form GST DRC-01 had been issued under the Section 73 assessment process. No procedural irregularity was discernible in the making of the impugned order. Nevertheless, a conditional opportunity for de novo adjudication was granted in accordance with the consistent approach adopted in similar matters.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside for fresh adjudication upon the petitioner depositing 25% of the disputed tax in cash and filing its reply with supporting documents within the stipulated period. The bank attachment was directed to be lifted upon compliance with the stipulated conditions.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2015-16, founded on a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on or after 1 April 2021, could continue under the substituted reassessment regime.

Analysis: The applicable legal position included the Revenue's accepted concession that notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 for Assessment Year 2015-16 did not fall within the period available for completion under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. That position applied to the notice in question and its consequential proceedings under Sections 148A and 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2015-16 could not continue and were required to be dropped.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate forum has statutory power to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution and to set aside such default dismissal; (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to a fresh merits determination in its first appeal after dismissal for non-appearance despite payment of pre-deposit and disputed service of hearing notices.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate forum has statutory power to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution and to set aside such default dismissal.

Analysis: Section 111(1) requires the appellate forum to be guided by principles of natural justice while regulating its procedure. Section 111(2)(f) expressly authorises dismissal of a representation for default or ex parte decision, while Section 111(2)(g) expressly authorises setting aside of such default dismissal or ex parte order. The reference to a representation includes an appeal for this purpose.

Conclusion: The appellate forum is empowered to dismiss for default and to set aside a default or ex parte order. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to a fresh merits determination in its first appeal after dismissal for non-appearance despite payment of pre-deposit and disputed service of hearing notices.

Analysis: The first appeal had been validly constituted upon payment of the prescribed pre-deposit. In view of the asserted lack of effective notice of the hearing dates and the absence of any apparent reason for the assessee to abandon an appeal after making the pre-deposit, denial of a merits determination in the first appeal was not justified. The statutory restoration mechanism was available, but the facts warranted preservation of the assessee's opportunity for a first appellate decision on merits.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to a fresh merits determination after due opportunity of hearing. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's right to an effective first appellate adjudication on merits was preserved notwithstanding the appellate forum's statutory power to dismiss matters for default.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate forum expressly empowered to dismiss for default is correspondingly empowered to set aside a default dismissal or ex parte order under the statutory procedure.