Issues: (i) Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter; (ii) Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice; and (iii) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Issue (i): Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars proceedings by a proper officer under the Central enactment only where proceedings under the State enactment were initiated earlier and both proceedings concern the same subject matter. The DGST proceedings arose from reconciliation of turnover declared in GSTR-3B returns, whereas the CGST proceedings were founded on search material concerning non-existent suppliers, wrongful availment of ITC, and issuance of invoices without corresponding supplies. The allegations, evidentiary material and defaults were therefore distinct.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 6(2)(b) did not bar the CGST proceedings, and the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not non est.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: Multiple hearing notices were sent through speed post and registered e-mail. The assessee neither appeared on the notified dates nor filed a substantive response to the show-cause notice, having only sought additional time and a hearing.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded, and the ex parte order was not vitiated by breach of natural justice.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.

Analysis: The provision had been held intra vires by a High Court, and that view was affirmed by a speaking order of the Supreme Court. The constitutional position was consequently treated as settled.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 remains intra vires and constitutionally valid.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar was inapplicable, no denial of hearing was established, and the constitutional challenge could not be sustained; the merits of the ITC demand remain unadjudicated.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings operates only when prior proceedings under the State enactment and the subsequent proceedings concern the identical subject matter; distinct allegations and evidentiary foundations preclude its application.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-disclosure of bank details and multiple registrations linked to a joint bank account should be quashed and reconsidered.

Analysis: Rules 10A and 21(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 require disclosure of bank-account particulars and permit cancellation for specified defaults. Non-disclosure of correct bank details was treated as a curable lapse. Cancellation of GST registration carries severe civil consequences by disabling the dealer from carrying on business; where no allegation of fraudulent transactions, fake invoices, circular trading, or tax evasion exists and the taxpayer expresses bona fide willingness to regularise returns and outstanding dues, a liberal and pragmatic approach is warranted. A fresh representation supported by relevant bank documents and a personal hearing were required before a decision on restoration.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed, and the authority was directed to independently decide restoration of registration after considering the taxpayer's representation and granting a hearing, with restoration conditional on statutory compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority's failure to address the material grounds of appeal and give reasons violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order; (ii) Whether the matters should be sent for fresh original adjudication where the first appellate authority had not decided the grounds on merits and objections concerning notice, relied-upon documents and hearing remained unresolved.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority's failure to address the material grounds of appeal and give reasons violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order.

Analysis: The appellate orders merely stated that satisfactory evidence had not been produced and confirmed the original orders. They did not address the seven grounds of appeal or the authorities relied upon, and identical reasoning was used in all three matters despite distinct evidentiary disputes. The principles of natural justice require a quasi-judicial appellate authority to give cogent reasons and determine the material grounds raised before it.

Conclusion: The first appellate orders were unsustainable for failure to provide reasoned determinations of the material grounds.

Issue (ii): Whether the matters should be sent for fresh original adjudication where the first appellate authority had not decided the grounds on merits and objections concerning notice, relied-upon documents and hearing remained unresolved.

Analysis: A merits determination at the second-appellate stage would deprive the parties of effective appellate review of the factual and legal grounds not considered at the first stage. Although remand is ordinarily avoided, the original orders were ex parte and the objections regarding the contents of the notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective personal hearing had not received adjudication. These matters required examination on the original record with a meaningful opportunity to respond.

Conclusion: The impugned appellate and original orders were set aside for fresh original adjudication after consideration of the procedural objections and issuance of a reasoned decision.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicatory process must ensure identification and availability of relied-upon material, a reasonable opportunity to respond and be heard, and reasoned findings on the evidence before tax liability is redetermined.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order that does not address material grounds or give reasons is invalid; where foundational objections in the original adjudication remain unaddressed, fresh original adjudication is warranted to preserve effective appellate review.

Issues: (i) Whether invoices issued during the refund period for export goods may be included in zero-rated turnover where the goods were actually exported after that period; (ii) Whether Net ITC for the refund formula must be reduced by inadmissible ITC where the maximum refund remains higher than the amount claimed.

Issue (i): Whether invoices issued during the refund period for export goods may be included in zero-rated turnover where the goods were actually exported after that period.

Analysis: Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits refund of ITC on zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax under bond or letter of undertaking. The refund formula requires Net ITC, turnover of zero-rated supply and adjusted total turnover to relate to the same relevant period. Under Sections 12 and 31 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, a tax invoice for goods involving movement must be issued before or at removal, and the supply is accounted for through invoices issued in that period. Export goods supplied under bond or letter of undertaking consequently form part of zero-rated turnover in the period in which the export invoices are issued. Actual export remains a condition for grant of refund, but the later date of the shipping bill does not displace the invoice value from the relevant-period turnover once export is established.

Conclusion: Yes. The value of the four export invoices was includible in zero-rated turnover for the refund period despite the subsequent physical export of the goods. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Net ITC for the refund formula must be reduced by inadmissible ITC where the maximum refund remains higher than the amount claimed.

Analysis: The alleged inadmissible ITC of Rs. 23,560 did not materially affect the entitlement because, even on the Department's proposed calculation, the maximum refund permissible under Rule 89(4) remained substantially higher than the refund claimed and sanctioned.

Conclusion: No. The alleged inadmissible ITC did not warrant reduction of the sanctioned refund. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The refund claim remains legally sustainable on the invoice-based computation of zero-rated turnover, and the proposed ITC adjustment does not alter the admissible refund.

Ratio Decidendi: For refund under Rule 89(4), turnover of zero-rated supply of goods for the relevant period is determined by export invoices issued at or before removal of the goods, subject to proof of actual export, and not by the later date on which the goods leave India.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after a search could be sustained where the seized cash had been disclosed by the petitioner as income and accepted as belonging to it in prior proceedings.

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2024-25, a search-related notice could be issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without recourse to Section 153C or the procedure under Section 148A(1). However, the seized cash had been offered by the petitioner as cash sales, and adjustment thereof towards tax liability had been accepted in prior appellate proceedings. The same Assessing Officer had also accepted, while assessing the director, that the cash belonged to the petitioner. The notice did not refer to the seized cash or assert the jurisdictional facts supporting the inference of escaped income; treating the known cash as deemed information was therefore found to raise a serious jurisdictional question requiring consideration.

Outcome: Notice was issued and reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice were stayed pending final hearing.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings complied with principles of natural justice when additional information was sought through a subsequent communication without adequate time to respond.

Analysis: The information concerning the source of funds was sought through a communication issued after the original show-cause notice. Considering that the communication was digitally signed shortly before intervening holidays and required a response by midday on the next working day, the effective time available was about three-and-a-half hours. The petitioner was therefore not afforded an adequate opportunity to furnish the requested particulars before the order under Section 148A(3) was made.

Conclusion: The denial of adequate opportunity violated principles of natural justice and vitiated the order made under Section 148A(3). The petitioner must be afforded a hearing after furnishing the requested details, with all merits kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.

Issue (i): Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deems an act done on the next day on which the office is open to have been done in time where the last day of the prescribed period is a day on which the office is closed. Since the thirtieth day for filing the objection fell on a Sunday, the following working day was the valid last date.

Conclusion: The objection filed on 16 March 2026 was within limitation, and its rejection as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.

Analysis: The procedure under Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is mandatory. Where a timely objection is filed, a final assessment may be made only after the Dispute Resolution Panel adjudicates the objection and issues directions under Section 144C(5); such directions are binding under Section 144C(10). A final assessment made before that process is completed lacks jurisdictional foundation.

Conclusion: The final assessment made without Dispute Resolution Panel adjudication and directions was without jurisdiction and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A timely objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel must be adjudicated on merits before a final assessment can lawfully be made, and the statutory Dispute Resolution Panel process is required to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the last day for filing a Dispute Resolution Panel objection falls on a day when the office is closed, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits filing on the next working day; a timely objection precludes final assessment until binding Dispute Resolution Panel directions are issued.

Issues: Whether the five formulated grades of natural astaxanthin are classifiable as non-synthetic food colours under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 or as food preparations under Tariff Item 2106 90 99.

Analysis: Rules 1 and 6 of the General Rules for the Interpretation require classification by the terms of the relevant headings, notes and subheadings. Heading 3203, read with Note 3 to Chapter 32 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, covers vegetable or animal colouring matter and preparations of a kind used for colouring materials or for making colouring preparations. The formulations, in their condition as imported, were standardised to specified astaxanthin concentrations and contained carriers, stabilisers and, for certain grades, emulsifying, micro-encapsulation or spray-drying features. Their product specifications and safety data sheets identified dietary-supplement, food, beverage and nutraceutical applications rather than a colouring function.

Analysis: The goods were not crude algal extracts or separately chemically defined compounds, nor were they shown to be preparations mainly used for colouring. Heading 2106 applied because the formulated astaxanthin products were not more specifically covered elsewhere and answered the description of food or dietary-supplement preparations under Supplementary Note 5 to Chapter 21 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, which include food-supplement preparations based on extracts or concentrates despite the presence of colours, carriers or stabilisers.

Conclusion: The five astaxanthin grades are not classifiable under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 and are classifiable under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals; (ii) Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals.

Analysis: The documents sought to be produced were relied-upon documents forming part of the respondent's prosecution complaint. Their consideration was material to determining whether the attachment of the properties should continue during pendency of the complaint.

Conclusion: The refusal to take the documents on record was set aside, and the documents were treated as having been taken on record, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.

Analysis: The appeals had remained pending since 2022, the documents were already within the appellants' knowledge and possession, and the applications were filed only when the appeals were listed for final hearing.

Conclusion: The costs imposed for the belated filing were sustained, against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The relied-upon documents form part of the appellate record for consideration of the continuing attachment, while the monetary consequence for the delayed application remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Relied-upon documents forming part of the prosecuting authority's complaint should be received on record where they are material to deciding the continuation of property attachment, though belated production may warrant costs.

Issues: (i) Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Section 17 permits search and seizure upon the requisite material, while retention and adjudication require a prima facie connection between the property and proceeds of crime. The material disclosed substantial movement of alleged tainted funds through accounts operated by or connected with the appellant and their utilisation for acquisition of assets, including jewellery. At the retention stage, a transaction-wise tracing of every item of jewellery was not essential where the material as a whole established a continuous flow and utilisation of funds. Recovery from a joint-family residence, or the assertion that some jewellery belonged to a person not accused in the scheduled offence, did not by itself invalidate the seizure; the relevant inquiry was whether the property was connected with, or required examination in relation to, proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The search, seizure and retention were justified, and the seized jewellery was prima facie connected with proceeds of crime. The finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellant participated in the adjudicatory proceedings and had an effective opportunity to place a defence. No specific prejudice resulting in a failure of natural justice was established. A procedural irregularity does not invalidate an adjudication unless it causes substantial prejudice.

Conclusion: The alleged non-service of the show-cause notice did not vitiate the retention order. The finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of retention of the seized property remains legally sustainable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Ratio Decidendi: Retention of property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be sustained on prima facie material connecting it with proceeds of crime, notwithstanding its recovery from a joint-family premises or a claim by a person not accused in the scheduled offence.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to consider and decide the representations.

Issues: Whether an adjudication and appellate order can be sustained when the personal hearing under the show-cause notice was fixed before expiry of the time allowed for filing a reply.

Analysis: Sections 75(4) and 75(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require a meaningful opportunity of hearing before an adverse determination. Fixing the hearing before the deadline to submit a reply deprived the assessee of an effective opportunity to respond and seek a hearing on the proposed demand, contrary to the prescribed statutory procedure and principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The hearing was ineffective and the resulting adjudication and appellate orders were invalid for breach of principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether recovery from the electronic cash ledger may continue after payment of the statutory pre-deposits pending appeal.

Analysis: The Court noted the statutory stay of recovery upon the required pre-deposit and found a prima facie case for examining whether any amount recovered exceeded the cumulative pre-deposit. Compliance with the pre-deposit requirements and the claim for recredit or refund were left for independent determination by the competent authority.

Outcome: The representation was directed to be decided by a reasoned order after personal hearing, with recredit or refund of any excess recovery if found due.

Issues: (i) Whether commission earned for soliciting orders for a foreign principal constituted export of Business Auxiliary Service and was not liable to service tax; (ii) Whether equipment rentals involving transfer of possession, custody and effective control constituted a deemed sale rather than Supply of Tangible Goods service; (iii) Whether service tax under reverse charge on imported software was time-barred because the demand was based on disclosed financial records and was revenue-neutral; (iv) Whether Cenvat credit transferred on demerger under Rule 10 was admissible and, in any event, whether its recovery was time-barred; (v) Whether Cenvat credit could be denied for want of documents despite invoices, input-service register and reconciliation having been furnished; (vi) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for demands founded on audit records, filed returns and information disclosed to the Department.

Issue (i): Whether commission earned for soliciting orders for a foreign principal constituted export of Business Auxiliary Service and was not liable to service tax.

Analysis: Under Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005, the service qualified as export where provided to a recipient located outside India and consideration was received in foreign exchange. For the subsequent period, Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 located the provision of the service at the recipient's location. The foreign principal was the recipient of the order-procurement service.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the commission-based order-procurement service was export of service and was not liable to service tax.

Issue (ii): Whether equipment rentals involving transfer of possession, custody and effective control constituted a deemed sale rather than Supply of Tangible Goods service.

Analysis: The contractual terms placed the rented equipment under the customer's possession, custody, control and overall supervision during the rental tenure, and restricted its withdrawal by the supplier. VAT had also been discharged on the transaction as a deemed sale.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the rentals were deemed-sale transactions and no service tax was payable under Supply of Tangible Goods service.

Issue (iii): Whether service tax under reverse charge on imported software was time-barred because the demand was based on disclosed financial records and was revenue-neutral.

Analysis: The demand was founded solely on figures appearing in publicly available balance sheets and profit-and-loss records, without evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement. Any service tax paid under reverse charge would have been available as input-service credit under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, rendering the transaction revenue-neutral.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the reverse-charge demand on imported software was time-barred and liable to be set aside.

Issue (iv): Whether Cenvat credit transferred on demerger under Rule 10 was admissible and, in any event, whether its recovery was time-barred.

Analysis: The credit was reflected as opening balance in the relevant ST-3 return and its availment following demerger had been intimated to the Department. The show-cause notice issued in April 2016 sought recovery of credit availed for April to September 2010, beyond even the extended limitation period. The demerger also entitled the successor entity to carry forward the transferor's closing Cenvat-credit balance under Rule 10 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the transferred Cenvat credit was admissible and its recovery was also time-barred.

Issue (v): Whether Cenvat credit could be denied for want of documents despite invoices, input-service register and reconciliation having been furnished.

Analysis: The invoices, input-service tax register, sample invoices and reconciliation of the Cenvat-credit register with the ST-3 return had been furnished. The eligibility of the input-service credit was undisputed, but the submitted records were not considered.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: denial of Cenvat credit for want of documents was legally unsustainable.

Issue (vi): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for demands founded on audit records, filed returns and information disclosed to the Department.

Analysis: The substantial demands concerned the extended period and were based on audit of records, service-tax returns and information made available to the Department. Such disclosed material did not establish suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the extended period was wrongly invoked and the demand for October 2011 to March 2014 was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned fiscal demands, together with consequential interest and penalties, lacked legal sustainability.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax was invocable; (ii) Whether works contract services for widening and strengthening a road and providing footpaths qualified for exemption applicable to road construction.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax was invocable.

Analysis: The demand was founded on figures appearing in Form 26AS, income-tax returns and statements of receipts supplied by the assessee. The material was already available to the department, and the notice did not identify any independent verification or evidence of a deliberate and wilful act to evade tax. For invoking the extended period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, suppression must be a positive, deliberate and wilful non-disclosure; mere omission or failure to declare is insufficient.

Conclusion: The extended period was not available, and the demand raised by invoking that period was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether works contract services for widening and strengthening a road and providing footpaths qualified for exemption applicable to road construction.

Analysis: The services involved material and labour and were works contract services rendered to Government authorities for a public road-development project. Entry 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempts construction-related services concerning a road for public use. A road includes its integral facilities for public movement, including footpaths; therefore, widening and strengthening works for providing footpaths could not be severed from the composite road-development project.

Conclusion: The works contract services qualified for the exemption under Entry 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand, and the consequential interest and penalties founded on it, were legally unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period requires evidence of deliberate and wilful suppression, and public-road construction exemption extends to integral footpath works forming part of a composite road-development project.

Issues: (i) Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business; (ii) Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served; and (iii) Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction is supervisory and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or displacement of Concurrent Findings absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest miscarriage of justice. Admission of signature and issuance of the cheque activated the Presumption of Consideration and the Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt under Sections 118(a) and 139. The Rebuttable Presumption required a Probable Defence supported by material. The inconsistent account of the tyre price and balance payable, absence of proof of part-payment, and admitted connection between the complainant and the business did not displace those presumptions. The absence of transaction records did not by itself require the holder to prove the underlying consideration.

Conclusion: The concurrent finding of liability was not liable to revisional interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served.

Analysis: Service of Statutory Notice was established by the acknowledgement bearing the accused's signature. The contention concerning a delayed presumption of service was inapplicable because actual service, rather than deemed service, was proved. Non-payment after receipt of the demand notice completed the relevant statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The statutory demand notice was validly served.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Analysis: The penal provision for cheque dishonour serves a deterrent purpose, while compensation is compensatory and restitutive. Considering the cheque amount, the prolonged delay before sentencing, loss of interest, and litigation expense, the imprisonment and monetary relief were regarded as adequate rather than excessive.

Conclusion: The sentence and compensation required no modification.

Final Conclusion: No perversity, jurisdictional error, or disproportionality was established in the concurrent determinations.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of the signature and issuance of a cheque activates the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability; an unsupported blank-cheque defence does not rebut them, and concurrent findings are not revisable absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab, without separate intimation and without an effective opportunity of hearing, could be sustained.

Analysis: Adjudication under Section 73 of the applicable GST enactments must conform to principles of natural justice. The order was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, and the petitioner had made out a prima facie case regarding the absence of an effective hearing. A fresh determination therefore required consideration of the reply, an opportunity of hearing, and a reasoned adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order was unsustainable and required fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision; (iii) Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund; (iv) Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective; and (v) Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Issue (i): Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 54(3) permits refund of unutilised input tax credit. Once accumulated credit is converted into a monetary payment, it is a statutory refund; if it exceeds the entitlement under Section 54(3) read with Rule 89(5), it falls within the erroneous-refund limb of Section 73. The separate expression concerning input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised addresses ledger-stage credit and does not exclude a cash refund originating from input tax credit. The strict construction of taxing statutes does not require an exclusion unsupported by the enacted text.

Conclusion: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit is capable of being treated as an erroneous refund under Section 73. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision.

Analysis: Sections 107(2) and 108 provide appellate and revisional routes to test the legality or propriety of a refund order, whereas Section 73 provides an independent demand-and-determination mechanism for an amount erroneously refunded. None of those provisions makes prior appeal or revision a jurisdictional precondition for Section 73. The Section 73 power is not a general authority to reopen concluded refund adjudications or to disregard a subsisting appellate determination; on the facts, however, no appellate order affirming the refund existed and the notice was founded on the governing Rule 89(5) computation.

Conclusion: Non-invocation of Section 107(2) or Section 108 did not oust Section 73 jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund.

Analysis: Section 73(1), (5), (8) and (9) repeatedly link an erroneous refund with interest payable under Section 50. This supplies substantive statutory authority rather than an interest charge based on implication. Interest is compensatory and is not conditional on fraud, fault, or the absence of departmental error in sanctioning the refund. Payment of only the principal amount does not result in statutory closure under Section 73(8), which requires payment of the tax together with applicable interest.

Conclusion: Sections 73 and 50 jointly authorise interest on an erroneous refund. Against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective.

Analysis: The substituted Rule 89(5) was operative from 01.07.2017, before both the refund application and the refund sanction. The subsequent Supreme Court decision upheld the existing rule and did not create a new liability. Rule 88B concerns computation of interest and neither creates nor extinguishes the statutory charge arising from Sections 73 and 50. A contrary High Court ruling operative for part of the period did not suspend the rule or create an interest-free interval.

Conclusion: The interest demand is not an impermissible retrospective levy. Against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Analysis: The refund was credited on 13.02.2019 and the principal amount was repaid on 08.11.2021. Interest at 18% per annum for 999 days was arithmetically consistent with the quantified demand, and no alternative rate, period, or computation was established.

Conclusion: The interest demand of Rs.44,51,491/- was correctly sustained. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory interest liability arising from repayment of the erroneous inverted-duty refund remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit exceeding statutory entitlement may be recovered as an erroneous refund under Section 73, and Section 73 read with Section 50 carries compensatory interest without requiring prior reversal of the original refund order through appeal or revision.

Issues: (i) Whether the Benami proceedings conclusively established ownership of the seized cash; (ii) Whether a person claiming cash seized from another person's premises may seek its release under the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i); (iii) Whether established ownership entitled the claimant to immediate release without explaining the cash's nature and source.

Issue (i): Whether the Benami proceedings conclusively established ownership of the seized cash.

Analysis: The order under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 expressly found the ownership of the cash to be established, held that it was not benami property, declined attachment, and dropped the proceedings. That determination conclusively established ownership for purposes of the Benami proceedings. It did not, however, determine the nature and source of the cash for income-tax assessment.

Conclusion: Ownership of the seized cash stood established in favour of the claimant under the Benami proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether a person claiming cash seized from another person's premises may seek its release under the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i).

Analysis: The expression "person concerned" in the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i) includes a person whose assets are seized in a search conducted against another person. A claimant is therefore not disentitled from applying for release merely because the cash was seized from another person's custody, although Revenue interests may be protected by an appropriate indemnity where competing claims arise.

Conclusion: A third-party claimant may apply for release of seized assets under section 132B(1)(i), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether established ownership entitled the claimant to immediate release without explaining the cash's nature and source.

Analysis: The first proviso to section 132B(1)(i) requires an application within the stipulated period and an explanation of the nature and source of acquisition to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Ownership established in proceedings under another statute does not substitute for this statutory disclosure and satisfaction. The application was delayed and did not explain the nature or source of the cash, while assessment proceedings concerning the seized cash remained pending or contemplated. The stated questions concerning the effect of the 120-day period, non-decision on an application, and a deficient application were referred to a Larger Bench for determination.

Conclusion: Established ownership alone did not entitle the claimant to immediate release of the cash without the required disclosure and satisfaction; the claim for release was not accepted at this stage, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The claimant's ownership and standing to seek release were recognised, but the income-tax inquiry into the source of the cash was not displaced; the questions concerning the statutory time limit and consequences of a deficient release application await determination by a Larger Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: A person claiming assets seized from another may invoke section 132B(1)(i), but ownership established under the Benami law does not by itself warrant release without compliance with the statutory requirement to explain the nature and source of acquisition to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer.

Issues: Whether thermic fluids imported for initial charging of a Continuous Polycondensation plant qualify as capital goods eligible for customs-duty exemption under the Status Holders Incentive Scheme.

Analysis: Paragraph 9.12 of the Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 and Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14.09.2009 define capital goods broadly to cover plant, machinery, equipment or accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacture, including specified articles required for initial charge. The thermic fluids were initially charged into the plant and thereafter continuously circulated in a closed loop to supply the precise high-temperature heat essential to the polycondensation process while maintaining low pressure. Their functional integration with, and indispensability to, the plant's operation established their character as capital goods; their description as chemical inputs under the Standard Input Output Norms did not displace that character.

Conclusion: Thermic fluids used for the initial charging and essential operation of the Continuous Polycondensation plant are capital goods and qualify for the exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14.09.2009.