Return scrutiny is not mandatory before fraud-based input tax credit proceedings; disputed facts belong in statutory adjudication.
Section 61 return scrutiny and Rule 99 procedures are not mandatory jurisdictional preconditions for proceedings under Section 74A where the proper officer relies on independent material. Allegations of input tax credit claimed through fake invoices, fictitious entities, or supplies not actually received prima facie support initiation of fraud-based proceedings, while the underlying facts require statutory adjudication. Writ intervention against a show-cause notice is generally unavailable where objections involve disputed facts and no lack of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice, fundamental-rights violation, or surviving validity challenge is established. Merits defences remain available before the adjudicating authority.
Issues: (i) Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation; (iii) Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.
Issue (i): Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice.
Analysis: Section 61 is a pre-adjudicatory mechanism confined to scrutiny of returns. Its procedure, including Rule 99, applies once scrutiny has in fact been initiated and discrepancies are noticed. Proceedings under Section 74A are independent and may be triggered by material obtained through scrutiny, audit, inspection, investigation or other credible independent verification. Here, the notice was founded on independent verification concerning allegedly bogus and non-existent sub-contractors, and not on a scrutiny of the petitioner's returns under Section 61.
Conclusion: Prior scrutiny under Section 61 and compliance with Rule 99 were not jurisdictional preconditions for the notice under Section 74A. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation.
Analysis: The notice alleged that input tax credit had been availed through fake documents and invoices relating to fictitious entities and without actual underlying supplies. Such allegations prima facie disclose fraudulent availment of input tax credit and satisfy the foundational threshold for initiating action under Section 74A(5)(ii). The truth of those allegations, including the existence and functioning of the sub-contractors and actual execution of work, requires evidentiary adjudication by the statutory authority.
Conclusion: The notice disclosed sufficient jurisdictional facts for invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii). The issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.
Analysis: A show-cause notice ordinarily does not warrant writ interference unless it is wholly without jurisdiction or falls within recognised exceptional circumstances. The asserted objections involve disputed facts and are available for determination in the statutory adjudication. No infringement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction, or surviving challenge to statutory validity was established.
Conclusion: No case for threshold interference under Article 226 was made out. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the notice fails, while all factual and legal defences on the merits of the proposed tax demand remain available before the adjudicating authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Scrutiny of returns is not an invariable condition precedent to proceedings for determination of wrongly availed input tax credit where the proper officer acts on independent material that prima facie discloses fraud or fictitious supplies; disputed factual defences must ordinarily be addressed in statutory adjudication rather than writ jurisdiction.