Issues: Whether gold jewellery imported in breach of applicable import conditions becomes prohibited goods, and whether redemption in lieu of confiscation under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 can be claimed as a right.

Analysis: Import restrictions constitute prohibition for confiscation purposes, and non-compliance with conditions governing import of gold results in restricted gold being treated as prohibited goods. The import conditions were not fulfilled: the passengers were not eligible passengers, had stayed abroad only for four days, had neither made the prescribed declaration nor paid duty in convertible foreign currency, and the quantity exceeded the permissible limits for jewellery under the Baggage Rules, 2016. For prohibited goods, Section 125 confers discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, to grant redemption. The refusal of redemption was based on relevant material, including non-declaration, concealment, the nature and quantity of gold, and failure to establish lawful import. Exercise of such discretion is not open to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is arbitrary or perverse.

Conclusion: The imported gold was prohibited goods due to breach of import conditions; redemption under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not available as a matter of right, and the refusal to permit redemption was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) could be denied for AY 2016-17 because the return was filed in response to notice under section 148 and after the time stated in that notice; (ii) Whether interest earned on bank deposits of idle funds by a co-operative credit society was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Issue (i): Whether deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) could be denied for AY 2016-17 because the return was filed in response to notice under section 148 and after the time stated in that notice.

Analysis: For AY 2016-17, section 80AC did not extend to deduction under section 80P; its enlarged scope applied only from AY 2018-19. The sixth proviso to section 139(1) neither covered a co-operative society nor a deduction under section 80P. Section 80A(5) required that the deduction be claimed in a return of income, without prescribing that the return must be filed within the due date under section 139(1). A return furnished under section 148 is deemed to be a return under section 139, subject to the statutory exception for an out-of-time return. The assessment was completed on the return furnished under section 148, treating it as valid; consequently, the claim made in that return fulfilled section 80A(5). The appellate authority's substitution of section 80A(5) as the basis for disallowance, without an opportunity on that basis, was also impermissible.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P could not be denied by invoking section 80AC, section 80A(5), or the sixth proviso to section 139(1). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest earned on bank deposits of idle funds by a co-operative credit society was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Analysis: Interest arising from temporary placement of surplus funds of a society engaged solely in providing credit facilities to members is attributable to that business where the funds are not amounts retained and payable to members. The jurisdictional precedent distinguishing interest on such business funds from interest on liabilities arising from retained sale proceeds was binding. The contrary authorities concerning deduction for investments with co-operative banks under section 80P(2)(d) did not govern a claim under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Conclusion: Interest earned on bank deposits of idle funds was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's claimed deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) is allowable in full, including the interest income from temporary bank deposits of idle business funds.

Ratio Decidendi: For AY 2016-17, a deduction under section 80P claimed in a return accepted under section 148 satisfies section 80A(5), and interest on temporary deposits of surplus business funds of a co-operative credit society is attributable to its credit-facility business.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed offline sale of listed shares and adjustment of sale consideration against loan liability established a genuine transfer so as to justify deletion of the addition under Section 68; (ii) Whether writing off a debit balance of Rs. 6,50,000 attracted Section 69C.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed offline sale of listed shares and adjustment of sale consideration against loan liability established a genuine transfer so as to justify deletion of the addition under Section 68.

Analysis: A transfer of listed shares required substantiation through the demat trail and relevant regulatory documentation. No demat statement evidencing movement of shares, share-transfer documentation, contract notes, broker confirmation, stock-exchange trade data, or banking trail for the alleged sale consideration and loan adjustment was available. The claimed transaction therefore did not establish a transfer within Section 2(47). At the same time, a merely notional accounting adjustment, without real transfer or actual reduction of liability, did not by itself generate real income chargeable under Sections 4 and 5. The first appellate finding that all requirements of genuineness stood satisfied was not supported by identified corroborative material.

Conclusion: The Section 68 issue is remitted for de novo adjudication after verification of the documentary and regulatory requirements and of any subsequent completion of the alleged transfer.

Issue (ii): Whether writing off a debit balance of Rs. 6,50,000 attracted Section 69C.

Analysis: The amount represented a debit balance written off, and the expenses including that write-off had already been disallowed by the assessee. No unrecorded expenditure falling within Section 69C was established.

Conclusion: Deletion of the addition under Section 69C is sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax treatment of the alleged share-sale and loan-adjustment arrangement requires fresh examination, while the deletion relating to the written-off debit balance remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: An alleged transfer of listed shares cannot be accepted without reliable evidence of transfer and consideration; however, a notional accounting adjustment that produces no real income cannot alone be subjected to tax.

Issues: (i) Whether a notice under Section 148A(1) must disclose the source of information suggesting escapement of income; (ii) Whether the order under Section 148A(3) was sustainable without considering the assessee's material contention that the disputed amount had already been taxed in an earlier assessment year.

Issue (i): Whether a notice under Section 148A(1) must disclose the source of information suggesting escapement of income.

Analysis: Section 148A(1) requires that the assessee be furnished information suggesting that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. It does not require disclosure of the source from which that information was obtained. The notice and its annexure sufficiently identified the proposed reassessment basis and enabled an effective response.

Conclusion: Disclosure of the source of information was not mandatory; the notice complied with Section 148A(1). This issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the order under Section 148A(3) was sustainable without considering the assessee's material contention that the disputed amount had already been taxed in an earlier assessment year.

Analysis: The assessee's response and computation statements specifically asserted that the amount proposed for reassessment had been included as taxable income in the preceding assessment year. That contention did not dispute taxability but raised the material question whether the income had already suffered tax. Although the response was acknowledged, the order addressed only taxability and did not verify or determine the prior-inclusion contention. The assessing authority could verify the relevant returns available with it; the characterisation of the computation statements as non-statutory documents did not dispense with the need to examine the material assertion.

Conclusion: The order under Section 148A(3) was vitiated by failure to consider the material contention of prior taxation and was quashed. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment decision-making process must address and verify the assessee's claim that the income proposed to be assessed has already been subjected to tax for an earlier year, after affording an effective hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: A determination under Section 148A(3) must consider a material response bearing directly on whether the alleged escaped income has already been taxed; deciding only the abstract taxability of the amount is insufficient.

Issues: Whether discretion to permit redemption of confiscated foreign currency under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962, was properly refused.

Analysis: Foreign currency exported without declaration or requisite permission may be treated as prohibited goods, for which redemption is discretionary rather than mandatory. That discretion must nevertheless be exercised judiciously on the facts of each case and not mechanically merely because the goods are prohibited. The absence of prior Customs Act violations, the penalty already paid, and the statutory ceiling that redemption fine cannot exceed the market value less applicable duty were material considerations. The redemption fine must also be determined consistently with the governing principles applied in comparable cases.

Conclusion: The refusal to allow redemption was set aside, and the petitioner was entitled to release of the confiscated foreign currency upon payment of redemption fine determined in accordance with Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether imported goods may be detained without seizure and without complying with the safeguards under the Customs Act; (ii) Whether the imported goods should be released pending assessment or adjudication and, if so, on what conditions.

Issue (i): Whether imported goods may be detained without seizure and without complying with the safeguards under the Customs Act.

Analysis: Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 permits seizure where the proper officer has reason to believe that goods are liable to confiscation. The statutory scheme, read with Section 124(a), does not authorise indefinite retention of goods under the description of detention or pending verification. Detention cannot be employed as a substitute for seizure so as to avoid the time limitations and procedural safeguards governing seized goods.

Conclusion: Detention of the imported goods without seizure and without compliance with the statutory safeguards is unlawful. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the imported goods should be released pending assessment or adjudication and, if so, on what conditions.

Analysis: Even assuming that concerns existed regarding the nature or classification of the goods, their release could be secured by appropriate conditions. Release was directed on furnishing an indemnity bond for the value of the goods and a bank guarantee for 25% of the differential duty, subject to verification that the goods are fit for human consumption. The customs authorities retain liberty to continue adjudication in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The goods are to be released subject to an indemnity bond, a bank guarantee for 25% of the differential duty, and confirmation of fitness for human consumption. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Imported goods cannot be retained indefinitely merely on the basis of a pending classification dispute where no statutory seizure has been effected; their release may be secured through proportionate protective conditions while adjudication continues.

Ratio Decidendi: Customs authorities cannot use detention without seizure to bypass the statutory safeguards and time limits applicable to retention of goods, and may protect revenue interests through conditions for provisional release.

Issues: (i) Whether limitation relates to jurisdiction; (ii) What is the scope of the expression "where it is possible to do so" in Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962, as applicable when the show-cause notice was issued; and (iii) Whether the 2018 amendment to Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962 applies to proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Issue (i): Whether limitation relates to jurisdiction.

Analysis: Limitation extinguishes stale demands and goes to the root of the adjudicating authority's jurisdiction. An order made after expiry of the applicable limitation is a nullity.

Conclusion: Limitation is jurisdictional; an adjudication barred by limitation is invalid.

Issue (ii): What is the scope of the expression "where it is possible to do so" in Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962, as applicable when the show-cause notice was issued.

Analysis: The expression required adjudication within one year unless completing it within that period was impracticable. It did not authorise indefinite or unreasonable retention of proceedings. Even where a statute does not prescribe a rigid outer limit, statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable time. No material substantiated the asserted Call Book explanation for the prolonged delay.

Conclusion: Adjudication nearly fourteen years after the notice was unreasonable, arbitrary and beyond the permissible scope of Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (iii): Whether the 2018 amendment to Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962 applies to proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Analysis: Although limitation provisions are ordinarily procedural and may operate retrospectively, an enlarged limitation period cannot revive a claim already barred under the prior law. In any event, even if the amendment were applied from its commencement, the permissible extended period would have expired by March 2020, whereas the adjudication was made only in February 2024.

Conclusion: The 2018 amendment could not revive the stale proceeding; alternatively, the adjudication remained barred even under the amended timeline.

Final Conclusion: The delayed customs adjudication was legally unsustainable for want of jurisdiction and for arbitrariness contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory adjudication required to be completed within a stipulated or reasonable period cannot be kept pending indefinitely; a subsequent extension of limitation cannot revive a claim that had already become stale or time-barred.

Issues: (i) Whether COVID-19-related unabsorbed fixed overheads should be excluded as extraordinary costs in computing the tested party's operating margin; (ii) Whether capacity-underutilisation adjustment should be considered for transfer-pricing comparability; (iii) Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment under TNMM can extend to non-associated-enterprise transactions; (iv) Whether the bad-debt addition resulted in double addition; (v) Whether working-capital adjustment should be granted in determining the arm's length price.

Issue (i): Whether COVID-19-related unabsorbed fixed overheads should be excluded as extraordinary costs in computing the tested party's operating margin.

Analysis: The manufacturing operations and sales were materially affected by lockdown conditions, while substantial salary, depreciation and fixed overheads continued to be incurred. Such costs did not generate operating revenue and were incurred to preserve employment and business continuity rather than in ordinary operations. Exceptional, clearly identifiable and non-recurring COVID-19 costs materially affecting comparability warrant separate treatment under the transfer-pricing comparability framework.

Conclusion: COVID-19-related extraordinary fixed overheads shall be excluded from operating cost while computing the operating margin. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether capacity-underutilisation adjustment should be considered for transfer-pricing comparability.

Analysis: The record established underutilisation of the assessee's installed capacity. The absence of publicly available capacity-utilisation data of comparable companies could not require the assessee to perform an impossible task. Relevant information from comparable companies may be obtained through the statutory information-gathering power, with opportunity to the assessee before determination of the adjustment.

Conclusion: The capacity-underutilisation claim is remitted for obtaining comparable-company data and fresh determination of the appropriate adjustment. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment under TNMM can extend to non-associated-enterprise transactions.

Analysis: The transfer-pricing regime authorises redetermination only of income arising from international transactions. Transactions with independent parties are presumed to be at arm's length, and extending the adjustment to them would alter profits from non-associated-enterprise dealings beyond the scope of the regime.

Conclusion: The adjustment shall be restricted to international transactions with associated enterprises and shall not be applied to transactions with unrelated parties. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the bad-debt addition resulted in double addition.

Analysis: The claim was that the amount added through processing had already been offered to tax in the return. The objection was not examined on merits, requiring verification of the return computation and the claimed deduction.

Conclusion: The bad-debt claim is remitted for verification and decision on merits in accordance with law. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether working-capital adjustment should be granted in determining the arm's length price.

Analysis: A working-capital adjustment requires material differences between the tested party and comparables, and their impact on price, cost or profit, to be demonstrated with supporting data. The record did not establish those differences sufficiently, but the assessee is to be given an opportunity to furnish the requisite material.

Conclusion: The working-capital adjustment claim is remitted for fresh consideration upon demonstration of material differences. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The operating-margin computation must exclude the identified extraordinary COVID-19 costs, and the transfer-pricing adjustment is confined to associated-enterprise international transactions; the remaining adjustment claims require fresh verification or determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer-pricing adjustment under the arm's-length regime may be made only in respect of international transactions with associated enterprises and cannot be extended to unrelated-party transactions.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to submit an application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration despite expiry of the prescribed period.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled for continuous non-filing of returns, and the petitioner was unable to avail the portal-based revocation process because the prescribed time had elapsed. In the stated circumstances, submission of a revocation application before the competent authority was permitted, including in physical form if online submission was not technically accepted.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted liberty to submit the revocation application within two weeks; the competent authority was directed to entertain and decide it in accordance with law within three weeks thereafter.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the impugned GST order.

Analysis: The petitioner sought leave to file an appeal, including a delay-condonation application. No adjudication on the merits of the challenge was undertaken.

Outcome: Liberty granted to file a statutory appeal within two weeks with statutory pre-deposit and a delay-condonation application; writ petition disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether freight paid for transportation by road without issuance of consignment notes was taxable as goods transport agency service under reverse charge; (ii) Whether remuneration paid to the directors constituted consideration for taxable service or salary arising from an employer-employee relationship; (iii) Whether contract-manufacturing arrangements constituted manpower supply service taxable under reverse charge.

Issue (i): Whether freight paid for transportation by road without issuance of consignment notes was taxable as goods transport agency service under reverse charge.

Analysis: Goods transport agency service requires both transportation of goods by road and issuance of a consignment note. The record did not establish issuance of any consignment note, and the transportation was confined to mere carriage of goods for freight. Transportation by road otherwise falls within the negative list.

Conclusion: The freight transportation was not goods transport agency service and was not liable to service tax under reverse charge, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether remuneration paid to the directors constituted consideration for taxable service or salary arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Analysis: Tax deducted as salary, income disclosed under the salary head, and provident-fund contributions supported the directors' employment relationship with the company. No contrary material established that the directors were independent directors. Services provided by an employee to an employer in the course of employment are excluded from the definition of service.

Conclusion: The directors' remuneration was salary paid in an employer-employee relationship and was not taxable under reverse charge, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether contract-manufacturing arrangements constituted manpower supply service taxable under reverse charge.

Analysis: Under the agreements, the contractors remained responsible for labour management, wages, statutory compliances, safety and supervision, while undertaking production work. The labour did not work under the assessee's supervision or control, which is essential for characterising an arrangement as manpower supply.

Conclusion: The contract-manufacturing arrangements did not constitute manpower supply service and attracted no reverse-charge liability, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed activities were outside the taxable service categories invoked, eliminating the corresponding service-tax liabilities, interest and penalties.

Issues: Whether an assessment order could be sustained where the assessee's reply, filed before the order, was ignored and no personal hearing was afforded under Section 75(4).

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates an opportunity of hearing where a written request is received or an adverse decision is contemplated. A show-cause notice itself signifies contemplated adverse action. The prescribed DRC-01 format contemplates a distinct personal hearing, and no hearing date was fixed after expiry of the reply deadline. Since the reply and hearing request were available before the assessment order, proceeding on the incorrect premise that no reply had been filed disclosed non-application of mind and denied the assessee the required opportunity.

Conclusion: The assessment made without considering the reply and without granting a personal hearing was invalid and could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a trust providing transport facilities to school students for charges is engaged in a charitable purpose of education and is entitled to registration under section 12AB.

Analysis: Registration requires satisfaction regarding the genuineness of the activities and their charitable character. A facility that assists education does not, merely by such connection, amount to advancement or imparting of education. The determinative consideration is whether the activity itself has a direct, proximate and dominant nexus with advancement of education, rather than whether it facilitates an educational institution. The trust provided transport services to a defined class of students for consideration and generated recurring surplus; its relationship with beneficiaries was contractual. Although surplus alone does not negate charity, that principle applies only where the underlying activity is charitable. The registration authority may ascertain the true substance and predominant purpose of the activities and is not confined to the charitable recitals in the trust deed.

Conclusion: The transport activity constituted a commercial service and not advancement of education as a charitable purpose; rejection of registration under section 12AB was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether interest and dividend income earned by a co-operative credit society from bank deposits and investments qualifies for deduction as business income; (ii) Whether reassessment initiated beyond three years was valid where the surviving alleged escaped income was below the statutory threshold; (iii) Whether penalty proceedings founded on a quantum assessment already restored for fresh assessment should be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether interest and dividend income earned by a co-operative credit society from bank deposits and investments qualifies for deduction as business income.

Analysis: A co-operative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members may treat interest and dividend earned from compulsory, fixed-deposit and savings-bank deposits as attributable to that business where the deposits represent funds deployed in the ordinary course of the regulated lending activity. The jurisdictional precedent distinguishing deposits of a society's own surplus or operational funds from retained amounts payable to members was binding. The restriction applicable to interest from a co-operative bank under the separate investment deduction provision did not govern the claim under the business-income deduction provision.

Conclusion: The interest and dividend income qualified for deduction in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment initiated beyond three years was valid where the surviving alleged escaped income was below the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Although reopening was initiated on information of cash deposits exceeding the extended-limitation threshold, no addition was ultimately made for unexplained cash deposits. The only surviving basis was disallowance of deduction, amounting to less than the prescribed threshold and not represented in the requisite form of asset, expenditure or book entry. Extended limitation could not be sustained by relying on an initial allegation that did not survive after the assessee's explanation.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid; consequently, the reassessment order was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty proceedings founded on a quantum assessment already restored for fresh assessment should be sustained.

Analysis: The penalty was solely consequential to a quantum assessment that had been restored for fresh assessment following disposal of the condonation petition. The penalty determination therefore required reconsideration after the fresh quantum outcome.

Conclusion: The penalty order was set aside and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh proceedings, if required by the fresh assessment, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deduction claim was upheld and the reassessment for the earlier year was invalidated, while the penalty matter was returned for determination dependent on the fresh quantum assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended reassessment limitation is unavailable where the alleged escaped income that actually survives assessment does not meet the statutory monetary threshold.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's allegation that GST payment was forcibly obtained was sustainable at the interim stage in light of the undisclosed anticipatory-bail proceedings and the recorded statement concerning payment.

Analysis: The material placed on record, including the withdrawal pursis stating that reasonable amounts had been deposited and the recorded proceedings concerning payment, prima facie indicated voluntary payment. The non-disclosure of the anticipatory-bail application and its withdrawal was treated as material and required explanation.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to deposit costs and file an affidavit explaining the suppression of facts; the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure; (ii) whether provision for warranty was deductible; (iii) whether specified software companies were to be excluded as functionally dissimilar comparables; (iv) whether specified software companies were to be included as functionally comparable comparables; (v) whether working-capital adjustment was allowable; (vi) whether foreign-exchange fluctuation was operating in nature for transfer-pricing purposes; (vii) whether capacity-utilisation adjustment required fresh determination; (viii) whether transfer-pricing adjustment in the manufacturing segment had to be confined to international transactions; (ix) whether amortisation of goodwill was non-operating expenditure; and (x) whether adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure.

Analysis: Consistent treatment in the assessee's earlier assessment years, including acceptance in a remand proceeding, supported treatment of the payment as incurred in the ordinary course of business. No change in facts was established for the relevant year.

Conclusion: The licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether provision for warranty was deductible.

Analysis: Under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a warranty provision based on historical experience, product-wise trends and a scientific method of estimation represents an accrued liability rather than a contingent liability. The provision was supported by the assessee's past experience and actual warranty expenditure.

Conclusion: The provision for warranty was allowable as a deduction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether specified software companies were to be excluded as functionally dissimilar comparables.

Analysis: The excluded companies were engaged in software products, product development, research and development, outsourced product development, or had significant intangible assets and mixed revenue streams without reliable segmental data. Those functions materially differed from a captive software-development service provider.

Conclusion: CG-VAK Software Exports Ltd., Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd. and Persistent Systems Ltd. were rightly excluded from the comparable set, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether specified software companies were to be included as functionally comparable comparables.

Analysis: Professional software services, ERP implementation, support and maintenance were treated as software-development services. Software testing was also regarded as part of the software-development life cycle. The relevant companies derived substantially all their revenue from software services.

Conclusion: Akshay Software Technologies Ltd. and Cigniti Technologies Ltd. were rightly included in the comparable set, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether working-capital adjustment was allowable.

Analysis: The direction to determine the working-capital adjustment afresh followed the approach adopted in the assessee's earlier years, where the adjustment had been granted in the consequential proceedings. Differences materially affecting price or profit require appropriate examination under Rule 10(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Conclusion: The direction for working-capital adjustment and fresh determination was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether foreign-exchange fluctuation was operating in nature for transfer-pricing purposes.

Analysis: Foreign-exchange fluctuation relating to the assessee's import-intensive manufacturing operations affected its operating costs and required consistent treatment in computing the transfer-pricing margin. The approach followed in the earlier assessment year had allowed the relevant adjustment after comparison of the import content of the assessee and comparables.

Conclusion: Foreign-exchange fluctuation was rightly treated as operating in nature for transfer-pricing computation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether capacity-utilisation adjustment required fresh determination.

Analysis: Since the capacity-utilisation details of comparable companies were unavailable in the public domain, the transfer-pricing authorities were required to obtain relevant information, where necessary by exercising powers under Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and determine the adjustment after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The direction for fresh determination of capacity-utilisation adjustment was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether transfer-pricing adjustment in the manufacturing segment had to be confined to international transactions.

Analysis: Transfer-pricing benchmarking under Section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns controlled international transactions with associated enterprises and cannot be extended to the entire segmental turnover, including uncontrolled transactions.

Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment was rightly restricted to international transactions with associated enterprises, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether amortisation of goodwill was non-operating expenditure.

Analysis: The goodwill arose from an extraordinary business acquisition and its amortisation did not relate to regular operating activities. It was therefore excluded from the operating-cost base for determining the transfer-pricing margin.

Conclusion: Amortisation of goodwill was rightly treated as non-operating expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (x): Whether adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was allowable.

Analysis: The assessee's significantly higher import content resulted in customs-duty costs not borne comparably by domestic-input comparables. This material cost difference warranted adjustment in determining the appropriate profit level indicator.

Conclusion: Adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was rightly allowed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantive determinations on revenue deduction and transfer-pricing benchmarking, comparability and adjustments remain governed by the consistent findings reached for the assessee's earlier assessment years.

Issues: Whether an adverse GST adjudication order could stand when the registered person was not afforded a personal hearing mandated by statute.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of personal hearing before an adverse decision is made. The notices recorded the date, time and venue of personal hearing as "NA", establishing that no oral hearing was made available. The statutory requirements of a written reply and an oral hearing are independent safeguards; failure to submit a written reply does not extinguish the right to a personal hearing. The procedural defect was apparent and material, making recourse to the alternative remedy inappropriate.

Conclusion: The adverse adjudication order was invalid for denial of the mandatory opportunity of personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether service of a show-cause notice solely through the GST portal is valid where the taxpayer's registration had already been cancelled.

Analysis: Portal-based communication is a permissible mode of service, but effective service must be ensured through the modes provided by law. Since the registration stood cancelled before issuance of the show-cause notice, the taxpayer was not required to monitor the GST portal. The undisputed service exclusively through the portal consequently did not amount to valid service. An adverse adjudication also requires an opportunity of personal hearing where sought.

Conclusion: Service of the show-cause notice exclusively on the GST portal after cancellation of registration was invalid; the adjudication could not be sustained and the taxpayer must be afforded a personal hearing if requested.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST registration is cancelled before issuance of a show-cause notice, exclusive uploading of the notice on the GST portal does not constitute valid service, as the former registrant cannot be obliged to monitor that portal.

Issues: Whether reassessment notice and the order under section 148A(d), issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, were valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner rather than the authority prescribed under section 151(ii).

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2018-19, the notice under section 148 and the order under section 148A(d) were issued on 12.04.2022, after three years from the end of the assessment year. Under section 151(ii), as then applicable, sanction was required from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The proviso inserted into section 151 by the Finance Act, 2023, which permits computation of the three-year period by considering exclusions and extensions under section 149(1), was expressly effective from 01.04.2023 and could not retrospectively validate a sanction granted in April 2022. Sanction under section 151 is a jurisdictional condition precedent; the limitation extensions under section 149 could not be imported into section 151 before insertion of that proviso.

Conclusion: The approval granted by the Principal Commissioner was not approval by the specified authority under section 151(ii); consequently, the order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148 and consequential reassessment were void ab initio and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether further relief was required against a summons issued to an advocate for a legal opinion after its withdrawal.

Analysis: The summons issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 had been withdrawn, rendering the challenge infructuous. The order noted that summoning an advocate who rendered a legal opinion should ordinarily occur only in rare and exceptional circumstances and that authorities should exercise due care and caution in such cases.

Outcome: The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of as infructuous following withdrawal of the summons.