Communication of order for limitation cannot be presumed from dispatch where postal evidence rebuts service.

Limitation under Section 35EE(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 runs from communication of the order, not merely from dispatch. Where postal records showed the article was returned with the remark that there was no such person at the address, the normal presumption of service from dispatch could not be applied. The appellate authority's reliance on deemed communication from the dispatch date to hold the appeal time-barred was therefore unsustainable. The relevant communication for limitation was the petitioner's later receipt of the order copy on request, and the appeal was to be treated as filed within limitation.

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Issues: Whether the appeal was barred by limitation, and whether the appellate authority could presume communication of the order from the date of dispatch in the face of contrary postal evidence.

Analysis: Limitation under Section 35EE(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 runs from the date of communication of the order. The order had been dispatched, but the postal communication showed that the article was returned with the remark that there was no such person at the address. In those circumstances, the normal presumption of service from dispatch could not be applied, and the appellate authority's finding of delay based on deemed communication on the dispatch date was not sustainable. The petitioner's receipt of the copy on request was treated as the relevant communication for computing limitation.

Conclusion: The finding that the appeal was time-barred was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be treated as filed within limitation.

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