Issues: Whether the provisional attachment and confirmation of attachment of the school building and the underlying land were liable to be interfered with on the ground that the property was not shown to be proceeds of crime and that the appellant had no complicity in the laundering activity.

Analysis: The attachment was sustained on the basis that the funds traced to the school building were substantially derived from donations made by the Islamic Research Foundation, which had been declared unlawful, and that the relevant activities fell within the scheduled offences under the money-laundering framework. The funds received by the associated trust were found to have been diverted into construction of the school building on land leased from the appellant. The Tribunal also relied on the timing and terms of the lease, the utilisation of the donated funds, and the material indicating that the appellant was not a bona fide stranger to the transaction chain. The appellant's reliance on the lease termination and the absence of a direct charge against him or the trust was held insufficient to displace the taint attached to the property.

Conclusion: The attachment of the property was upheld and the appellant's challenge was rejected.

Issues: Whether blocking of Input Tax Credit could survive after restoration of the petitioner's GST registration.

Analysis: The cancellation of registration had become academic because the registration had already been restored upon verification. The blocking of Input Tax Credit was founded solely on the earlier cancellation of registration, and once that foundation disappeared, the blocking could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The blocking of Input Tax Credit was quashed and the petitioner was held entitled to utilize the Input Tax Credit in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) could admit additional evidence without recording reasons in writing and without affording the Assessing Officer an opportunity to examine or rebut it under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules.

Analysis: Rule 46A permits additional evidence at the appellate stage only in the specified exceptional circumstances. Admission of such evidence requires the appellate authority to record reasons in writing showing that the rule's conditions are satisfied. The rule also mandates that the Assessing Officer must be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence and produce rebuttal material. These requirements are mandatory and reflect the rule of natural justice. On the record, no speaking order admitting the additional evidence was shown, and no effective opportunity to the Assessing Officer to test the fresh material was established.

Conclusion: The admission and use of the additional evidence were invalid for non-compliance with Rule 46A, and the Tribunal's affirmation of the appellate order was unsustainable. The Revenue succeeded on this issue, leading to remand for fresh consideration by the Commissioner (Appeals) in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether a resident individual assessed under section 115BAC(1A) and having total income below Rs. 7,00,000 is entitled to rebate under section 87A against tax payable on short-term capital gains chargeable under section 111A.

Analysis: The amended first proviso to section 87A extends rebate to an eligible resident individual under section 115BAC(1A) where total income does not exceed the prescribed limit. The provision does not carve out any exception for income taxable under section 111A. By contrast, the legislature has expressly restricted rebate in section 112A(6), showing that where exclusion was intended it was stated in clear terms. Section 115BAC(1A) governs computation under the new regime and does not itself create a bar to rebate under Chapter VIII. A later prospective amendment cannot control the unamended position for the relevant assessment year, and rebate cannot be denied on the basis of system logic in the absence of an express statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to section 87A rebate against tax on section 111A short-term capital gains for the assessment year in question, and the denial of rebate was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute grants section 87A rebate to an eligible assessee under section 115BAC(1A) and contains no express exclusion for section 111A income, rebate cannot be denied merely because the tax liability arises on short-term capital gains.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice and penalty order were vitiated for not specifically distinguishing the clauses and sub-clause under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962, and whether the petitioner's role in smuggling gold in paste form attracted penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The notice set out the petitioner's role in arranging funds, aiding the syndicate, and dealing with gold smuggled through Surat International Airport, and expressly stated that such acts rendered him liable under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b). On the facts recorded in the notice and the order-in-original, the conduct was held to involve both direct and ancillary participation in smuggling. The Court treated smuggled gold as prohibited goods for customs purposes and held that non-quoting or imperfect quoting of the precise sub-clause did not vitiate the order when the exact nature of the contravention was otherwise conveyed and the petitioner had replied to the notice. The reliance on authority requiring notice of the exact contravention was distinguished on the ground that such notice had in fact been given.

Conclusion: The challenge to the penalty failed, and the impugned penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was found to be without merit, as the impugned proceedings adequately disclosed the contravention and the petitioner's penal liability for aiding and dealing in smuggled gold.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the show-cause notice clearly conveys the precise nature of the alleged customs contravention and the person's role in it, an incorrect or non-specific citation of the exact penal clause does not by itself invalidate the penalty order.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ direction for reimbursement of differential GST and consideration of its claim on production of supporting documents evidencing payment of GST.

Analysis: The petition arose from a claim for differential GST reimbursement in respect of work executed under a government contract after the introduction of GST. The respondents stated that the claim could not be processed on the material then available because supporting proof of actual GST payment had not been furnished, but undertook to examine the claim if such documents were produced. The Court recorded this submission and fashioned relief accordingly, directing production of supporting documents within a fixed time and requiring the respondents to examine the claim and pass orders in accordance with law within a stipulated period.

Conclusion: The petitioner obtained a limited mandamus for consideration of the GST reimbursement claim, and the writ petition was allowed with directions.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner secured a time-bound administrative reconsideration of the GST reimbursement claim, rather than an outright declaration of entitlement or immediate monetary relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax reimbursement claim is supported by an assurance of examination on production of proof, the Court may direct submission of documents and require the authority to decide the claim within a fixed time in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the services provided to educational institutions and a body corporate attracted service tax, or were covered by the negative list, exemption notification, or reverse charge mechanism; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation for want of suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the services provided to educational institutions and a body corporate attracted service tax, or were covered by the negative list, exemption notification, or reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The demand was founded on figures reflected in income tax data. The services rendered to educational institutions fell within the negative list for education-related services. Security services provided to educational institutions were also exempt under the applicable exemption notification. Services supplied to a body corporate were liable, if at all, under reverse charge in the hands of the recipient. On these facts, the appellant was not liable to discharge service tax on the activities in question.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax on the said services was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation for want of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The appellant was registered, filed returns regularly, maintained records, and the department relied on public income tax data rather than concealed material. In these circumstances, no suppression attributable to the appellant was established, and the extended period could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The service tax demand, along with the consequential interest and penalties, could not be sustained, and the appellant obtained full relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee's services are covered by the negative list or exemption and the department fails to establish suppression of facts, a service tax demand based on public third-party data cannot be sustained, nor can the extended limitation period be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether amounts recovered as bundling error charges, rejection charges, non-compliance charges and similar deductions constituted consideration for a declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: A declared service under Section 66E(e) requires a specific agreement where one party, for consideration, agrees to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act. The statutory definition of service under Section 65B(44) also requires an activity carried out for consideration. Amounts recovered as penalties, liquidated damages or other contractual deductions arising from breach or non-performance do not, by themselves, amount to consideration for tolerating a default. Such recoveries are compensatory or deterrent in nature and are not referable to an independent agreement to tolerate the breach.

Conclusion: The impugned recoveries were not taxable as consideration for a declared service under Section 66E(e), and the demand could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The demand was unsustainable and the appeal succeeded, with the impugned order set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery of contractual penalties or liquidated damages is not consideration for a declared service under Section 66E(e) unless there is an independent agreement to tolerate the act or situation for consideration.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-filing of returns for six months was liable to be set aside and the registration restored subject to compliance with filing of returns and payment of dues.

Analysis: The cancellation was founded solely on the petitioner's failure to furnish returns for the default period. The petitioner expressed readiness to regularise the lapse by filing the pending returns and making good the arrears of tax, penalty and interest. In view of that stand, the dispute was capable of being resolved by granting restoration of registration on compliance with the default obligations.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside and the GST registration was directed to be restored within the stipulated period, subject to the petitioner filing the pending returns and paying the tax, penalty and interest due for the default period.

Issues: (i) Whether the order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration was liable to be quashed for want of reasons and observance of the prescribed procedure, and (ii) whether the bank account attachment had lapsed by operation of law under the GST provisions.

Issue (i): Whether the order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration was liable to be quashed for want of reasons and observance of the prescribed procedure.

Analysis: The impugned cancellation order did not record reasons. The challenge was confined to the cancellation order, and the absence of reasons showed non-compliance with the requirement that such a serious civil consequence be preceded by a reasoned decision and adherence to the prescribed process. In these circumstances, the cancellation could not be sustained and the matter required reconsideration by the designated officer after following due process.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed and set aside, and the proceedings were remanded for fresh action in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank account attachment had lapsed by operation of law under the GST provisions.

Analysis: The attachment was stated to have been imposed under the GST regime, but it had already lapsed in view of the statutory operation of the attachment provision. Once the attachment ceased by operation of law, there was no subsisting restraint on the bank account and the account was required to be restored to operation.

Conclusion: The attachment was held to have lapsed, and the petitioner's bank account was directed to be made operational forthwith.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded in part: the cancellation of registration was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration, while the bank account attachment was treated as having lapsed, with consequential restoration of banking operations.

Ratio Decidendi: An order cancelling GST registration must be supported by reasons and due procedure, and an attachment that has ceased under the statutory scheme cannot continue to bind the assessee's bank account.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice issued for cancellation of registration under section 12AA was vague or lacked the necessary grounds; (ii) whether the authority had power under section 12AA(3) to cancel the registration of a trust registered prior to 01.10.2004 and whether such cancellation could operate retrospectively.

Issue (i): Whether the show cause notice issued for cancellation of registration under section 12AA was vague or lacked the necessary grounds.

Analysis: The notice referred to the search and survey proceedings, the material gathered, the alleged misuse of trust funds, the assessment of years as an association of persons, and the violations of the trust deed. The Court found that the assessee had sufficient information to answer the proposed action and that the notice was not bereft of particulars. The alleged irregularities were not treated as a mere curable deviation, but as serious material bearing on the use of trust funds and the genuineness of the trust's functioning.

Conclusion: The show cause notice was held to be valid and sufficient; the challenge to it failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the authority had power under section 12AA(3) to cancel the registration of a trust registered prior to 01.10.2004 and whether such cancellation could operate retrospectively.

Analysis: The Court held that the power to cancel registration, once conferred by the amendment, could be exercised in relation to an earlier registration when the cancellation proceedings were initiated after the amendment came into force. However, the cancellation could not be given retrospective effect from the date of original registration. On the facts, the materials showed misuse and diversion of trust funds, and the Tribunal had erred in upsetting the cancellation order.

Conclusion: The authority had the power to cancel the registration, but the cancellation could operate only prospectively from the date of the cancellation order.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was set aside and the cancellation of the trust's registration was sustained, with the legal position that such cancellation takes effect only from the date of the cancellation order.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory power to cancel registration of a charitable trust under section 12AA(3) is available once the amendment is in force, even for an earlier registration, but such cancellation cannot relate back to the original date of registration and must operate prospectively from the date of the cancellation order.

Issues: Whether the denial of preferential duty benefit under the free trade agreement, founded on Public Notice No. 33/2024 and the FOB value mismatch, could be sustained in the light of CBIC instructions and the governing trade agreement framework.

Analysis: The preferential claim was rejected by treating the public notice as controlling and by demanding the exporter's invoice and breakup of values as a precondition for clearance. The subsequent CBIC clarification stated that third-party invoicing is a recognised trade practice, that commercially confidential information need not be compelled from the importer, and that any denial of preference must conform to the trade agreement and the prescribed verification mechanism. The later public notice issued by the Customs House itself acknowledged that the earlier procedure stood modified to the extent of the CBIC instruction. In these circumstances, the basis of the impugned rejection was found to have been displaced, and a public notice could not override the statutory and treaty-based scheme or the binding instruction issued by CBIC.

Conclusion: The rejection of preferential duty benefit could not be sustained and the assessment order was set aside with a direction for fresh assessment in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs public notice cannot dilute or override the governing trade agreement, the statutory scheme for preferential-origin claims, or binding CBIC instructions issued within its lawful authority; a denial of preferential duty must rest on the prescribed legal procedure and not on an inconsistent local requirement.

Issues: Whether the enhanced demand raised under Form No. SVLDRS-3 without prior notice or hearing was valid.

Analysis: The enhanced demand was issued behind the assessee's back without any show cause notice or opportunity of hearing. Such unilateral enhancement of liability offended the principles of natural justice. The proper course would have been to issue a notice or reissue the earlier form so that the assessee could respond before a fresh determination was made.

Conclusion: The enhanced demand was unsustainable and was set aside. The proceedings were restored before the designated Committee for fresh action after notice and reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appellant's request for recredit or refund of duty paid on invoices for goods that were not removed from the factory could be rejected as time-barred under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The duty had been debited on export invoices issued in anticipation of export, but the export order was cancelled and the goods were never removed from the factory. The appellant had promptly informed the department and sought recredit. The failure of the department to guide the appellant to file a formal refund claim could not be used to defeat the claim on limitation. Since the payment was made in error and the amount was not legally retainable, the limitation under Section 11B was held inapplicable to the claim.

Conclusion: The claim was not barred by limitation and the request letter was directed to be treated as a refund application. The appeal was allowed and refund was held admissible.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a third re-testing of the seized shawls and whether the refusal to grant such re-testing warranted interference under writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The dispute arose after one test report found the shawls to contain hair of Tibetan antelope and a later report sought by the petitioner remained inconclusive. The governing public notice of 28.07.2017 permitted the competent authority to consider re-test results and, where necessary, to order a further re-test, but that power was discretionary and not available to be invoked as a matter of right by the petitioner. The Court held that the adjudicating authority must first consider the available reports and decide whether a further test is required, and that the petitioner could not compel a third test merely because it hoped for a favourable result. The challenge was also viewed as belated and intended to delay the proceedings.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to a writ directing a third re-testing, and the refusal to order such re-testing did not call for interference.

Issues: Whether the respondent could be permitted to operate the attached bank accounts and furnish a fixed deposit receipt for the equivalent amount, subject to the continuation and revival of the provisional attachment in case of default.

Analysis: The proceeding concerned provisional attachment of immovable and movable properties in relation to alleged proceeds of crime. The respondent expressed readiness to secure the total amount by way of a fixed deposit receipt for Rs. 33,00,000/- and sought permission to operate the three bank accounts so as to aggregate the amount already lying therein with the balance sum required to make up the total deposit. The arrangement was accepted and treated as an undertaking before the Court. The relief was structured so that the respondent could use the bank funds to create the fixed deposit receipt within two weeks, while the attachment would revive automatically on default and would cease on payment.

Conclusion: The respondent was permitted to operate the bank accounts and furnish a fixed deposit receipt for Rs. 33,00,000/- within two weeks, with the provisional attachment remaining subject to automatic revival on default.

Final Conclusion: The matter was disposed of on a conditional arrangement balancing the respondent's request for access to the bank accounts with protection of the secured amount for the enforcement proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A provisional attachment may be conditionally moderated where the secured amount is adequately protected through an enforceable undertaking and equivalent deposit, with automatic revival on default.

Issues: Whether Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners fitted inside the Ball Mill constituted integral parts of plant and machinery or were liable to be treated as incidental goods attracting entry tax, and whether the consequential penalty could stand.

Analysis: The definition of incidental goods under Section 2(hh) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 excludes raw material and packing material and applies to goods used in manufacture. The controlling distinction is between goods used for carrying out manufacture, which are plant and machinery, and goods used in the manufacturing process as consumables. On the facts found, the Ball Mill could not function without the Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners, which performed the very grinding function of the machine and were indispensable to its operation. Their periodic replacement due to wear and tear did not change their legal character. The functional integrality test therefore required classification of these items as constituent parts of the machine, not as incidental goods. Once the levy of entry tax failed, the penalty levied under Section 17(3) of the Entry Tax Act could not survive.

Conclusion: Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners were not incidental goods but integral parts of plant and machinery, so no entry tax was leviable on them and the penalty also could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are indispensable constituent parts of machinery and the machinery is inoperative without them, they are to be treated as plant and machinery on the basis of functional integrality, and not as incidental goods merely because they directly participate in the process or wear out in use.

Issues: Whether the refund rejection order could be sustained when it recorded no specific finding on the assessee's reply and submissions, and whether the matter required remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The petition challenged rejection of refund on the ground that the appellate authority did not deal with the assessee's written reply or oral submissions and did not record any specific finding before rejecting the claim. The Court noted the consistent view taken in similar matters that a refund rejection must be supported by a reasoned and speaking order. Since the impugned order did not contain a specific finding on the material placed by the assessee, it suffered from the vice of a non-speaking order and could not stand.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the refund proceedings were remanded for de novo consideration and a fresh order after hearing the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund rejection that does not record specific findings on the assessee's reply and submissions is a non-speaking order liable to be set aside, and the matter must be remanded for fresh, reasoned adjudication.

Issues: Whether late fee under Section 47 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be levied for belated filing of Form GSTR-9C, and whether non-filing of the reconciliation statement amounts to failure to furnish the annual return under Section 44 read with Rule 80(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 44, as amended, contemplates the annual return as including a self-certified reconciliation statement, while Rule 80(3) requires eligible registered persons with turnover above the prescribed threshold to furnish Form GSTR-9C along with the annual return. The expression "includes" in the statutory scheme was treated as enlarging the content of the annual return, and the phrase "along with" in Rule 80(3) was treated as mandatory. On that construction, filing Form GSTR-9 without Form GSTR-9C was held to amount to failure to furnish the return required under Section 44 within time. Since Section 47(2) imposes late fee for failure to furnish the return required under Section 44 by the due date, the levy was held to be attracted. The clarificatory circular and the amnesty notification did not avail the petitioner on the facts, as Form GSTR-9C was filed beyond the relevant cut-off date.

Conclusion: Late fee under Section 47 was held payable for delayed filing of Form GSTR-9C, and the impugned levy was sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of the refund claim without granting a personal hearing, despite a request for rescheduling, violated the principles of natural justice and Rule 92(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017; (ii) Whether the shorter time granted to reply to the show cause notice, contrary to the prescribed period under Rule 92(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, vitiated the refund adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of the refund claim without granting a personal hearing, despite a request for rescheduling, violated the principles of natural justice and Rule 92(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: The proviso to Rule 92(3) mandates that no refund application shall be rejected without giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard. An adverse order passed without affording such hearing, particularly where a specific request to reschedule was made due to inability to attend, breaches the requirement of fair hearing and renders the adjudication procedurally unsound.

Conclusion: The rejection order was vitiated for breach of natural justice and non-compliance with Rule 92(3), and fresh consideration after granting a hearing was warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the shorter time granted to reply to the show cause notice, contrary to the prescribed period under Rule 92(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, vitiated the refund adjudication.

Analysis: The challenge to the curtailed period for filing the reply was considered relevant to the fairness of the proceedings and was directed to be examined by the authority before passing a fresh order on the refund claim. The defect formed part of the procedural infirmities requiring de novo adjudication.

Conclusion: The reply period objection was left for reconsideration in fresh proceedings, and the prior adjudication could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The refund proceedings were set aside and remitted for fresh adjudication after issuance of a fresh show cause notice, grant of personal hearing, and passing of a speaking order in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim under the GST regime cannot be rejected without affording the applicant a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and non-compliance with the mandatory hearing requirement under Rule 92(3) vitiates the adjudication.