Right to be forgotten and privacy may outweigh free speech for interim relief after exoneration.

Claims based on the right to be forgotten, privacy and dignity were not rejected at the threshold on limitation where the plaintiff moved the civil court soon after criminal proceedings ended in his favour. The court treated entitlement to the reliefs as a matter for trial, rather than a preliminary bar under Article 75 of the Limitation Act. It also upheld interim restraint after balancing free speech under Article 19(1)(a) against dignity and privacy under Article 21, noting that continued online publication after exoneration could cause ongoing reputational harm and that later updates did not fully neutralise the effect of the original reports.

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Issues: (i) Whether the reliefs founded on the right to be forgotten were liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation; (ii) Whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in balancing the competing rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 called for interference in appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the reliefs founded on the right to be forgotten were liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation.

Analysis: The plaint contained distinct prayers founded not only on defamation but also on privacy, dignity and the right to be forgotten. The challenge based on Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was not accepted because the plaintiff had approached the civil court shortly after the criminal proceedings culminated in his favour. The question whether the plaintiff was ultimately entitled to the reliefs was held to be a matter for trial and not a threshold bar.

Conclusion: The plea of limitation failed, and the right to be forgotten claims were not rejected in limine.

Issue (ii): Whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in balancing the competing rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The balance between free speech and dignity was assessed through constitutional proportionality. The continued online availability of reports concerning the plaintiff after his exoneration was treated as capable of causing continuing reputational harm, while the media's inconvenience from the interim restraint was considered limited and reversible. The addition of brief updates was held insufficient to neutralise the impact of the original publications.

Conclusion: No interference with the interim injunction was warranted, and the trial court's discretion was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the interim protection in favour of the plaintiff remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where digital publication continues to associate a person with criminal allegations after exoneration, the right to dignity and privacy may outweigh press freedom for purposes of interim relief, and limitation based on the original publication date does not necessarily defeat distinct claims grounded in the right to be forgotten.

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