Passing off and temporary injunctions require prior user and a prima facie case; appellate interference is limited.

In a passing off dispute, appellate interference with refusal of temporary injunction is justified only where the trial court's discretion is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles. The plaintiff must show a prima facie case, including prior user and likelihood of deception; mere trade mark registration is insufficient for interlocutory relief. As the defendant's prior user finding remained undisturbed and the plaintiff did not establish grounds to displace the status quo, the appellate court should not have reversed the trial court's refusal of injunction, and the restraint order in favour of the plaintiff was unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether the appellate court was justified in reversing the trial court's refusal of temporary injunction in a passing off dispute, and whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for interlocutory relief.

Analysis: In an appeal against the exercise of discretion in granting or refusing interlocutory injunction, appellate interference is warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled principles. The trial court had found that the defendant was the prior user of the trade mark, and that finding was not displaced. In a passing off action, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of prior user and likelihood of deception; mere registration is not enough. The appellate court reappreciated the material and interfered without showing any error in the trial court's exercise of discretion. The material relied upon by the plaintiff did not overcome the defendant's prior user or justify disturbing the status quo by interim injunction.

Conclusion: The appellate court ought not to have interfered with the trial court's refusal of temporary injunction, and the restraint order in favour of the plaintiff was unsustainable.

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