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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of a receipt treated as income under section 56 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
1.2 Whether a gift can be validly made by one incorporated company to another, and consequently whether the deleted addition on that footing was justified.
1.3 Whether questions relating to taxability under section 28(iv) and inclusion of the receipt in book profits under section 115JB raised any substantial question of law.
1.4 Whether additional questions of law involving allegations of use of a shell company, lifting the corporate veil, application of the McDowell anti-avoidance principle, and reopening of individual assessments could be framed in an appeal under section 260A when no foundational facts for such questions were laid before the Tribunal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Deletion of addition under section 56 and validity of gift between incorporated companies
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Tribunal had deleted the addition of Rs. 87,15,95,326/- following its own earlier decision in the assessee's case for a prior assessment year, where a similar receipt characterized by the Revenue as not being a permissible "gift" between companies had been treated as non-taxable.
2.1.2 The Revenue's proposed substantial questions of law A to D essentially challenged (i) the non-taxability of the receipt as income within section 2(24), and (ii) the Tribunal's acceptance of the transaction as a "gift" between companies, contending that a company cannot, in law, make a gift to another company.
2.1.3 The Court reformulated and admitted only two substantial questions of law: (A) whether the Tribunal was justified in law in deleting the addition of Rs. 87,15,95,326/-, and (B) whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition without appreciating the Revenue's case that a gift cannot be made by an incorporated company, holding that the Revenue's original questions C and D were subsumed within these two.
Conclusions
2.1.4 The Appeal was admitted only on two substantial questions of law concerning (i) the justification of the deletion of the addition, and (ii) the legal possibility of a gift between incorporated companies. Questions C and D as framed by the Revenue were not separately entertained as they were covered by these two admitted questions.
2.2 Taxability under section 28(iv) and inclusion in book profit under section 115JB
Legal framework
2.2.1 The Court referred to section 28(iv) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning taxation of benefits arising from business, and section 115JB regarding computation of book profit for minimum alternate tax.
2.2.2 The Court also referred to the Supreme Court decisions in CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (404 ITR 1) and Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT (255 ITR 273).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.3 With respect to the question whether the receipt was taxable under section 28(iv) (Revenue's question E), the Court observed that, in an earlier appeal involving the same assessee and similar issues, counsel for the Revenue had conceded that the issue stood concluded against the Revenue by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.; consequently, that question had not been entertained in the earlier appeal.
2.2.4 Applying the same reasoning, the Court held in the present matter that the issue raised in question E was squarely covered by Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., did not give rise to any substantial question of law, and therefore could not be entertained.
2.2.5 As to the inclusion of the receipt in book profit under section 115JB (Revenue's question F), the Court noted that the same issue had been raised in the earlier appeal and that the Revenue had then fairly stated that it was concluded against the Revenue by the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT. On that basis, the Court had refused to entertain the question in the earlier appeal.
2.2.6 The Court held that, in the present appeal as well, question F stood answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by Apollo Tyres Ltd., and therefore did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Conclusions
2.2.7 Questions relating to taxability of the receipt under section 28(iv) and to its inclusion in book profits under section 115JB did not give rise to any substantial question of law in view of binding Supreme Court precedents in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and Apollo Tyres Ltd., and were therefore not entertained.
2.3 Competence to raise additional questions of law based on new factual foundations in an appeal under section 260A
Legal framework
2.3.1 The Court proceeded on the settled principle, as laid down in earlier decisions including CIT v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (256 ITR 395) and CIT v. Smt. Lata Shantilal Shah (323 ITR 297), that a question which does not arise from the order of the Tribunal cannot be made the subject matter of an appeal under section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
2.3.2 The Court reiterated that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding authority and that substantial questions of law before the High Court must arise from the facts as found or placed before the Tribunal. If findings are contrary to the record, perversity may itself raise a substantial question of law, but new factual foundations cannot be introduced for the first time in a section 260A appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.3 The Revenue sought to frame additional questions of law alleging, inter alia, that the assessee was a shell company and a mere vehicle for transferring money to its shareholders; that the so-called gifts were actually monies received by those shareholders; that the anti-avoidance principles in McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (154 ITR 148) should apply; that the corporate veil should be lifted and the sums taxed in the hands of the individuals under section 56(2); and that individual assessments should be reopened under section 150.
2.3.4 The Court examined the orders of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), and the Tribunal, and found that at no stage had the Revenue contended that the assessee was a shell company, that the amounts from Kardam Commercial Pvt. Ltd. were actually for the benefit of the shareholders, or that the arrangements constituted a device to evade tax.
2.3.5 On the contrary, the Court observed that the consistent stand of the Revenue throughout was that the money received by the assessee from Kardam Commercial Pvt. Ltd. was taxable in the hands of the assessee company itself on the ground that one company cannot give a gift to another, and therefore the receipts were income under section 56 in the hands of the assessee.
2.3.6 The Court held that permitting the additional questions would require bringing in new facts and laying a fresh factual foundation at the High Court stage, which is "wholly impermissible" in an appeal under section 260A, as such questions do not arise from the Tribunal's order and are not based on findings or material considered by the Tribunal.
Conclusions
2.3.7 The additional questions of law proposed by the Revenue, based on allegations of shell company, routing of funds to shareholders, application of McDowell, lifting the corporate veil, taxing shareholders under section 56(2), and reopening of individual assessments under section 150, were held not to arise from the Tribunal's order, lacked foundational facts before the Tribunal, and therefore could not be framed or entertained in the present appeal under section 260A.
2.3.8 The appeal was confined to the two substantial questions of law earlier formulated and admitted by the Court, and directions were issued to the Registry to communicate the order to the Tribunal to keep the records available.
Issues: (i) whether the bail granted to the accused should be cancelled; (ii) whether the condition restricting the accused to the city of Kolkata after release on bail should be modified; (iii) whether delay in presenting the modification application should be condoned.
Issue (i): whether the bail granted to the accused should be cancelled.
Analysis: Cancellation of bail requires a demonstrated breach of bail conditions or circumstances showing that continued liberty would imperil the trial. The application was founded mainly on apprehensions of influence over witnesses and alleged hostility in the prosecution evidence, but no conclusive material established that the accused had breached the terms of bail or that cancellation had become necessary at the then stage of trial. The Court also noted the progress already made in the trial.
Conclusion: The prayer for cancellation of bail was rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the condition restricting the accused to the city of Kolkata after release on bail should be modified.
Analysis: A condition imposed while granting bail can be altered only on a substantial change in circumstances or where the restraint is shown to be unjustified. The Court held that the restrictive condition was part of the careful balance struck while enlarging the accused on bail, and no significant fresh circumstance had been shown to justify relaxation. The Court also accepted that the condition continued to serve the concern of witness protection and the integrity of the trial.
Conclusion: The prayer for modification of the bail condition was rejected.
Issue (iii): whether delay in presenting the modification application should be condoned.
Analysis: The delay related only to the presentation of the modification application and no prejudice was shown from condoning it.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned.
Final Conclusion: The criminal applications were finally disposed of by declining cancellation of bail and refusal to relax the bail restraint, while granting condonation of delay in the modification matter and leaving the trial court free to proceed in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether 18% GST is applicable on the services forming the subject-matter of the tender and, if so, how that affects bid evaluation.
1.2 Whether the tendering authority violated the tender conditions, particularly Annexure 9, Clause 6 and the "Method of Tender Evaluation and Price Comparison", by treating the successful bidder's quoted price as inclusive of GST and accepting an indemnity bond.
1.3 Whether the tender process and award decision were arbitrary, unfair, mala fide or otherwise vitiated, warranting interference in judicial review despite the limited scope of intervention in tender matters.
1.4 Whether, assuming infirmities in the tender process, the Court ought to set aside the award considering the stage of contract performance and public interest.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Applicability of 18% GST on the tendered services and its relevance
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the tendering authority sought a specific clarification from the GST Department by letter dated 21.03.2025 on applicability of GST to the services in question.
2.2 The GST Department, by letter dated 25.03.2025, clarified that under Notification No. 11/2017 (Central Tax Rate) dated 28.06.2017, 18% GST is chargeable on "Human Health & Social Care Services".
2.3 The Court held that the services under the tender, being NAT testing and related services, fall within "Human Health and Social Care Services" and therefore attract GST at 18%.
2.4 The contrary position urged on the basis of Notification No. 12/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 was not examined substantively, as the Court relied on the contemporaneous departmental clarification from the GST authority and was not called upon to adjudicate upon the correctness of that notification or the clarification itself.
Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that 18% GST is applicable to the services forming the subject of the tender, and answered the issue of chargeability of GST in the affirmative.
Issue 2 - Whether the tendering authority violated tender conditions by treating the successful bidder's price as inclusive of GST and accepting an indemnity bond
Legal framework discussed
2.6 Annexure 9 (Price Bid) required bidders to indicate: (a) "Rate per reportable test (without GST)" (Column D), (b) "% GST" (Column E), (c) "Final reportable test (including GST) in Rs." (Column F), and (d) "Total amount during contract (including GST)" (Column G = C × F). The note specified that L1 would be selected on the basis of the grand total of Column G.
2.7 Clause II (Taxes & Duties) of the tender provided that prices "shall be inclusive of all taxes & duties leviable including GST and Entry tax etc. and the Purchaser shall not be liable for the same" [sub-clause (ii)], and that if tax rates change during performance, an equitable adjustment to the contract price would be made [sub-clause (iv)].
2.8 Clause IV(xvi) (Price Negotiation) of the General Terms and Conditions permitted negotiations with the lowest quoted technically qualified bidder (L1) in exceptional circumstances, with prior approval of the competent authority.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court accepted that Annexure 9 is an integral and relevant part of the tender, and that all fields (including indication of GST) are material for price comparison.
2.10 It was undisputed that the successful bidder did not specify, in Annexure 9, whether Rs. 945/- CPRT was with or without GST, and indicated 0% GST, whereas the other bidder quoted CPRT, GST at 18% and the corresponding total.
2.11 The Court observed that at the time of tender issuance, the tendering authority itself was evidently uncertain about the GST position, which led to divergent stands by the two bidders on applicability of GST and to the subsequent reference to the GST Department.
2.12 On harmonising Annexure 9 with Clause II, the Court held that while Annexure 9 requires separate disclosure of CPRT without and with GST, Clause II(ii) clearly mandates that quoted prices are to be "inclusive of all taxes & duties including GST" and that the purchaser has no liability for such taxes.
2.13 The Court reasoned that Clause II(ii) must be given its plain and natural meaning; otherwise, it would be rendered otiose. Reading the tender conditions harmoniously, the Court held that the tendering authority was entitled to treat quoted prices as inclusive of GST and to evaluate bids on that basis.
2.14 In this light, the tendering authority's decision to treat the successful bidder's quoted CPRT of Rs. 945/- as inclusive of GST at 18% and to protect itself by obtaining an indemnity bond was considered to be within the contractual framework and commercial discretion of the authority.
2.15 The Court recognised that the indemnity bond was likely sought to safeguard the purchaser in view of Clause II and the GST clarification, and held that calling for such a bond did not, by itself, render the process arbitrary or perverse.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court held that, although Annexure 9 required explicit indication of GST, the overriding stipulation in Clause II(ii) permitting consideration of prices inclusive of GST justified the tendering authority's approach.
2.17 The award of the contract to the successful bidder on the footing that its quoted price was inclusive of 18% GST, coupled with an indemnity bond, was not found to be in violation of the tender conditions so as to warrant judicial interference.
Issue 3 - Alleged arbitrariness/unfairness in the tender process and scope of judicial review
Legal framework discussed
2.18 The Court referred to principles laid down in decisions on judicial review of tenders, including that: (a) tender processes are primarily commercial decisions of the State; (b) interference is limited to cases of arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides, bias or violation of mandatory norms; and (c) there is no absolute obligation to accept the lowest bid, provided the decision is fair and reasonable.
2.19 The Court reiterated the tests from prior judgments that judicial review is confined to examining whether the process adopted or decision made is mala fide, intended to favour someone, or so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority could have reached it, and whether public interest is adversely affected.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.20 The Court noted the existence of multiple committees (pre-bid clarification, prequalification, technical evaluation, and price bid evaluation) as indicative of an institutional process, but did not treat this alone as conclusively negating arbitrariness.
2.21 The Court accepted that once the GST Department clarified that 18% GST was applicable, the tendering authority knew that both bidders would be subject to GST at the same rate. In such circumstances, fairness required that both bidders be treated even-handedly, including in any further clarification or price negotiation.
2.22 The Court held that the tendering authority, after receiving the GST clarification, ought to have called both bidders for further clarification or negotiations, especially in view of Clause IV(xvi) providing for negotiations with the L1 bidder in exceptional circumstances. Restricting the indemnity arrangement to only one bidder without extending a comparable opportunity to the other was viewed as falling short of ideal fairness and transparency.
2.23 The Court regarded Annexure 9 as materially relevant, and noted as a "disturbing feature" that the successful bidder had not clearly stated whether its quote was inclusive of GST, yet its bid was regularised through the indemnity mechanism without parallel engagement with the other bidder.
2.24 The Court also took serious note of the incorrect instructions furnished to the Court earlier, where it was represented that services at both hospitals had commenced on 30.03.2025, while the record showed that installation and commencement at one hospital occurred only at the end of April 2025. The Court characterised this as falling within the doctrine of "suppressio veri suggestio falsi" and expressly deprecated such conduct, though it stopped short of initiating contempt proceedings.
2.25 At the same time, the Court found no conclusive material to hold that the process was tainted by mala fides or that the decision to award the contract to the successful bidder was so irrational or arbitrary as to be unsustainable in law.
Conclusions
2.26 The Court held that while the tendering authority's conduct displayed procedural lapses and lack of ideal fairness (particularly in not engaging both bidders equally post-GST clarification and in furnishing incorrect instructions to the Court), these did not cumulatively establish mala fides, bias, or such arbitrariness as would vitiate the entire tender process under the limited scope of judicial review.
2.27 Consequently, the tender award was not set aside on grounds of arbitrariness or unfairness, though the Court admonished the authority's conduct and emphasised the binding necessity of fairness and transparency in public tenders.
Issue 4 - Whether the contract should be quashed despite identified infirmities, in light of public interest and stage of performance
Interpretation and reasoning
2.28 The Court was informed that the contract period was one year, that services under the tender had been performed by the successful bidder since April 2025, and that the contract was due to end around March-April 2026.
2.29 The Court recognised that setting aside the award at that stage would cause significant disruption to ongoing NAT testing services in public hospitals and adversely affect public interest, which is of paramount importance in matters involving essential health services.
2.30 The Court also considered that the price difference between the two bidders was marginal in overall terms and that there was no challenge to the technical capability or performance standards of the successful bidder.
Conclusions
2.31 Weighing the identified procedural shortcomings against the advanced stage of contract performance and the potential disruption to public health services, the Court declined to interdict the contract.
2.32 The writ petition was dismissed, without costs, and the contract in favour of the successful bidder was allowed to continue until its natural expiry, with the Court's admonition to the tendering authority to adhere strictly to fairness, transparency and accuracy in future tender processes.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, for Assessment Year 2006-07, disallowance under section 14A could be validly computed by applying Rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
1.2 Whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the first appellate authority and remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer with a direction that the disallowance under section 14A, if any, should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
1.3 Whether the questions proposed by the Revenue raised any substantial question of law warranting interference by the Court in second appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Applicability of Rule 8D for Assessment Year 2006-07 in making disallowance under section 14A
Legal framework
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had applied Rule 8D for computing disallowance under section 14A for Assessment Year 2006-07.
2.1.2 The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai v. Essar Teleholdings Ltd., wherein it was held that Rule 8D is prospective in operation and cannot be applied to assessment years prior to Assessment Year 2008-09.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court observed that Assessment Year 2006-07 precedes Assessment Year 2008-09 and, therefore, the Assessing Officer could not have invoked Rule 8D for this year.
2.1.4 Since the disallowance sustained by the first appellate authority proceeded on the basis of the disallowance originally computed by the Assessing Officer under Rule 8D, the foundation of the Revenue's computation was itself contrary to the legal position clarified by the Supreme Court.
Conclusions
2.1.5 Rule 8D is not applicable to Assessment Year 2006-07, and the Assessing Officer's action in applying Rule 8D for that year was impermissible in law.
2.2 Justification for Tribunal's direction to remand and cap disallowance at 5% of exempt income
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The Tribunal noted that in Assessment Year 2004-05, in the assessee's own case and under similar circumstances, the first appellate authority had restricted the disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income to 5%, and that order had been accepted by the Assessing Officer without further appeal.
2.2.2 The Tribunal, relying on that earlier year and other decisions of the Court holding 5% to be a reasonable basis for disallowance, set aside the order of the first appellate authority and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to freshly evaluate the assessee's plea, with a direction that the disallowance, if any, should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
2.2.3 The Court endorsed this approach, noting that in the absence of applicability of Rule 8D, and considering prior acceptance of a 5% disallowance in the assessee's own case as well as several judgments treating 5% as reasonable, the Tribunal's direction was justified.
Conclusions
2.2.4 The Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer to re-evaluate the assessee's claim under section 14A, with a ceiling that any disallowance should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
2.3 Existence of substantial question of law in Revenue's appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Revenue's questions challenged the Tribunal's direction to limit the disallowance to 5% of exempt income and relied on a CBDT Circular and the Supreme Court's decision in Maxopp Investment Ltd. to support a broader application of the principle of apportionment.
2.3.2 The Court held that once it is accepted, in light of Essar Teleholdings Ltd., that Rule 8D could not be applied to the relevant assessment year, the basis of the Revenue's challenge falls away.
2.3.3 In that view, the Tribunal's order, being consistent with binding precedent on the prospective operation of Rule 8D and with prior decisions treating 5% as a reasonable disallowance, did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
2.3.4 The Court observed that, having found no substantial question of law arising from the first proposed question, the second proposed question, which was dependent on the first, also did not survive for consideration.
Conclusions
2.3.5 No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the appeal by the Revenue was liable to be dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether continued detention of the seized gold chain is permissible in the absence of issuance of a show cause notice within the time prescribed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, or any valid extension thereof.
1.2 Consequential directions and conditions, if any, for release of the seized gold chain upon holding the continued detention to be impermissible.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality of continued detention of the seized gold chain in absence of show cause notice within the statutory period
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which prescribes a six-month period from the date of seizure for issuance of notice under clause (a) of Section 124, extendable by the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner for a further period not exceeding six months, with reasons recorded in writing and intimation to the person from whom goods were seized.
2.2 The Court relied on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3489/2024, which held that: (i) the only power to extend the time period is as per the first proviso to Section 110(2); (ii) release under Section 110A is merely interim and does not affect the mandatory consequence flowing from non-issuance of notice within the period under Section 110(2); and (iii) if no notice is issued within the original or validly extended period, the consequence is that the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the gold chain was detained on 17 January 2024 and that no show cause notice had been issued till the date of decision.
2.4 It was observed that there was also no material before the Court to show that the period under Section 110(2) had been validly extended by the competent authority in the manner prescribed, i.e., by recording reasons in writing and informing the person concerned before expiry of the initial six-month period.
2.5 The Court held that in view of the Supreme Court's interpretation, the time period to issue notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is governed by Section 110(2), and that this time prescription is mandatory in relation to the consequence of seizure and continued detention, irrespective of the distinct field in which Section 124 operates.
2.6 The Court found that more than one year had elapsed from the date of seizure; consequently, even the maximum extendable period under the first proviso to Section 110(2) stood exhausted, and no show cause notice could be issued at that stage for purposes of sustaining the seizure.
2.7 Applying the binding precedent, the Court held that continued detention of the seized gold chain in such circumstances is impermissible and that the goods are liable to be released to the person from whose possession they were seized.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that, as no show cause notice was issued within six months of seizure nor any valid extension granted within the statutory framework of Section 110(2), and the one-year outer limit had elapsed, the seized gold chain must be released to the petitioner.
Issue 2: Conditions and modalities for release of the seized gold chain
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 Having held that the continued detention was illegal and that the gold chain must be released, the Court proceeded to structure the terms on which such release should occur, ensuring compliance with applicable revenue requirements.
2.10 The Court directed that release would be subject to payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges calculated as on the date of detention, thereby balancing the petitioner's right to release of goods with the statutory dues of the Customs Department.
2.11 The Court also prescribed the procedural modality for implementation by directing the petitioner to appear before the Customs Department on a specified date, personally or through an authorised representative, with verification of authorisation through appropriate communication.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court directed the Customs Department to release the seized gold chain to the petitioner upon:
(a) Payment of applicable customs duty; and
(b) Payment of warehousing charges based on the rates applicable on the date of detention.
2.13 The Court further directed that, upon such payments being made and appearance being facilitated through the designated nodal officer, the gold items shall be released and the petition stood disposed of on these terms.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether continued detention of seized gold items is lawful when no show cause notice has been issued within the time limits prescribed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the seized gold items are liable to be released to the petitioners and, if so, on what terms and conditions.
1.3 Whether costs are liable to be imposed on the petitioners for having misrepresented the nature of the seized jewellery as "old jewellery".
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Legality of continued detention in absence of show cause notice under Section 110(2)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which prescribes that if no notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is given within six months of seizure, the seized goods shall be returned, with a further possible extension of up to six months by the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner for reasons recorded in writing and communicated before expiry of the initial period.
2.2 The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja, which held that: (i) the only power to extend time for issuance of notice is under the first proviso to Section 110(2); (ii) Section 110A, being an interim power to release goods, does not affect or dilute the mandatory operation of Section 110(2); and (iii) failure to issue notice under Section 124(a) within the prescribed/extended period results in an obligation to return the seized goods.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was undisputed before the Court that no show cause notice had been issued in respect of the seized gold items.
2.4 The Court noted, following the Supreme Court, that the time period to issue notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is governed solely by Section 110(2), and that this time prescription is mandatory and distinct from the general power to issue a show cause notice under Section 124.
2.5 The Court observed that the statutory period of six months from seizure, even if extended by a further maximum period of six months under the proviso to Section 110(2), had in any event expired; hence, the outer limit of one year had elapsed without issuance of any show cause notice.
2.6 On these facts, the Court held that continuation of detention of the gold items after expiry of the maximum permissible period, in the absence of a show cause notice or a valid extension under Section 110(2), is impermissible in law and attracts the statutory consequence of release.
Conclusions
2.7 The seized gold items could not be lawfully detained beyond the statutory period in Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, as no show cause notice had been issued within that period or its permissible extension.
2.8 The gold items were, therefore, liable to be released to the petitioners.
Issue 2 - Direction for release and conditions imposed
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court recorded, upon physical inspection, that the seized items were "absolutely brand new jewellery" and not used or old jewellery as claimed by the petitioners.
2.10 Nonetheless, applying the binding ratio of the Supreme Court decision, the Court held that the character of the jewellery (old vs new) did not alter the statutory consequence under Section 110(2) once no show cause notice was issued within the prescribed time.
2.11 Considering the statutory position and the factual matrix, the Court directed that the release of the seized gold items would be subject to compliance by the petitioners with fiscal and procedural requirements.
Conclusions
2.12 The Customs Department was directed to release the seized gold items to the petitioners, subject to:
* Payment of the entire applicable customs duty by the petitioners; and
* Payment of full warehousing charges as applicable on the date of detention.
2.13 The petitioners were directed to appear (personally or through an authorised representative, with due verification of authorisation) before the Customs Department on the specified date to complete the formalities, whereupon the goods would be released on proof of compliance with the Court's conditions.
Issue 3 - Imposition of costs for misrepresentation regarding the nature of jewellery
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The petitioners had stated that the detained gold items were their "old jewellery" being worn by them; however, upon production and perusal of the jewellery in Court, it was found that the items were not old jewellery but clearly brand new pieces purchased in Dubai.
2.15 The Court held that the petitioners had given an incorrect impression to the Court as to the nature of the seized jewellery, warranting imposition of costs.
Conclusions
2.16 Costs of Rs. 10,000/- in each petition were imposed on the petitioners, directed to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Bar Clerk Association by a specified date.
2.17 Production of proof of such deposit before the Customs Authority on the date fixed for appearance was made a condition precedent to effecting release of the gold items.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a demand of Safeguard Duty under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 is legally sustainable when earlier re-assessed Bills of Entry, allowing exemption, were not challenged by the Revenue under the statutory appeal/review mechanism and had attained finality.
1.2 Whether a demand of Safeguard Duty is maintainable in respect of subsequent self-assessed Bills of Entry, when the Revenue did not file appeals against such self-assessment despite the law requiring appeal even against self-assessment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of invoking Section 28 where reassessment orders granting exemption attained finality
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment)
2.1 The Tribunal relied on its own earlier decision which had, in turn, examined the scheme of Sections 11A, 11B and 35E of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the judgment of the High Court in "Eveready Industries India Ltd. v. CESTAT, Chennai". That judgment held, inter alia:
(a) Orders granting refund under Section 11B are orders of adjudication and are appealable. (b) Section 11B is a complete code for refund, involving adjudication by the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner. (c) Once an order under Section 11B attains finality (no appeal/review under Section 35E), the Department cannot subsequently invoke Section 11A to treat the refund as "erroneous refund" and recover it. (d) Sections 11A and 35E operate in different fields and must be read harmoniously; what cannot be done directly by appeal/review cannot be done indirectly by invoking the demand provision. (e) One authority cannot, in collateral proceedings, declare erroneous what another adjudicating authority has already decided, when that earlier order has not been appealed against.
2.2 The Tribunal applied the above ratio, mutatis mutandis, to the Customs context, in relation to reassessment of Bills of Entry and subsequent attempts to raise demand under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 without first challenging the reassessment orders by appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal found that the case did not involve mere self-assessment. In the first four Bills of Entry:
(a) The Customs electronic system itself had flagged non-eligibility to Safeguard Duty exemption on the ground that imports were from "Taiwan". (b) The appellant and CHA appeared before the reassessing authority, submitted documents and arguments on eligibility to exemption. (c) The competent Customs authorities, after considering the material, formally re-assessed the Bills of Entry and allowed clearance without payment of Safeguard Duty.
2.4 The Tribunal treated this re-assessment as a conscious adjudicatory decision of the proper officer on the very issue now sought to be reopened. The Revenue did not challenge these reassessment orders before the Commissioner (Appeals). Thus, the reassessments attained finality.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that, after such reassessment and removal of the relevant "flag" in the electronic system, subsequent imports passed through without objection on Safeguard Duty, evidencing that the Department itself treated the exemption position as settled.
2.6 Applying the ratio of the earlier relied-upon judgment (following "Eveready Industries India Ltd.") the Tribunal held that, once an adjudicatory order has been passed and has not been appealed or reviewed under the statutory mechanism, the Department cannot subsequently invoke the demand provision (here, Section 28 of the Customs Act) to indirectly undo or overturn that final order.
2.7 It was held that, as in the excise context where an unchallenged refund order under Section 11B cannot later be treated as "erroneous refund" under Section 11A, an unchallenged reassessment order under the Customs law cannot be collaterally attacked by a demand under Section 28.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal concluded that, in the absence of any appeal against the reassessed Bills of Entry, the issue of Safeguard Duty exemption for the relevant imports had reached finality and the Department could not lawfully invoke Section 28 to raise a demand contrary to such final reassessments.
2.9 On this ground, the proceedings initiated through the Show Cause Notice and the consequent demand pertaining to the reassessed Bills of Entry were held to be legally unsustainable.
Issue 2 - Maintainability of demand on subsequently self-assessed Bills of Entry without Revenue appeal against self-assessment
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment)
2.10 The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in "ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-IV", which held that even in the case of self-assessed Bills of Entry, if any issue arises regarding value, rate of duty, etc., such self-assessed Bills of Entry must be challenged by way of appeal; they cannot be collaterally questioned without recourse to the appellate mechanism.
2.11 The Tribunal applied the principle that what is applicable to the assessee, in terms of the requirement to challenge self-assessment by appeal, is equally applicable to the Revenue.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 For the subsequent 30 consignments, the Tribunal found:
(a) The Bills of Entry were self-assessed by the appellant. (b) The Customs electronic system did not raise any query or objection regarding Safeguard Duty. (c) The Revenue, if aggrieved by such self-assessment or by the system's non-flagging of Safeguard Duty, was required to file appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) to challenge these self-assessments.
2.13 The Tribunal held that, following the principle laid down in "ITC Ltd.", self-assessed Bills of Entry, once accepted and not appealed, also attain finality. The Revenue cannot bypass the appellate remedy and instead initiate proceedings under Section 28 to dispute aspects of the self-assessment that could and should have been agitated in appeal.
Conclusions
2.14 Since the Revenue did not file any appeal against the 30 self-assessed Bills of Entry, the Tribunal held that the confirmed demand of Safeguard Duty in respect of those consignments is not legally sustainable.
2.15 The Tribunal explicitly declined to examine or decide the substantive question whether "Taiwan" is a part of "China" for the purpose of the Safeguard Duty exemption notification, holding that the appeal could be allowed on the ground of finality of reassessment/self-assessment and failure of the Revenue to pursue the prescribed appellate remedies.
2.16 On the combined reasoning that (i) the reassessment orders and (ii) the accepted self-assessments had attained finality without appeal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal, granting consequential relief as per law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 within the prescribed period, the seized gold coins are liable to be released under Section 110(2) of the Act.
1.2 Whether an alleged "oral" show cause notice or waiver of notice can satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Consequence of non-issuance of show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to Section 124(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 requiring a show cause notice before confiscation, and Section 110(2) mandating return of seized goods if such notice is not issued within the prescribed period. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's interpretation in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja that non-issuance of notice under Section 124(a) within the statutory period attracts the mandatory consequence under Section 110(2) that the goods "shall be returned" to the person from whose possession they were seized, absent a valid extension by the competent authority under the first proviso to Section 110(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that no show cause notice, written or oral, had been issued in respect of the seized gold coins, and that the coins continued to remain with the Customs Authority.
2.3 Relying on an earlier coordinate bench decision in a connected matter and on the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja, the Court held that, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124(a) within the period contemplated by Section 110(2) and without any recorded extension by the competent authority under the first proviso, the statutory consequence is that the seized goods must be returned.
2.4 The Court accepted the principle, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, that Section 110A (provisional release) is merely an interim mechanism and cannot dilute or negate the mandatory operation of Section 110(2), and that the time limit for issuing notice under Section 124(a) is governed solely by Section 110(2).
Conclusions
2.5 The seized gold coins are liable to be released to the petitioner as no show cause notice under Section 124 has been issued within the statutory framework and no valid extension of time has been shown.
Issue 2: Validity of "oral" show cause notice and waiver of statutory notice under Section 124
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 The Court adopted and relied upon the reasoning of the coordinate bench in the connected matter which examined the contention of the Customs Authorities that a show cause notice under Section 124 could be issued orally and/or that the notice requirement could be waived by the passenger.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court noted that in the earlier connected matter it had been specifically held that: (a) there was no averment in the counter affidavit that any oral show cause notice had been issued; (b) there is no statutory provision permitting waiver of the notice mandated under Section 124; and (c) in the absence of any such notice, written or oral, the requirements of Section 124(a) are not satisfied.
2.8 Applying the same reasoning, the Court rejected the Department's stand in the present case that an "oral show cause notice" existed, in circumstances where there was neither pleading nor material establishing such oral notice, and where the statute does not contemplate waiver of the prescribed notice.
Conclusions
2.9 Alleged oral show cause notice and any purported waiver of the statutory notice do not satisfy Section 124; in the absence of a valid statutory notice, the seizure cannot be sustained and the goods are to be returned in accordance with Section 110(2).
Issue 3: Conditions and modalities for release of the seized gold coins
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Having held that the seized gold coins must be released to the petitioner, the Court directed that the release be subject to payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges.
2.11 The Court further directed that warehousing charges be computed on the basis of the charges applicable on the date of detention and facilitated the petitioner's appearance before the Customs Authority (personally, through Power of Attorney Holder, or virtually), designating a nodal officer and fixing a specific date and time for appearance.
Conclusions
2.12 The Department is required to release the seized gold coins to the petitioner upon: (i) payment of applicable customs duty; and (ii) payment of warehousing charges calculated as on the date of detention, with the release process to be coordinated through the designated nodal officer on the specified date and time.
Issues: Whether the impugned appellate order was liable to be set aside for want of a proper opportunity of personal hearing, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned.
Analysis: The petition challenged the order-in-original and the order-in-appeal in GST proceedings. The Court found that the petitioner was not afforded a sufficient opportunity of hearing at either stage, and also noted the unusual nature of the hearing notice which stated that no personal hearing was required and that the notice was only for uploading of the order. In these circumstances, the appellate process was held to have suffered from procedural unfairness. The Court also condoned the delay in filing the appeal and directed that a fresh personal hearing be given before the appellate authority.
Conclusion: The impugned order-in-appeal was set aside, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the matter was remitted for decision afresh on merits after granting the petitioner a personal hearing.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained restoration of appellate consideration with a direction for a fresh merits decision after hearing, while the substantive tax dispute was left open for determination by the appellate authority.
Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order passed without affording a meaningful opportunity of personal hearing cannot be sustained, and the appellate remedy must be decided afresh after complying with natural justice.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority was bound to consider the assessee's annual return in Form GSTR-9, the unavailed input tax credit on inward supplies, and the resulting claim of revenue neutrality while re-examining the tax demand; (ii) Whether the amended restriction in Section 44(2) of the Goods and Services Tax law could be applied to the assessee's annual return filed before the amendment took effect.
Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority was bound to consider the assessee's annual return in Form GSTR-9, the unavailed input tax credit on inward supplies, and the resulting claim of revenue neutrality while re-examining the tax demand.
Analysis: The annual return filed in Form GSTR-9 was material to the controversy because it reflected the assessee's corrected disclosure. The Court held that where the assessee asserts that it did not avail input tax credit on inward CESS and that the demand on outward supplies should be neutralised by the available but unutilised credit, the tax authorities cannot ignore that aspect altogether. Reference was made to Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which requires that tax be levied and collected only by authority of law. On that reasoning, the appellate authority was required to give due regard to the annual return and the pleaded revenue-neutral position.
Conclusion: The assessee's annual return and the claimed input tax credit position had to be considered by the appellate authority; the omission to do so was not sustained.
Issue (ii): Whether the amended restriction in Section 44(2) of the Goods and Services Tax law could be applied to the assessee's annual return filed before the amendment took effect.
Analysis: The Court held that the pre-amendment position under Section 44(2) did not impose a fatal prohibition against filing the annual return beyond the stated date. The amendment introducing a mandatory prohibition was stated to take effect from 1 October 2023 and could not govern a return filed earlier. The presence of a late-fee mechanism also indicated that late filing was not intended to be totally barred under the earlier regime.
Conclusion: The amended restriction in Section 44(2) did not apply to the assessee's return filed before the amendment came into force.
Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh consideration in accordance with law, with the assessee obtaining substantive relief on the issues of GSTR-9 and revenue neutrality.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax assessee's corrected annual return and unavailed input tax credit are relevant to the ultimate liability, the appellate authority must consider them, and a later statutory prohibition on late filing cannot be applied to invalidate an earlier return filed before the amendment's commencement.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of Section 35(2AB) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the applicable judicial precedents, there is any legal impediment to considering the assessee's applications for recognition and approval of its R&D facility, and issuance of Forms 3CM and 3CL, for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17.
1.2 Whether the respondents acted lawfully in declining or omitting to consider the assessee's claim for recognition/approval and issuance of requisite certificates for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17, despite subsequent recognition of the R&D facility and grant of approval with effect from 01.04.2017.
1.3 Whether the respondents are required to reconsider the assessee's applications for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in light of the binding interpretation of Section 35(2AB) laid down in the cited Division Bench judgment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legal impediment to considering recognition/approval and issuance of Forms 3CM/3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted the legal position as declared in the Division Bench decision interpreting Section 35(2AB) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and approving the reasoning in earlier decisions which held:
(i) Section 35(2AB) is intended to encourage innovation, research and development in India.
(ii) For availing weighted deduction, the essential elements are: (a) development of the R&D facility; (b) incurring of expenditure on such facility; (c) approval of the facility by the prescribed authority (DSIR); and (d) allowance of weighted deduction on the expenditure so incurred.
(iii) The provisions do not stipulate that weighted deduction is confined only to expenditure incurred from the date of recognition/approval or any "cut-off" date mentioned in the DSIR certificate.
(iv) A plain and harmonious reading of Section 35(2AB), Rule 6(5A) and Form 3CM indicates that once the facility is approved, the entire expenditure incurred on development of the approved R&D facility is eligible for weighted deduction, except expenditure on land and building.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 Relying on the Division Bench judgment, the Court recorded the settled position that, for claiming benefit under Section 35(2AB):
- What is relevant is the existence of recognition/approval of the R&D facility, and
- It is not permissible to restrict the benefit only from the date of recognition or from any cut-off date mentioned in Form 3CM, as such restriction would amount to "reading more in the law which is not expressly provided".
2.3 The Court noted the petitioner's contention that there was no "in principle" impediment to granting approval under Section 35(2AB) for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17, particularly as:
- The petitioner's R&D unit had been granted recognition on 26.10.2016; and
- Approval under Section 35(2AB) had been granted with effect from 01.04.2017 and Form 3CM had been issued for FY 2017-18.
2.4 The Court observed that neither the communication dated 02.08.2021 nor the subsequent communication dated 30.01.2021 (received during the pendency of the petition) reflected a consideration of the petitioner's eligibility for Forms 3CM and 3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in the light of the above legal position.
(c) Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that there is, in principle, no legal bar under Section 35(2AB), as interpreted by the Division Bench, against considering the petitioner's applications for recognition/approval and issuance of requisite certificates for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 merely because recognition/approval came later.
Issue 2: Validity of the respondents' omission/refusal and necessity of reconsideration
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Court found that the respondents' prior communications had not addressed the petitioner's entitlement to approval and issuance of Forms 3CM and 3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in accordance with the binding legal position laid down in the Division Bench judgment.
2.7 The Court emphasised that the legislative intent behind Section 35(2AB) is to incentivise research and development and that non-grant of benefit on a restrictive reading of dates of recognition or approval would defeat that intent, as recognised in the cited precedents.
(b) Conclusions
2.8 The Court did not itself grant the certificates or approve the expenditure, but held that the matter required fresh examination by the respondents in accordance with law.
2.9 The petition was disposed of with the following operative directions:
(i) The respondents shall examine the matter afresh and consider grant of the requisite certificate/issuance of Forms (including Forms 3CM and 3CL) for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17.
(ii) This exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four weeks.
(iii) If the petitioner's request/application is to be rejected, the respondents shall pass a reasoned order under intimation to the petitioner.
(iv) While undertaking this exercise, the concerned authorities shall consider and apply the Division Bench judgment interpreting Section 35(2AB).
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to implementation of the Order-in-Original permitting redemption and re-export of the seized gold jewellery despite delay in payment of the redemption fine.
Analysis: The Order-in-Original had already permitted redemption and re-export of the gold jewellery on payment of redemption fine and penalty. The delay in approaching the Customs Department was viewed in the backdrop of the COVID-19 period and the extension of limitation recognised by the Supreme Court. The Court also noted the petitioner's medical purpose for visiting India and the finding that he was not a habitual offender. In these special circumstances, the order of confiscation was directed to be given effect to, with the petitioner being required to pay costs and comply with the prescribed formalities.
Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to implementation of the Order-in-Original and release of the seized gold jewellery for re-export, subject to payment of costs and compliance with formalities.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether CENVAT credit on capital goods is deniable where, on the date of receipt of such capital goods, the intended final product was exempted, but at the time the capital goods were put to use, the final product had become dutiable.
1.2 Whether capital goods in such circumstances can be regarded as "used exclusively in the manufacture of exempted goods" within the meaning of Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
1.3 Whether the Tribunal's earlier decision and its affirmation by the High Court in relation to the same assessee, product, and period conclude the controversy and render the present dispute covered by precedent.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Timing of eligibility for CENVAT credit on capital goods and meaning of "used exclusively in the manufacture of exempted goods" under Rule 6(4)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was considered, which restricts CENVAT credit on capital goods used "exclusively" in the manufacture of exempted goods. The focus of interpretation was on:
2.1.1 The relevant point of time for determining credit eligibility on capital goods - whether it is the date of receipt/installation of capital goods or the date when such capital goods are put to use for manufacture.
2.1.2 The condition that capital goods must be "used exclusively" for exempted goods to attract the bar under Rule 6(4).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal adopted and relied upon the reasoning of the coordinate Bench (Ahmedabad) in the assessee's own case, which held that:
2.2.1 For purposes of Rule 6(4), the relevant date to determine whether capital goods are hit by the exclusion is the date of commencement of production on such capital goods, not the date of their receipt or installation.
2.2.2 The statutory language links the restriction to whether the capital goods are used "exclusively" for exempted goods; hence, the factual position when the capital goods are actually put to use for manufacture is decisive.
2.3 It was noted that in the earlier decision, the Tribunal had examined the factual matrix and held that:
2.3.1 Although the capital goods were received when the finished product "Maaza" was exempt, they were not used for manufacture of exempted goods during that period.
2.3.2 Production on the capital goods in question (meant for "Maaza" in PET bottles) commenced only from 29.03.2011, by which date the finished product had become dutiable and the exemption had been withdrawn.
2.3.3 Consequently, the capital goods were never "used exclusively" for manufacture of exempted goods, and the bar under Rule 6(4) did not apply.
2.4 The Tribunal distinguished the decision relied upon by Revenue (Surya Roshni Ltd.) on two principal grounds highlighted in the earlier Ahmedabad decision:
2.4.1 The decision had not attained finality before the higher courts; therefore, its binding value was limited as against the clear ratio already laid down in the assessee's own case.
2.4.2 On facts, in Surya Roshni, the same capital goods were actually used for a substantial period for manufacturing exempted goods before the product became dutiable, justifying the denial of credit. In contrast, in the present facts, the capital goods started production only after the product became dutiable, and were never used for exempted production.
2.5 The Tribunal emphasized that the adjudicating authority, in earlier remand proceedings, was required only to verify the factual aspects-namely, the date of commencement of production on the capital goods and whether the finished goods were exempted or dutiable on that date. Revisiting the legal issue at that stage was characterized as beyond the scope of remand.
Conclusions
2.6 The Tribunal reaffirmed that, for Rule 6(4) purposes, the eligibility of CENVAT credit on capital goods is to be determined with reference to the date the capital goods are put to use for production.
2.7 Since, on the date of commencement of production on the capital goods in question, the finished goods were dutiable and the capital goods were never used exclusively for exempted goods, the bar under Rule 6(4) did not apply and CENVAT credit was legally admissible.
2.8 The Tribunal therefore upheld the dropping of proceedings by the adjudicating authority and rejected Revenue's argument that mere receipt of capital goods during an exemption period disentitled the assessee to credit.
Issue 3: Effect of prior Tribunal and High Court decisions in the same assessee's case
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The Tribunal observed that the precise question - whether the date of receipt or the date of commencement of production governs credit eligibility on capital goods where the status of the finished goods changes from exempted to dutiable - had already been decided by the coordinate Bench (Ahmedabad) in the assessee's own case.
3.2 That decision held that the date of production is determinative and that the assessee was entitled to credit as the capital goods were first used when the final product was dutiable.
3.3 The Tribunal recorded that the said decision was subsequently carried by Revenue before the jurisdictional High Court, which, after examining the Tribunal's factual findings (including the commencement of production on 29.03.2011 and the dutiable status of the product on that date), declined to interfere and held that no substantial question of law arose.
3.4 In light of this affirmation, the Tribunal held that the controversy is no longer "res integra" and stands squarely covered in favour of the assessee, leaving no scope to re-agitate the same issue in the present appeal.
Conclusions
3.5 The Tribunal concluded that the matter is fully covered by the earlier Tribunal decision and the High Court's order, and therefore Revenue's appeal could not be sustained.
3.6 The appeal filed by Revenue was dismissed, confirming the assessee's entitlement to CENVAT credit on the capital goods in question.
Issues: (i) whether the petitioners rebutted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and established that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability; (ii) whether non-service of the statutory legal notice vitiated the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): whether the petitioners rebutted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and established that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
Analysis: Once execution and signature on the cheque were admitted, the statutory presumptions as to consideration and discharge of debt or liability arose. The defence that defective goods were returned was examined on the evidence led by the petitioners, including the delivery challan and the testimony of the alleged witnesses. The evidence did not support the defence: one witness denied knowledge of the transaction or return of goods, the other did not prove employment or preparation of the challan, and there was no reliable documentary proof that the goods were defective or that a valid return was made. The circumstances, including the timing and contents of the challan, also did not corroborate the defence.
Conclusion: The petitioners failed to rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the cheque was treated as issued towards a legally enforceable liability.
Issue (ii): whether non-service of the statutory legal notice vitiated the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: The notice was sent to the address used by the petitioners, dispatch was proved by postal receipt and tracking material, and the address itself was not disputed. A notice properly addressed and sent by registered post is deemed served, and service of summons also cures any alleged defect in notice service.
Conclusion: The plea of non-service of legal notice was rejected and service of notice was treated as duly proved.
Final Conclusion: The revisional court found no infirmity in the concurrent conviction and sentence, and no ground for interference was made out.
Ratio Decidendi: Where execution of a cheque is admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operate, and they can be displaced only by credible rebuttal showing non-existence of debt or liability on a preponderance of probabilities; duly addressed and dispatched statutory notice is deemed served.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns for six months under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central/State GST Acts, read with Rule 22 of the CGST Rules, 2017, could be revisited in light of the proviso to Rule 22(4) when the registered person expresses willingness to file pending returns and pay dues.
1.2 Whether the case is covered by an earlier decision of a Coordinate Bench on identical facts and law, warranting grant of similar relief.
1.3 Manner in which the period under Section 73(10) of the Central/State GST Acts is to be computed in the event of restoration of registration, and the assessee's liability for arrears of tax, interest, penalty and late fees.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns and applicability of proviso to Rule 22(4)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to Section 29(2)(c) of the GST Acts, which empowers the proper officer to cancel registration where a registered person has not furnished returns for a continuous period of six months.
2.2 The Court extracted and relied upon Rule 22 of the CGST Rules, 2017, particularly:
(a) Sub-rule (1): issuance of show-cause notice in Form GST REG-17 where registration is liable to be cancelled under Section 29.
(b) Sub-rule (2): reply in Form GST REG-18 within the stipulated period.
(c) Sub-rule (3): order of cancellation in Form GST REG-19, directing payment of arrears of tax, interest and penalty.
(d) Sub-rule (4) and its proviso: dropping of cancellation proceedings and passing of order in Form GST REG-20 where the person, instead of replying, furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee in cases covered by Section 29(2)(b) or (c).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the petitioner's registration was cancelled for non-filing of returns for six months, squarely falling under Section 29(2)(c), and that cancellation of registration entails serious civil consequences.
2.4 Relying on the interpretation adopted in the earlier Coordinate Bench decision, the Court read the proviso to Rule 22(4) to mean that if a person, whose registration is proposed to be cancelled under Section 29(2)(c), is ready and willing to furnish all pending returns and make full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee, the proper officer may drop the cancellation proceedings and pass an appropriate order in Form GST REG-20.
2.5 The Court accepted the statement that the petitioner was ready and willing to comply with all the formalities under the proviso to Rule 22(4), and that GST returns had been updated up to a specified period.
Conclusions
2.6 The Court held that, notwithstanding the earlier cancellation and the expiry of the statutory time limit for a revocation application, the petitioner is entitled to seek restoration of registration by invoking the mechanism contemplated in the proviso to Rule 22(4), subject to furnishing all pending returns and paying all tax dues with applicable interest, penalty and late fee.
Issue 2: Applicability of a Coordinate Bench decision on identical facts and law
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court perused the earlier judgment of a Coordinate Bench dealing with cancellation of GST registration under Section 29(2)(c) for non-filing of returns for six months, where the same provisions of Section 29 and Rule 22, including the proviso to Rule 22(4), were examined.
2.8 The Court observed that the earlier decision directed the authority to consider restoration of registration if the assessee approached within a stipulated time, furnished all pending returns and made full payment of tax dues, interest and late fees, and further clarified computation of limitation under Section 73(10) post such order.
2.9 The Court recorded the concession by the respondent that the facts and law in the present case are similar to those considered in the earlier decision, and held that the said judgment "squarely covers" the present matter.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court concluded that the petitioner is entitled to be granted relief in terms identical to that awarded in the earlier Coordinate Bench judgment and accordingly extended similar directions for restoration of registration, subject to compliance with the statutory conditions.
Issue 3: Computation of limitation under Section 73(10) and liability for arrears upon restoration
Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Court referred to Section 73(10) of the Central/State GST Acts in relation to the period of limitation for passing adjudication orders and to Section 44 in respect of the financial year 2024-25.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.2 Following the Coordinate Bench's approach, the Court held that, in view of the intended restoration of registration, it is necessary to clarify how the limitation period under Section 73(10) is to be reckoned so as to avoid prejudice to the revenue.
Conclusions
3.3 The Court directed that the period stipulated under Section 73(10) of the Central/State GST Acts shall be computed from the date of the present order, except for the financial year 2024-25, which shall be governed by Section 44 of the Central/State GST Acts.
3.4 The Court further held that the petitioner shall make payment of all arrears, namely tax, penalty, interest and late fees, as a condition for restoration of GST registration.
Operative directions (arising from all issues)
4.1 The petitioner shall approach the concerned authority within 60 days from the date of the order, seeking restoration of GST registration.
4.2 If such application is filed and the petitioner complies with all requirements of the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017, the concerned authority shall consider the application in accordance with law and take necessary steps to restore the GST registration as expeditiously as possible.
4.3 Computation of limitation under Section 73(10) and the petitioner's obligation to pay all arrears, including tax, interest, penalty and late fees, shall be as specified above.
Issues: (i) Whether deletion of penalty under Section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Tribunal required quashing of prosecution under Section 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether pendency of the Department's appeal against the Tribunal's order affected maintainability of the quashing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) Whether cognizance by the trial court barred exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): Whether deletion of penalty under Section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Tribunal required quashing of prosecution under Section 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The prosecution and the penalty arose from the same search-based allegations of concealed income and willful evasion. The Tribunal had deleted the penalty on merits after finding that the statutory preconditions for penalty were not satisfied and that concealment was not established. The judgment applied the settled principle that where the factual foundation for concealment is judicially negated by the final fact-finding authority, criminal prosecution resting on the same foundation cannot survive. The presumption under Section 278E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could not operate once the foundational facts themselves stood negated.
Conclusion: Yes. The deletion of penalty on merits warranted quashing of the prosecution.
Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the Department's appeal against the Tribunal's order affected maintainability of the quashing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Mere filing or pendency of the appeal did not stay the Tribunal's findings or revive the factual basis of the prosecution. In the absence of any stay, the Tribunal's exoneration continued to hold the field. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remained available where continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process or where the proceedings lacked a surviving legal foundation.
Conclusion: No. The pendency of the appeal did not make the petition non-maintainable.
Issue (iii): Whether cognizance by the trial court barred exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Taking of cognizance is not a fetter on the High Court's inherent power. If the continuation of proceedings is unjust, oppressive, or an abuse of process, the High Court can still quash the matter to secure the ends of justice. The existence of cognizance therefore did not preclude intervention under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Conclusion: No. Cognizance did not bar exercise of inherent powers.
Final Conclusion: Since the penalty proceedings had been set aside on merits and the prosecution was founded on the same alleged concealment, the criminal case could not be sustained; the proceedings were quashed as an abuse of process, while leaving liberty to seek revival if the appellate challenge to the Tribunal's order succeeds.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a competent tax appellate forum, acting as the final fact-finding authority, conclusively negates concealment or the statutory basis of penalty on merits, prosecution for willful tax evasion founded on the same facts cannot continue unless that exoneration is stayed or reversed; pendency of appeal or prior cognizance does not curtail the High Court's power to quash abuse of process.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether mere specification of goods by Central Government notification under section 4A(1) of the Central Excise Act is, by itself, sufficient to mandate valuation on the basis of retail sale price for the purposes of additional duty of customs (CVD).
(2) Whether a show cause notice and consequential adjudication proceedings are vitiated when they proceed on the basis of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011 for a period during which only the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and the Rules made thereunder were in force.
(3) Consequential effect of a fundamentally defective show cause notice on the validity of the demand of duty, confiscation, interest and penalties.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Conditions for application of section 4A-based MRP valuation to imported goods for CVD
Legal framework
The Court examined section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, which levies additional duty on imported articles equal to the excise duty on like articles manufactured in India, and its linkage to section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 where valuation is with reference to retail sale price in cases covered by the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (SWMA) and notifications issued thereunder.
The Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in "JAYANTI FOOD PROCESSING P. LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, RAJASTHAN", which interpreted section 4A of the Central Excise Act and laid down the conditions for its applicability.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that, as per the Supreme Court, section 4A applies only where all of the following factors are cumulatively satisfied:
(i) the goods are excisable goods;
(ii) the goods are sold in packaged form;
(iii) there is a requirement under the SWMA, the Rules made thereunder, or any other law, to declare on the package the retail sale price of such goods;
(iv) the Central Government has specified such goods by notification in the Official Gazette under section 4A(1); and
(v) valuation is then to be done on the basis of the declared retail sale price on the packages, less the notified abatement.
The Court emphasized that the "thrust of section 4A is on the packages and not on the commodity", and that the nature of sale (wholesale, bulk, retail) is not the relevant factor; instead, the decisive factor is whether the goods are required, under the SWMA/Rules or other law, to carry a retail sale price declaration.
On this basis, the Court held that the revenue's stand that once goods are specified in a notification under section 4A(1), that fact alone mandates assessment under section 4A is unsustainable. Specification by notification is only one among several mandatory preconditions; the statutory requirement to declare retail sale price on the package under the SWMA/Rules is equally indispensable.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that:
(a) Mere specification of the goods by notification under section 4A(1) is not, by itself, sufficient to attract section 4A-based valuation.
(b) For section 4A to apply, all conditions enumerated by the Supreme Court in JAYANTI FOOD PROCESSING, including a legal requirement under SWMA/Rules (or other law) to declare retail sale price on the package, must be fulfilled.
(c) The broader proposition advanced by revenue-that specification in the notification alone compels RSP-based assessment-cannot be sustained.
Issue (2): Validity of reliance on the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and 2011 Rules for the period January 2007 to August 2008
Legal framework
The period of dispute is January 2007 to August 2008. During that period, section 4A of the Central Excise Act referred exclusively to the SWMA, 1976 and the Rules made thereunder.
The show cause notice and order-in-original, however, invoked and relied upon specific provisions of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011 ("New Act" and "New Rules"), which came into force on 01.04.2011, i.e. after the disputed period.
The Court referred to:
- Article 265 of the Constitution of India ("No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law").
- The principle that statutes are presumed to be prospective in operation, encapsulated in the maxim "nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis".
- Supreme Court decisions including:
* Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (show cause notice is the foundation of the proceedings; allegations must be clearly spelt out);
* Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta v. Pradyumna Steel Ltd. (mere mention of a wrong provision is not fatal if power exists under some other applicable provision);
* Glaxo Smith Kline PLC v. Controller of Patents and Designs (pre-existing rights are governed by old law);
* T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf (no statute is to be construed as retrospective unless clearly so intended).
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted the following critical features of the show cause notice and adjudication:
- Paragraphs of the show cause notice and the order-in-original specifically relied upon provisions of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, both of which were not in force during January 2007 to August 2008.
- The show cause notice stated violations of "Legal Metrology Act, 2009 / Standards of Weights and Measures Act 1976 and the Rules made thereunder" and of the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, described as "earlier Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977".
- The appellant had specifically contended in reply that provisions of a later Act and Rules not in force during the material period could not be relied upon for that earlier period; this contention was not addressed in the order-in-original.
The Court held that:
- There is nothing in the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 to indicate retrospective operation; consequently, the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011 also cannot operate retrospectively.
- A dispute must be adjudicated in accordance with the law in force at the time when the relevant facts occurred; statutory liability must be tested against the validity and content of the applicable law at that time.
- This is not a case of a mere mis-citation of a section where the underlying power is traceable to a correct provision; rather, it is a case where the very foundation of the allegations and legal characterisation rests upon a statute and rules that were non-existent during the relevant period. This goes to the core of the show cause notice.
- Failure to properly notify the assessee of the applicable legal provisions, while basing allegations on a subsequent Act and Rules, undermines the assessee's ability to mount an effective defence and results in a failure of justice.
Conclusions
The Court held that:
(a) The Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011, not being in force during January 2007 to August 2008 and not being retrospective, could not legally govern the disputed period.
(b) The show cause notice and adjudication, having substantially proceeded on the basis of that later legislation, are fundamentally defective.
(c) Such a foundational defect goes to the root of jurisdiction and vitiates the entire proceedings; the defect cannot be cured by characterising it as a mere wrong citation of provision.
Issue (3): Effect of the defective show cause notice on duty demand, confiscation, interest and penalties
Interpretation and reasoning
Having found that the show cause notice was fundamentally defective because it invoked a statute and rules not in force during the relevant period, the Court considered the impact on the adjudication.
It held that:
- As per Article 265, no tax can be levied or collected except by authority of law in force at the relevant time.
- When the very legal basis identified in the show cause notice is inapplicable to the period in question, the jurisdictional foundation for demand of duty, confiscation, interest and imposition of penalties is destroyed.
- Proceedings based on such a defective notice "have occasioned a failure of justice" and cannot be sustained.
The Court noted that, in view of this threshold defect, it was constrained from deciding the several other "complex and novel" legal issues argued by both sides (including limitation, correctness of CVD computation, and confiscation/penalty issues) on their merits.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that:
(a) The impugned order, being founded on a fundamentally defective show cause notice that relied on inapplicable legislation, is vitiated.
(b) The impugned order is set aside in entirety.
(c) As a consequence, the demand of differential duty, proposals for confiscation, interest and penalties do not survive.
(d) The appellant is entitled to consequential relief in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, instituted in the name of a registered welfare association of homebuyers, is maintainable when the association itself is not the "financial creditor".
1.2 Whether the authorisation produced in favour of the persons filing the Section 7 application on behalf of the homebuyers, being only a resolution of the "core committee" of the association, satisfied the statutory requirement of authorisation by the financial creditors.
1.3 Whether the defect in authorisation for filing the Section 7 application is a curable defect and whether the adjudicating authority ought to have permitted the filing of individual affidavits of homebuyers authorising the association/applicants.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Maintainability of Section 7 application filed in the name of a registered welfare association of homebuyers
Legal framework
2.1 Section 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, permits a "financial creditor either by itself or jointly with other financial creditors, or any other person on behalf of the financial creditor, as may be notified by the Central Government" to file an application for initiation of CIRP.
2.2 The Central Government notification dated 27.02.2019, issued under Section 7(1), specifies four categories of persons who may file such application on behalf of a financial creditor: (i) a guardian, (ii) an executor or administrator of an estate of a financial creditor, (iii) a trustee (including a debenture trustee), and (iv) a person duly authorised by the Board of Directors of a company.
2.3 Rule 4(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 mandates that a financial creditor make the application in Form 1. In Form 1, Part I, item 5 requires disclosure of "name and address of the person authorised to submit application on its behalf (enclose authorisation)".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The application in Form 1 showed the "name of the financial creditor" as the welfare association; however, in Part IV it was specifically pleaded that the financial creditor "comprises of flat purchasers" who have purchased 98 flats, and that the debt is the total value of such flats and the monies paid by these homebuyers.
2.5 The Court noted that, in substance, the financial creditors are the 98 homebuyers, and the dues of these individual flat purchasers form the basis of the Section 7 claim. The welfare association, registered under the Societies Registration Act, is only a vehicle representing them.
2.6 The notification dated 27.02.2019 does not list a registered society or welfare association as one of the notified "persons" who can file on behalf of a financial creditor under Section 7(1). However, Form 1, Part I, item 5 contemplates that "any person" can be authorised by the financial creditor to submit the application on its behalf, provided due authorisation is in place.
2.7 The Court therefore distinguished between: (a) the identity of the "financial creditors" (the 98 flat buyers) and (b) the person who actually submits the application on their behalf (which can be a society/association or individuals, if duly authorised by the financial creditors).
Conclusions
2.8 The financial creditors in law are the 98 homebuyers, not the welfare association itself.
2.9 A welfare association or registered society may act as the applicant in a Section 7 filing if it is duly authorised by the actual financial creditors in terms of Form 1, Part I, item 5; the association's competence thus turns on the existence and validity of such authorisation.
2.10 In light of the Court's approach of allowing the defect in authorisation to be cured, it held that, upon establishing valid authorisation from the homebuyers, the Section 7 application at the instance of the welfare association is to be treated as maintainable and proceeded with in accordance with law, making detailed examination of precedents unnecessary.
Issue 2 - Sufficiency and validity of the "core committee" resolution as authorisation for filing the Section 7 application
Legal framework
2.11 Form 1, Part I, item 5 requires disclosure of the "person authorised to submit application" on behalf of the financial creditor and mandates enclosure of the authorisation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The Section 7 application relied on a resolution dated 23.01.2024 (Exhibit A), described as a "certified true copy of the resolution passed at the virtual meeting of the core committee members of the Avenue 54 Welfare Association".
2.13 This resolution authorised certain named members to appoint legal representatives and to "file Section 7 Petitions before the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai" against the promoters, along with other authorisations relating to litigation and protection of the association's interests.
2.14 The Court noted that the resolution is expressly by "core committee members of the Avenue 54 Welfare Association", and not a resolution of all members of the association or of all 98 flat purchasers whose claims form the basis of the Section 7 application.
2.15 On the face of the pleadings, the Section 7 proceeding is based on the dues of all 98 flat buyers; therefore, any authority to institute insolvency proceedings on their behalf must emanate from all such financial creditors, and not merely a subset or internal committee of the association.
Conclusions
2.16 The core committee resolution dated 23.01.2024 does not constitute sufficient authorisation by all the financial creditors (i.e., all 98 homebuyers) to the persons filing the Section 7 application.
2.17 There was a defect in the authorisation supporting the Section 7 application, as the authorisation did not demonstrably emanate from or on behalf of all members whose claims were being asserted.
Issue 3 - Whether the defect in authorisation is curable and whether the adjudicating authority ought to have allowed filing of individual affidavits by the homebuyers
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 During the hearing of the interlocutory applications seeking dismissal of the Section 7 petition, the applicants (homebuyers/association) offered to file individual affidavits of the homebuyers "stating their identity, as also the fact that they individually have authorised the applicants in the present Company Petition", as recorded in the order dated 17.06.2025 of the adjudicating authority.
2.19 The corporate debtor opposed the move on the ground that the matter had already been substantially argued and that such affidavits should not be permitted to be tendered at that stage. The adjudicating authority declined to take such affidavits on record, treating them as "new material".
2.20 The Court examined the structure of Form 1 and observed that the statutory scheme allows any person to be authorised by the financial creditors to submit the application on their behalf. The essence of the objection was therefore not to the nature of the association per se, but to the fact that there was inadequate proof of authorisation from the actual financial creditors.
2.21 The Court treated this deficiency as procedural and curable: the objection could be addressed by filing individual affidavits from each homebuyer, evidencing their identity and explicit authorisation of the applicant/association for purposes of the Section 7 petition.
2.22 The Court held that, in these circumstances, the adjudicating authority ought to have allowed the Section 7 applicants to cure the defect by filing such affidavits, particularly since the offer to do so was made during the hearing itself.
Conclusions
2.23 The defect in authorisation supporting the Section 7 application is not fatal; it is a curable defect.
2.24 The adjudicating authority erred in refusing to take on record the individual affidavits of the homebuyers that were offered to be filed to establish and regularise authorisation.
2.25 To serve the ends of justice, the Court granted the welfare association a period of 7 days to file individual affidavits of the homebuyers stating their identity and confirming that they have individually authorised the applicants in the company petition.
2.26 Upon filing of these affidavits and thereby curing the defect in authorisation, the Section 7 application is to be treated as maintainable and the adjudicating authority is to proceed to hear and decide the Section 7 application in accordance with law.
2.27 The impugned order of the adjudicating authority rejecting the applications seeking dismissal of the Section 7 petition was not interfered with, for the reasons indicated, and the appeals were disposed of with the above directions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of donation made during the relevant assessment year to a research institute whose approval under that provision had expired and whose activities were found to be non-genuine.
1.2 Whether the Revenue's appeal before the Tribunal is maintainable notwithstanding the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, in view of the exceptions contained in CBDT Circular No. 05/2024 and the CBDT notification dated 14.12.2018 regarding bogus donations under Section 35(1)(ii).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Allowability of weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii)
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of the statutory scheme of Section 35(1)(ii), which allows weighted deduction for donations made to an institution approved for the purposes of scientific research. The Court also referred to the requirement that such institution must hold a valid approval from the prescribed authority for the relevant period to be eligible to receive donations qualifying for deduction.
2.2 The Court noted the CBDT notification/communication dated 14.12.2018, which recorded that the concerned trust had been earlier approved under Section 35(1)(ii) up to 31.03.2006 only, and that subsequent donations were raised on the basis of forged certificates, leading to "irregularly claimed weighted deduction u/s 35(1)(ii)."
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3 The Assessing Officer had undertaken enquiries by issuing notice under Section 133(6) to the institute, which remained unanswered, and by obtaining confirmation from the jurisdictional Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemption) that no approval under Section 35(1)(ii) existed for the institute for the relevant assessment year and that its registration under Section 12AA had been cancelled and its activities held to be not genuine.
2.4 The Court treated as an undisputed fact that the institute's approval under Section 35(1)(ii) had expired on 31.03.2006 and that all donations received thereafter, including in the relevant assessment year, were supported by forged documents. The CBDT's advisory letter dated 14.12.2018 directing field formations to examine irregular claims of weighted deduction in relation to this institute was specifically taken into account.
2.5 The Court held that the mere fact that the assessee, at the time of making the donation, relied on documents furnished by the institute and was not aware of the expiry of approval or of any adverse material against the institute, does not convert an otherwise ineligible donation into one eligible for deduction under Section 35(1)(ii). The genuineness of the assessee's belief or the absence of evidence of cash-back to the assessee was held to be irrelevant for the statutory condition of valid approval of the donee institute.
2.6 The Court relied on consistent decisions of co-ordinate Benches in relation to the same institute, wherein denial of weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) on donations to this institute had been upheld on the ground that it was neither recognised for the purposes of Section 35(1)(ii) nor eligible to raise donations for scientific research during the relevant period (including decisions in Iolite Cube Inframaterial Limited, C K Zipper (P.) Limited, Kapadia Marketing Inc., and Parag Dave).
Conclusions:
2.7 The Court concluded that, since the institute did not hold a valid approval under Section 35(1)(ii) after 31.03.2006 and had raised donations on the basis of forged documents, the assessee's donation could not qualify for weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) for the assessment year in question.
2.8 The disallowance of the weighted deduction made by the Assessing Officer was held to be in accordance with law and was upheld. The order of the appellate authority granting the deduction was set aside, and the Revenue's appeal on this issue was allowed.
Issue 2: Maintainability of Revenue's appeal in view of CBDT monetary limit circulars
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.9 The assessee relied on CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024, which prescribes monetary limits for filing appeals in income-tax cases and, specifically, a limit of Rs. 60,00,000 of tax effect for filing an appeal before the Tribunal. On that basis, the assessee contended that, as the tax effect in the case was about Rs. 20,66,348, the Revenue's appeal was not maintainable.
2.10 The Revenue relied on CBDT Circular No. 05/2024 dated 15.03.2024, particularly clause (m) of paragraph 3.1, which provides an exception to the monetary limits for "any other case or class of cases where in the opinion of the Board it is necessary to contest in the interest of justice or revenue and specified so by a circular issued by Board in this regard."
2.11 The Court further relied on CBDT notification F.No.225/351/2018-ITA(II) dated 14.12.2018 titled "Information regarding bogus donation racket under section 35(1)(ii) of the Act, 1961," which recorded that the concerned trust's approval under Section 35(1)(ii) expired on 31.03.2006, that it had thereafter raised substantial donations on the basis of a forged certificate, and that donors had irregularly claimed weighted deductions under Section 35(1)(ii). The notification directed that scrutiny assessment cases of such donors should be handled in the light of these facts and that a list of donors for specified years be drawn and circulated for appropriate examination.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.12 The Court interpreted clause (m) of paragraph 3.1 of Circular No. 05/2024 to mean that where the Board has, by a separate circular/notification, identified a case or class of cases requiring contest in the interest of justice or revenue, such cases fall outside the monetary thresholds for filing appeals.
2.13 Referring to the 14.12.2018 notification, the Court held that the CBDT had expressly treated the class of cases involving bogus/irregular weighted deductions under Section 35(1)(ii) in respect of donations to the concerned trust as a special category requiring particular scrutiny and action. The direction to the field formations to examine claims and pass suitable assessment orders in such donor cases was viewed as an explicit instruction to treat these matters as requiring contest irrespective of monetary limits.
2.14 On that basis, the Court held that donor cases involving this institute and claims of weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) constituted a class of cases covered by the exception in clause (m) of Circular No. 05/2024. Consequently, the general monetary limit prescribed by Circular No. 09/2024 for filing appeals could not bar the Revenue's appeal in such cases.
Conclusions:
2.15 The Court held that the Revenue's appeal was maintainable despite the tax effect being below Rs. 60,00,000, because the case fell within the exception contemplated in clause (m) of CBDT Circular No. 05/2024, read with the CBDT notification dated 14.12.2018 on bogus donations under Section 35(1)(ii).
2.16 The cross objection of the assessee seeking dismissal of the Revenue's appeal on the ground of low tax effect was rejected and dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether availment of Cenvat credit of additional duty of customs and special additional duty of customs on imported capital goods was barred by the exclusion contained in Rule 9(1)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
1.2 Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was validly invoked for recovery of the alleged inadmissible Cenvat credit and consequential interest and penalty under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Bar on Cenvat credit under Rule 9(1)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004
Legal framework
2.1 The Court reproduced Rule 9(1)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, which permits taking of Cenvat credit on the basis of a supplementary invoice or similar document evidencing payment of additional excise duty or additional duty of customs, but specifically excludes cases where the additional duty became recoverable on account of non-levy or short-levy by reason of fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, or contravention of provisions of the Excise Act or Customs Act or rules thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that the capital goods were imported under the EPCG scheme with exemption benefit and that customs duty was paid subsequently upon non-fulfilment of export obligation. The department's contention was that, as duty became payable only after detection and issuance of a customs show cause notice and penalty under the Customs Act, the exclusion under Rule 9(1)(b) applied, thereby barring Cenvat credit.
2.3 The Court held that, for the exclusion under Rule 9(1)(b) to apply, the department must establish that the additional duty became recoverable due to fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, or contravention of statutory provisions with intent to evade payment of duty. Mere failure to fulfil EPCG obligations or delayed payment of duty does not, by itself, satisfy these requirements.
2.4 The Court found that the appellant had separately reflected the Cenvat credit on imported capital goods in the Cenvat credit table of ER-1 returns filed with the department. As these facts were on record and it was not alleged that the ER-1 disclosures were false, the department could not claim that the appellant had not informed it about availment of such credit or that there was suppression or mis-statement.
2.5 The Court observed that the burden lies on the department to prove malafide intention to evade duty, and that no material had been produced to show fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty in relation to the customs duty on the capital goods.
Conclusions
2.6 The Court concluded that the conditions for invoking the exclusion in Rule 9(1)(b) were not satisfied. Consequently, the availment of Cenvat credit of additional duty of customs and special additional duty of customs on the imported capital goods was not barred under Rule 9(1)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Issue 2 - Validity of extended period under Section 11A(4) and imposition of penalty
Legal framework
2.7 The Court reproduced Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which permits invocation of an extended limitation period of five years where non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, short-payment, or erroneous refund of duty is "by reason of" fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, or contravention of statutory provisions with intent to evade payment of duty, and authorises recovery of duty with interest and penalty equivalent to the duty.
2.8 The demand and penalty in the impugned orders were founded on Section 11A(4) read with Rule 14 and Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court held that the same elements (fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression, or contravention with intent to evade duty) underpin both the exclusion in Rule 9(1)(b) and the extended period under Section 11A(4). As the department had not established any such element for purposes of Rule 9(1)(b), it likewise failed to justify invocation of Section 11A(4).
2.10 The Court emphasised that the appellant had disclosed availment of Cenvat credit in ER-1 returns, and that there was no allegation that these disclosures were incorrect. In such a situation, there could be no ground to allege wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts so as to attract Section 11A(4).
2.11 The Court relied on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Dynamic Industries Ltd., wherein it was held that when Cenvat credit is duly reflected in ER-1 returns and there is no material to indicate suppression, the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A (and corresponding provisions) is not available to the Revenue. The Court found the facts of the present case to be identical in principle.
2.12 On these findings, the Court held that there was no basis to allege that duty was not paid or was short-paid by reason of fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade payment of duty. Accordingly, Section 11A(4) could not be invoked.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court concluded that the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) was not available to the department. The entire demand for the period from November 2014 to June 2017 was held to be barred by limitation.
2.14 As the substantive demand failed on limitation and the requisite mens rea was not proved, the consequential imposition of penalty under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was also unsustainable.
2.15 The Court therefore held that the impugned order upholding demand of Cenvat credit, interest, and penalty was not legally sustainable, set it aside, and allowed the appeal.
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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 within the prescribed period, the seized gold coins are liable to be released under Section 110(2) of the Act.
1.2 Whether an alleged "oral" show cause notice or waiver of notice can satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Consequence of non-issuance of show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to Section 124(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 requiring a show cause notice before confiscation, and Section 110(2) mandating return of seized goods if such notice is not issued within the prescribed period. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's interpretation in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja that non-issuance of notice under Section 124(a) within the statutory period attracts the mandatory consequence under Section 110(2) that the goods "shall be returned" to the person from whose possession they were seized, absent a valid extension by the competent authority under the first proviso to Section 110(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that no show cause notice, written or oral, had been issued in respect of the seized gold coins, and that the coins continued to remain with the Customs Authority.
2.3 Relying on an earlier coordinate bench decision in a connected matter and on the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja, the Court held that, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124(a) within the period contemplated by Section 110(2) and without any recorded extension by the competent authority under the first proviso, the statutory consequence is that the seized goods must be returned.
2.4 The Court accepted the principle, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, that Section 110A (provisional release) is merely an interim mechanism and cannot dilute or negate the mandatory operation of Section 110(2), and that the time limit for issuing notice under Section 124(a) is governed solely by Section 110(2).
Conclusions
2.5 The seized gold coins are liable to be released to the petitioner as no show cause notice under Section 124 has been issued within the statutory framework and no valid extension of time has been shown.
Issue 2: Validity of "oral" show cause notice and waiver of statutory notice under Section 124
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 The Court adopted and relied upon the reasoning of the coordinate bench in the connected matter which examined the contention of the Customs Authorities that a show cause notice under Section 124 could be issued orally and/or that the notice requirement could be waived by the passenger.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court noted that in the earlier connected matter it had been specifically held that: (a) there was no averment in the counter affidavit that any oral show cause notice had been issued; (b) there is no statutory provision permitting waiver of the notice mandated under Section 124; and (c) in the absence of any such notice, written or oral, the requirements of Section 124(a) are not satisfied.
2.8 Applying the same reasoning, the Court rejected the Department's stand in the present case that an "oral show cause notice" existed, in circumstances where there was neither pleading nor material establishing such oral notice, and where the statute does not contemplate waiver of the prescribed notice.
Conclusions
2.9 Alleged oral show cause notice and any purported waiver of the statutory notice do not satisfy Section 124; in the absence of a valid statutory notice, the seizure cannot be sustained and the goods are to be returned in accordance with Section 110(2).
Issue 3: Conditions and modalities for release of the seized gold coins
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Having held that the seized gold coins must be released to the petitioner, the Court directed that the release be subject to payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges.
2.11 The Court further directed that warehousing charges be computed on the basis of the charges applicable on the date of detention and facilitated the petitioner's appearance before the Customs Authority (personally, through Power of Attorney Holder, or virtually), designating a nodal officer and fixing a specific date and time for appearance.
Conclusions
2.12 The Department is required to release the seized gold coins to the petitioner upon: (i) payment of applicable customs duty; and (ii) payment of warehousing charges calculated as on the date of detention, with the release process to be coordinated through the designated nodal officer on the specified date and time.
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