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Issues: (i) Whether the recalled order could be disturbed on the grounds of alleged non-service, lack of locus standi, and alleged suppression of material facts; (ii) whether the earlier winding-up direction could be treated as a decree for specific performance and whether section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act applied; (iii) whether the prior dismissal for default of the applicant's enforcement proceeding barred the present recall; and (iv) whether any independent ground for recall was made out.
Issue (i): Whether the recalled order could be disturbed on the grounds of alleged non-service, lack of locus standi, and alleged suppression of material facts.
Analysis: The notice objection was rejected because the applicant's recognised advocate had continued to appear and had accepted service in the proceedings, so service on that advocate was effective service on the applicant. The applicant, being only a contributory, had no present proprietary interest in the company's assets once the secured creditors had been paid and no further liability remained. The alleged non-disclosure relating to the 1980 agreement and the old winding-up directions was held not to be material to the disclaimer application, because those matters did not bear on the issue whether the property could be disclaimed as an onerous burden.
Conclusion: The objections based on lack of notice, lack of locus standi, and suppression of material facts were rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the earlier winding-up direction could be treated as a decree for specific performance and whether section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act applied.
Analysis: The Court held that the 1987 direction was conditional, since registration of the agreement was first required and that pre-condition was never fulfilled. The Company Court could not, in the absence of a proper suit and adjudication, confer a right equivalent to a decree for specific performance. The contractual claim was also found to be time-barred, so there was no subsisting enforceable agreement. For the same reason, section 53A could not be invoked, and in any event the company was already in possession as lessee or licensee, making the alleged transfer of possession in terms of the agreement unproven.
Conclusion: The 1987 order was not a decree for specific performance, and section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was inapplicable.
Issue (iii): Whether the prior dismissal for default of the applicant's enforcement proceeding barred the present recall.
Analysis: The applicant had earlier sought enforcement of the same claim, and that proceeding was dismissed for default. The principle behind Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure barred re-agitation of the same claim in another form, and a party could not do indirectly what it could not do directly.
Conclusion: The prior dismissal for default operated as a bar against the present recall attempt.
Issue (iv): Whether any independent ground for recall was made out.
Analysis: No gross error by the Court itself was shown, and therefore the exceptional principle of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit was not attracted. The application also disclosed no ground warranting review. The property was treated as an onerous burden, the agreement was not shown to be enforceable, and the company's title had remained with the disclaimer applicant, justifying release of the property. The applicant failed to establish any legally sustainable basis to recall the earlier order.
Conclusion: No independent ground for recall or review was established.
Final Conclusion: The application for recall was unsustainable on every substantial ground, and the earlier disclaimer order was left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: A winding-up court cannot, through a conditional chamber order, create the equivalent of a decree for specific performance or revive an unenforceable contract; where no subsisting enforceable agreement exists, statutory possession-based protection cannot be invoked and a recall application will fail absent a material legal error or valid ground for review.
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The Supreme Court, in an order authored by Hon'ble Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi, condoned delay due to the case's peculiar facts but declined to interfere with the impugned High Court of Karnataka order dated 22.11.2022. Relying on the precedent set in the Court's order dated 05.08.2024 in Diary No.25767/2024 (Pr. Commissioner Of Income Tax & Anr. vs. M/s Infosys Ltd.), the Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition and disposed of all pending applications.
The Supreme Court, per Hon'ble Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, after hearing counsel, "condoned delay" but declined to interfere with the impugned High Court judgment and order. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
The Supreme Court, through Hon'ble Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, after hearing counsel, granted condonation of delay but declined to interfere with the impugned High Court judgment and order. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. All pending applications were disposed of.
The Supreme Court, with Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale presiding, condoned a delay of 323 days in filing the petition, allowing I.A. No. 160389/2025. The petitioners challenged the High Court's condonation of delay in entertaining the writ petition. However, relying on the findings in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment, the Court held that the High Court did not err in condoning the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and disposed of any pending applications.
Issues: Whether the applicants could be impleaded as accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in respect of alleged offences under the Income-tax Act, 1961, when no previous sanction under Section 279 of that Act was shown and the evidence did not establish the conditions of Section 278B of that Act.
Analysis: The earlier order had already accepted that the applicants were brought on record only as representatives of the firm and not as accused, and that order had attained finality. The application under Section 319 sought to convert that position into one of criminal accusation without showing the requisite previous sanction under Section 279 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The evidence relied upon only showed that the firm had four partners and that registration and assessment-related forms had been filed, but it did not disclose strong and cogent material showing that the applicants were in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the business of the firm, or that the offence was committed with their consent, connivance, or neglect. A conjoint reading of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 278B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required those statutory conditions to be satisfied before the applicants could be proceeded against as accused.
Conclusion: The order permitting impleadment of the applicants as accused could not be sustained and was set aside, in favour of the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to array persons as accused for offences under the Income-tax Act, 1961 unless the statutory preconditions for their prosecution, including prior sanction where required and the ingredients of partner liability under Section 278B, are satisfied on the evidence.
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Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid when they were based on the same bank-account material that had already been considered in the earlier reassessment and settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme.
Analysis: The assessee had already been subjected to a first round of reassessment in which the income was estimated on the basis of deposits in the bank account, following survey material indicating accommodation entries. The subsequent reopening again proceeded on the premise that the assessee had received accommodation entries credited in the same bank account. The earlier assessment on the same material had already attained finality through settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme. On these facts, a fresh reopening on the very same material was not permissible, since the matter had already been examined and concluded in the earlier round.
Conclusion: The reassessment reopening was invalid and was quashed.
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Issues: Whether interest on refund arising from an assessment made under the repealed Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 was governed by the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 or the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and whether the assessee was entitled to interest for the entire period from deposit till refund.
Analysis: The assessment order was passed under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 after the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 had come into force. The saving provision in Section 61 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 preserved the previous operation of the repealed Act, rights and liabilities accrued thereunder, and actions taken under it, and the rule in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 required the repealed law to continue for matters saved by the repeal unless a contrary intention appeared. The Court applied the principles governing repeal and reenactment to hold that the legislative scheme did not evince an intention to shift the substantive incidents of the demand and refund to the new Act so as to attract Section 20(8) of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the entire period claimed. The Tribunal's view was therefore inconsistent with the applicable statutory framework under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.
Conclusion: The issue is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Interest was not payable under Section 20(8) of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the entire period from deposit to refund.
Ratio Decidendi: In a repeal-and-saving regime, rights and liabilities arising under the repealed taxing statute continue to govern the matter unless the later enactment clearly manifests a contrary intention; the successor statute does not automatically govern substantive refund interest merely because the refund is granted after repeal.
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