1973 (11) TMI 82 - SC - Indian Laws

Property rights clarified: leased shops, licensed pavements. Repealed Act impacts possession. Costs split.

QUDRAT ULLAH Versus MUNICIPAL BOARD BAREILLY

The court held that the shops and sheds were leased, while the pavements and footpaths were licensed. The repeal of the earlier Act removed the ... Contraction of a contract - why the Legislature can and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some res- pects similar to that of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act? Held that:- The argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that rights of a statutory tenant created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of s. 43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal, any right to rebuff the plaintiff's claim for, eviction and (d) that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act does not justify anything longer or for any time longer than s. 2 of the Act confers or lasts. It-is appropriate for a Court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. This statute 'which provides for summary eviction of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of a tenant. The far-fetched submission has hardly any substance and we reject it. In the result, C.A. 1727 of 1968 is dismissed and C.A. No. 1728 of 1968 is allowed. Issues Involved:1. Whether Ex. '1' (or Ex. '4') is a lease, a license, or a composite one.2. If a lease, does it encompass a demise of an 'accommodation' as defined in the Act, or moreRs. If more than an 'accommodation', is the portion dealing with 'non-accommodation' severable to warrant a decree for possession confined to that portionRs.3. If Ex. '1' is a lease wholly of an accommodation, can the plaintiff claim possession based on the repeal of the Act by the later Act during the pendency of the present appealRs.Detailed Analysis:1. Nature of Ex. '1' and Ex. '4':The primary issue revolves around whether Ex. '1' and Ex. '4' constitute a lease or a license. The court analyzed the terms of Ex. '1' and Ex. '4', noting that the documents were ambiguous due to poor legal drafting. The court emphasized that the distinction between a lease and a license depends on the operative intent of the parties. A lease grants an interest in immovable property with exclusive possession, whereas a license allows use without exclusive possession.The court found that the terms in Ex. '1' and Ex. '4' indicated a lease for the shops and sheds, as evidenced by clauses that granted possession and the right to sublet. However, the pavements and footpaths were deemed to be licensed areas, not leased, as they did not grant exclusive possession. The High Court's view that Ex. '1' was a combination of lease and license was upheld, with the lease applying to the shops and sheds, and the license to the pavements and footpaths.2. Scope of Lease and Severability:The court examined whether the lease covered more than 'accommodation' as defined under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 'Accommodation' includes buildings and appurtenant grounds. The court concluded that the shops and sheds were leased as 'accommodation', but the pavements and footpaths, although leased, were not appurtenant to the buildings and thus fell outside the definition of 'accommodation'.The court held that the lease of the pavements and footpaths was severable from the lease of the shops and sheds. Consequently, the decree for possession could be confined to the non-accommodation areas, i.e., the pavements and footpaths.3. Impact of Repeal of the Act:The court addressed the effect of the repeal of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 by the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The later Act excluded buildings belonging to local authorities from its scope. The court noted that the repeal of the earlier Act removed the protection it provided to the defendant, and the later Act governed pending proceedings.The court rejected the argument that the repeal could not affect the defendant's accrued rights, stating that the earlier Act imposed a procedural restriction rather than creating a substantive right. The court emphasized that the repeal of a temporary statute terminates any rights or protections under it unless expressly saved by the repealing statute.The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to possession based on the repeal of the earlier Act, as the defendant's protection under the Act no longer existed. The court also dismissed the argument that the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 obstructed the suit for eviction.Conclusion:The court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 1727 of 1968 and allowed Civil Appeal No. 1728 of 1968. It held that the shops and sheds were leased, while the pavements and footpaths were licensed. The repeal of the earlier Act removed the defendant's protection, entitling the plaintiff to possession. The court directed that each party bear its own costs.