Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail pending trial for alleged GST offences.

Analysis: Article 21 protects personal liberty through just, fair and reasonable procedure. Pre-trial detention is not punitive, and its necessity must be assessed alongside the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy trial. The investigation was complete, the complaint had been filed, the applicant had no criminal history, and the trial was unlikely to conclude soon. No material indicated a risk of absconding, interference with evidence or witnesses, or other exceptional circumstances warranting continued custody. The Court also noted the circular concerning GST arrest powers.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to release on bail. The criminal trial remains pending, and the merits of the allegations were not determined.

Ratio Decidendi: Pre-trial detention must not be punitive; bail ordinarily follows unless continued custody is justified by circumstances affecting the trial or administration of justice.

Issues: Whether failure to provide an opportunity of personal hearing vitiated the orders.

Analysis: The show cause notice and reminders stated "N.A." against the date, time and venue of personal hearing. A date, time and venue were required to enable the assessee to present its case.

Conclusion: The orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: An order is vitiated for breach of natural justice where the assessee is denied an opportunity of personal hearing through failure to specify its date, time and venue.

Issues: Whether an appeal is maintainable without filing Form APL-05 when the defect remains uncorrected despite opportunities to cure it.

Analysis: Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Rule 110 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, provides for an appeal in Form APL-05. Rule 18 of the GST Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025, requires online filing in the prescribed form with the relevant documents. Final acknowledgment follows filing and removal of defects. Form APL-05 had not been filed despite notices and opportunities to correct the defect.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable without Form APL-05.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal to the Tribunal is not maintainable where the mandatory statutory appeal form has not been filed and the defect remains uncorrected despite opportunities to cure it.

Issues: Whether CGST authorities had jurisdiction under Section 73 of the CGST Act to recover allegedly inadmissible CENVAT credit transitioned to GST.

Analysis: The proceedings concerned CENVAT credit transitioned under Section 140 of the CGST Act. The applicable precedents distinguish the admissibility of credit under the earlier law from input tax credit under the CGST Act and recognise the preservation of proceedings under the earlier law through Section 174.

Conclusion: The CGST authorities lacked jurisdiction to conduct the recovery proceedings under Section 73. The impugned appellate order was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 of the CGST Act cannot be used to determine the admissibility under the earlier law of CENVAT credit transitioned to GST; proceedings under the earlier law remain subject to the statutory saving.

Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit could be denied because it was entered in the wrong table of Form GST TRAN-1. (ii) Whether Revenue could challenge substantive eligibility for the credit on appeal when that ground was omitted from the notice and adjudication. (iii) Whether the appellate authority was obliged to conduct a further inquiry into eligibility.

Issue (i): Whether transitional credit could be denied because it was entered in the wrong table of Form GST TRAN-1.

Analysis: Section 140 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides for transitional credit for different categories of registered persons, and Rule 117 requires a declaration in Form GST TRAN-1. A dealer claiming credit under Section 140(3) must use Table 7(a), rather than Table 5(a). Adopted precedents distinguish inadvertent procedural lapses from substantive eligibility. The later circular provided an opportunity to revise declarations.

Conclusion: The credit could not be denied solely because it was entered in the wrong table. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Revenue could challenge substantive eligibility for the credit on appeal when that ground was omitted from the notice and adjudication.

Analysis: The notice and adjudication confined the proposed recovery to use of the wrong table, although invoices had been produced and verification was available under Rule 121. The reasoning applied principles analogous to constructive res judicata and approbation and reprobation to the eligibility objection available but omitted during adjudication.

Conclusion: Revenue could not raise the omitted eligibility objection on appeal. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellate authority was obliged to conduct a further inquiry into eligibility.

Analysis: Section 107(11) provides for further inquiry as may be necessary, conferring discretion to be exercised according to the facts. The appellate authority addressed the ground on which recovery had been adjudicated.

Conclusion: A further inquiry was not obligatory in this case. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional credit remains undisturbed without a fresh adjudication of substantive eligibility.

Ratio Decidendi: An inadvertent procedural error in a transitional credit declaration cannot by itself defeat a claim to credit where the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for reversal of input tax credit availed under CGST and SGST instead of IGST, with interest and penalty, should stand; (ii) whether the specified credit was liable to reversal for breach of the statutory time limit.

Issue (i): Whether the demand for reversal of input tax credit availed under CGST and SGST instead of IGST, with interest and penalty, should stand.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to specified tax shortfalls and wrongful availment or utilisation of credit. The applicable precedents treat the electronic credit ledger as a unified source and distinguish an inadvertent technical error in reporting eligible credit under different tax heads from wrongful availment where there is no revenue loss.

Conclusion: The direction for reversal, interest and penalty was set aside for fresh consideration in accordance with those principles, in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the specified credit was liable to reversal for breach of the statutory time limit.

Analysis: Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 operates notwithstanding the time limit in Section 16(4) and applies to the disputed credit.

Conclusion: The assessee was absolved of the liability to reverse the specified credit under both CGST and SGST.

Final Conclusion: The time-limit objection does not require reversal of the specified credit; the wrong-head credit demand remains subject to fresh consideration under the applicable principles.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the customs house agent for involvement in the import of misdeclared goods was sustainable.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority found that the agent's role in importing the seized consignment was not proved, but inferred knowledge of misdeclaration from third-party statements and the use of the agent's telephone number in the trader's contact details. No independent documentary evidence directly linked the agent to the import. Penalties against other implicated persons had been set aside, eroding the foundation of the allegations. Cross-examination is not an absolute right, but forms part of natural justice and is consistent with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962. The agent's request to cross-examine persons whose statements were relied upon was denied on grounds including delay; the Tribunal incorrectly proceeded on the basis that no such request had been made.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs penalty based on third-party statements cannot be sustained where cross-examination has been denied, independent evidence of the alleged role is absent, and the foundation of the allegations has been eroded.

Issues: Whether the request to convert free shipping bills into advance authorisation shipping bills was rightly rejected.

Analysis: A coordinate bench had allowed conversion on substantially similar facts involving the same advance authorisation. The time limit prescribed by the circular relied upon by the authorities had been held ultra vires the statute.

Conclusion: The rejection of the conversion request was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A time limit prescribed by a circular held ultra vires the statute cannot bar conversion of shipping bills.

Issues: (i) Whether the application against the personal guarantor was barred by limitation; (ii) whether the personal guarantee was validly invoked.

Issue (i): Whether the application against the personal guarantor was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The continuing guarantee expressly treated a written acknowledgment by the borrower as made on the guarantor's behalf for limitation purposes. The borrower's balance-sheet acknowledgment was made during the subsisting limitation period. Applying that acknowledgment and the exclusion of the pandemic period, limitation extended to 28 February 2025; the application was filed on 8 May 2024.

Conclusion: The application was within limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the personal guarantee was validly invoked.

Analysis: The guarantee made the guarantor's obligation payable on written demand and permitted enforcement without first proceeding against the borrower. A copy of the default notice was addressed to the guarantor, and the subsequent recall notice was also addressed to the guarantor.

Conclusion: The guarantee was validly invoked.

Final Conclusion: The guarantor remains subject to the initiated insolvency resolution process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a guarantee expressly deems the borrower's written acknowledgment to bind the guarantor for limitation purposes, a timely acknowledgment extends limitation against the guarantor even after invocation of the guarantee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the insolvency appeal could be condoned when the order was uploaded after its pronouncement.

Analysis: The order recorded counsel's presence, and no material showed that it had not been pronounced on its stated date. Under the insolvency appeal framework, limitation runs from pronouncement rather than subsequent uploading, with the day of pronouncement excluded from computation. The prescribed period is 30 days, extendable by no more than 15 days for sufficient cause. Exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy requires an application within the prescribed limitation period; the copy was sought after that period.

Conclusion: The delay was beyond the Tribunal's condonable jurisdiction and could not be condoned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an insolvency order is pronounced in counsel's presence, subsequent uploading does not defer limitation. The Tribunal cannot condone delay beyond the statutory maximum, and exclusion of time for obtaining a certified copy requires a timely application for it.

Issues: Whether rejection of the refund claim for unutilised input tax credit on supplies to a special economic zone should be sustained where return disclosures and supporting documents require verification.

Analysis: Supplies to a special economic zone for authorised operations are zero-rated under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Rule 89 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 prescribes the refund formula and documentation requirements. Correct reporting of zero-rated turnover and its breakup is material to applying the formula. The returns did not disclose the claimed SEZ supplies, turnover figures required reconciliation, and there were conflicting accounts concerning the submission of supporting documents. Invoice-wise reconciliation, invoices, endorsements and the letter of undertaking required verification, with an opportunity of hearing and a speaking order.

Conclusion: The rejection could not be sustained without re-examination of the claim. Refund entitlement remains undecided.

Issues: (i) Whether the GST refund limitation applies to a service-tax appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST portal. (ii) Whether unjust enrichment applies to the refund of that pre-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether the GST refund limitation applies to a service-tax appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST portal.

Analysis: Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act concerns refunds of amounts paid under GST law. The disputed payment was identified as a service-tax appeal pre-deposit and was subsequently paid through the accepted channel. The adopted precedents distinguish amounts paid under mistake of law from tax collected under GST law and apply general limitation principles.

Conclusion: Section 54's limitation does not bar the claim; general limitation provisions apply. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unjust enrichment applies to the refund of that pre-deposit.

Analysis: A statutory appeal pre-deposit secures the right of appeal rather than discharging duty. The adopted precedent and departmental circular distinguish its return from a refund of duty.

Conclusion: Unjust enrichment does not apply to the pre-deposit refund. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The erroneous GST-portal payment is recoverable as a service-tax appeal pre-deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal pre-deposit mistakenly paid through the GST mechanism is outside the GST refund limitation and its refund is not subject to unjust enrichment; general limitation provisions apply.

Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 74 for financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20 could be sustained on the basis of audit-detected discrepancies.

Analysis: Section 74 requires the adjudicating officer's satisfaction that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused the short payment, with the foundational facts stated in the show-cause notice. The discrepancies arose from records produced by the taxpayer, and no incriminating material was identified. The taxpayer's stated exemption from filing the reconciliation statement and accounts was not disputed. Failure to discharge the liability voluntarily before audit did not necessarily establish wilful suppression.

Conclusion: The Section 74 proceedings are unsustainable. Liability for financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20 is to be determined on the footing of a notice under Section 73.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings for short payment under Section 74 require foundational facts supporting the adjudicating officer's satisfaction that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused the short payment; an audit-detected discrepancy and failure to pay voluntarily do not by themselves establish that requirement.

Issues: Whether the claim for refund of special additional duty was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The refund notification, as amended with effect from 1 August 2008, required a claim to be filed within one year of payment of the additional duty. Its conditions required strict interpretation. The goods were imported and the duty paid after the amendment, while the claim was filed more than one year after payment. Decisions concerning imports before the amendment were distinguished.

Conclusion: The refund claim was barred by limitation and was correctly rejected. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For imports after the amendment, a claim under the conditional special additional duty refund notification must be filed within one year of payment of the duty.

Issues: (i) Whether admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application was justified; (ii) whether the lenders could be compelled to accept the proposed settlement; (iii) whether the admitted insolvency application could be withdrawn outside the statutory procedure.

Issue (i): Whether admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application was justified.

Analysis: Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 requires ascertainment of default in a financial debt that is due and payable. The debt and default were undisputed, and evidence of default had been supplied. The objections concerned the applicant's minority share, settlement and assignment.

Conclusion: Admission was justified, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the lenders could be compelled to accept the proposed settlement.

Analysis: The initial settlement proposal required an upfront deposit before the lenders could obtain internal approvals. That deposit was not made, and subsequent commitments to deposit settlement amounts were also not honoured.

Conclusion: The lenders could not be compelled to accept the proposed settlement, against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the admitted insolvency application could be withdrawn outside the statutory procedure.

Analysis: Amended Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prescribes the procedure for withdrawal, including committee approval and restrictions on the stage at which withdrawal is available.

Conclusion: Withdrawal could occur only in accordance with the statutory procedure, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The established default supports continuation of the insolvency process; unfulfilled settlement offers do not displace the statutory withdrawal mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: A complete insolvency application by a financial creditor must be admitted when a due financial debt and default are established.

Issues: The Letter of Permission and whether the unit is within a Special Economic Zone.

Outcome: The appeal was disposed of. The remitted issue remains for fresh consideration by the authority, with all contentions open; no final adjudication was made on that issue.

Issues: Whether the imported clear float glass was classifiable under tariff item 7005 1090 and eligible for the consequential preferential nil rate of basic customs duty.

Analysis: The tariff framework covers non-wired glass with an absorbent, non-reflecting layer under heading 7005 10. The supplier's certificate and technical specifications identified that layer and a tin surface; no contrary test report was produced. The precedents applied recognised the microscopic tin layer as an absorbent layer. A customs circular issued after the import could not be applied retrospectively.

Conclusion: The glass is classifiable under tariff item 7005 1090 and eligible for the preferential nil rate of basic customs duty, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-wired float glass having an absorbent, non-reflecting layer falls under tariff item 7005 1090.

Issues: (i) Whether anonymity invalidated the proceedings initiated by the Department of Pharmaceuticals; (ii) whether the Apex Committee could act without an appeal from the Association's Ethics Committee; (iii) whether the special audit was invalid because its auditors were not selected from a notified panel or appointed with the company's consent; (iv) whether the Registrar of Companies' inquiry lacked jurisdiction; (v) whether the income-tax summonses were liable to be quashed; and (vi) whether a professional services agreement or knowledge gained by a conference delegate displaced the restrictions on travel and hospitality.

Issue (i): Whether anonymity invalidated the proceedings initiated by the Department of Pharmaceuticals.

Analysis: The 2024 Code prescribes identification and fee requirements for complaints lodged with an Association, while separately providing for complaints received by the Department and for a special audit. The Department verified the material through an audit and gave the company an opportunity to respond.

Conclusion: Anonymity did not invalidate the Department's independent proceedings. An anonymous complaint could not be entertained within the Association's complaint mechanism.

Issue (ii): Whether the Apex Committee could act without an appeal from the Association's Ethics Committee.

Analysis: The Code provides for finality within the Association's complaint mechanism and separately provides for a Departmental special audit. The audit was ordered before the Ethics Committee's decision, and the Apex Committee considered the audit findings and the company's response rather than reviewing that decision.

Conclusion: The Apex Committee could act on the Department's independent inquiry without an appeal from the Ethics Committee's decision.

Issue (iii): Whether the special audit was invalid because its auditors were not selected from a notified panel or appointed with the company's consent.

Analysis: The 2024 Code separately provides for special audits and a panel of auditors. Neither provision expressly requires every special audit to use a panel firm or requires the audited company's consent. No incompetence or resulting prejudice was established.

Conclusion: The special audit was not shown to be invalid on those grounds.

Issue (iv): Whether the Registrar of Companies' inquiry lacked jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 206 of the Companies Act, 2013 confers independent inquiry powers and permits a Central Government direction to conduct an inquiry. The notice referred to such a direction and sought information beyond the Apex Committee's order. The statutory procedure requires written identification of allegations and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Conclusion: The inquiry was not invalid for lack of an Apex Committee direction. The Registrar must comply with the statutory safeguards and form an independent view.

Issue (v): Whether the income-tax summonses were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The summonses invoked the Income-tax Act and sought financial information. The record did not establish that they were issued solely on the basis of the Apex Committee's order. Tax liability and deductibility remain for the tax authorities to determine independently.

Conclusion: No ground was established to quash the summonses.

Issue (vi): Whether a professional services agreement or knowledge gained by a conference delegate displaced the restrictions on travel and hospitality.

Analysis: The applicable Codes and medical ethics regulations address travel and hospitality provided to healthcare professionals. The regulations also permit professional affiliations subject to safeguards; the substance of an engagement and services performed require examination.

Conclusion: Knowledge gained by a delegate or the mere label of a professional services agreement does not automatically displace the restrictions. The factual character of the engagements remains for the competent authorities to determine.

Final Conclusion: The reprimand remains in effect, while the statutory authorities must conduct their inquiries independently and observe the applicable safeguards. Tax liability and the doctors' individual misconduct remain undetermined.

Ratio Decidendi: The Department's independent special-audit channel under the 2024 Code is not barred by restrictions or finality applicable to an Association's complaint mechanism; statutory authorities must exercise their own powers independently.

Issues: Whether interest on the refunded pre-deposit, including amounts paid during investigation, should be paid at 12% rather than 6%.

Analysis: The Tribunal observed that a High Court decision concerning interest under Section 35FF and the notification prescribing 6% covered the issue against the assessee. It also noted a pending larger-bench reference arising from divergent Tribunal views.

Outcome: The matter was referred for tagging with the pending larger-bench reference. The interest claim has not been finally adjudicated.