Issues: (i) Whether retention money, previously included in income and written off as irrecoverable, was deductible as bad debt under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2). (ii) Whether the entire rent paid to related parties could be disallowed under Section 40A(2)(b) absent material establishing excessiveness or unreasonableness having regard to fair market value.

Issue (i): Whether retention money, previously included in income and written off as irrecoverable, was deductible as bad debt under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2).

Analysis: The retained sums formed part of the gross invoice amounts recognised as income in the relevant earlier years and were reflected as receivables. On forfeiture by the contracting authority, the amounts were written off in the accounts for the relevant previous year. Following the post-1989 position under Section 36(1)(vii), proof that the debt became irrecoverable in a particular year was not required once it was actually written off; the requirement of prior inclusion in income under Section 36(2) stood satisfied.

Conclusion: The bad-debt claim was allowable and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the entire rent paid to related parties could be disallowed under Section 40A(2)(b) absent material establishing excessiveness or unreasonableness having regard to fair market value.

Analysis: Section 40A(2)(b) permits disallowance only to the extent a related-party payment is excessive or unreasonable having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities. No comparable material or other evidence established that the rent was excessive or unreasonable. A disallowance founded merely on suspicion or an allegation that the transaction was not revenue-neutral lacked a factual foundation under the provision.

Conclusion: The rent disallowance was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disallowances of bad debts and related-party rent payments cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether global-ranking support, institutional facilitation and coordination services constituted business activities eligible for presumptive taxation under section 44AD rather than a specified profession attracting section 44ADA.

Analysis: Section 44ADA applies only where the assessee carries on a profession referred to in section 44AA(1). The statutory test is the substance and actual nature of the services, not merely the use of expressions such as advisory or consultancy in agreements, nor the payer's withholding treatment under section 194J. The services comprised institutional support, stakeholder coordination, data organisation, reporting, benchmarking and operational guidance for improving educational rankings. They did not amount to legal, medical, engineering, architectural, accountancy, interior-decoration, technical consultancy, or any notified profession. The material also did not establish commission, brokerage or agency business excluded under section 44AD(6). Since the premise that section 44ADA applied was unsustainable, the estimation of income at 70% of gross receipts on that basis lacked a sustainable statutory foundation.

Conclusion: The services were business activities and not a specified profession under section 44AA(1); section 44ADA and the consequential 70% income estimation were unsustainable, and the income offered under section 44AD was required to be accepted.

Issues: Whether non-deduction of tax under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 justified disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of commission paid to a United States non-resident entity.

Analysis: The obligation to withhold tax under Section 195 arises only where the remitted sum is chargeable to tax in India. A Tax Residency Certificate is relevant to claiming treaty relief under Section 90(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but its absence does not itself create a domestic tax charge where the income is otherwise not chargeable. The material showed that the commission was for services rendered outside India and that the recipient had no business operations, office, or Permanent Establishment in India. Revenue established neither rendition of services in India nor a sufficient nexus for the commission income to accrue or arise in India. The description of the remittance as consulting services in Form 15CB was not determinative; the transaction's substance had to be ascertained from the underlying agreement, invoices, and actual services.

Conclusion: The commission paid to the non-resident entity was not chargeable to tax in India; consequently, no tax was deductible under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the corresponding disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for an act rendering the goods liable to confiscation or for abetment of such act; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for knowingly or intentionally making, signing, using, or causing the use of a false document.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for an act rendering the goods liable to confiscation or for abetment of such act.

Analysis: Section 112(a)(i) requires proof that the person committed or omitted an act that rendered the goods liable to confiscation, or abetted such act. The respondent was neither the importer, declarant, nor Customs Broker, and had only introduced persons and forwarded documents to the licensed Customs Broker. The concealment and misdeclaration had occurred before that role. No evidence established that the respondent knew of the import or concealment, was a beneficiary, or participated in or abetted the acts rendering the goods confiscable.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(a)(i) was not sustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for knowingly or intentionally making, signing, using, or causing the use of a false document.

Analysis: Section 114AA applies only where knowing or intentional involvement in making, signing, using, or causing use of a false document is proved. The record did not establish that the respondent prepared any invoice or declaration, knew of the concealed goods, or knowingly used or caused the use of any false document.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114AA was not sustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The essential statutory prerequisites for imposing either penalty were not established by evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalties for abetment of acts rendering goods confiscable and for false documents require proof of the person's knowing participation in the relevant prohibited act or document; mere introduction of persons or forwarding of documents is insufficient.

Issues: Whether a service-tax demand for the extended period can be sustained solely on Form 26AS and income-tax-return data without independent corroborative evidence of taxable services.

Analysis: Form 26AS and income-tax-return figures, maintained for tax-deduction purposes on a receipt basis, do not by themselves establish the taxable value or rendition of taxable services for service-tax purposes. Independent verification of the nature of receipts and corroborative evidence are necessary. The adjudicating authority had not properly addressed the explanation regarding differences between billing-based service-tax liability and figures reflected in Form 26AS.

Conclusion: The demand confirmed for the extended period solely on CBDT data was set aside; service-tax liability, if any, for the normal period together with interest remained payable.

Issues: (i) Whether road transportation without issue of a consignment note is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service; and (ii) whether transportation of food-grains is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Issue (i): Whether road transportation without issue of a consignment note is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Analysis: Section 65B(26) of the Finance Act, 1994 defines a Goods Transport Agency as a person providing road transport service who issues a consignment note. Since no consignment notes were issued, the activity did not qualify as Goods Transport Agency service. Transportation of goods by road other than by a Goods Transport Agency or courier agency falls within the negative list under Section 66D(p)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The road transportation activity was not taxable as Goods Transport Agency service and was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether transportation of food-grains is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Analysis: The receipts related to transportation of food-grains. The activity was held not liable to service tax.

Conclusion: Transportation of food-grains was not taxable as Goods Transport Agency service and was in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The entire service-tax demand, with consequential interest, penalties and late fee, was unsustainable, and the tax already paid became refundable.

Ratio Decidendi: Road transportation without issuance of a consignment note does not constitute Goods Transport Agency service and falls within the negative-list exclusion from service tax.

Issues: Whether the withholding of used multifunction print and copying machines on the basis of the model-wise import restriction was sustainable despite the absence of a centralised all-India monitoring mechanism and the furnishing of security for the entire consignment.

Analysis: The relevant policy framework treated the 100-unit criterion as applicable collectively to a particular model imported through all ports and by all importers. No centralised mechanism had been evolved to monitor that criterion, resulting in inconsistent port-wise practices. A prior decision on identical facts, directing provisional release against a provisional duty bond and bank guarantee, had attained finality following dismissal of the departmental challenge and implementation by the Department. Since security covered the whole consignment, there was no valid basis to retain any part of it.

Conclusion: The direction for provisional release of the withheld machines upon the stipulated security was valid.

Issues: (i) Whether a suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and unsuccessful resolution applicant may maintain an appeal against plan approval under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the challenge-process, e-bidding, treatment of secured statutory dues, Section 29A verification, and consideration of the successful plan were vitiated by material irregularity or unequal treatment; (iii) Whether the CIRP valuation of the corporate debtor's land and building warranted interference; (iv) Whether the continuation of the resolution professional during suspension of authorisation for assignment invalidated the CIRP; (v) Whether the approved consortium plan breached the special-purpose-company and shareholding requirements of the request for resolution plan; and (vi) Whether refusal of the suspended director's one-time-settlement proposal warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether a suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and unsuccessful resolution applicant may maintain an appeal against plan approval under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: A suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and an unsuccessful resolution applicant is an aggrieved person with standing to challenge approval of a resolution plan under the statutory appellate framework.

Conclusion: In favour of the appellants: their status as suspended directors, personal guarantors, and unsuccessful resolution applicants did not bar the appeals.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge-process, e-bidding, treatment of secured statutory dues, Section 29A verification, and consideration of the successful plan were vitiated by material irregularity or unequal treatment.

Analysis: The e-bidding terms, accepted by all participating resolution applicants, required incorporation of the bid placed in the price-discovery process and prohibited unilateral deviation from that bid. The request for resolution plan allowed the Committee of Creditors to seek clarifications, negotiate terms, and require modifications necessary to ensure feasibility, viability, and statutory compliance. The higher second proposal submitted after closure of e-bidding was unsolicited and could not compel a reopening of the concluded process.

Analysis: Clarifications on equal treatment of the secured operational creditor were sought from all applicants. The successful applicant's subsequent addendum, made in response to a written query and allocating an additional amount to comply with the applicable treatment of secured statutory dues, was a permitted compliance-related modification rather than a discriminatory reopening of financial bidding. Eligibility verification under Section 29A had no bearing on the appellants' failure to enhance their bids during e-bidding. The amended Regulation 39(2), applicable when the plans were considered, required all plans, including non-compliant plans, to be placed before the Committee of Creditors with relevant particulars; the successful plan was compliant when voted upon.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: no material irregularity or unequal treatment was established in rejection of the unilateral revised bid or approval of the successful resolution plan.

Issue (iii): Whether the CIRP valuation of the corporate debtor's land and building warranted interference.

Analysis: Valuation under Regulations 27 and 35 was performed by two registered valuers. The reports accounted for the land's agricultural planning zone, industrial use, surrounding properties, access, prevailing market rates, and relevant adjustments. The objections based on different circle rates, prior valuations, and a private valuation did not establish a glaring illegality in the CIRP valuation. Valuation accepted by the Committee of Creditors after compliance with the prescribed process falls within its commercial domain.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: the valuation process did not justify fresh valuation or interference with plan approval.

Issue (iv): Whether the continuation of the resolution professional during suspension of authorisation for assignment invalidated the CIRP.

Analysis: The suspension order permitted the Committee of Creditors to decide whether the resolution professional should continue. Given the advanced stage of CIRP, the Committee of Creditors consciously retained the same resolution professional. No statutory breach or material irregularity affecting plan approval was shown.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: the resolution professional's continuation did not invalidate the CIRP or the approved plan.

Issue (v): Whether the approved consortium plan breached the special-purpose-company and shareholding requirements of the request for resolution plan.

Analysis: The request for resolution plan used the expression "may" regarding incorporation of a special-purpose company, making such incorporation optional rather than mandatory. The proposed shareholding demonstrated that the consortium collectively retained more than 50% shareholding in the corporate debtor. The consortium remains responsible for implementation of the resolution plan.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: no breach of the special-purpose-company requirement was established; the consortium must retain more than 50% shareholding in the corporate debtor until full implementation of the plan.

Issue (vi): Whether refusal of the suspended director's one-time-settlement proposal warranted interference.

Analysis: The financial creditor had already declined the one-time-settlement proposal. The limited appellate jurisdiction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not permit a direction requiring acceptance of such a proposal after approval of the resolution plan. Any separate dispute regarding retention of pre-CIRP amounts must be pursued before the competent forum.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: refusal of the one-time-settlement proposal did not warrant interference.

Final Conclusion: The objections disclosed no statutory non-compliance or material irregularity capable of displacing the Committee of Creditors' commercial decision approving the resolution plan, which remains binding and enforceable subject to the consortium's shareholding obligation during implementation.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors is not open to appellate interference absent statutory non-compliance or material irregularity; commercial decisions concerning permitted negotiations, plan viability, and compliant valuation remain within the Committee's domain.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to nil or concessional interest for belated payment of tax on outward supplies under Circular No. 136/06/2020-GST.

Analysis: The circular prescribed nil or reduced interest only where GSTR-3B returns were filed and tax was paid within the dates stipulated in the relevant notifications. The record established that the petitioner had not complied with those stipulated timelines. The interest demand was therefore consistent with the circular and disclosed no infirmity warranting judicial-review interference.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to nil or concessional interest under the circular; the interest imposed for delayed payment of tax was valid, against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional; (ii) Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022; (iii) Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional.

Analysis: Section 147A purported to deem the Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A to be an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or an assessment unit, notwithstanding Section 151A and schemes framed under it. Retrospective validation is permissible only where a competent legislature removes the statutory defect or foundational basis of the prior judicial determination. The governing Scheme of 2022 continued to include issuance of notice under Section 148 through automated allocation and faceless assessment, and its statutory basis remained unamended. The amendment therefore sought to displace prior jurisdictional rulings without removing their foundation, contrary to the separation of powers and the rule of law.

Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022.

Analysis: Section 151A authorised a scheme for reassessment, issuance of notice under Section 148, and pre-notice action under Section 148A. Clause 3 of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 required reassessment under Section 147 and issuance of notice under Section 148 to be undertaken through automated allocation and in a faceless manner to the extent provided by Section 144B. The mandatory language of the Scheme, the continued inclusion of Section 148, and the absence of automated allocation for case identification precluded initiation by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers. The pre-notice procedure under Section 148A is inseparable from issuance of a Section 148 notice and could not be retained with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer merely because Section 148A was not separately specified in clause 3. Concurrent-jurisdiction notifications could not override the statutory faceless scheme, and transfer of a case to the National Faceless Assessment Centre without compliance with Section 127 did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: Jurisdictional Assessing Officers lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 outside the faceless mechanism. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Analysis: Although the Finance Act, 2026 received Presidential assent before repeal, its express commencement date under Section 2(a) was 1 April 2026. The Income-tax Act, 1961 stood repealed at the end of 31 March 2026, while the Income-tax Act, 2025 came into force from 1 April 2026. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act did not advance the commencement date where the enactment expressly fixed one. The repeal-and-savings provisions preserved pending proceedings and the existing faceless scheme under the repealed enactment, but did not sustain insertion of Section 147A into that repealed Act after repeal.

Conclusion: Section 147A could not validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 and has no legal sanctity. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The operative statutory scheme required reassessment initiation through automated allocation and faceless procedure, and the unamended scheme could not be displaced by a retrospective provision that failed to remove the basis of the jurisdictional defect.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating provision is valid only where a competent legislature removes the statutory foundation of the earlier decision; it cannot merely override judicial determinations while the unamended governing scheme mandates a faceless and automated process.

Issues: Whether an appeal concerning classification of imported goods and consequential duty liability lies to the High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 130 excludes appeals to the High Court involving determination of questions relating to the rate of customs duty or the value of goods for assessment. Section 130E provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court from an Appellate Tribunal order determining such questions. The classification dispute concerns the applicable rate of duty and consequently falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The appeal lies before the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962, and not before the High Court.

Issues: Whether interest paid on a bill of entry is refundable where duty payment was initiated on time but was not reflected due to continuing ICEGATE technical failure.

Analysis: The Customs (Waiver of Interest) 3rd Order dated 17.04.2023 restricted waiver to bills of entry filed up to 13.04.2023. However, the advisory dated 27.07.2023 acknowledged that the system inability continued until that date, and the bank record established that payment had been initiated on 20.04.2023. The principle applicable to delays in crediting payment caused by technical failure supported waiver of interest notwithstanding the stated cut-off date.

Conclusion: The interest was liable to be waived and refunded, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the absence of a CFSL report and the non-summoning of panch witnesses vitiated reliance on the seized documents? (ii) Whether the evidence established contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 despite retracted statements, health records, non-recovery of foreign currency, and subsequent misplacement of records? (iii) Whether the penalty of Rs. 1 crore was sustainable?

Issue (i): Whether the absence of a CFSL report and the non-summoning of panch witnesses vitiated reliance on the seized documents?

Analysis: The seized documents were recovered under a panchnama bearing the appellant's signature. No specific case of fabrication, forgery, or non-recovery from the appellant was made out. In the absence of a genuine dispute as to the documents' authenticity or recovery, neither forensic verification nor examination of panch witnesses was necessary.

Conclusion: Reliance on the seized documents was valid; the procedural objections fail against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the evidence established contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 despite retracted statements, health records, non-recovery of foreign currency, and subsequent misplacement of records?

Analysis: The medical material did not displace the evidence that the appellant was present at the premises during the search and recording of the statement. Recovery of foreign currency was not a pre-condition for proving the contravention where seized documents disclosed foreign-currency and gold transactions. A retracted statement required corroboration, which was supplied by the seized documents and statements of connected persons. The belated retraction by a witness was treated as an afterthought. Subsequent misplacement of the departmental record did not negate the material on which the adjudicating authority had based its order.

Conclusion: Contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was established against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty of Rs. 1 crore was sustainable?

Analysis: The amount of contravention had not been quantified, and the penalty was excessive having regard to the seized amount, the proved circumstances, and the appellant's health condition. A reduced monetary sanction was considered proportionate.

Conclusion: The penalty is reduced from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 15 lakhs, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Liability for the foreign-exchange contravention remains sustained, with the monetary sanction recalibrated to Rs. 15 lakhs.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted statement cannot by itself establish a foreign-exchange contravention and must be supported by corroborative evidence.

Issues: Whether the attached properties could be sold and the provisional attachment substituted by an escrow arrangement securing the quantified proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The quantified balance of proceeds of crime was Rs. 189.92 crore after accounting for Rs. 55 crore realised from earlier sales. The assets related to investment schemes involving several entities, and continuation of attachment affected interests beyond those attributable to the quantified amount. An arrangement securing the amount while permitting sale of the properties was accepted as protecting investors' interests and preserving the amount for the pending trial. An additional amount of 50% of the quantified proceeds, namely Rs. 95 crore, was fixed to make the arrangement equitable.

Conclusion: The appellant may sell the attached properties through a joint escrow account, with sale proceeds retained until Rs. 284.92 crore is secured. Attachment shall be lifted proportionately upon sale and entirely upon receipt of the full amount, which shall be placed in fixed deposit pending the trial.

Issues: Whether the appeals concerning service-taxability and valuation of interest on bill-discounting facilities lie before the High Court or directly before the Supreme Court.

Analysis: Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, was treated as covering determinations relating to taxability and valuation for assessment. The question was considered prima facie to fall within the direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further submissions on the jurisdictional issue were permitted.

Outcome: The matters were listed for orders.

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G to entertain an appeal involving determination of the value of taxable service for assessment.

Analysis: Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 excludes High Court appeals concerning questions relating to the rate of duty or value of goods for assessment. Section 35L assigns appeals involving such valuation-related questions to the Supreme Court. The proposed questions substantially concerned valuation of service under the applicable service-tax valuation mechanism.

Conclusion: The appeal concerning determination of value for assessment lay before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and was not maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G.

Issues: Whether the appellant had discharged the Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess payable on Tea Cess for the relevant period.

Analysis: The Chartered Accountant's certificate and month-wise payment particulars evidenced payment of Rs. 1,96,583 towards Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess during 2004-05 to 2013-14. The material showed that the cess was calculated on Tea Cess at the time of despatch from the factory, accounted for as garden expenditure, and not recovered from buyers.

Conclusion: The Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess stood paid in the normal course; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the GST appellate authority could dismiss the appeal for an alleged pre-deposit shortfall without issuing a defect memo, notice, or hearing, despite the petitioner's prior deposit during investigation.

Analysis: The governing requirement of statutory pre-deposit must be applied consistently with principles of natural justice. The prior deposit of Rs. 1.50 crore, which exceeded the required pre-deposit, was a material fact requiring consideration. Where an appellate authority perceives a shortfall in pre-deposit, it must issue a defect memo, notice, or afford an opportunity of hearing to enable the appellant to cure the asserted deficiency before dismissing the appeal.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection without considering the prior deposit or granting an opportunity to address the alleged pre-deposit shortfall was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings and orders founded on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 could survive after its omission without a saving clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted by Notification No. 20/2024-Central Tax with effect from 08.10.2024. The binding position accepted by the revenue was that, in the absence of an express saving clause or other legal mechanism preserving pending proceedings, the omitted rule could not be applied to proceedings pending on the date of omission. The departmental memorandum also accepted that the restrictions under the omitted rule could not govern such pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings and consequential orders based on Rule 96(10) were vitiated and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.