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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the impugned orders, founded entirely on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, can be sustained after the omission/repeal of that Rule without a savings clause.
1.2 Whether the controversy raised in the petitions is fully covered by the earlier decision of the Court in Hikal Ltd. and subsequent orders following that decision.
1.3 Whether quashing the impugned orders on the above ground precludes the authorities from initiating proceedings on any other issues arising in relation to the petitioners.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Sustainability of orders based on Rule 96(10) CGST Rules, 2017 post-omission; applicability of precedent
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court records the statement of counsel for the petitioners that the petitions are "squarely covered" by the Court's earlier decision in Hikal Ltd. and subsequent orders including Aarti Drugs Ltd.
2.2 The Court also notes the statement of the State's counsel, after verification, that the issue involved in all the petitions "stands covered" by the decision in Hikal Ltd.
2.3 It is further recorded that the impugned orders in all the petitions are "entirely based on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, which have since been omitted/repealed without a savings clause."
2.4 Proceeding on this admitted position, the Court follows the reasoning adopted in Hikal Ltd. to test the validity of the impugned orders, without re-opening or re-arguing the legal position already settled therein.
Conclusions
2.5 Applying the ratio of Hikal Ltd., the Court holds that the impugned orders, being entirely founded upon Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017, which stands omitted/repealed without any savings clause, cannot be sustained.
2.6 All the writ petitions are allowed, and the impugned orders in each of them are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in these terms.
Issue 3: Effect of quashing on other potential proceedings or issues
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 At the request of the State's counsel, the Court considers whether its order quashing the impugned orders should restrict the authorities from taking steps on any other issues that may arise concerning the petitioners.
3.2 The Court determines that its present decision is confined to invalidating the impugned orders based solely on Rule 96(10) and does not adjudicate upon or foreclose other distinct issues or causes of action that may exist.
3.3 The Court also considers it appropriate to preserve all legal contentions of all parties regarding any future steps by the authorities, including challenges to their competence.
Conclusions
3.4 The Court clarifies that nothing in its order will preclude the respondents from taking steps, as they may be advised, in relation to any other issue that might be involved against the petitioners.
3.5 It is expressly clarified that all contentions of all parties, including on the competence of the respondents to initiate any such proceedings, are kept open.
Issues: Whether penalty under Section 15-A(1)(c) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act could be sustained when no independent finding or material was recorded to establish suppression or concealment.
Analysis: The revision arose from penalty proceedings founded solely on a survey conducted by the Income Tax Department and the alleged suppression noticed therein. The orders below did not record any independent finding of guilt against the assessee or any material establishing the ingredients required for levy of penalty. A penalty under Section 15-A(1)(c) cannot rest merely on borrowed material or on the fact that reassessment proceedings resulted in some tax determination; the Department must bring on record cogent material to prove the alleged concealment or suppression. In the absence of such a finding, the penalty order cannot stand.
Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was rightly quashed; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the penalty proceedings did not survive.
Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 15-A(1)(c) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act requires an independent, evidence-based finding of concealment or suppression, and cannot be upheld merely on borrowed material or consequential reassessment findings.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether penalties imposed under section 271(1)(c), invoking Explanation 5A, are sustainable where additions in assessments under section 153A are confined to disallowance of expenditure and income offered in the section 153A return, unconnected with any incriminating material or tangible asset found during search.
(2) Whether penalties imposed under section 270A for assessment years governed by that provision can be sustained when the underlying additions consist of estimated disallowances of salary, wages and administrative expenses, and suo motu disallowances made and disclosed in returns filed under section 153A.
(3) Whether penalty under section 271AAB is leviable where the additions are based on disallowance of expenditure and interest, without any finding in search that such claims were false or bogus so as to constitute "undisclosed income" within the meaning of section 271AAB.
(4) Whether, in the absence of incriminating material found in search under section 132, mere acceptance of quantum additions in section 153A assessments justifies imposition and sustenance of penalties under sections 271(1)(c), 270A and 271AAB.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Penalty under section 271(1)(c) read with Explanation 5A in search cases with section 153A returns
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Tribunal reproduced and examined Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c), which deems concealment where, in a search, an assessee is found owner of "any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing" or income represented thereby, subject to specified conditions, and clarifies when such income is deemed concealed notwithstanding its declaration in a return filed after search.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal, following the co-ordinate bench in Swaran Nadhan Salaria, construed Explanation 5A as applicable where the assessee is found during search to be owner of tangible assets or income represented by such assets acquired from undisclosed income, based on material unearthed in search.
(b) It was noted that in the present case, the additions in section 153A assessments for the relevant years stemmed from:
- disallowance of salary and wages,
- disallowance of administrative expenses,
- disallowance under section 40(a)(ia),
- suo motu disallowance of excess depreciation, and
- additional income declared in returns filed under section 153A,
and that none of these additions emanated from any seized material or discovery of money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing in the course of the search.
(c) The Tribunal held that for Explanation 5A to operate, the Assessing Officer must establish that the income or disallowance treated as concealed is linked to the tangible assets or documents found during search. Where variations in income in the section 153A returns are not shown to be a direct consequence of search findings, the deeming fiction under Explanation 5A cannot be invoked.
(d) It was specifically observed that the disallowances and income offered in the section 153A returns were not shown to be based on any incriminating material; they were not traceable to any seized asset or document uncovered in the search.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the preconditions for invoking Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) were not satisfied. Since the additions and variations in income did not arise from incriminating material or tangible assets found in search, the penalties imposed under section 271(1)(c) for the relevant assessment years were held unsustainable and directed to be deleted.
Issue (2): Penalty under section 270A on estimated disallowances and suo motu disallowances in section 153A returns
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Tribunal referred to section 270A(2) defining "under-reported income" and to section 270A(6), particularly clauses (a) and (b), which exclude from "under-reported income":
- income where the assessee's explanation is found bona fide and all material facts are disclosed (clause (a)); and
- income determined on the basis of an estimate, where accounts are accepted as correct and complete but the method employed does not permit proper deduction of income (clause (b)).
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal observed that for the years governed by section 270A, the surviving penalty was in respect of disallowances of salary and wages and administrative expenses. These disallowances were made on an estimated basis due to lack of vouchers for cash expenses, while the books of account were not rejected under section 145(3).
(b) Relying on the ratio in Swaran Nadhan Salaria, the Tribunal noted that:
- where the Assessing Officer accepts the accounts as correct and complete but makes an ad hoc or percentage disallowance for non-production of vouchers, such addition is "determined on the basis of an estimate" within the meaning of section 270A(6)(b);
- in such cases, the estimated portion is expressly excluded from "under-reported income", and no penalty under section 270A can be sustained on that component.
(c) As to the suo motu disallowances and income voluntarily offered in the section 153A returns, the Tribunal recorded that the assessee had explained the reasons and disclosed all material facts. On those facts, following the co-ordinate bench, these fell within the exclusion under section 270A(6)(a), since the explanation was bona fide and properly substantiated.
(d) The Tribunal emphasized there were no distinguishing facts in the present case from those considered in the earlier co-ordinate bench decision, particularly:
- additions being purely estimated without rejecting the books, and
- complete disclosure of facts for amounts voluntarily disallowed in the section 153A returns.
Conclusions
The Tribunal held that the estimated disallowances of salary, wages and administrative expenses did not constitute "under-reported income" in view of section 270A(6)(b), and that suo motu disallowances/income offered with bona fide explanation fell under section 270A(6)(a). Accordingly, penalties levied under section 270A for the concerned assessment years were found not sustainable in law and were deleted.
Issue (3): Penalty under section 271AAB where additions are disallowances of expenditure/interest
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the definition of "undisclosed income" for purposes of section 271AAB and adopted the reasoning of the co-ordinate bench in Swaran Nadhan Salaria, which requires that:
- the income or expenditure treated as "undisclosed" be found false; and
- such falsity emerge from material found in the course of the search.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The underlying additions for the year in which penalty under section 271AAB was imposed consisted of:
- disallowance of salary and wages,
- disallowance of administrative expenses,
- disallowance of excess depreciation suo motu in the section 153A return, and
- disallowance of interest under section 36(1)(iii), in addition to a disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) on which penalty had already been deleted by the first appellate authority.
(b) The Tribunal noted that there was no finding by the Assessing Officer that any of the said expenditure claims were bogus or false; the disallowances were driven by absence of supporting vouchers or lack of verification, not by detection of fabrication or falsity during search.
(c) It further observed, in line with the co-ordinate bench, that for disallowances of such expenses to be treated as "undisclosed income" under section 271AAB, two cumulative conditions must be satisfied:
- the expenditure must be found to be false; and
- such falsity must have been discovered in the course of search proceedings.
(d) In the present case, neither condition was fulfilled:
- there was no recorded finding that the expenses or interest claims were false or bogus; and
- the non-availability of vouchers or deficiencies in documentation did not emerge as a result of search but were noted in assessment proceedings.
(e) The Tribunal reiterated that a mere disallowance in assessment, without satisfaction of the statutory definition of "undisclosed income" for section 271AAB purposes, cannot by itself justify levy of penalty under that section.
Conclusions
The Tribunal held that the additions on account of disallowance of salary, wages, administrative expenses, depreciation and interest did not qualify as "undisclosed income" within the meaning of section 271AAB. Therefore, the penalty sustained by the first appellate authority under section 271AAB was held unjustified and was directed to be deleted.
Issue (4): Effect of absence of incriminating material in section 153A assessments on penalty under sections 271(1)(c), 270A and 271AAB
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal recorded as an admitted factual position that all additions made in the section 153A assessments for the relevant years were not based on any incriminating material or seized documents unearthed in the course of search under section 132.
(b) It noted that while the assessee had chosen not to contest the quantum additions, this acceptance did not automatically warrant imposition or confirmation of penalties, particularly where the statutory preconditions under the respective penalty provisions, as interpreted by the co-ordinate bench, were not met.
(c) For section 271(1)(c) read with Explanation 5A, the absence of tangible assets or incriminating material linking the additions to search findings was fatal to the Revenue's case.
(d) For section 270A, the nature of additions as estimates without rejection of books, and bona fide suo motu disallowances/income disclosures, brought the case within the express exclusions of section 270A(6).
(e) For section 271AAB, the lack of search-based evidence establishing falsity of expenditure/interest claims meant that the additions did not satisfy the definition of "undisclosed income" required for invoking that section.
Conclusions
The Tribunal held that, in the absence of incriminating material discovered in search and in view of the specific statutory conditions for each penalty provision, the penalties imposed under sections 271(1)(c), 270A and 271AAB and sustained in part by the first appellate authority were not legally sustainable. All residual penalties for the concerned assessment years were ordered to be deleted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the order rejecting the application for release of seized jewellery was invalid as having been passed by an officer who was not the jurisdictional Assessing Officer over the applicant, in contravention of directions issued by another High Court.
1.2 Whether, in the circumstances, the Court should examine the merits of the applicant's claim to ownership of the seized jewellery and entitlement to release under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of the rejection order passed by a non-jurisdictional officer
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted that the jewellery was requisitioned under Section 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and that the application for release was made under Section 132B. The first proviso to sub-clause (i) of Section 132B(1) was referred to in argument to contend that the application must be made to, and considered by, the Assessing Officer dealing with and in possession of the seized assets.
2.2 The Court relied upon the orders of another High Court directing that the applicant's release application be decided on merits, with liberty to transfer the matter to the "concerned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer holding charge over the Petitioner" within the extended time granted.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was undisputed that: (i) the Department had stated before the other High Court that the application would be decided on its own merits, with liberty to transfer the case to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer holding charge over the petitioner; (ii) pursuant thereto, the Investigation Wing at Jabalpur transferred the pending application to the stated "Jurisdictional Assessing Officer", namely the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central 2(4), Pune (Respondent No. 4); and (iii) Respondent No. 4 thereafter passed the impugned rejection order.
2.4 On a plain reading of the impugned order, the Court found that Respondent No. 4 herself recorded that jurisdiction over the petitioner did not lie with her office. The Court held that, in view of the clear direction of the other High Court that the application be decided by the concerned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer holding charge over the petitioner, the decision by an officer who did not, by her own admission, hold such charge was contrary to those directions.
2.5 The Court rejected the contention that the impugned order should be sustained merely because Respondent No. 4 had analysed the facts in detail or because she was dealing with the seized assets. The determinative factor for propriety and compliance with the prior High Court's directions was that the application had to be decided by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the petitioner.
2.6 The Court emphasised that the findings and reasoning in the impugned order did not reflect the position advanced in argument that Respondent No. 4 was the competent authority under Section 132B(1) proviso; instead, the order itself disclosed absence of jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Conclusions
2.7 On the "sole ground of propriety" and for contravention of the directions of the other High Court, the Court held that the impugned order dated 20 May 2024 was vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside.
2.8 The Court directed that the application dated 6 December 2023 be decided afresh by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 5(3), Mumbai, who was stated to be presently holding jurisdiction over the petitioner and the employee from whose possession the jewellery was seized.
2.9 The jurisdictional Assessing Officer was directed to decide the application on its own merits, without being influenced by any observations in the present order, with liberty to call for necessary or additional documents and after granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, and to complete the process within twelve weeks.
Issue 2 - Whether to examine the merits of the claim to ownership and release of jewellery
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Although rival submissions were advanced on the petitioner's ownership of the jewellery, the adequacy of documentation, and applicability of Section 132B, the Court expressly declined to enter into those merits.
2.11 In view of the subsequent centralisation of the petitioner's case and the identification of the current jurisdictional Assessing Officer (Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 5(3), Mumbai), the Court considered that the proper course was to remit the matter to that officer rather than adjudicate on the substantive claim to ownership and release.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court recorded that it had "not examined the merits of the matter" and confined its decision strictly to setting aside the impugned order on grounds of propriety and non-compliance with the directions of the other High Court, leaving all questions on ownership of the jewellery and entitlement to release to be decided afresh by the competent jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable when the legality of the RBI acceptance of Form IPI-7 and the alleged violation of the FERA regime had already been conclusively decided in earlier proceedings between the parties.
Analysis: The same controversy concerning the transaction, the applicability of Section 31(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, and the RBI notification had been examined and decided in the connected appeals. The prior judgment held that the transaction fell within the general permission framework and that the declaration submitted to RBI had been accepted, rendering the transaction compliant with the applicable foreign exchange regime. In these circumstances, the Court held that the petitioner could not seek to reopen the same question in writ jurisdiction. The preliminary objection to maintainability was therefore accepted.
Conclusion: The writ petition was barred from re-agitating issues already decided and was not maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A question conclusively decided in prior proceedings between the same parties cannot be reopened in a later writ petition on the same factual and legal foundation.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether a rectification order under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, issued after 1.10.2019 without a Document Identification Number (DIN), and without satisfying the exceptions in CBDT Circular No. 19/2019, is invalid and deemed never to have been issued.
(2) Whether the subsequent generation/communication of a DIN through a separate intimation letter beyond the prescribed time and without prior approval/recorded reasons can cure the defect of a manually issued order without DIN, by invoking CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 or Section 292B of the Act.
(3) Whether, on the facts, the rectification order purportedly dated 29.03.2024 was backdated and therefore barred by limitation under Section 154(7), and passed without mandatory prior notice/opportunity under Section 154(3).
(4) Whether the existence of an alternate remedy before the Tribunal bars the exercise of writ jurisdiction when the impugned rectification order is ex facie without jurisdiction and contrary to mandatory statutory/CBDT requirements.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Validity of rectification order without DIN under CBDT Circular No. 19/2019
Legal framework
(a) CBDT Circular No. 19/2019, issued under Section 119, mandates that with effect from 01.10.2019 no "communication" (defined to include notice, order, summons, letter and any correspondence) shall be issued by any income-tax authority unless a computer-generated DIN has been allotted and is duly quoted in the body of such communication (para 2).
(b) In specified exceptional circumstances (technical difficulties, officer outside office, PAN migration issues, PAN not available, functionality not available), manual communication is permissible only after recording reasons in writing and with prior written approval of the Chief Commissioner/Director General of Income Tax, and the communication must itself state that it is issued manually without DIN in the prescribed format (para 3).
(c) Any communication not in conformity with paras 2 and 3 "shall be treated as invalid and shall be deemed to have never been issued" (para 4).
(d) Manually issued communications in specified cases must be regularised within 15 working days by uploading on the system, generating a DIN and communicating the DIN to the assessee (para 5).
Interpretation and reasoning
(e) The impugned rectification order under Section 154, being an "order" and "communication" within the meaning of the Circular, falls squarely within para 2 and must bear a DIN on its face.
(f) The impugned order does not contain any DIN, does not refer to any exceptional circumstance under para 3, does not carry the mandated para 3 format, and no written approval of the Chief Commissioner/Director General has been placed on record in either of the affidavits; the Court therefore presumed none exists.
(g) Even assuming an exceptional circumstance existed, the mandatory regularisation by generation and communication of DIN within 15 working days was not complied with; the DIN was later sought to be furnished only via an intimation letter dated 10.07.2024, which itself was not properly served and in any event issued well beyond the 15-working-day window.
(h) The Court interpreted "communication" in the Circular to cover the very issuance of notices/orders and not merely their later communication to the assessee, rejecting the contention that DIN is needed only at the stage of communication and not at the stage of passing/issuing the order.
(i) The object of the Circular is to ensure a proper audit trail and prevent precisely the kind of manipulation/backdating revealed in the present case; failure to generate and quote DIN cannot be treated as a curable or minor irregularity.
(j) The Court declined to follow the contrary view of the Jharkhand High Court in Prakash Lal Khandelwal, holding that it misread the Circular by restricting the DIN requirement to the act of communication rather than to all communications issued, and was in any event distinguishable on facts (single day delay in upload versus substantial delay and backdating here).
(k) The Court relied on and followed binding and persuasive precedents holding communications without DIN (and without para 3 compliance) to be invalid and non est, including decisions where: (i) assessment orders without DIN were held invalid; (ii) notices under Section 148 without DIN were held bad in law; (iii) directions/orders without DIN could not be cured by separate intimation letters or by Section 292B.
Conclusions
(l) The impugned rectification order under Section 154, issued without a DIN and without satisfying or recording any exception under para 3 of the Circular, is in direct contravention of paras 2, 3 and 4 of CBDT Circular No. 19/2019.
(m) By force of para 4 of the Circular, the impugned order is invalid and deemed never to have been issued.
Issue (2): Effect of delayed DIN/intimation letter and applicability of Section 292B
Legal framework
(a) CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 para 5 allows regularisation of manual communications issued in limited exceptional cases by uploading, generating and communicating DIN within 15 working days.
(b) Section 292B allows certain technical defects in returns, assessments, notices, etc., to be ignored if they are in substance and effect in conformity with the Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
(c) The Department contended that non-generation of DIN was due to a technical glitch and that the later intimation letter dated 10.07.2024, mentioning a DIN, regularised the defect; reliance was placed on Section 292B and on Prakash Lal Khandelwal.
(d) The Court found that the intimation letter: (i) was itself not served on the correct email address and bounced; (ii) was uploaded only on 16.07.2024; and (iii) was issued far beyond the 15-working-day period contemplated in para 5, even if an exception were assumed.
(e) The impugned order does not carry any recital of exceptional circumstances, or the requisite para 3 language, or any reference to approval of higher authority; therefore, the basic preconditions for manual issuance and subsequent regularisation were never satisfied.
(f) Following earlier precedent, the Court held that a separate DIN intimation letter cannot retrospectively validate an order which never mentioned DIN and never complied with para 3; later communication of DIN does not cure the original violation of the Circular.
(g) Given the categorical language of para 4 (communication non-conforming to paras 2 and 3 is invalid and deemed never issued) and the binding nature of Section 119 circulars on the Department, Section 292B cannot be invoked to override or dilute the Circular's specific consequence of invalidity.
Conclusions
(h) The delayed generation/communication of DIN via the intimation letter dated 10.07.2024 does not regularise or validate the impugned order.
(i) Section 292B is inapplicable; the defect is substantive and jurisdictional under a binding CBDT Circular, not a mere procedural or technical irregularity.
Issue (3): Limitation under Section 154(7), backdating, and non-compliance with Section 154(3)
Legal framework
(a) Section 154(7) mandates that no amendment under Section 154 shall be made after expiry of four years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was passed.
(b) Section 154(3) requires that where the amendment has the effect of enhancing an assessment, reducing a refund or otherwise prejudicing the assessee, the authority must give the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Interpretation and reasoning
(c) The order sought to be rectified was dated 16.03.2020; the four-year limitation under Section 154(7) therefore expired on 31.03.2024.
(d) The impugned rectification order is purportedly dated 29.03.2024. However, the same Assessing Officer subsequently issued a notice under Section 154 on 20.06.2024, granting time up to 01.07.2024 to show cause why rectification of the 16.03.2020 order should not be undertaken.
(e) The issuance of a show-cause notice on 20.06.2024 by the very officer who allegedly passed the rectification order on 29.03.2024 is inherently inconsistent with the Department's case that the order was in fact passed on that earlier date; it demonstrates that as of 20.06.2024 no such rectification order existed.
(f) The DIN generated for the impugned order bears the financial year "2024-25" in its string, whereas orders admittedly passed in FY 2023-24 (e.g., notices/orders dated 21.03.2024 and 27.03.2024) carry DINs referable to FY 2023-24. This indicates that the DIN and thus the order were generated only in FY 2024-25, i.e., after 01.04.2024.
(g) The Court held that, cumulatively, the circumstances (absence of contemporaneous DIN, later DIN indicating FY 2024-25, and the 20.06.2024 show-cause notice by the same officer) compel an inference that the impugned order was actually made after 31.03.2024 and then backdated to 29.03.2024 to avoid limitation.
(h) As regards Section 154(3), the Court accepted that, since the proposed rectification would enhance the total income (and thereby prejudicially affect the assessee) even though it followed a TPO's order, the Assessing Officer was independently required to issue a notice and grant an opportunity of hearing before passing the rectification order.
(i) The show-cause notice under Section 154 was admittedly issued only on 20.06.2024, making it impossible for the rectification order to have been validly passed on 29.03.2024 in compliance with Section 154(3).
(j) The Department's explanation that the 20.06.2024 notice was an inadvertent oversight by subordinates was rejected as factually incorrect; the notice was issued by the same officer who is shown as having passed the impugned order, further supporting the conclusion of backdating and non-compliance with Section 154(3).
Conclusions
(k) The rectification order could not, in law or on facts, have been passed on 29.03.2024; it was in reality made after the expiry of the limitation period under Section 154(7) and is therefore time-barred.
(l) The mandatory requirement of prior notice and opportunity under Section 154(3) was not complied with; the order is vitiated on this independent ground as well.
(m) On these grounds alone, the impugned rectification order is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.
Issue (4): Maintainability of writ petition despite alternate remedy
Legal framework
(a) Article 226 of the Constitution confers writ jurisdiction on High Courts.
(b) As per the principles affirmed in Whirlpool Corporation, the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where, inter alia, the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction or has been passed in violation of mandatory provisions or principles of natural justice.
Interpretation and reasoning
(c) The Department urged that the assessee had an alternate remedy by way of a pending appeal before the Tribunal.
(d) The Court noted that the pending appeal relates, inter alia, to the order of the CIT(A), whereas the present writ challenges the later rectification order dated 29.03.2024 and the DIN intimation letter dated 10.07.2024, both alleged to be void ab initio.
(e) Given the findings that: (i) the impugned order is invalid and deemed never issued for breach of CBDT Circular No. 19/2019; (ii) the order is time-barred and backdated under Section 154(7); and (iii) the mandatory hearing requirement under Section 154(3) was not met, the Court held that the Assessing Officer had acted beyond jurisdiction.
(f) In such circumstances, the case falls within the recognised exceptions where writ jurisdiction may be exercised notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy.
Conclusions
(g) The writ petition is maintainable despite the pendency of appellate proceedings before the Tribunal, as the impugned rectification order and the accompanying DIN intimation letter are ex facie without jurisdiction and contrary to mandatory requirements.
(h) The Court accordingly exercised writ jurisdiction, quashed the impugned rectification order dated 29.03.2024 and the intimation letter dated 10.07.2024, while making no observations on the merits of the underlying transfer pricing additions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether purchases shown from the alleged accommodation-entry provider were to be treated as bogus and, if so, whether the entire purchase amount was liable to disallowance or only the profit element embedded therein.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the Assessing Officer was justified in making a 100% addition of the alleged bogus purchases notwithstanding confirmation of transactions by the supplier and other supporting documents.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Characterisation of purchases as bogus and extent of disallowance (100% vs. profit element)
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court/Tribunal)
2.1 The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the factual and evidentiary matrix discussed by the lower authorities, including: (i) investigation reports indicating the supplier as an accommodation-entry provider; (ii) analysis of the supplier's financials suggesting a shell concern; and (iii) supporting documents produced by the assessee such as purchase bills, sales records, bank statements, stock records, confirmations, and affidavit of the supplier. The Tribunal also noted that notice under section 133(6) of the Act had been issued and the supplier had confirmed the transactions. The decision of the Tribunal in the case of a sister concern engaged in similar line of business, where only a percentage of alleged bogus purchases was sustained as addition, was treated as a guiding precedent on estimation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer, relying on information from the Investigation Wing and analysis of the supplier's balance sheet, treated the entire purchases from the said concern as bogus and disallowed 100% of such purchases.
2.3 The first appellate authority, after examining the material, agreed that the supplier was part of an accommodation-entry network and that the purchases were not genuine in the ordinary sense, thereby upholding the characterisation of the purchases as bogus. It rejected the assessee's contention that regular documentation and cheque payments conclusively established genuineness, observing that such features are common in accommodation-entry transactions.
2.4 However, the first appellate authority accepted the argument that the sales declared by the assessee had not been disturbed and that "there can be no sales without purchase". On this premise, it held that only the profit element embedded in the impugned purchases could be brought to tax, not the entire purchase value.
2.5 In estimating such profit element, the first appellate authority relied on a decision of the Tribunal in the case of a sister concern operating in the same line of diamond trading business, where under similar circumstances an addition at 6% of the alleged bogus purchases had been upheld. It therefore restricted the disallowance to 6% of the amount of disputed purchases and deleted the balance.
2.6 The Tribunal, in second appeal, took note that in response to notice under section 133(6) the supplier had confirmed the transactions. It held that in such circumstances the entire addition of the purchase amount could not be justified "unless anything contrary to the details furnished by the assessee is established by the revenue authorities".
2.7 The Tribunal observed that the first appellate authority had already followed the coordinate bench decision in the case of the assessee's sister concern, involving the same line of business and comparable factual pattern, and had restricted the addition to 6% of the alleged bogus purchases. The Tribunal found no material brought by the Revenue to dislodge either the confirmations obtained under section 133(6) or the basis on which the first appellate authority had applied the 6% rate.
2.8 As regards the assessee's cross-objection seeking further reduction of the rate below 6% (by reference to past assessments and another related concern), the Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the specific rate adopted by the first appellate authority, having been based on a directly comparable Tribunal decision under similar circumstances, and therefore declined to interfere.
Conclusions
2.9 The purchases from the concerned supplier were treated as bogus in character, but since the corresponding sales were accepted, only the profit element embedded in such purchases was held taxable.
2.10 A 100% disallowance of the purchase value was held unjustified in view of the supplier's confirmation under section 133(6) and absence of further contrary material from the Revenue.
2.11 The restriction of the disallowance to 6% of the value of the alleged bogus purchases, following the coordinate bench decision in a sister concern's case in the same line of business, was upheld.
2.12 Both the Revenue's appeal seeking restoration of 100% disallowance and the assessee's cross-objection seeking reduction of the disallowance below 6% were dismissed, sustaining the first appellate authority's order in full on this issue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the appellate court was justified in disposing of the statutory company appeal solely on the basis of the appellant's statement agreeing to deposit the claimed amount, without adjudicating the appeal on merits.
1.2 Whether the order of the appellate court dated 06.11.2017 should be treated as a consent/concession order barring further challenge.
1.3 How the deposit made pursuant to the orders dated 06.11.2017 and 29.01.2018 is to be treated pending adjudication of the restored company appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Disposition of statutory appeal on the basis of deposit statement without decision on merits
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court examined the tenor and contents of the order dated 06.11.2017, noting that at first reading it might suggest that the appellant, after arguments, conceded to deposit the amount and that the appellate court was not inclined to accept the appellant's contentions on merits.
2.2 However, on a closer reading of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the order, the Court emphasized that: (i) withdrawal of the deposit by the respondent was made conditional on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Registrar General; (ii) the appellate court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on whether the amount was actually due and payable; and (iii) the statement of the appellant that it would invoke the arbitration clause under the agreement was specifically recorded, along with an observation that if arbitration was not initiated, the security would lapse.
2.3 These features, particularly the insistence on security for withdrawal and the express neutrality of the appellate court on the existence or extent of liability, were contrasted with the order of the Company Judge, in which no such security condition had been imposed.
2.4 The Court inferred from these elements that the appellant's intention was not to unconditionally admit liability but to demonstrate bona fides in contesting the winding up claim and to keep its disputes alive for adjudication (including by arbitration). The offer to deposit was therefore treated as a measure to show bona fides rather than an acceptance of the claim in satisfaction.
2.5 The Court also took into account that the special leave petition had been filed before expiry of the time allowed for deposit, reinforcing that the appellant did not intend final disposal of the appeal on the basis of the deposit alone.
Conclusions
2.6 The Court held that, in the circumstances, the appellant ought to have been given an opportunity to have its statutory appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 decided on merits.
2.7 The order dated 06.11.2017 was to be treated as an interim order permitting deposit for the purpose of enabling consideration of the appeal on merits, and the direction that "the appeal is disposed of" was ordered to be deleted.
2.8 The company appeal was directed to be restored to the file of the High Court for decision in accordance with law, with all contentions on merits left open.
Issue 2 - Character of the appellate court's order as a consent/concession order
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellate order should be treated as one based on concession or consent, arising from the appellant's offer to deposit the amount after the appellate court allegedly indicated disinclination to accept the appellant's arguments.
2.10 The Court rejected this characterisation by focusing on the express terms of the order: the conditional nature of withdrawal by the respondent, the requirement of security, the absence of any finding regarding the debt being indisputably due, and the express reservation of comments on the necessity of arbitration.
2.11 The presence of conditions inconsistent with an unconditional admission of liability, and the explicit reservation of the parties' rights and contentions, led the Court to hold that the order could not properly be treated as a final consent order embodying a concluded settlement or concession on liability.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court concluded that the order of 06.11.2017 could not be treated as a pure consent or concession order so as to bar challenge or preclude adjudication of the statutory appeal on merits.
Issue 3 - Treatment and disposition of the deposit pending final adjudication
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.13 The Court referred to its earlier interim order dated 29.01.2018, by which, while issuing notice, it allowed the appellant further time to deposit the amount mentioned in the impugned order with interest, stayed the winding up process including appointment of the Provisional Liquidator, and provided that failure to deposit within the extended time would result in dismissal of the special leave petition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 It was recorded that the requisite deposit had been made pursuant to the order of 29.01.2018 and was presently held in a fixed deposit receipt.
2.15 Consequent upon the Court's decision to treat the High Court's order as interim and to restore the company appeal, it became necessary to direct how the deposited amount should be dealt with pending final adjudication.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court directed that:
(a) The amount deposited by the appellant in terms of the order dated 06.11.2017 read with the order dated 29.01.2018 shall abide the final decision in the restored company appeal.
(b) The fixed deposit amount, on maturity, shall be transmitted to the Registrar of the High Court, who shall deal with the amount in terms of the order dated 06.11.2017 as modified by the present order.
(c) If the respondent does not furnish security for withdrawal of the amount as stipulated, the said amount shall be invested in a fixed term deposit with a nationalised bank and shall abide further orders of the High Court in the appeal.
2.17 The Court clarified that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the company appeal or on the underlying dispute, and all contentions of the parties in that regard were left open for determination by the appellate forum.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the objects and activities of the assessee-society constitute "education" or fall under "advancement of any other object of general public utility" within the meaning of section 2(15).
1.2 Whether, having regard to the proviso to section 2(15), the income from activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or services in relation thereto, exceeded the 20% threshold so as to deny exemption under section 11.
1.3 Whether earning surplus/profit from activities advancing a general public utility object, by itself, disentitles the assessee from exemption under section 11.
1.4 Whether exemption under section 11 could be denied on the ground of non-filing of Form 10 for accumulation, when Form 10 had in fact been filed with the return within the prescribed time.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Nature of objects and activities - "Education" vs "General Public Utility" (GPU)
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1.1 Section 2(15) defines "charitable purpose" to include, inter alia, "education" and "advancement of any other object of general public utility". The proviso carves out a restriction where GPU involves activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or services in relation thereto, for a fee, cess or other consideration, subject to the 20% receipt limit.
2.1.2 The Court referred to the interpretation of "charitable purpose" and GPU activities in the decision of the Supreme Court in ACIT (Exemption) v. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, including the principle that an institution advancing GPU may carry on business-related activities in the course of achieving its objects, subject to quantitative limits.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.1.3 The Court examined the society's main objects: encouraging, supporting and nurturing entrepreneurship; providing educational, networking and mentoring assistance; promoting and assisting entrepreneurs to explore new areas of business; and planning, organizing, managing and promoting events and mentoring activities for exploring professional ideas and achieving higher business goals.
2.1.4 On a careful reading of the bye-laws and main aims and objects, the Court held that these activities do not fall within "education" in section 2(15) as claimed, but clearly fall under the last limb of "charitable purpose" viz., "advancement of any other object of general public utility".
2.1.5 The Court relied on the reasoning in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to distinguish between pure trade promotion/coordination activities (GPU) and additional commercial services (e.g., courses for skilling, rental spaces, consulting) whose receipts are business/commercial in nature and therefore subject to the proviso to section 2(15).
Conclusions:
2.1.6 The assessee-society is a GPU institution and its claim for exemption under section 11 must be examined with reference to section 2(15) and its proviso, not under the "education" limb.
2.2 Application of proviso to section 2(15) - 20% threshold and characterization of receipts
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.2.1 Under the proviso to section 2(15), advancement of any other object of GPU is not a "charitable purpose" if it involves activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or services in relation thereto, for fee/cess/consideration, unless:
(i) such activities are undertaken in the course of actual carrying out of the GPU object; and
(ii) aggregate receipts from such activities during the previous year do not exceed 20% of the total receipts of the trust or institution.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.2.2 The Court held that, in the course of achieving its GPU objects, the society had carried on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business (e.g., organizing events), and therefore its eligibility for exemption depended on compliance with the 20% receipts ceiling under the proviso.
2.2.3 The assessee reported gross income of Rs. 1,53,69,214/- comprising membership fees (from associate, student, and charter members) and event fees. The Court classified:
(a) Membership fees as forming part of the advancement of GPU and not as consideration for carrying out trade, commerce or business;
(b) Income from conducting events as receipts from activities of rendering services to trade, commerce or business, falling within the ambit of the proviso to section 2(15).
2.2.4 The assessee had income from events of Rs. 20,60,655/-. On comparison with the gross receipts, this amount was found to be less than 20% of the total receipts.
2.2.5 The Court found the Assessing Officer erred in treating 48% of the total income as arising from commercial activities by incorrectly including membership fees in the computation of "commercial" receipts. Properly construed, only the event receipts constituted business/commercial receipts for the purpose of the proviso.
Conclusions:
2.2.6 The event-related receipts (trade/commerce/service-related) constituted less than 20% of the total receipts of the assessee-society.
2.2.7 As the activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business were carried out in the course of advancing the GPU object and their receipts were within the statutory 20% limit, the proviso to section 2(15) did not operate to deny "charitable purpose" status.
2.2.8 Consequently, the assessee-society remained a "charitable" institution under section 2(15) and was entitled to claim exemption under section 11, subject to other conditions.
2.3 Effect of profit/surplus on eligibility for exemption under section 11
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.3.1 The Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, wherein it was held that earning profit in the course of carrying out charitable objects does not, by itself, justify denial of exemption if the predominant object remains charitable.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3.2 The Assessing Officer had reasoned that the assessee derived around 22% profit from its activities and therefore could not be regarded as a charitable institution.
2.3.3 The Court rejected this reasoning, holding that an institution advancing GPU can earn surplus from its activities; mere existence of profit or surplus is not sufficient to deny exemption under section 11, so long as the activities are directed to the charitable object and the statutory conditions (including the proviso to section 2(15)) are satisfied.
Conclusions:
2.3.4 The fact that the assessee-society earned a surplus of about 22% from its activities could not, by itself, be a ground to deny exemption under section 11.
2.3.5 The Assessing Officer erred in treating the existence of such surplus as determinative of non-charitable character.
2.4 Requirement and filing of Form 10 - denial of exemption by appellate authority
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.4.1 The Court noted that, under the scheme of sections 11(1) and 11(2),
(a) Up to 15% of gross income derived from property held under trust can be accumulated under section 11(1);
(b) Accumulation in excess of 15% under section 11(2) requires filing of Form 10 as prescribed by Rule 17, within the prescribed time (including during assessment or appellate proceedings) to claim the benefit.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.4.2 The Commissioner (Appeals) had rejected the assessee's claim to exemption under section 11 on the ground that Form 10 for accumulation beyond 15% was not filed on or before the due date, and therefore the exemption could not be allowed.
2.4.3 The Court found, as a matter of record, that the assessee had in fact filed the relevant Form 10 along with its return of income on 05.10.2018, which was on or before the due date under section 139.
2.4.4 In light of this factual finding, the stated ground of the Commissioner (Appeals) - absence of Form 10 - was held to be incorrect.
Conclusions:
2.4.5 Denial of exemption under section 11 by the appellate authority on the ground of alleged non-filing of Form 10 was untenable, as Form 10 was duly filed within time.
2.4.6 The appellate order sustaining denial of exemption on this ground could not be upheld.
2.5 Overall conclusion on exemption under section 11 and assessment of income
2.5.1 The Court held that the assessee-society's objects fall under "advancement of any other object of general public utility" and that it validly qualifies as a charitable institution within section 2(15), since its business/commercial receipts (event income) are within the 20% limit and its membership fees are not to be treated as business receipts.
2.5.2 The existence of surplus/profit from its activities does not defeat its charitable character or its eligibility under section 11.
2.5.3 Form 10 for accumulation was in fact filed with the return within time, and thus could not be a basis for refusing exemption.
2.5.4 The Assessing Officer erred in denying exemption under section 11 and assessing excess of income over expenditure as "Income from Business and Profession", and the Commissioner (Appeals) further erred in upholding denial on an incorrect and new ground.
2.5.5 The order of the appellate authority was set aside and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow exemption under section 11 for the assessment year in question.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the assessee was entitled to raise an additional legal ground challenging the validity of the reassessment proceedings on the basis of the recorded reasons for reopening.
1.2 Whether a reassessment initiated under section 147 on the basis of reasons recorded only under section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is valid when no addition is made under section 50C and the only addition ultimately made is under section 43CA.
1.3 Consequential effect on other grounds in the appeal if the reassessment itself is held invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of additional legal ground challenging reassessment
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.1 The assessee sought to raise an additional ground contending that the reassessment was invalid because the addition was not made on the very ground for which the assessment was reopened, namely, under section 50C. It was argued, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of NTPC, that a pure question of law going to the root of the assessment, based on facts already on record, can be raised at any stage of appellate proceedings.
2.2 The Tribunal proceeded to examine the legality of the reassessment on this additional ground, thereby implicitly accepting its maintainability as a pure legal ground arising from the existing record.
Conclusions:
2.3 The additional ground challenging the validity of the reassessment was admitted and entertained, and ultimately allowed.
Issue 2: Validity of reassessment where reopening reasons refer to section 50C but addition made under section 43CA
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.4 The Court noted that section 50C is a special provision for determining full value of consideration in certain cases where the consideration received or accruing from transfer by an assessee of a capital asset, being land or building or both, is less than the value adopted or assessed by the State authority, and such income is assessable under the head "Capital gains".
2.5 Section 43CA is a distinct special provision for determining full value of consideration for transfer of assets other than capital assets, being land or building or both, where the consideration received or accruing is less than the value adopted or assessed by the State authority, and such income is assessable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession".
2.6 Reliance was placed on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. v. ACIT, as followed by the Tribunal in DCIT v. Govinda Rajulu Srinivasan, that the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction in reassessment to reassess any income other than the income in respect of which the proceedings under section 147 were initiated, and that for every new issue which the Assessing Officer intends to bring to tax in reassessment, a fresh notice under section 148 is required, particularly where the original reasons cease to survive.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.7 The recorded reasons for reopening, as reflected in the assessment order and the notice under section 143(2) read with section 147, referred only to escapement of income by invoking section 50C on account of difference between the sale consideration declared (Rs. 38,61,600) and the guideline/stamp value (Rs. 1,28,69,000) of immovable properties.
2.8 The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer's "reason to believe" for reopening was confined to possible escapement of income under section 50C alone; there was no reference to section 43CA in the reasons recorded.
2.9 It was undisputed that, in the reassessment order, no addition was made under section 50C, and instead, the addition was made only under section 43CA. The Tribunal held that the two provisions operate in different fields-section 50C relating to capital assets and capital gains, and section 43CA relating to business stock-in-trade and business income-and therefore could not be treated as interchangeable for purposes of jurisdiction under section 147.
2.10 The contention of the Revenue that there was effectively no difference between sections 50C and 43CA was rejected in view of their distinct scope, heads of income, and nature of assets covered.
2.11 Following the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court as applied in the prior Tribunal decision in DCIT v. Govinda Rajulu Srinivasan, the Tribunal held that where the very ground on which reassessment was initiated (section 50C) does not result in any addition, the Assessing Officer cannot sustain reassessment purely on a different ground (section 43CA) which was not part of the recorded reasons for reopening.
Conclusions:
2.12 Since no addition was made under section 50C, which alone formed the basis of the recorded reasons for reopening, and the only addition was under section 43CA, which was not a ground for reopening, the reassessment order dated 29.09.2021 passed under section 147 read with section 144B was held to be invalid and was quashed.
Issue 3: Effect of invalid reassessment on other grounds in appeal
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.13 Having quashed the reassessment itself as invalid on the additional legal ground, the Tribunal observed that the remaining grounds raised in Form 36 on the merits of additions became purely academic.
Conclusions:
2.14 The other grounds were not adjudicated as they were rendered academic by the quashing of the reassessment, and the appeal was allowed on that basis.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue deserved condonation on the grounds of administrative approval procedures.
1.2 Whether additions under section 153A could be sustained solely on the basis of a disclosure statement recorded during search, in the absence of corroborative incriminating material.
1.3 Whether, on the facts and seized documents, the assessee was to be treated as a finance broker/middleman or as a principal in the cash finance transactions.
1.4 Whether the quantum of undisclosed income in the relevant assessment years was to be determined on the basis of the disclosure of Rs. 20 crores or restricted to brokerage/commission income worked out from seized material and related enquiries.
1.5 Whether the factual and legal conclusions for assessment year 2011-12 applied mutatis mutandis to assessment years 2012-13 to 2017-18.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay in filing appeals
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted delays of 80 days in some appeals and 49 days in others. The Revenue explained the delay as arising from the time taken to obtain administrative approval from competent authorities. The assessee's representative did not oppose condonation. Considering the reasons stated and absence of opposition, the Tribunal accepted that the delay was adequately explained.
Conclusions
2.2 The delay in filing the Revenue's appeals was condoned and the appeals were admitted for hearing on merits.
Issue 2: Sustainability of additions under section 153A based solely on disclosure statement without corroborative incriminating material
Legal framework (as deliberated)
2.3 The Tribunal proceeded on the principle, noticed by the first appellate authority and supported by CBDT Circular dated 10.03.2003, that additions pursuant to search should not be made merely on the basis of confessions but must rest on seized materials or other corroborative evidence. The Tribunal also endorsed the proposition that an uncorroborated disclosure, particularly when retracted, cannot by itself justify substantive additions.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The assessment for all years was found to be primarily based on an alleged disclosure of Rs. 20 crores made during search, which the assessee claimed not to be aware of and later retracted through an affidavit immediately after receiving a copy of the statement.
2.5 The Tribunal noted the detailed findings of the first appellate authority that:
(a) The Assessing Officer did not specify or rely on any particular incriminating material while making additions, and no document supporting the alleged disclosure was enclosed with the show cause notice.
(b) No substantial asset or unexplained investment was found with the assessee to support the quantum of undisclosed income of Rs. 20 crores.
(c) The "closing balance" or "peak" derived from seized material never exceeded Rs. 1,93,85,157, casting doubt on the figure of Rs. 20 crores.
(d) The Assessing Officer, even in remand, essentially reiterated reliance on the disclosure statement, without working out undisclosed income independently from seized papers as specifically directed by the appellate authority.
2.6 The Tribunal recorded that seized papers identified by the Assessing Officer (notably Rukkas in DB/8 and DB/9) did not yield figures matching the disclosure, and there was no material "for name sake" to support the disclosed amount. The disclosure was therefore considered "bereft of any corroborative material and not coming out of any seized papers."
2.7 The Tribunal further observed that the assessee had prepared a statement of income from seized books (Annexure B), at the instance of the Assessing Officer, which the Assessing Officer treated as unaccounted cash inflow/outflow, but without pointing to underlying corroboration in the seized material.
Conclusions
2.8 Additions under section 153A could not be sustained merely on the disclosure statement recorded during search in the absence of corroborative incriminating material. The Tribunal upheld the principle that assessment must rest on seized documents and reliable evidence, not on a bare or retracted confession.
Issue 3: Characterisation of assessee's role - finance broker versus principal in finance transactions
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 On appraisal of the assessment order, seized documents, statements recorded during search, remand report, replies to section 133(6) notices, and records of related proceedings, the first appellate authority and the Tribunal recorded consistent findings that:
(a) The nature of business was described in the assessment order itself as "Commission and Brokerage".
(b) The main search was in the case of a financier, and search in the assessee's case was consequential; questions put to the assessee's son during search consistently indicated that the assessee was acting as a finance broker arranging funds.
(c) Rukkas seized (DB/8, DB/9 and others) described the assessee as a "middleman" between identified lenders and borrowers, with the borrowers' names, addresses and signatures clearly appearing; this showed that the underlying funds belonged to clients, not to the assessee.
(d) Notices under section 133(6) issued to various parties resulted in replies (e.g., from Srijan Realty and other parties) admitting to having taken loans through the assessee and disclosing the transactions in their own hands; one party (Babulal Bothra) admitted before the Settlement Commission that he undertook financial transactions through the assessee and his son.
(e) No material was found to suggest that the assessee owned or deployed his own funds in the cash finance transactions in a manner commensurate with the Rs. 20 crores figure.
2.10 The Tribunal emphasized the appellate authority's reliance on these objective indicators (business description, Rukkas, third-party confirmations, settlement proceedings) and agreed that they established the assessee's position as a finance broker, not as a principal financier.
Conclusions
2.11 The assessee was held to be a finance broker or middleman arranging cash loans between lenders and borrowers. The funds involved in the transactions belonged to clients, and only brokerage/commission, not the entire transaction amounts or interest, could be treated as income in the assessee's hands.
Issue 4: Determination and limitation of quantum of undisclosed income to brokerage/commission computed from seized material
Legal framework (as deliberated)
2.12 The Tribunal, concurring with the appellate authority, applied the principle that where an assessee is established to be a mere intermediary/broker in financial transactions, his taxable income is limited to brokerage or commission, not to the gross transaction values. This approach was supported by cited decisions including Tribunal and High Court rulings (e.g., decisions treating accommodation/facilitating parties as entitled to be assessed only on commission).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The first appellate authority undertook a detailed exercise to segregate and quantify income attributable to brokerage from seized materials and related explanations:
(a) The assessee had filed, before the Investigation Wing and the Assessing Officer, a computation headed "synopsis of income inflows from various seized materials" (Annexure B to the assessment order), prepared from all seized documents, working out year-wise receipts/income aggregating to Rs. 1,76,44,279 for seven years.
(b) The Assessing Officer did not dispute the correctness of the Annexure B computation as derived from seized papers and made it part of the assessment order, yet chose to ignore it in favour of the higher disclosed figure of Rs. 20 crores, without correlating that figure with specific seized documents.
(c) In remand, the Assessing Officer again failed to compute undisclosed income with reference to seized materials as directed, and continued to rely on the disclosure statement and a cash flow (Annexure A) which was not corroborated by any seized paper.
(d) The appellate authority found that neither the disclosure statement nor Annexure A had evidentiary value in the absence of linkages with seized documents, whereas Annexure B was based on seized material and remained uncontroverted.
2.14 Independently, the appellate authority also applied a reasoned estimation:
(a) Assuming, even in Revenue's favour, that total transaction volume for the seven-year period was Rs. 20 crores, and considering that typical loan tenure was six months (implying two rotations per year), the effective rotation over the block period was estimated at Rs. 40 crores.
(b) Taking average brokerage at 3% on total transaction value, the notional brokerage income would be about Rs. 1.20 crores.
(c) Comparing this estimate with the figure emerging from Annexure B (Rs. 1.76 crores over seven years as per assessee's computation from seized documents), the appellate authority adopted the higher figure derived from seized materials, treating it as undisclosed brokerage income.
2.15 For assessment year 2011-12, after examining Annexure B and the seized documents, the appellate authority computed undisclosed income attributable to that year at Rs. 15,42,994 and reduced the original addition of Rs. 1 crore to this amount. The Tribunal noted that:
(a) The assessee's later contention that Annexure B included already disclosed income was not supported by the document or by any indication given at the time of filing it before the Assessing Officer.
(b) The Assessing Officer did not challenge or disprove the computations in Annexure B.
(c) On these facts, the appellate authority was "perfectly justified" in adopting Annexure B as the basis for quantifying undisclosed income.
2.16 The Tribunal also took note that the assets found with the assessee during search were less than the undisclosed income quantified as per Annexure B, which reinforced the reasonableness of the adopted figure and further undermined the unsubstantiated Rs. 20 crores disclosure.
Conclusions
2.17 The Tribunal affirmed that only brokerage/commission income could be brought to tax in the assessee's hands from the finance transactions, and that the undisclosed income for assessment year 2011-12 was correctly restricted to Rs. 15,42,994 as computed from seized material (Annexure B). The addition of Rs. 1 crore made by the Assessing Officer on the basis of the disclosure statement was unsustainable and stood reduced to Rs. 15,42,994.
Issue 5: Application of findings for assessment year 2011-12 to assessment years 2012-13 to 2017-18
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 For assessment years 2012-13 to 2017-18, the Tribunal recorded that the issues raised by the Revenue were similar and arose from the same search, same pattern of assessment, and same underlying reasoning-namely, additions based on the common disclosure of Rs. 20 crores without independent correlation to seized material.
2.19 The Tribunal held that its reasoning and conclusions in relation to assessment year 2011-12-on the status of the assessee as finance broker, the impermissibility of basing additions solely on an uncorroborated disclosure, and the quantification of undisclosed income limited to brokerage derived from seized documents-applied mutatis mutandis to all the other years under appeal.
Conclusions
2.20 For assessment years 2012-13 to 2017-18, the additions made by the Assessing Officer on the basis of the disclosure of Rs. 20 crores were similarly unsustainable. The appellate authority's orders restricting income to brokerage/commission as per seized materials were upheld, and all Revenue appeals for these years were dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in determining the arm's length margin under the TNMM for the manufacturing segment located in a backward area, the operating profit margin should be computed after excluding the effect of excise duty and CST incentives specific to that backward area.
1.2 Whether the excise duty exemption availed under Central Excise Notification No. 49-50/2003-CE in respect of an industrial undertaking located in a specified backward area is a capital receipt, excludible from total income under the normal provisions as well as from computation under section 115JC.
1.3 How the transfer pricing issues relating to characterization of the assessee's activities, selection of comparables, applicability and scope of sections 80-IA(8), 80-IA(10) and 92BA, segment-wise benchmarking (manufacturing vs. trading), and the permissibility of entity-level TP adjustment are to be dealt with.
1.4 Effect of non-pressing of certain grounds of appeal by the assessee.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Exclusion of excise duty and CST incentives while computing operating margin for TNMM
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The assessee's manufacturing unit is situated in a backward area of Himachal Pradesh and enjoys waiver of 12.5% excise duty (under Notification No. 50/2003-CE) and waiver of 2% CST under a State notification. The assessee contended that, for transfer pricing purposes under TNMM, its operating profit/operating revenue should be adjusted to neutralise these location-specific incentives so that its margin is properly comparable with margins of uncontrolled comparables that do not enjoy such benefits.
2.2 The Court noted that a co-ordinate Bench, in a case concerning a similar backward-area unit, had directed the AO/TPO to compute the operating profit margin "without considering the excise duty, sales tax and income-tax". The assessee placed reliance on this decision and on the fact that its claim was based on the same type of backward-area incentives.
2.3 On examination of the record, including financials, Form 10CCB and objections before the DRP, the Court found that the assessee had consistently claimed that its manufacturing profits were impacted by such backward-area benefits and that the lower authorities had not properly given effect to this location-specific aspect in the comparability analysis.
Conclusions
2.4 The Court directed that, for determining the operating profit margin under TNMM, excise duty and CST benefits specific to the backward-area unit are to be excluded. The ground relating to this adjustment was allowed.
Issue 2 - Nature of excise duty exemption: capital receipt and its treatment under normal provisions and section 115JC
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.5 The assessee's unit, located in a specified backward area, availed 100% excise duty exemption for ten years under Central Excise Notification No. 49-50/2003-CE, issued pursuant to an industrial policy for Himachal Pradesh/Uttaranchal. During the relevant year (the 10th year), the assessee availed excise duty exemption of Rs. 30,35,92,206 and claimed it as a capital receipt, not forming part of taxable income under normal provisions and also to be excluded for the purposes of section 115JC.
2.6 The assessee relied on the "purpose test" laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions on subsidy characterisation, and on the High Court decision holding that excise duty refund/interest subsidy/insurance subsidy granted to promote industrialisation and employment in backward areas constituted capital receipts. The assessee also pointed to the Office Memorandum of the Ministry of Commerce & Industry and the scheme itself, evidencing that the objective was industrialisation of backward areas and generation of employment.
2.7 It was further urged that, even after insertion of section 2(24)(xviii), "exemption" from excise duty does not fall within its ambit, and that incentives under pre-existing schemes retain their character notwithstanding later legislative amendments.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Court observed that, as per the cited High Court judgment, excise duty subsidy and similar incentives granted for industrial development and employment generation in backward areas are capital receipts, applying the "purpose test". A co-ordinate Bench had already taken a similar view in an analogous matter involving excise incentives.
2.9 In light of the purpose of the excise exemption scheme for the backward area and the judicial precedents cited, the Court treated the exemption as a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. It followed that, being a capital receipt with no profit element, it was not chargeable to tax under normal provisions and, correspondingly, not includible in the computation under the alternative minimum tax provisions.
Conclusions
2.10 The excise duty exemption of Rs. 30,35,92,206 availed under the backward-area notification was held to be a capital receipt, to be excluded from total income under the normal provisions and also to be excluded in computing income under section 115JC. The additional ground on this issue was allowed.
Issue 3 - Transfer pricing characterisation, benchmarking, comparables, and scope of adjustment (grounds 4-10)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The assessee raised multiple objections to the TP analysis adopted by the TPO/DRP, inter alia:
(a) that the authorities had wrongly characterised the assessee as manufacturing "electronics including hardware" or "computers, its parts, UPS, inverters and all kinds of electric and electronics goods" contrary to the TP study which demonstrated that the assessee was engaged primarily in manufacturing UPS, inverters, stabilisers, wires and parts thereof, with about 82% of turnover from UPS, inverters and stabilisers;
(b) that manufacturing and trading activities, clearly distinguished in the financials, had been wrongly consolidated and not benchmarked separately;
(c) that TP provisions were applied to the trading segment merely because it appeared in Form 3CEB, without proper regard to the limited scope of specified domestic transactions;
(d) that the TPO/DRP presumed applicability of sections 80-IA(8) and 80-IA(10) only on the basis of the filing of Form 3CEB, without requisite findings about non-correspondence to market value or existence of any "arrangement";
(e) that comparables were selected randomly without ensuring functional similarity with the assessee's products, and without availability/consideration of financials and segmental data; and
(f) that the TP adjustment was wrongly made at the entity level, instead of being confined to the specific transactions falling within sections 80-IA(8) or 80-IA(10).
2.12 The Court noted that the TP study recorded manufacturing constituting about 82% of turnover; that the assessee's grievance was that these factual aspects and segmental distinctions had not been properly appreciated; and that there were allegations of inappropriate selection of comparables and of overbroad application of TP provisions.
2.13 It was observed that the assessee pointed out infirmities in the impugned TP order and sought a fresh, proper adjudication considering financials, segment-wise details and statutory preconditions for invoking sections 80-IA(8)/(10) and 92BA. The Revenue raised no objection to remand of the TP issues to the Assessing Officer.
Conclusions
2.14 All issues raised in grounds 4 to 10 concerning characterisation of the assessee's activities, the need for separate benchmarking of manufacturing and trading, the applicability and scope of sections 80-IA(8), 80-IA(10) and 92BA, the selection and comparability of alleged comparables, and the propriety of entity-level TP adjustment were remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
Issue 4 - Non-pressed grounds
Conclusions
2.15 The assessee did not press grounds relating to: alleged invalidity of the DRP's order for want of DIN; alleged invalidity for not being passed through ITBA and without digital signatures; the contention that TP adjustments cannot be made at entity level; and the issue concerning retrospective operation of amendments to sections 43B and 36(1)(va) vis-à-vis employees' contribution to ESI/EPF. These grounds were dismissed as not pressed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be sustained where the quantum addition on account of alleged bogus purchases is ultimately restricted to a fixed percentage on an estimated basis.
1.2 Whether an estimated disallowance of purchases, without cogent evidence of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, amounts to "concealment of income" or "furnishing of inaccurate particulars" for purposes of section 271(1)(c).
1.3 Whether the Tribunal's finding and conclusion in the lead appeal are to be applied mutatis mutandis to the assessee's other assessment years involving identical facts and issues.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Sustainability of penalty under section 271(1)(c) on estimated disallowance of bogus purchases
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The penalty was levied under section 271(1)(c) read with section 274, on the basis that the assessee had allegedly concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars by claiming bogus purchases, and the penalty was quantified at 100% of the tax sought to be evaded.
2.2 The assessee contended that, on the facts, there was no concealment of income nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars, since the sustained addition represented only an estimated disallowance of purchases, as reflected by the successive reductions of the quantum addition by the appellate authorities.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer initially disallowed 100% of the alleged bogus purchases. The first appellate authority restricted the addition to 12.5% of the purchases, and, in further appeal, the Tribunal restricted the disallowance to 10% of the alleged bogus purchases.
2.4 From this progression, the Court inferred that the final addition sustained was purely on an estimated basis, being a percentage disallowance of purchases that were otherwise accepted as having been actually made, with the disallowance arising essentially due to non-availability of parties for direct verification.
2.5 The Court accepted the assessee's contention that, in such circumstances, the addition represented an estimated disallowance, and that there was no concrete or cogent material demonstrating actual concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income.
2.6 The Court referred to and relied upon the binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in PCIT v. Colo Colours Pvt. Ltd., where, in similar circumstances involving estimated additions, the levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) was held to be unsustainable.
2.7 The Court also noted that a consistent view has been taken by the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in Kamal H. Shah v. ITO, wherein penalty was deleted in cases of additions sustained on an estimated basis.
2.8 The Court observed that the Departmental Representative did not advance any substantive objection that could distinguish the present case from the binding precedent or justify penalty on the peculiar facts here.
2.9 Proceeding on these lines, the Court held that an estimated addition arising from partial disallowance of purchases does not automatically imply concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars so as to attract section 271(1)(c).
Conclusions
2.10 As the quantum addition on account of alleged bogus purchases was ultimately sustained only on an estimated basis at 10% of such purchases, the preconditions for levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) were held to be not satisfied.
2.11 The penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) was found to be unsustainable in law and on facts and was accordingly quashed for the lead assessment year.
Issue 3: Applicability of findings to other assessment years with identical facts
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The Court recorded that, for the remaining two appeals, the facts and circumstances were identical to those in the lead appeal, involving the same assessee, same nature of alleged bogus purchases, same pattern of estimated addition, and identical penalty under section 271(1)(c).
2.13 Given this identity of facts and issues, the Court held that the reasoning and decision in the lead appeal would govern the other appeals as well.
Conclusions
2.14 The decision to delete penalty in the lead year was applied mutatis mutandis to the other assessment years.
2.15 Penalty orders under section 271(1)(c) for all three assessment years were quashed, and all appeals of the assessee were allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a demand order passed under Section 74(9) of the GST Act, 2017 can lawfully determine tax, interest, and penalty in excess of the amount specified in the show cause notice issued under Section 74(1), in view of Section 75(7) and the principles of natural justice.
1.2 Whether, despite the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 107 of the GST Act, 2017, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised where the impugned order is ex facie contrary to Section 75(7) and violative of natural justice.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Scope of demand under Section 74(9) vis-à-vis show cause notice under Section 74(1) and Section 75(7)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 74(1) of the GST Act, 2017, emphasizing that where tax has not been paid, short paid, erroneously refunded, or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized by reason of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, the proper officer shall serve a notice requiring the person chargeable with tax "to show cause as to why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice along with interest payable thereon under section 50 and a penalty equivalent to the tax specified in the notice."
2.2 The Court also relied on Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017, which mandates that "the amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in the order shall not be in excess of the amount specified in the notice and no demand shall be confirmed on the grounds other than the grounds specified in the notice."
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that an essential requirement of a notice under Section 74(1) is the clear specification of the amount of tax, interest payable thereon, and penalty equivalent to the tax specified in the notice, so as to afford the assessee a clear and adequate opportunity to respond and make representation.
2.4 It was observed that, although under Section 74(9) the proper officer determines the amount of tax, interest and penalty after considering the assessee's representation, Section 75(7) operates as a limitation: the final order cannot (i) demand an amount in excess of that specified in the show cause notice, nor (ii) confirm demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice.
2.5 The Court characterized Section 75(7) as a statutory embodiment of the principles of natural justice, in particular the rule that nobody should be condemned unheard. It ensures that the assessee is not saddled with a higher or different demand than that for which opportunity to show cause was given.
2.6 On facts, the Court noted that the impugned final order determined a demand of Rs. 7,61,80,000/-, whereas the show cause notice had specified a much lower amount of Rs. 4,59,50,000/-. This excess demand beyond the quantified amount in the show cause notice was undisputed.
2.7 In view of the clear statutory prohibition in Section 75(7), the Court held that the impugned demand order, being for an amount far exceeding that specified in the show cause notice, was contrary to Section 75(7) and violative of principles of natural justice.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that the impugned order passed under Section 74(9) was not sustainable in law as it demanded tax, interest and penalty in excess of the amount specified in the show cause notice, in breach of Section 75(7) of the GST Act, 2017 and the principles of natural justice.
2.9 The impugned show cause notice dated 6th February 2021 and the consequential demand order dated 26th August 2021 were set aside, with a direction that the assessing authority reconsider the matter and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. If the authority intends to confirm an amount exceeding that in the original show cause notice, it may issue a fresh notice for the excess amount, subject to limitation.
Issue 2: Maintainability of writ petition despite availability of alternate statutory remedy
Legal framework
2.10 The respondents invoked Section 107 of the GST Act, 2017, contending that the impugned order being appealable, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court acknowledged that ordinarily it would have relegated the petitioner to the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107, as the order impugned is appealable.
2.12 However, the Court declined to do so in the present case because the illegality was apparent on the face of the record: the impugned order demanded an amount significantly higher than that specified in the show cause notice, in clear contravention of Section 75(7).
2.13 This patent violation of the statutory mandate and principles of natural justice justified the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy.
Conclusions
2.14 The Court held the writ petition to be maintainable despite the existence of an appellate remedy under Section 107 of the GST Act, 2017, on the ground that the impugned order was ex facie in breach of Section 75(7) and principles of natural justice.
2.15 Relief was granted in writ by setting aside the impugned notice and demand order and remitting the matter to the assessing authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law and limitation.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration and rejection of the application for revocation suffered from violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of lack of adequate opportunity of hearing.
1.2 Whether, in the circumstances of non-filing of GST returns due to adverse family circumstances, the Court should exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside the cancellation and appellate orders and permit revocation of registration subject to conditions.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Alleged lack of adequate opportunity of hearing in cancellation and revocation proceedings
Legal framework (as noticed by the Court): The respondents referred to Sections 25, 29 and 30 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 21(a), 21(h), 22 and 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, in support of the contention that proper procedure and opportunity were afforded and that fresh registration could be sought.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the documents annexed to the petition and found that due to non-filing of GST returns, a show cause notice for cancellation of registration was issued on 12.08.2024; thereafter, an order cancelling registration was passed on 12.09.2024, and the appeal against such cancellation was dismissed on 15.09.2025. On this basis, the Court held that it was not a case where opportunity of hearing was not provided; rather, opportunity was "very much provided" and only thereafter the orders were passed.
Conclusions: The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that sufficient opportunity of hearing was not given. It held that principles of natural justice had been complied with and that the challenge could not be sustained on the ground of denial of hearing.
Issue 2: Exercise of writ jurisdiction to set aside cancellation and permit revocation subject to conditions
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the petitioner, a proprietor of a local firm, had failed to file GST returns within time due to adverse family circumstances, which resulted in cancellation of registration and dismissal of the appeal. The petitioner expressed willingness to bear costs and comply with statutory obligations if given another chance to revive the registration and resume business. While acknowledging that due process had been followed in issuing the show cause notice and passing the cancellation and appellate orders, the Court emphasised that the petitioner wished to "go again into the main stream of tax regime" and that it would be in the interest of the department/revenue to bring him back into the "regular main stream as part of formal economy" so that he could conduct business while paying regular tax. Considering these peculiar facts and circumstances, and the objective of encouraging compliance and inclusion in the formal tax regime, the Court decided to grant conditional relief.
Conclusions: The Court set aside the orders dated 12.09.2024 (cancellation of registration) and 15.09.2025 (dismissal of appeal). It directed the petitioner to submit all pending GST returns, particularly for the period during which registration was cancelled. Upon submission of such pending returns, the competent authority was directed to consider the case for revocation of registration. As the petitioner had committed default, the Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000/- payable to the department along with the pending GST returns within two months. The Court clarified that this relief was granted in the "peculiar facts and circumstances of the case." The petition was allowed and disposed of in these terms.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1. Whether the addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- as unexplained cash credit under section 68, alleged to be an accommodation entry from a concern connected with a known hawala operator, was justified on the facts and evidentiary record.
1.2. Whether the disallowance of Rs. 3,78,740/- as unexplained expenditure under section 69C, being interest paid on the aforesaid loan, was sustainable.
1.3. Whether reliance by the revenue on third-party statements and investigation material, without providing such material to the assessee or affording cross-examination, met the requirements of natural justice in sustaining the impugned additions.
1.4. Effect of repayment of the impugned loan and payment of interest through banking channels, and deduction of tax at source, on the applicability of sections 68 and 69C.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1. Addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- as unexplained cash credit under section 68
2.1.1. Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1.1. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the assessee bears the initial onus under section 68 to establish identity of the creditor, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The Commissioner (Appeals) had held that the assessee failed to establish creditworthiness and genuineness as required under section 68.
2.1.1.2. The Tribunal considered the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court in a case where additions were based on statements and material obtained behind the assessee's back, without supplying such material or permitting cross-examination, holding that such denial of opportunity violates principles of natural justice and vitiates the addition.
2.1.2. Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.2.1. The Tribunal recorded that the assessee had furnished confirmations, bank statements and other documentary evidence relating to the loan from the lender, and that the loan was repaid with interest through account payee cheques, with tax deducted at source on the interest.
2.1.2.2. It was noted that the Assessing Officer relied solely on information from the Investigation Wing and the statement of the alleged hawala operator, without conducting any independent verification of the lender's source of funds and without confronting the assessee with such material or allowing cross-examination.
2.1.2.3. While agreeing with the revenue that mere filing of documents does not, by itself, conclusively establish genuineness, the Tribunal held that in view of the jurisdictional High Court's decision, once the assessee demonstrates repayment of the loan through banking channels and there is no rebuttal of such evidence by the revenue, the onus shifts and additions under section 69 (and by parity, allied deeming provisions invoked on the same premise) cannot be sustained without the department disproving the repayment evidence.
2.1.2.4. Applying the cited High Court decision, the Tribunal emphasised that the revenue was bound to provide the material used against the assessee and to allow cross-examination of the person whose statement was relied upon. Failure to do so constituted a denial of natural justice that went to the root of the matter.
2.1.2.5. The Tribunal distinguished the decision of another High Court, relied upon by the revenue, affirming an order where entities controlled by the same hawala operator had been treated as shell companies, on the factual ground that in that case there was no repayment of the loans by the assessee, whereas in the present case the loan was admittedly repaid with interest, and the repayment evidence remained undisputed.
2.1.3. Conclusions
2.1.3.1. In the absence of any attempt by the Assessing Officer to disprove the assessee's evidence of repayment and interest payment through banking channels, and in light of the denial of opportunity to meet the investigation material and cross-examine the deponent, the addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- could not be sustained.
2.1.3.2. The Tribunal held that, on the peculiar facts, the addition in respect of the alleged bogus unsecured loan deserved to be deleted and accordingly deleted the addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-.
2.2. Disallowance of Rs. 3,78,740/- as unexplained expenditure under section 69C in respect of interest on the loan
2.2.1. Legal framework (as discussed)
2.2.1.1. The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) invoked section 69C to disallow interest paid to the same lender, on the footing that the underlying loan was a bogus accommodation entry and that expenditure on such bogus entry could not be allowed as incurred for business purposes. The Commissioner (Appeals) expressly linked this to the assessee's alleged failure under section 68 to prove creditworthiness and genuineness of the loan.
2.2.2. Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.2.1. The Tribunal noted that the interest was paid through banking channels to the lender and that the revenue did not disprove either the fact of such payment or the deduction of tax at source on the interest.
2.2.2.2. Referring again to the jurisdictional High Court's reasoning, the Tribunal treated the undisputed repayment of principal and payment of interest through account payee cheques as a key factual distinction from cases where loans were treated as mere paper entries without any genuine outflow or repayment.
2.2.2.3. Given that the foundational addition in respect of the loan itself was unsustainable for want of proper evidentiary rebuttal and violation of natural justice, the Tribunal held that the consequential disallowance of interest, premised solely on the alleged bogus nature of the loan, could not independently survive.
2.2.3. Conclusions
2.2.3.1. The Tribunal upheld that the interest payment had not been disproved and that the rationale adopted by the lower authorities-treating the interest as expenditure on a bogus entry-was untenable once the loan addition itself was deleted.
2.2.3.2. The disallowance of Rs. 3,78,740/- under section 69C, being interest on the impugned loan, was therefore deleted.
2.3. Principles of natural justice in use of investigation material and third-party statements
2.3.1. Legal framework (as discussed)
2.3.1.1. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional High Court's exposition that where additions are founded on seized material and third-party statements, the assessee must be provided copies of such material and an effective opportunity to cross-examine the deponent; denial of these rights amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, rendering the addition unsustainable.
2.3.1.2. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's observations that an adjudicating authority cannot presuppose the irrelevance of cross-examination and must afford such opportunity when requested.
2.3.2. Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.2.1. It was observed that the Assessing Officer made the additions by relying on the statement of the alleged hawala operator and investigation inputs, without furnishing such material to the assessee and without granting the requested opportunity for cross-examination.
2.3.2.2. Applying the cited precedents, the Tribunal treated this as a substantive procedural defect that went to the very foundation of the additions, rather than a mere irregularity, particularly in the context of the assessee having produced primary evidence of banking-channel transactions and repayments.
2.3.3. Conclusions
2.3.3.1. The additions based solely on investigation material and third-party statements, without confronting the assessee with such material and without allowing cross-examination, were held to be vitiated by breach of natural justice.
2.3.3.2. This breach formed an independent ground, along with the undisputed repayment and interest payment, for deleting both the loan addition and the related interest disallowance.
2.4. Status of legal grounds on reassessment validity
2.4.1. The Tribunal recorded that although grounds challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings were raised, the assessee chose to argue the appeal on merits. Having allowed the appeal on merits, the Tribunal expressly kept the legal grounds on reassessment jurisdiction open, treating them as academic and not adjudicating upon them.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether interest at 18% under clause (c) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 133 of the CGST Rules is leviable on the profiteered amount for the investigation period 15.11.2017 to 30.06.2019.
1.2 Whether penalty is imposable in respect of profiteering that occurred prior to insertion of the penalty provision in the CGST framework in 2020.
1.3 Determination of the quantum of profiteering and consequential direction regarding deposit of such amount.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Levy of interest at 18% under Rule 133(3)(c) of the CGST Rules
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal examined the Central Goods and Services Tax (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2019, notified by Notification No. 31/2019-Central Tax dated 28.06.2019, issued under Section 164 of the CGST Act. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the said notification provides that, save as otherwise provided, the rules shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
2.2 Rule 17 of the said Fourth Amendment Rules amended Rule 133(3)(c) of the CGST Rules by inserting the words "along with interest at the rate of eighteen percent from the date of collection of higher amount till the date of deposit of such amount".
2.3 The Tribunal also considered subsequent notification G.S.R. 927(E), which, in exercise of powers under rule 5 of the Fourth Amendment Rules, appointed 01.04.2020 as the date from which the provisions of the said rule would come into force.
2.4 The Tribunal referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in C.I.T. v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., which lays down that, as a general rule, legislation affecting substantive rights or imposing new obligations or liabilities is presumed to be prospective unless the statute clearly provides, or by necessary implication intends, retrospective operation. It further notes that provisions that are onerous or impose new burdens are subject to the presumption against retrospectivity, whereas curative or purely clarificatory amendments may be retrospective.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5 The Tribunal analysed whether the insertion of interest at 18% in Rule 133(3)(c) is clarificatory/curative (and thereby retrospective) or introduces a new, onerous liability (and thereby prospective in the absence of clear contrary intention).
2.6 Relying on the ratio of Vatika Township, the Tribunal held that legislation (including delegated legislation) which modifies accrued rights or imposes new duties or attaches a new disability must be construed prospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed or necessarily implied a contrary intention, or the amendment is to cure an obvious omission or explain the former law.
2.7 The Tribunal characterised the interest provision in Rule 133(3)(c) as an onerous imposition on the assessee, introducing a new liability and not conferring any benefit. Consequently, the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation applies.
2.8 The Tribunal examined the wording of Notification No. 31/2019-Central Tax, particularly the expression "to further amend" the CGST Rules, and held that grammatically and semantically the term "further" connotes addition or advancement, not application to the past. On this basis, it rejected the contention that the amendment is merely clarificatory or curative with retrospective effect.
2.9 The Tribunal thus concluded that there is no clear statutory indication or necessary implication that the amended clause (c) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 133 is to operate retrospectively from any date prior to its notified commencement (01.04.2020).
Conclusions
2.10 The Tribunal held that the investigation period (15.11.2017 to 30.06.2019) does not substantially fall within the period from which interest liability under the amended Rule 133(3)(c) is applicable.
2.11 Accordingly, the respondent is not liable to pay interest at 18% on the profiteered amount for the said investigation period, and no order for interest was passed.
Issue 2: Imposition of penalty for profiteering prior to insertion of penalty provision
Legal framework
2.12 The Tribunal noted that the statutory provision enabling imposition of penalty in such profiteering matters was inserted only in the year 2020, i.e., subsequent to the last date of the alleged profiteering (30.06.2019).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The Tribunal proceeded on the admitted position that the acts of profiteering in the present case were completed before the penalty provision came into force.
2.14 Consistent with the general principle against retrospective imposition of penal consequences, the Tribunal accepted that the respondent's conduct, which predated the insertion of the penalty provision, could not be brought within its ambit.
Conclusions
2.15 The Tribunal held that the case does not fall within the scope of the subsequently inserted penalty provision.
2.16 No penalty was imposed on the respondent in respect of the profiteering determined for the period 15.11.2017 to 30.06.2019.
Issue 3: Determination and deposit of profiteered amount
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The Tribunal noted that the Director General of Anti-Profiteering initially determined profiteering at a higher figure, but as per the latest report dated 20.11.2025, the profiteered amount was quantified at Rs. 4,57,683/-.
2.18 It was recorded that the respondent, through written submissions, admitted the profiteered amount as determined in the latest report and confined its dispute to interest and penalty.
2.19 The Tribunal, therefore, accepted the DGAP's report to the extent of quantification of profiteering at Rs. 4,57,683/-, attributable to "faceless" recipients.
Conclusions
2.20 The Tribunal affirmed that the respondent had profiteered an amount of Rs. 4,57,683/- during the investigation period.
2.21 The respondent was directed to deposit the said amount into the Consumer Welfare Fund created by the Centre and the States, in equal proportion.
2.22 The concerned Commissioner was directed to submit a compliance report to the Tribunal within four months from receipt of the order.
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