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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge an appellate order under the GST Act when the statutory appellate tribunal was previously non-functional but has since been constituted and made operational with notified timelines for filing appeals.
2. Whether the pre-deposit requirement under Section 112(8) of the GST Act must be complied with when approaching the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal, even where the petitioner had initially invoked writ jurisdiction citing non-constitution of the tribunal.
3. What directions are appropriate regarding redressal of the petitioner's grievance once the appellate tribunal is functional and extended, staggered timelines for filing appeals before the tribunal have been notified and operationalised.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of writ petition in light of subsequent constitution and functioning of the appellate tribunal under the GST Act
Legal framework:
4. The judgment proceeds on the basis of Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 / Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which provides for appeals to the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal against orders in appeal. The Court notices Notification S.O. No. 4220(E) dated 17 September 2025 issued by the Department of Revenue under Section 112(1) notifying 30 June 2026 as the outer date up to which appeals may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal in respect of specified orders, and thereafter within three months for orders communicated on or after 1 April 2026.
4.1. The Court also takes note of the "User Advisory for the GSTAT E-Filing Portal" prescribing a staggered filing period up to 31 December 2025, and the general window up to 30 June 2026 for filing appeals before the tribunal corresponding to the dates of APL-01/APL-03/RVN-01, including special provision for cases where ARN/CRN is not available in the GSTN system.
Interpretation and reasoning:
4.2. The Court records that it is no longer res integra that writ jurisdiction can be invoked to assail an order where a statutory appellate forum, though provided, is not constituted or not functional, as an aggrieved person cannot be rendered remediless.
4.3. At the same time, the Court emphasizes that once the statutory forum is available and functional, and the period for filing appeals is provided and extended through statutory notification and e-filing advisory, it would not be proper for the Writ Court to continue to entertain or keep pending writ petitions where such forum can adjudicate the dispute.
4.4. The Court notes that the grievance earlier urged-non-constitution and non-functionality of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal-stands addressed by the subsequent notification making the tribunal functional and providing adequate and extended timelines for filing appeals.
Conclusions:
4.5. Writ petitions filed earlier on the ground of non-availability of the tribunal are not to be kept pending once the appellate tribunal has been made functional and concrete timelines for filing appeals have been notified.
4.6. The appropriate course is for the petitioner to avail the statutory appellate remedy before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal within the notified timelines rather than pursuing the writ petition on merits.
Issue 2: Necessity of complying with the pre-deposit requirement under Section 112(8) of the GST Act when appealing to the tribunal after invoking writ jurisdiction
Legal framework:
5. The Court extracts and relies upon Section 112(8) of the GST Act, which mandates that no appeal shall be filed under Section 112(1) unless:
(a) the appellant has paid in full such part of the amount of tax, interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order as is admitted by him; and
(b) a sum equal to ten per cent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute, in addition to the amount paid under Section 107(6), subject to a maximum of twenty crore rupees.
Interpretation and reasoning:
5.1. The Court reiterates that although writ jurisdiction can be invoked where the appellate forum is non-functional, that does not entitle a litigant to bypass or dilute the statutory conditions attached to the filing of an appeal once the forum is available.
5.2. The Court clearly states that even where writ jurisdiction had been properly invoked earlier due to non-constitution of the tribunal, a litigant cannot "steal a march" by seeking orders from the Writ Court in derogation of express statutory requirements such as the mandatory pre-deposit under Section 112(8).
5.3. The Court underscores that when a statute prescribes conditions for filing an appeal, the Writ Court, while directing recourse to the appellate forum, must ensure strict compliance with such statutory preconditions.
Conclusions:
5.4. Compliance with the pre-deposit requirements stipulated in Section 112(8) is mandatory for filing an appeal before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal.
5.5. The fact that the tribunal was earlier non-functional and the petitioner had approached the Writ Court does not absolve the petitioner from fulfilling the statutory pre-deposit condition when now availing the appellate remedy.
Issue 3: Appropriate directions following availability of the appellate remedy and notified timelines
Interpretation and reasoning:
6. The Court observes that the statutory forum-Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal-has been made functional and that comprehensive timelines for filing appeals (including staggered filing periods and a long-stop date of 30 June 2026) have been notified through the central government notification and the "User Advisory for the GSTAT E-Filing Portal."
6.1. In view of such arrangements, the Court holds that the petitioner's dispute can and should be adjudicated by the tribunal rather than in writ proceedings.
6.2. The Court therefore declines to go into the merits of the first appellate order and confines itself to ensuring that the petitioner is directed to properly channel the grievance through the statutory appeal mechanism, with due compliance of statutory preconditions.
Conclusions and directions:
6.3. The writ petition is disposed of with the following operative directions:
(i) The petitioner is directed to deposit, if not already deposited, the amount required under Section 112(8) of the GST Act and to file an appeal before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal within the period specified in the timelines contained in the notification and the "User Advisory for the GSTAT E-Filing Portal."
(ii) The petitioner shall file the appeal in accordance with the staggered and overall timelines prescribed in the said User Advisory.
(iii) In the event the appeal is filed and is found to be in order as per the requirements of Section 112 of the GST Act and the relevant Rules, the same shall be entertained by the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal.
6.4. The Court clarifies that it has expressed no opinion on the merits of the first appellate order and that pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of as a consequence of the disposal of the writ petition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect is legally sustainable when the show cause notice for cancellation does not contemplate retrospective cancellation and no reasons are recorded for such retrospective operation.
1.2 Consequences of failure by the appellate authority to consider the illegality of retrospective cancellation and dismissal of the appeal as barred by limitation.
1.3 Appropriate reliefs and consequential directions regarding restoration of GST registration, filing of returns, and liberty of the Department to conduct fresh verification and take action in accordance with law.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of retrospective cancellation of GST registration
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered Section 29(2) of the Central/Delhi Goods and Services Tax enactment as interpreted in earlier decisions, holding that although the proper officer has the power to cancel GST registration from any date including a retrospective date, such power must be exercised with reasons, due application of mind, and based on objective criteria.
2.2 The Court relied on the principles laid down in earlier decisions, holding that: (i) the order cancelling registration with retrospective effect must itself reflect reasons justifying retrospective operation; (ii) such power cannot be exercised mechanically or routinely; (iii) the show cause notice should put the taxpayer to notice if retrospective cancellation is proposed; and (iv) consequences such as denial of input tax credit to customers must be borne in mind while ordering retrospective cancellation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The show cause notice dated 11 November 2021 was issued only on the ground that the petitioner was allegedly non-functioning/non-existent at the principal place of business; the notice did not state that cancellation would be with retrospective effect.
2.4 The cancellation order dated 17 August 2023, however, cancelled the registration from 21 July 2020, thereby giving it retrospective effect, without the show cause notice having contemplated such retrospective period and without recording reasons to justify retroactivity.
2.5 Applying the settled position of law, the Court held that where the show cause notice does not contemplate retrospective cancellation, an order directing cancellation retrospectively is not tenable, particularly in view of the serious consequences, including jeopardising input tax credit.
2.6 The Court noted also that no separate show cause notice had been issued to the petitioner in relation to availment of input tax credit, reinforcing that the foundation for retrospective cancellation and its consequences had not been properly laid.
Conclusions
2.7 The order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration with retrospective effect from 21 July 2020 was held to be legally unsustainable and not tenable in law.
Issue 2 - Effect of appellate dismissal on limitation and sustainability of cancellation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The appellate authority had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the cancellation order as barred by limitation, without addressing the illegality in ordering retrospective cancellation.
2.9 In view of the Court's finding that the underlying cancellation order itself was unsustainable in law, the appellate order, which merely dismissed the appeal on limitation and upheld such cancellation indirectly, could not be sustained.
Conclusions
2.10 Both the cancellation order dated 17 August 2023 and the appellate order dated 11 March 2025 were set aside.
Issue 3 - Consequential reliefs, restoration, and future action
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 Since the order of cancellation was held to be untenable, and the petitioner expressed willingness to continue business and comply with statutory requirements, the Court considered it appropriate to restore the GST registration subject to conditions.
2.12 The Court also balanced the Department's interest by reserving liberty to conduct fresh inspection to verify the petitioner's existence and compliance and to proceed in accordance with law in case any violation is found.
Conclusions
2.13 The GST registration of the petitioner was restored.
2.14 The Department was directed to grant access to the GST portal to the petitioner within one week.
2.15 Upon restoration of access, the petitioner was directed to file all previous returns on the portal along with late payment and penalty, if any.
2.16 The Department was granted liberty to conduct fresh inspection to verify the existence of the petitioner and, in case of any violation, to take action in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting additional evidence in the form of confirmation letters of partners and related documents without further enquiry.
1.2 Whether the Tribunal was justified in sustaining addition of Rs. 33,00,000/- as unexplained cash deposits under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act on the ground that the assessee failed to establish the genuineness and source of alleged capital contribution from partners.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification for rejecting additional evidence and sustaining addition under Section 69A
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The appeal was filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, raising a substantial question of law as to whether the Tribunal was justified in rejecting additional evidence (confirmation letters of partners of a firm) and consequently in sustaining the addition of Rs. 33,00,000/- made under Section 69A towards unexplained cash deposits.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The assessee claimed that cash deposits of Rs. 33,00,000/- were received as capital contribution from partners of a partnership firm and were deposited into his bank account.
2.3 The Tribunal noted that the partnership deed did not contain any recital regarding capital contribution by the partners, despite the assessee's claim that an amount of Rs. 35,40,000/- was introduced as capital of the firm.
2.4 The Tribunal further observed that there was no explanation why the alleged capital contribution of partners to the firm was deposited into the individual bank account of the assessee instead of the bank account of the partnership firm.
2.5 In dealing with the additional evidence, the Tribunal considered the confirmation letters of the partners and the claim that the funds came from agricultural income. It held that:
(a) Creditworthiness of the partners was not established.
(b) Agricultural income of the partners was not substantiated.
(c) The deposits were in the assessee's personal account and not in the firm's account.
2.6 The Court found that the contention that the Tribunal had "overlooked" the additional evidence was incorrect. It held that the Tribunal had in fact addressed the sufficiency and credibility of the confirmation letters and related material, and gave reasons for not accepting them.
2.7 The Court characterised the issue as a mixed question of fact and law and examined the Tribunal's reasoning with reference to:
(a) Absence of any clause on capital contribution in the partnership deed.
(b) Unexplained routing of alleged capital contribution through the assessee's personal bank account rather than the firm's bank account.
2.8 On this basis, the Court held that the Tribunal had "properly addressed" and appreciated the additional evidence and its rejection was supported by reasons that were germane to the issue of genuineness of the source of funds.
Conclusions
2.9 The substantial question of law was answered against the assessee. The Tribunal was held to be justified in:
(a) Rejecting the additional evidence (confirmation letters and related documents) as insufficient to prove the partners' creditworthiness and the genuineness of the alleged capital contribution.
(b) Sustaining the addition of Rs. 33,00,000/- as unexplained cash deposits under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act.
2.10 The Court held that the Tribunal's appreciation of the additional evidence was in accordance with law and that the impugned order did not warrant interference. The appeal was dismissed without costs.
Issues: (i) Whether the upward transfer pricing adjustment in respect of royalty payments (framed by TPO/DRP applying CUP for royalty while accepting TNMM for other transactions) is sustainable; (ii) Whether denial of exemption under section 10AA for A.Y. 2018-19 on account of delay in filing return is justified; (iii) Whether weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) can be allowed where DSIR certificate (Form 3CL) was obtained after completion of assessment; (iv) Whether disallowance under section 14A (Rule 8D) at Rs.47,55,629/- is sustainable; (v) Whether deduction under section 80JJAA is rightly denied for delay in filing return; (vi) Whether disallowance under section 14A is required to be added while computing book profit under section 115JB; (vii) Miscellaneous computational / rectification issues remitted for verification.
Issue (i): Legality of TP adjustment of Rs.12,70,86,646/- (royalty) made by AO/TPO/DRP by segregating royalty and applying CUP while TNMM was accepted for other international transactions.
Analysis: The Tribunal analysed the TPO/DRP approach and the jurisdictional High Court decision in assessee's earlier years where the High Court held that where TNMM was accepted as the most appropriate method for all international transactions, it was not open to tax authorities to subject one element (royalty) to a different method (CUP). The Tribunal applied that ratio to the facts of A.Y.2018-19 and found the DRP/TPO direction to separately benchmark royalty using CUP inconsistent with the High Court ratio on identical facts.
Conclusion: In favour of Assessee TP adjustment on royalty as imposed by AO/TPO/DRP is set aside and the ALP as determined by the assessee using TNMM is accepted; grounds Nos.25 allowed.
Issue (ii): Validity of denial of deduction/exemption under section 10AA for filing return one day late.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined statutory text, the Finance Act, 2023 amendment (proviso to section 10AA made effective from 01/04/2024) and consistent tribunal decisions. It found that for AY 2018-19 no requirement existed in section 10AA to file return by the section 139(1) due date and that the CPC denial was solely for a short delay caused by technical issues; required reports (Form 56F, Form 3CD etc.) were filed within time.
Conclusion: In favour of Assessee denial of deduction under section 10AA for the A.Y. 2018-19 is rejected; Revenue grounds dismissed and corresponding assessee ground allowed.
Issue (iii): Allowability of deduction under section 35(2AB) where DSIR certificate (Form 3CL) was obtained after assessment.
Analysis: The Tribunal noted the assessee obtained Form 3CL post-assessment and that AO denied deduction for want of certificate. The Tribunal held verification of the certificate and expenditure nature is appropriate and remitted the matter to the AO to verify Form 3CL and grant deduction if criteria are met.
Conclusion: Partly in favour of Assessee ground allowed for statistical purposes and remitted to AO for verification of Form 3CL and consequential relief.
Issue (iv): Validity of disallowance under section 14A (Rule 8D) at Rs.47,55,629/-.
Analysis: The Tribunal considered amended Rule 8D (effective 02/06/2016) and AO's application of the Rule. It found AO had applied a plausible method and that prior tribunal decisions relied on by assessee related to pre-amendment years; AO's disallowance was not infirm in the facts.
Conclusion: Against Assessee disallowance under section 14A at Rs.47,55,629/- upheld; ground dismissed.
Issue (v): Claim of deduction under section 80JJAA denied for delay in filing return.
Analysis: The Tribunal noted that requisite certificate (Form 10DA) and other supporting documents were filed within time and the short delay in e-filing of return was due to technical glitches. It followed tribunal precedents holding machinery/formal filing delays not to defeat substantive entitlement where supporting records are timely.
Conclusion: In favour of Assessee deduction under section 80JJAA allowed; Revenue ground dismissed and corresponding assessee ground allowed.
Issue (vi): Whether disallowance under section 14A is to be added back for computing book profit under section 115JB.
Analysis: On authority of the Special Bench decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investments and related analysis, the Tribunal held that disallowance under section 14A need not be added to book profits for section 115JB computation.
Conclusion: In favour of Assessee ground allowed; disallowance under section 14A not to be added for computing book profit under section 115JB.
Issue (vii): Miscellaneous computational and rectification issues including alleged double taxation of LTCG, interest under section 234C, short TDS/TCS credit and DDT credit.
Analysis: The Tribunal observed discrepancies in assessment computation and pending rectification applications; it considered submissions and existing records.
Conclusion: In favour of Assessee for procedural reliefs these issues are remitted to the AO for correct computation/verification; allowed for statistical purposes.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the TP adjustment on royalty and upheld the assessee's entitlement to specified deductions (10AA, 80JJAA), remitted the 35(2AB) claim and certain computational matters to the AO for verification, upheld the section 14A disallowance, and accordingly partly allowed the assessee's appeal and dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the tax authority accepts TNMM as the most appropriate method for an entity's international transactions, it is not permissible to apply a different method to a component transaction (royalty) in the same ALP determination; absent a statutory requirement in section 10AA for filing the return by the due date for the year under consideration, denial of section 10AA benefits solely for a short, technical delay in e-filing is unjustified.
Issues: (i) Whether the assessment was vitiated for want of valid, non-mechanical approval under section 153D; (ii) Whether the addition for unexplained cash of Rs. 42 lakhs could be sustained on the basis of the search statement despite corroborative material showing the cash belonged to group companies; (iii) Whether the addition for alleged unexplained jewellery and the addition based on electronic loose documents were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the assessment was vitiated for want of valid, non-mechanical approval under section 153D.
Analysis: The approval was granted for a large number of cases on the same day and was not shown to reflect independent application of mind for each assessment year. Prior approval under section 153D is a mandatory safeguard and must be granted after meaningful examination of the draft assessment order and material on record. A common or routine approval, without year-wise consideration, does not satisfy the statutory requirement.
Conclusion: The assessment was invalid for want of a valid approval under section 153D, and this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition for unexplained cash of Rs. 42 lakhs could be sustained on the basis of the search statement despite corroborative material showing the cash belonged to group companies.
Analysis: The cash was found at the residential premises, but contemporaneous statements and the cash book of the group concerns supported the explanation that the cash belonged to the companies and was kept for security reasons. The later surrender was retracted, and the addition rested substantially on the statement recorded during search without adequate independent corroboration. An admission is relevant but not conclusive, and the Revenue was required to establish unexplained ownership by supporting evidence.
Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash was not sustained, and this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the addition for alleged unexplained jewellery and the addition based on electronic loose documents were sustainable.
Analysis: The jewellery was accepted as family jewellery supported by VDIS material, purchase and alteration bills, valuation reports and wealth-tax records, and the explanation was found consistent with the family's status and holdings. As regards the electronic loose documents, the additions were held unsustainable because the material was found in the course of search of group concerns, the assessment should have proceeded, if at all, under the appropriate third-party search provision, and the electronic data could not be used without the required statutory certification under section 65B. The Revenue's objections on retraction and evidentiary value did not displace these findings.
Conclusion: The addition relating to jewellery was deleted and the addition based on electronic material was not sustained, both in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The common result is that the assessee obtained complete relief on the substantive tax additions, while the Revenue's challenge failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Prior approval under section 153D must be granted with independent application of mind for each assessment year, and additions founded on search material must be supported by cogent corroboration, with electronic evidence satisfying the statutory certification requirement before it can be relied upon.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without any signature of the competent authority, though communicated electronically, satisfies the mandatory requirement of section 282A(1) and constitutes a valid notice.
1.2 Whether the defect of an unsigned notice issued under section 143(2) is a curable irregularity under section 292B of the Act.
1.3 Whether, in the absence of a valid notice under section 143(2), the Assessing Officer can assume and exercise jurisdiction to frame an assessment under sections 143(3)/147 read with sections 263 and 144B.
1.4 Whether reliance placed on the jurisdictional High Court decision interpreting section 282A(2) (deeming authentication by name and designation) dispenses with the mandatory requirement of "signature" under section 282A(1) for notices issued under section 143(2).
1.5 Consequentially, whether the grounds on merits survive for adjudication once the reassessment order is held without jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 4: Validity of unsigned notice under section 143(2) in light of section 282A(1) and 282A(2), and effect of jurisdictional High Court precedent
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal)
2.1 The Court reproduced section 282A of the Act, emphasizing:
(i) Section 282A(1): where the Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income-tax authority, such notice or document "shall be signed and issued" in paper form or communicated in electronic form, in accordance with prescribed procedure.
(ii) Section 282A(2): every such notice or document shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon.
2.2 The Court considered the jurisdictional High Court decision wherein it was held, in the context of approval under section 151, that in view of section 282A(2), a notice or document is deemed authenticated if the name and designation is provided.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted, on facts, that the notice under section 143(2) for the relevant assessment year was admittedly unsigned; both the physical notice and the screenshot were without signature or seal of the jurisdictional officer, leaving the space for signature blank.
2.4 The Revenue argued that since the notice was issued electronically, no signature was required, and relied on the jurisdictional High Court decision interpreting section 282A(2) to contend that mention of name and designation sufficed for validity.
2.5 The Court held that section 282A(1) uses the word "shall", indicating a mandatory requirement that any notice or document issued by an income-tax authority "shall be signed", whether in paper form or electronic form; the legislature did not use permissive language.
2.6 The Court distinguished between:
(i) The requirement of "signing" under section 282A(1) (a condition for valid issuance); and
(ii) The "deeming" provision in section 282A(2), which relates to "authentication" of a notice or document when the name and office of the designated authority are printed, stamped or written.
2.7 The Court interpreted the jurisdictional High Court decision as dealing with authentication under section 151 read with section 282A(2), not with the prior and independent statutory requirement in section 282A(1) that the notice itself must be signed. The High Court's observations on deemed authentication under section 282A(2) do not override or dispense with the mandatory signing requirement under section 282A(1).
2.8 The Court clarified that "authentication" is to inform the assessee that the notice emanates from the Income-tax Department and is deemed satisfied if the name and office of the competent authority appear on the notice; however, this does not eliminate the separate and mandatory condition of signing under section 282A(1).
Conclusions
2.9 The Court concluded that:
(i) A notice under section 143(2) must mandatorily be signed by the competent authority, even when communicated electronically.
(ii) Mere presence of the name and designation of the officer, satisfying section 282A(2) for authentication, does not cure or substitute the requirement of a signature under section 282A(1).
(iii) The unsigned notice under section 143(2) issued to the assessee was violative of section 282A(1) and therefore invalid, arbitrary and void ab initio.
Issue 2: Whether the defect of an unsigned section 143(2) notice is curable under section 292B
Legal framework and precedents (as discussed)
2.10 The Assessing Officer's report treated the absence of signature as a defect curable under section 292B. The Court, however, relied on judicial precedents including:
(i) A High Court decision holding that an unsigned notice under section 148 is invalid and constitutes "no notice" in the eyes of law, after referring to earlier authorities.
(ii) The same High Court decision further holding that absence of signature on the notice is not a "mistake or omission" curable under section 292B.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 Applying the above ratio to the present facts, the Court reasoned that absence of any signature (manual or digital) on a statutory notice goes to the root of jurisdiction and is not a mere technical or clerical error.
2.12 The Court treated an unsigned notice as substantively invalid, not as a procedural irregularity; thus, section 292B cannot be invoked to validate it.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court held that:
(i) An unsigned notice under section 143(2) is invalid and is effectively no notice in the eyes of law.
(ii) Such a defect is not curable under section 292B, as it is not a mere mistake, defect or omission but a jurisdictional infirmity.
Issue 3: Effect of invalid notice under section 143(2) on jurisdiction to frame assessment under sections 143(3)/147 r.w.s. 263/144B
Legal framework and precedents (as discussed)
2.14 The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court holding that issuance of notice under section 143(2) is sine qua non for framing an assessment under section 143(3).
2.15 The Court also referred to the decision of a High Court holding that issuance of notice under section 143(2) is mandatory even in reassessment proceedings under section 147.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 The Court proceeded on the basis that the validity of reassessment under sections 143(3)/147 read with sections 263 and 144B is contingent on the existence of a valid notice under section 143(2).
2.17 Having already found the notice under section 143(2) to be invalid and void ab initio for want of signature, the Court held that the Assessing Officer lacked the jurisdictional foundation to proceed with the reassessment.
Conclusions
2.18 The Court concluded that:
(i) In the absence of a validly issued and signed notice under section 143(2), the Assessing Officer ceased to possess any valid inherent jurisdiction to complete the assessment under sections 143(3)/147 read with sections 263 and 144B.
(ii) The assessment order so framed is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.
Issue 5: Consequential status of further proceedings and grounds on merits
Interpretation and reasoning
2.19 The Court held that once the foundational notice under section 143(2) is declared invalid and the resultant assessment under sections 143(3)/147 read with sections 263 and 144B is quashed, all consequential proceedings deriving therefrom automatically become non est in law.
2.20 Given that the appeal succeeded on the preliminary legal ground, adjudication on substantive/merits grounds would be purely academic and unnecessary.
Conclusions
2.21 The Court:
(i) Quashed the assessment order under sections 143(3)/147 read with sections 263 and 144B, holding it void for lack of jurisdiction.
(ii) Held all consequential proceedings to be non est.
(iii) Treated the grounds on merits as academic and did not adjudicate them.
(iv) Allowed the appeal of the assessee in full on the legal ground related to invalidity of the section 143(2) notice.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the long term capital gains arising from sale of shares of Sunrise Asian Limited and Monarch Health Services Limited, claimed as exempt under section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be treated as bogus and added as unexplained cash credit under section 68.
1.2 Whether, upon treating the aforesaid capital gains as accommodation entries, an addition towards alleged commission payment to entry providers under section 69C was justified.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Treatment of LTCG on sale of SAL and MHSL shares as unexplained cash credit u/s 68
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal considered the applicability of sections 10(38) and 68 of the Act in the context of alleged "penny stock"/bogus long term capital gain transactions. The burden of proof under section 68 and the evidentiary value of contemporaneous documents such as contract notes, demat statements, bank statements and payment of STT were examined in light of judicial precedents.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The assessee had purchased 10,000 shares of Conart Traders Ltd. through off-market purchase from Santoshima Tradelink Pvt. Ltd., which were later converted into shares of Sunrise Asian Limited pursuant to amalgamation, and also dealt in shares of Monarch Health Services Limited. The purchases were made through banking channels, the shares were held in demat account, and sales were executed through the BSE with delivery from the same demat account and payment of STT. The Assessing Officer did not dispute the receipt of sale proceeds.
2.3 The Tribunal noted that the assessee had furnished comprehensive documentary evidence, including debit note, bank statements, physical share certificates, demat statements, broker's contract notes and ledger, and return/computation documents. Upon such production, the initial onus stood discharged and the burden shifted to the Assessing Officer to produce cogent material establishing that the transactions were non-genuine.
2.4 The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer and the first appellate authority had merely relied on general allegations regarding "penny stock" and on statements of third parties and external reports, without bringing any corroborative material to specifically connect the assessee with any price rigging, accommodation entries, or the alleged modus operandi. No link was established between the assessee and the alleged operators/entry providers.
2.5 The Tribunal distinguished the reliance placed by the first appellate authority on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case involving the scrip Kappac Pharma Ltd., holding that it related to a different company with distinct facts and findings, and therefore was not applicable to the present scrips.
2.6 The Tribunal took note that the scrip of Sunrise Asian Limited had been examined by the Gujarat High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in separate matters, where transactions were not held to be sham, and that Santoshima Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. was held to have been duly amalgamated with Sunrise Asian Limited, a listed company. It also relied on co-ordinate bench decisions and the principle that transactions supported by regular documentary records could not be treated as bogus in the absence of contrary material.
2.7 Relying particularly on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shyam R. Pawar and the principle reiterated therefrom, the Tribunal held that mere suspicion, discrepancies at the stock exchange level or general findings regarding promoters/operators, without an inquiry carried forward to connect the assessee with any such activities, are insufficient to sustain an addition under section 68. The investigation in the present case had similarly not been carried to the point of establishing any connection between the assessee and the alleged rigging or accommodation entries.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal concluded that the assessee's transactions in shares of Sunrise Asian Limited and Monarch Health Services Limited were supported by proper documentary evidence and were not shown to be sham or bogus by the Revenue.
2.9 The addition of Rs. 2,41,53,979/- as unexplained cash credit under section 68, by treating the long term capital gains as bogus, was held to be unjustified and was deleted.
Issue 2 - Addition towards alleged commission payment to entry provider u/s 69C
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.10 The Tribunal examined the application of section 69C to an assumed commission expenditure, computed as a fixed percentage of the alleged bogus capital gains, purportedly paid to entry operators in accommodation entry cases.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Assessing Officer had assumed that a commission of 3-4% is normally paid for accommodation entries and, on that basis, made an addition of Rs. 9,66,159/- at 4% of the long term capital gains, treating it as unexplained expenditure under section 69C. The first appellate authority upheld this by placing reliance on another Tribunal decision where such percentage-based estimation was accepted in the context of established bogus transactions.
2.12 The Tribunal noted that the very foundation for treating the assessee's capital gains as bogus had not been established and stood rejected. In the absence of any evidence of the assessee having paid any commission, or of any specific arrangement or link with any operator or broker for providing accommodation entries, there was no factual basis for estimating commission expenditure.
2.13 The Tribunal held that a presumptive or percentage-based addition under section 69C cannot be sustained in isolation, particularly where the primary allegation of bogus capital gains has been disbelieved and where there is no independent material to show that any such expenditure was actually incurred.
Conclusions
2.14 Since the long term capital gains were accepted as genuine and exempt under section 10(38), and no evidence existed of any commission payment, the addition of Rs. 9,66,159/- under section 69C towards alleged commission to entry providers was held to be unsustainable and was deleted.
Overall Disposition
2.15 The Tribunal set aside the appellate order, quashed the total additions of Rs. 2,88,73,138/- (comprising the section 68 and section 69C additions), and allowed the assessee's appeal in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the prior approval granted under Section 153D for search assessments was mechanical and without application of mind, thereby vitiating the assessments framed under Section 153A read with Section 143(3).
1.2 Consequentially, whether the search assessments for the years under consideration were liable to be quashed on account of invalid approval under Section 153D.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of approval under Section 153D and its effect on the search assessments
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment)
2.1 The Court noted that under the scheme of the Act, search assessments under Sections 153A/153C can be passed only after prior approval of the draft assessment order by the Additional Commissioner/Joint Commissioner in terms of Section 153D. This requirement is treated as a mandatory safeguard against arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer.
2.2 The Court referred to and relied upon the Third Member decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case dealing with Section 153D approval, wherein it was held that:
(a) An order of approval is not to be mechanically granted; it must be based on material on record and reflect application of mind, as elucidated by the Supreme Court in decisions interpreting similar approval requirements.
(b) CBDT's Manual of Office Procedure (February 2003, Chapter 3, para 9 of Volume II - Technical), issued under Section 119, prescribes that the draft assessment order in search/block cases should be submitted well in time, docketed, and that the supervisory officer should give due opportunity of being heard to the assessee and grant written approval only after due examination of records and making proper entries in the order-sheet.
2.3 The Court also noticed High Court decisions (including Orissa, Delhi, Allahabad and Punjab & Haryana High Courts) to the effect that:
(a) "Approval" is an inbuilt protection and must not become an empty ritual; the approving authority must have before it the relevant material and must apply its mind to the facts.
(b) Proceedings leading to tax assessment, even if termed administrative in part, entail civil consequences and therefore require adherence to principles of natural justice and non-mechanical exercise of statutory powers.
2.4 The Court further noted jurisprudence emphasizing that the Assessing Officer performs a quasi-judicial function in framing assessment and must act independently; higher administrative authorities (including Additional CIT/JCIT) cannot direct or dictate the outcome of such assessment, save as permitted under specific provisions like Section 144A and instructions under Section 119.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5 On facts, the Court found that the Assessing Officer, stationed at Agra, forwarded the draft assessment orders for multiple assessees and years to the Additional CIT at Kanpur on 29.09.2021 and that the Additional CIT granted approval under Section 153D on the same date by a common/ consolidated approval letter for 13 assessees for different assessment years.
2.6 The Court reasoned that, considering the geographical locations (Agra and Kanpur) and normal office working constraints, it was humanly impossible for the physical files to be transmitted, examined in depth, and returned along with a reasoned approval on the same day for such a large number of cases and years.
2.7 It was observed that the approval so issued was consolidated for multiple assessees and assessment years and did not demonstrate any case-specific analysis or consideration of seized material, assessment records, questionnaires, replies of the assessee, or the conclusions drawn by the Assessing Officer.
2.8 The Court rejected the Revenue's contention that the Additional CIT's continuous involvement in the search assessment process and guidance to the Assessing Officer made it easy to approve all draft orders in a single day and that the approval was merely administrative in nature. Relying on the Third Member decision and High Court precedents, the Court held:
(a) The approval under Section 153D is a quasi-judicial safeguard and not a mere internal/administrative formality.
(b) Even if the Additional CIT is involved from the stage of appraisal report and during assessment proceedings, at the approval stage he must independently and freshly apply his mind to the draft assessment, the seized material, and the assessee's explanations, without merely endorsing prior views.
(c) The mere fact of involvement in earlier stages cannot replace or satisfy the statutory requirement of a considered, non-mechanical approval at the stage of Section 153D.
2.9 The Court further drew support from decisions where:
(a) Common or batch approvals under Section 153D for several assessees and years on the same date, unaccompanied by demonstrated examination of records, were held to be mechanical and invalid.
(b) It was emphasized that the Additional CIT must independently scrutinize assessment records and search material and that failure to do so vitiates the approval and thereby the assessments.
2.10 The Court also referred to the principle, as highlighted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, that while CBDT may provide for approval mechanisms and supervisory checks, the Assessing Officer must not abdicate his quasi-judicial function to superior officers, nor can the superior officer's deep involvement replace or override the statutory scheme that requires independent discretion and separate roles for the Assessing Officer and the approving authority.
2.11 In the instant case, the Court concluded that the procedure laid down in the CBDT Manual and the legal standards enunciated in the cited judgments were not followed. The approval was found to be:
(a) Granted on the very day the draft orders were sent,
(b) Common for multiple assessees and assessment years, and
(c) Unsupported by any indication of record-based scrutiny or individualized application of mind by the Additional CIT.
2.12 On these cumulative facts and legal principles, the Court held that the approval under Section 153D was given in a mechanical manner and without due application of mind, rendering it invalid in law.
Conclusions
2.13 The statutory precondition of a valid prior approval under Section 153D for framing search assessments under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) was not satisfied, as the approval was mechanical and devoid of independent application of mind.
2.14 An invalid or mechanical approval under Section 153D vitiates the entire assessment proceedings founded upon such approval.
2.15 Accordingly, the search assessments for all years under consideration were quashed as void for want of valid approval under Section 153D.
2.16 In view of the quashing of the assessments on this preliminary legal ground, the Court did not examine or adjudicate upon the remaining grounds on law or on merits, which were left open.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether cost recovery charges could be validly demanded and recovered from the appellant under the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, read with the applicable circulars and public notice, in view of judicial pronouncements declaring the Regulations ultra vires the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether penalty under Regulation 12(8) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 could be sustained when the levy and recovery of cost recovery charges under the said Regulations is not legally sustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of demand and recovery of cost recovery charges under the 2009 Regulations
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The impugned order confirmed demand of cost recovery charges by relying on condition (iii) of a public notice, a Board circular of 1995, and Regulations 5(2) and 6(1)(o) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, and also ordered recovery with interest.
2.2 The Tribunal referred to the judgment of a High Court which examined Sections 141 and 157 of the Customs Act, 1962 and held that there is no express statutory provision authorising levy or recovery of cost recovery charges (being salaries of customs officers posted at custodians' premises) through the 2009 Regulations, and therefore declared the 2009 Regulations ultra vires the Customs Act.
2.3 The Tribunal further referred to its own Division Bench decisions which, following the said High Court judgment, had held that Regulation 5(2) of the 2009 Regulations is ultra vires and that cost recovery charges could not be recovered under those Regulations; and that, even prior to the 2009 Regulations, recovery based only on circulars/administrative instructions had no statutory backing.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal noted that the High Court had specifically concluded that, in the absence of any special statutory authorisation in Sections 141 or 157, the department had no authority to impose or recover cost recovery charges by means of the 2009 Regulations, rendering them ultra vires.
2.5 The Tribunal observed that, in earlier appeals involving similar demands under Regulation 5(2) of the 2009 Regulations, it had already followed this High Court view and set aside cost recovery demands, and treated that High Court decision as binding judicial authority.
2.6 Applying the same reasoning, the Tribunal held that, once the Regulations themselves are ultra vires, directions in the impugned order to pay cost recovery charges with interest, purportedly under Regulation 5(2), Regulation 6(1)(o), the Board circular and the public notice, cannot be sustained in law.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal concluded that there is no valid legal authority to levy and recover cost recovery charges under the 2009 Regulations, and therefore the demand and recovery ordered in the impugned order are unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
Issue 2 - Sustainability of penalty under Regulation 12(8) of the 2009 Regulations
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.8 The impugned order imposed penalty on the appellant under Regulation 12(8) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, on the ground that the appellant had failed to fulfil its obligation to pay cost recovery charges in terms of Regulations 5(2) and 6(1)(o) and the public notice condition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Tribunal recalled its earlier reasoning (in the prior round of litigation) that penalty under Regulation 12(8) presupposes a contravention or failure to comply with a validly enforceable obligation created by the Regulations.
2.10 Since, following the binding High Court judgment and subsequent Tribunal decisions, the provisions of the 2009 Regulations relied upon for levy and recovery of cost recovery charges are ultra vires and cannot validly found such a demand, there can be no legally sustainable "contravention" in not paying those charges.
2.11 Consequently, the foundation for invoking Regulation 12(8) disappears once the demand of cost recovery charges under the 2009 Regulations is held to be without authority of law.
Conclusions
2.12 The Tribunal held that, as the direction to pay cost recovery charges cannot be sustained, the imposition of penalty under Regulation 12(8) is also unsustainable and must be set aside.
Overall disposition
2.13 On the above grounds, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order in toto, including the demand of cost recovery charges, interest, and penalty, and allowed the appeal. It found it unnecessary to examine the appellant's remaining contentions regarding exemptions/waivers, calculations, apportionment, transport allowance, or absence of specific recovery machinery.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal could ignore limitation under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, direct scrutiny of returns and refund processing beyond the prescribed period, hold that filing of Form 501 was not mandatory, reject the Revenue's rectification application, and whether an appeal lay against the rectification order.
Outcome: The appeal was admitted on substantial questions of law, the issues were kept open for final hearing, and no final adjudication was made on the merits.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the issuance and service of the show cause notice and consequential order through the GST portal, including the "Additional Notices Tab", resulted in denial of opportunity of hearing and violation of principles of natural justice.
1.2 Whether, in view of the pendency before the Supreme Court of the challenge to the relevant GST notification(s) extending limitation, the Court should adjudicate the vires of such notifications or confine itself to granting procedural relief by remanding the matter.
1.3 Whether the ex parte adjudication order passed without any reply or effective participation by the taxpayer ought to be set aside and the matter remanded with conditions, including imposition of costs and directions for fresh adjudication.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Effect of service via GST portal and "Additional Notices Tab"; denial of natural justice
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The show cause notice was issued on 29 May 2024 and the consequential order was passed on 17 August 2024, both after 16 January 2024, when changes were made to the GST portal making the "Additional Notices Tab" visible.
2.2 The taxpayer contended that the show cause notice and order were uploaded only on the "Additional Notices Tab" and therefore were not effectively brought to its knowledge, and that it came to know of them only during a statutory audit in September 2025.
2.3 The Court held that, in the given factual matrix, the objection based on the "Additional Notices Tab" was not tenable because the relevant documents were issued and uploaded after the portal changes of 16 January 2024, when such tab had already been made visible.
2.4 Notwithstanding the above, the Court noted that no reply had been filed to the show cause notice and no personal hearing had been availed by the taxpayer, and that the adjudication order had been passed without the taxpayer's case being examined on merits.
2.5 Relying on its earlier decision in a similar matter where no reply had been filed and an ex parte order had been passed, the Court reiterated that an assessee ought to be afforded a proper opportunity to contest the matter on merits, and that lack of an effective hearing rendered the order liable to be interfered with.
Conclusions
2.6 The contention that service through the "Additional Notices Tab" vitiated the proceedings was rejected as untenable on the facts.
2.7 However, since the taxpayer did not get a proper opportunity to be heard and no reply was filed to the show cause notice prior to the ex parte order, the principles of natural justice warranted remand for fresh adjudication.
Issue 2: Approach to challenge to GST notifications extending limitation, in light of pending proceedings before the Supreme Court
Legal framework discussed
2.8 The Court referred to batches of writ petitions where notifications extending limitation under Section 168A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and corresponding State enactments had been challenged, and noted divergent views of several High Courts and the pendency of these issues before the Supreme Court in a special leave petition.
2.9 The Court took note that another High Court had, in deference to judicial discipline, refrained from deciding the vires of Section 168A and the notifications, and had directed that the cases be governed by the Supreme Court's eventual decision.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Court observed that the validity of the key central notification (No. 56/2023-Central Tax) and related issues were squarely pending before the Supreme Court, and that several of its own earlier writ petitions had been disposed of by remanding matters or relegating parties to appellate remedies, with all such orders made subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings.
2.11 It noted that in some petitions involving parallel State notifications, matters had been retained for independent consideration, with a designated lead matter identified for that batch.
2.12 In the present case, the Court considered that the immediate grievance could be addressed by restoring an opportunity of hearing before the adjudicating authority, without deciding the constitutional or legal validity of the impugned notifications at this stage.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court refrained from adjudicating upon the validity or vires of the impugned notifications and left that issue open.
2.14 It directed that any fresh order passed on remand would be expressly subject to the outcome of the pending proceedings before the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court in the identified lead writ petition concerning State notifications.
Issue 3: Setting aside of ex parte order; remand with costs and directions for fresh adjudication
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 Considering that the taxpayer had not filed any reply to the show cause notice, had not appeared for personal hearing, and that the impugned order had been passed without examining the taxpayer's case on merits, the Court held that an opportunity should now be afforded to contest the matter substantively.
2.16 Following its earlier approach in a comparable case, the Court found it appropriate to set aside the ex parte order and remand the matter to the adjudicating authority, while imposing costs on the taxpayer for the remand.
2.17 To ensure effective participation and communication, the Court directed that the notice of personal hearing be specifically communicated to the taxpayer on the email address and mobile number recorded in the order.
2.18 The Court further directed that access to the GST portal be provided within a specified period to enable the taxpayer to upload its reply and to access notices and related documents, thereby facilitating substantive adjudication.
Conclusions
2.19 The ex parte adjudication order was set aside, subject to the taxpayer paying costs of Rs. 20,000/- to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.
2.20 The taxpayer was granted time up to a fixed date to file a reply to the show cause notice.
2.21 Upon filing of the reply, the adjudicating authority is required to issue a notice for personal hearing, communicate it via the specified email and mobile number, consider the reply and submissions made during the hearing, and pass a fresh, reasoned order on the show cause notice.
2.22 The fresh order to be passed on remand will be subject to the final decision of the Supreme Court on the validity of the relevant notifications and to the Court's decision in the identified lead case concerning State notifications, with all rights and remedies of the parties kept open.
Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 3,49,00,000 made under section 68 by treating cash deposits during the demonetisation period as unexplained income is sustainable where the assessee has recorded the amounts as cash sales in books, produced sales/purchase registers, stock records and paid tax on such sales.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether section 68 can be invoked to treat bank cash deposits as unexplained cash credits when the assessee had recorded the amounts as sales in its books of account, filed returns including those sales, furnished cash book, sales invoices, stock statements and audited accounts, and shown corresponding purchases. The Tribunal applied the legal principle that where books of account are relied upon and sales are reflected and taxed, the initial onus on the assessee to explain the nature and source of deposits stands discharged and the burden shifts to the revenue to prove that the deposits represent undisclosed income. The Tribunal also considered the effect of rejecting books under section 145(3) and the settled position that additions cannot be made by selectively relying on entries in books after rejecting them; similarly, where the evidence shows sufficient stock and corroborative documentation, deposits during demonetisation need not be treated as unexplained. Relevant precedents on demonetisation-period deposits, rejection of books, requirement to identify cash customers (PAN) and principles against double taxation were applied to the facts, including authorities holding that trade advances or cash sales subsequently recorded as sales are not amenable to section 68 treatment and that cash sales below statutory limits do not mandate PAN collection.
Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the assessee discharged the onus of proving that the cash deposits represented bona fide sales already recorded and taxed; the addition under section 68 (and consequential invocation of section 115BBE) is not sustainable. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee and the AO is directed to delete the addition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the addition under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, towards alleged unexplained investment of Rs. 5,07,690/-, based solely on an excel sheet seized from a third party during search, was justified in the facts of the case.
1.2 Whether, in light of the assessee's documentary evidence (bank statements and vendor confirmation), the burden of proof under section 69 stood discharged and the presumption of cash payment could be sustained.
1.3 Whether the first appellate authority erred in upholding the addition without proper enquiry or independent application of mind, contrary to section 250(4) and (6) of the Act.
1.4 Incidentally, whether, where incriminating material relating to the assessee is found in search on a third party, the correct assessment provision is section 153C rather than section 147, and whether it was necessary to adjudicate this legal issue in the present appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification of addition under section 69 based on third-party excel sheet vis-à-vis assessee's evidence
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Tribunal noted the application of section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which permits treating an investment as deemed income where (i) such investment is not recorded in the books of account, and (ii) the assessee either offers no explanation about the nature and source of the investment, or the explanation is not satisfactory to the Assessing Officer. The first appellate authority reproduced and relied upon this provision.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.2 The assessment and the first appellate order were based on an excel sheet (WH 2020 NOT REG.xlsx) seized during a search in the case of a third-party group, indicating alleged cash components in sale consideration for flats, along with a statement under section 132(4) of a director of that group admitting receipt of 10-15% sale consideration in cash.
2.3 The Tribunal observed that the alleged cash figure of Rs. 5,07,690/- attributed to the assessee in the excel sheet exactly matched an RTGS transaction of Rs. 5,07,690/- (plus RTGS charges, totaling Rs. 5,07,748.42) made by the assessee on 22.07.2019 from her UCO Bank account to the vendor, Chhattisgarh Project (India) Pvt. Ltd., as evidenced by the bank statement.
2.4 The Tribunal found that the total transaction amount of Rs. 80,22,190/- mentioned in the excel sheet tallied exactly with the amount paid by the assessee through banking channels and reflected in the registered sale deed, establishing that the entire consideration was through accounted, non-cash modes.
2.5 The Tribunal relied on a written confirmation from the vendor company stating that it had received Rs. 5,07,690/- from the assessee in its bank account and had not received any cash from the assessee in respect of this transaction. The Tribunal held that this confirmation, coupled with the bank statement, clearly disproved the allegation of cash payment.
2.6 The Tribunal noted that no direct evidence had been brought on record by the Revenue to show that the assessee had in fact paid any cash to the vendor, or that the assessee derived any benefit from such alleged cash payment. The addition was based solely on the excel sheet found in third-party premises and on general disclosures of the searched group, without any specific, corroborative material against the assessee.
2.7 The Tribunal emphasised that all evidence produced by the assessee (registered sale deed, agreement, bank statements, and vendor confirmation) demonstrated that the relevant amount was paid through banking channels and duly recorded in the books, thereby negating the foundational factual premise for invoking section 69.
Conclusions:
2.8 The Tribunal held that, in the presence of clear documentary evidence establishing RTGS payment and absence of any contrary, cogent evidence of cash payment by the assessee, the conditions of section 69 were not satisfied.
2.9 The belief that there was an unexplained cash investment of Rs. 5,07,690/- was held to be erroneous, as the amount was in fact paid through bank and recorded; therefore, the addition under section 69 was unsustainable in law and on facts.
2.10 The Tribunal directed deletion of the addition of Rs. 5,07,690/- made under section 69.
Issue 3: Propriety of the first appellate authority's approach under section 250(4) and (6)
Legal framework (as discussed):
3.1 The Tribunal referred to section 250(4) and (6) of the Act, which mandate the first appellate authority to make or cause to be made further enquiry, where necessary, and to pass a speaking order containing points for determination, the decision thereon, and reasons.
Interpretation and reasoning:
3.2 The Tribunal observed that the assessee had furnished before the first appellate authority all material including bank statements and the vendor's confirmation categorically stating that no cash was received, yet the authority upheld the addition without undertaking any independent enquiry or verification.
3.3 It was held that the first appellate authority merely carried forward the error of the Assessing Officer, resting solely on the excel sheet and general disclosure of the searched group, without addressing or rebutting the specific evidences filed by the assessee.
3.4 The Tribunal characterised the order of the first appellate authority as summary, arbitrary, and lacking independent application of mind, contrary to the statutory duty under section 250(4) and (6) to conduct proper enquiry and render a reasoned, speaking order, particularly when the assessee had placed on record prima facie exculpatory evidence.
Conclusions:
3.5 The Tribunal set aside the order of the first appellate authority on the ground that it was perverse and bad in law, having upheld an addition without enquiry and without dealing with the assessee's documentary evidence.
Issue 4: Correct assessment provision (section 153C vs. section 147) in search-related third-party information
Legal framework and observation (as discussed):
4.1 The Tribunal observed that the search in which the incriminating excel sheet was found was conducted in the premises of a third party (Wallfort Group), and that the information regarding the assessee emerged from that search.
4.2 The Tribunal noted that, in such a situation, the issue of applicability of the correct provision-section 153C (assessment of income of any other person) rather than section 147 (reassessment)-was "no more res integra", implying that the proper course, in principle, would be to proceed under section 153C when incriminating material relating to a non-searched person is found in search on another person.
Reasoning and conclusion:
4.3 The Tribunal recorded that, in the present case, the assessment had been framed under section 147, but since the appeal was being allowed on merits and the addition itself was being deleted, it found no justification to "travel further" on this legal issue.
4.4 The Tribunal thus treated the issue of applicability of section 153C versus section 147 as an academic or incidental point in the context of this appeal and expressly refrained from adjudicating upon it, resting its decision entirely on the merits of the addition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the amounts disclosed as agricultural income and tuition income were rightly treated by the assessment authorities as income from undisclosed sources.
1.2 Whether, in the facts and circumstances and on the evidences produced, the entire additions on account of agricultural income and tuition income were justified, or only an estimated/ad hoc addition was warranted.
1.3 Whether the adoption of a net profit rate of 10% on the aggregate of agricultural and tuition income additions, as an ad hoc disallowance agreed by both parties, was appropriate and confined to the peculiar facts of the case without setting a precedent.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Treatment of agricultural income and tuition income as income from undisclosed sources
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The assessee had disclosed agricultural income and tuition income in the return and, during assessment, furnished copy of accounts, bank statement, cash book, details of business, and confirmations, along with copies of 7/12 and 8A extracts and an income and expenditure account for agricultural operations.
2.1.2 The assessment authorities treated the entire agricultural receipts and tuition receipts as income from undisclosed sources on the ground that no sale bills for agricultural produce and no bills/vouchers for agricultural expenses (such as dava, khatar, labour, biyaran, etc.) were produced, and that for tuition income only a ledger for about two months was furnished without class-wise details, fee structure, qualification of tutor, and mode of payment.
2.1.3 The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a small farmer and had submitted all "possible" evidences such as 7/12 and 8A extracts proving holding of agricultural land and an income and expenditure account. It observed that the Assessing Officer had not specifically identified any specific defects in the evidences produced, nor held such evidences to be bogus.
2.1.4 As regards tuition income, the Tribunal recorded that explanations and supporting material, to the extent available, were filed and were ignored in toto in the assessment, resulting in full addition of the receipts as undisclosed income.
Conclusions
2.1.5 The Tribunal held that there was merit in the assessee's contention that complete disallowance of agricultural income and tuition income as income from undisclosed sources was not justified, as the evidences produced were neither disproved nor found to be bogus by the Assessing Officer.
2.2 Extent and manner of sustaining additions - adoption of estimated/net profit rate on aggregate receipts
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The aggregate of the additions made by the Assessing Officer on account of agricultural income (Rs. 8,15,200) and tuition income (Rs. 5,75,800) totalled Rs. 13,91,000.
2.2.2 The assessee, while maintaining that all possible evidences had been produced, alternatively suggested that an ad hoc addition of 10% may be made. The Revenue did not object to an estimated addition, suggesting that 15% would suffice in view of the smallness of the amount and to protect the interest of the Revenue.
2.2.3 The Tribunal, having found that the evidences were not specifically discredited but that there existed inconsistencies and deficiencies in documentation and corroboration, held that some addition was still warranted to plug possible leakage of revenue.
2.2.4 Balancing these considerations, and taking into account the smallness of the assessee's status as a small farmer and the stands of both parties, the Tribunal considered that applying a net profit rate of 10% on the aggregate of Rs. 13,91,000 would adequately take care of the inconsistencies in the documents and evidences submitted before the lower authorities.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the addition to 10% of Rs. 13,91,000, i.e. Rs. 1,39,100, in place of the entire additions originally made, thereby partly allowing the appeal.
2.3 Nature and precedential value of the ad hoc determination
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Tribunal explicitly recorded that the instant adjudication was made having regard to the smallness of the amount involved and the fact that both parties agreed to an ad hoc disallowance.
2.3.2 It emphasized that the estimation and rate adopted were based on the peculiar factual matrix of this case, particularly the nature of the assessee's activities and the evidence placed on record.
Conclusions
2.3.3 The Tribunal clarified that the decision and the 10% ad hoc addition directed herein shall not be treated as a precedent in any preceding or succeeding assessment year.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether disallowance of interest paid on loans, claimed as deduction under section 57(iii) against interest income assessable under the head "Income from other sources," was justified when no fresh loans were borrowed or advanced during the year and nexus had been accepted in earlier and subsequent years.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Allowability of interest paid on loans as deduction under section 57(iii)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis that interest expenditure incurred on borrowed funds is allowable as deduction under section 57(iii) of the Act if there exists a nexus between the borrowed funds and the funds advanced which generate taxable interest income under the head "Income from other sources."
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that: (i) the assessee had taken loans from various persons in earlier years and paid interest thereon; (ii) the assessee had, in earlier years, advanced loans to various persons and earned interest income therefrom; (iii) no fresh borrowings or fresh advances were made during the year under consideration; and (iv) the interest income on such advances was offered to tax under the head "Income from other sources."
2.3 The Court noted that in scrutiny assessments for earlier assessment years, the Assessing Officer had accepted and allowed deduction of interest paid on loans under the head "Income from other sources" after the assessee had established the nexus between borrowed funds and funds advanced.
2.4 For subsequent assessment years, though the Assessing Officer had disallowed the interest expenditure, the appellate authority had, in detailed findings, categorically held that the assessee had established the nexus between the interest expenses claimed and the interest income received, and accordingly allowed deduction under section 57(iii).
2.5 The lower authorities in the year under consideration disallowed the deduction on the ground that the assessee had not provided a one-to-one nexus between specific interest paid and specific interest received.
2.6 The Court held that, in circumstances where all borrowings and advances were carried forward from earlier years and no fresh loans were either borrowed or granted during the relevant year, there was no requirement to again prove nexus for the year under appeal, as the nexus had already been accepted in earlier scrutiny proceedings and in subsequent years.
2.7 The Court observed that the assessee had nevertheless furnished complete details of opening balances of loans borrowed and interest paid thereon, as well as details of opening balances of loans and advances and interest income earned thereon, before the Assessing Officer, and that the disallowance was made despite these details.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that, given the admitted position that no fresh loans were borrowed or granted during the year and that the nexus between borrowed funds and advances had been accepted in earlier and subsequent years, the disallowance of interest expenditure under section 57(iii) was not justified.
2.9 The Assessing Officer was directed to allow deduction of the interest paid on loans under section 57(iii) under the head "Income from other sources" in the amount claimed, and the grounds of appeal were allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether addition under section 69C on account of alleged unexplained expenditure for construction of a plant could be sustained solely on the basis of unsigned, undated loose sheets/WhatsApp chats seized during search.
1.2 Whether such loose sheets, whose figures do not reconcile with third-party records (bank and holding company ledgers) and which lack clear linkage to the assessee or to the relevant assessment year, can constitute reliable incriminating material or are to be treated as "dumb documents".
1.3 Whether, in absence of commencement of business and any revenue generation by the assessee during the relevant previous year, unexplained expenditure in the nature alleged can be attributed and taxed in the assessee's hands.
1.4 Whether the assessee's holding company having surrendered a certain amount in its own hands in respect of the same project, and no adverse inference being drawn in that company's assessment, affects the justification for addition in the hands of the assessee.
1.5 Whether the Assessing Officer, in a search assessment, discharged the burden of making addition based on cogent, corroborated material rather than on mere presumptions or rough notings, as per the CBDT's instructions governing search assessments.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Sustainability of addition u/s 69C based on seized loose sheets / WhatsApp chats ("dumb documents")
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal considered section 69C (unexplained expenditure) in the context of a search assessment based on seized loose papers and WhatsApp chats. The order also referred to CBDT Instruction F. No. 286/161/2006-IT (Inv. II) dated 22.12.2006, which mandates that search assessments be based on marshalling facts, establishing preponderance of probability through investigation, and not on mere presumptions or "multiplication formula".
2.2 The appellate authority's reasoning, endorsed by the Tribunal, relied on settled judicial principles that unsigned, undated, uncorroborated loose sheets, inconsistent with authenticated records and not clearly relatable to the assessee or the relevant year, are "dumb documents" with no evidentiary value unless supported by cogent corroborative material.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Assessing Officer treated a loose paper and certain WhatsApp chats as the basis to infer total expenditure of Rs. 129,15,55,494/- up to 31.03.2022 on the Mewat plant, of which Rs. 39,22,83,307/- was stated as through banking channels and the balance Rs. 89,92,72,187/- as alleged unexplained cash expenditure. After giving credit for funds from the holding company (including surrendered amount), the AO added Rs. 43,71,37,934/- u/s 69C.
2.4 The CIT(A), on a detailed examination of the seized material reproduced in the assessment order, found:
(a) One excel sheet was related to an individual (with items such as Vibhav Nagar plot, Delhi Kitchen, etc.) and did not pertain to the assessee's plant at Mewat.
(b) Payment slips relied upon by the AO related to financial year 2022-23 (AY 2023-24), not to the year under consideration (AY 2022-23).
(c) A third excel sheet clearly mentioned the entity name as "HMA Agro" for financial years 2021-22 and 2022-23; entries specifically mentioning the assessee related to AY 2023-24, not to AY 2022-23.
(d) WhatsApp chats referred to (with "Miswa, Bhulu Unnao") were either not clearly linked to the assessee or not related to the relevant year and, therefore, had no evidentiary value.
2.5 The crucial loose paper on which the AO based the cash expenditure inference was held to be:
(a) Undated, unsigned, with no indication of its author or purpose.
(b) Not specifying who allegedly incurred the expenditure.
(c) Not linked by the AO to any corroborative evidence or to the assessee's regular books.
2.6 The assessee produced third-party documentation (Yes Bank term loan statement and holding company ledger). The CIT(A) compared the figures in the loose sheet, AO's inference, and the actual records, and found that none of the critical figures reconciled:
(a) Amount from holding company for March 2022 in loose sheet (Rs. 12,47,19,850/-) vs. actual amount received (Rs. 6,80,00,000/-).
(b) Bank loan disbursement for March 2022 in loose sheet (Rs. 3,62,63,899/-) vs. actual Yes Bank disbursement (Rs. 5,80,48,427/-).
(c) Total investment by holding company up to 31.03.2022 in loose sheet (Rs. 129,15,55,494/-) vs. actual ledger balance (Rs. 44,03,81,860/-).
(d) Total loan amount from Yes Bank up to 31.03.2022 in loose sheet (Rs. 59,73,27,808/-) vs. actual bank outstanding balance (Rs. 61,91,02,337/-).
2.7 On this unreconciled comparison, the CIT(A) held that the loose sheet figures were not authentic or reliable; when none of its figures matched independent third-party records, it could not be treated as evidence of actual transactions. The paper was, at most, a rough jotting/estimate and therefore a classic "dumb document".
2.8 It was further observed that:
(a) The AO did not establish that the notings had materialised into real transactions yielding undisclosed income or real unexplained expenditure.
(b) The AO brought no corroborative material from banks, independent parties or valuation of the plant to support or validate the figures on the loose sheet.
(c) The AO did not even specify which component of alleged investment (building, plant and machinery, other fixed assets) the loose sheet figures related to.
2.9 Applying the CBDT Instruction, the CIT(A) concluded that the AO proceeded on presumption rather than investigation, contrary to the mandate that seized papers be corroborated by independent enquiries and not be used merely with a "multiplication formula".
2.10 The Tribunal noted and accepted the CIT(A)'s factual findings that:
(a) None of the figures in the loose sheet matched the Yes Bank statement or the holding company's ledger.
(b) The loose sheet was unsigned, undated, with unknown authorship and purpose.
(c) The AO failed to correlate the entries either with the assessee's books or with any reliable external evidence.
(d) Even the entity named in significant parts of the seized material was the holding company ("HMA Agro"), not the assessee, and where the assessee's name appeared, the period largely related to the subsequent assessment year.
2.11 On these facts, the Tribunal agreed that the loose sheet and connected material constituted a "dumb document" with no evidentiary value for making an addition, and that the AO's inference of unexplained cash expenditure was unwarranted, speculative, and unsupported.
Conclusions
2.12 The addition under section 69C was based solely on an undated, unsigned loose paper and ancillary material that neither matched third-party authenticated records nor was clearly relatable to the assessee or the relevant year.
2.13 Such loose sheets, being uncorroborated, internally inconsistent and not supported by independent enquiries, were rightly characterised as "dumb documents", incapable of forming a valid basis for addition.
2.14 The Revenue failed to discharge the burden of proof required in search assessments to establish unexplained expenditure by cogent and corroborated material. The deletion of the addition by the appellate authority was therefore upheld.
Issue 3: Absence of business commencement and capacity to incur unexplained expenditure
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.15 The appellate authority, whose reasoning was accepted by the Tribunal, referred to judicial precedents (including the principle from decisions such as CIT v. Bharat Engineering & Construction Co.) that, particularly in an initial or pre-commencement period, unexplained credits or alleged investments are not easily inferable as undisclosed income of the assessee when business operations have not started and no revenue has arisen.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 It was an undisputed fact that:
(a) The assessee was only in the process of establishing its plant at Mewat during the year relevant to AY 2022-23.
(b) Commercial production commenced only in December 2022, and an APEDA certificate was issued from 10.02.2023, demonstrating that there was no business activity during the relevant financial year 2021-22.
(c) No business revenue was earned by the assessee during the year under consideration.
2.17 On this factual matrix, the CIT(A) reasoned, and the Tribunal agreed, that:
(a) There was no material to show that the assessee had any source of income during the period which could fund unexplained cash expenditure of the magnitude alleged.
(b) Allegations of large-scale unexplained expenditure presuppose a source which, in the absence of business operations and revenue, was neither established nor even identified by the AO.
(c) In such pre-commencement circumstances, it is not proper to presume that substantial unexplained expenditure was incurred by the assessee out of undisclosed income in its own hands.
2.18 The Tribunal, referring also to analogous reasoning in cases like Khanna Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. and Burma Electro Corporation (as cited before it), accepted that where business has not commenced and the construction is financed by capital/borrowed funds, treating alleged cash expenditure as unexplained income in the hands of the assessee company is not justified without concrete evidence of such income.
Conclusions
2.19 In the absence of any business activity or revenue during the year, and with the project financed through identifiable bank loans and holding company funds, it was untenable to attribute the alleged cash expenditure to undisclosed income of the assessee.
2.20 The alleged unexplained expenditure under section 69C could not be sustained against an entity whose business had not commenced and for which no source of such alleged undisclosed income was established.
Issue 4: Effect of holding company's surrender and its assessment outcome
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21 The AO's working implicitly treated a part of the project investment as funded by the holding company, including Rs. 41,40,35,700/- surrendered by the holding company, and gave credit for a total of Rs. 85,44,17,560/- (comprising the holding company's ledger balance and surrendered amount), while attributing the balance as unexplained expenditure of the assessee.
2.22 The CIT(A) noted, and the Tribunal accepted, that:
(a) The same AO who framed the assessee's assessment also completed the assessment of the holding company (HMA Agro Industries Ltd.).
(b) Despite the AO's contention that the investment was made by the holding company in cash, no adverse inference or addition on this issue was made in the holding company's assessment for the same assessment year.
2.23 This inconsistency underscored the lack of clarity and evidentiary support as to which entity, if any, had actually incurred the alleged cash expenditure, and militated against fastening such liability on the assessee on a presumptive basis.
Conclusions
2.24 The holding company's own surrender and the absence of any parallel addition in its assessment highlighted that the AO had not consistently or convincingly established that unexplained expenditure belonged to the assessee.
2.25 Given this lack of clarity and the AO's inconsistent approach, the attempt to tax the alleged unexplained expenditure in the assessee's hands was unsustainable.
Issue 5: Compliance with CBDT instructions and evidentiary standards in search assessments
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.26 The CIT(A) relied on CBDT Instruction F. No. 286/161/2006-IT (Inv. II) dated 22.12.2006, particularly para 2.4, which directs Assessing Officers in search cases to:
(a) Marshal facts and place them in chronological sequence.
(b) Focus on establishing preponderance of probability regarding undisclosed income by investigation.
(c) Reach logical conclusions on periods not directly covered by seized evidence through investigation, not mere presumptions or multiplication formula.
(d) Carry out independent enquiries from banks, financial institutions, independent parties, and Government departments.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.27 The CIT(A) found, and the Tribunal concurred, that the AO:
(a) Relied exclusively on a single loose paper and unsubstantiated inferences from chats, without any independent verification with banks (beyond what the assessee itself produced), contractors, or valuation of the plant.
(b) Did not demonstrate the modus operandi or the actual flow of alleged unaccounted cash.
(c) Applied a purely arithmetic difference between a rough total expenditure figure and identifiable bank/holding company funds to infer unexplained cash spending, which amounted to the kind of "presumption or multiplication formula" specifically deprecated by the CBDT.
2.28 On this basis, the appellate findings were that the search assessment was not in conformity with the evidentiary and investigative standards mandated by the CBDT for search cases, and that the addition was made on conjectures, not on properly established facts.
Conclusions
2.29 The AO failed to adhere to CBDT's search assessment guidelines requiring investigation-based conclusions and corroborated evidence. The addition under section 69C, resting on an unverified loose sheet and unsupported inferences, did not meet the requisite standard.
2.30 The Tribunal, therefore, upheld the appellate deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 43,71,37,934/- u/s 69C and dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay of 846 days in filing the appeal by the revenue deserved condonation.
1.2 Whether the assessment order passed under sections 144/147 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer was non est for want of compliance with section 144B and the CBDT Instruction dated 31-03-2021.
1.3 Whether the subsequent CBDT Order dated 17-03-2022 under section 119 created a valid exception permitting completion of the assessment by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer without following the faceless assessment procedure.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the matter required remand to the appellate authority for adjudication of remaining grounds on merits.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that there was a delay of 846 days in filing the revenue's appeal. Reasons for delay were set out in a condonation petition. Considering these reasons, the Tribunal applied the principle of substantial justice.
Conclusions
2.2 The delay of 846 days was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
Issue 2 and 3: Validity of assessment by Jurisdictional Assessing Officer in light of section 144B, CBDT Instruction dated 31-03-2021, and CBDT Order dated 17-03-2022
Legal framework as discussed
2.3 The appellate authority had relied on CBDT Instruction F. No. 187/3/2020-ITA-I dated 31-03-2021, issued under section 144B(2), which mandated that all assessment proceedings pending as on 31-03-2021 and initiated on or after 01-04-2021 (other than specified exclusions) shall be completed in a faceless manner under section 144B, including cases where the assessee had not furnished returns in response to notices under sections 142(1) or 148(1). It had also taken note of sub-section (8) of section 144B regarding transfer of cases from faceless assessment to jurisdictional Assessing Officer with prior approval of the Board.
2.4 The Tribunal considered the CBDT Order F. No. 187/3/2020-ITA-1 dated 17-03-2022 issued under section 119, which, in partial modification of the earlier orders, added an exception that assessment orders in all cases for which the time limit for completion expires on 31-03-2022, and which were pending with the jurisdictional Assessing Officer as on 15-03-2022 or thereafter, and which could not be completed as per the procedure under section 144B due to technical/procedural constraints, shall be completed by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. This exception was stated to apply only to cases where the time limit expired on 31-03-2022.
Findings of the appellate authority (NFAC) as noticed by the Tribunal
2.5 The appellate authority held that the reassessment was pending as on 01-04-2021 and therefore mandatorily had to be completed under the faceless assessment system in terms of section 144B and the CBDT Instruction dated 31-03-2021. It observed that the assessment had instead been completed by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (ITO, Ashok Nagar), there was no material to show transfer from faceless assessment to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer with prior Board approval under section 144B(8), and no response was received from the Assessing Officer despite remand being called for on the jurisdiction issue. It therefore treated the assessment order dated 30-03-2022 as non est and void ab initio for gross violation of CBDT instructions and the mandate of section 144B, and did not adjudicate other grounds as academic.
Tribunal's interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Tribunal recorded the factual sequence that notice under section 148 was issued and served on 30-03-2021, no return was filed, information was gathered under section 133(6), a show-cause notice with draft order was issued on 24-03-2022, reply was filed on 26-03-2022, and the reassessment under section 144 read with section 147 was completed by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer on 30-03-2022.
2.7 The Tribunal took note of the CBDT Order dated 17-03-2022 and held that by virtue of this later order, the Board had granted relaxation in respect of reassessments to be completed by 31-03-2022, by specifically providing an exception from following the procedure laid down in section 144B for such cases and authorizing completion by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
2.8 On this basis, the Tribunal concluded that the appellate authority's view that the assessment was non est for not having been carried out under section 144B was inconsistent with the subsequent CBDT relaxation which squarely covered assessments whose limitation period expired on 31-03-2022 and which were pending with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal held that the declaration of the assessment as non est by the appellate authority on the ground of non-compliance with section 144B and the earlier Instruction dated 31-03-2021 was not in order in view of the CBDT Order dated 17-03-2022. The finding of non est and void ab initio assessment was set aside.
Issue 4: Remand for adjudication of remaining grounds on merits
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Since the appellate authority had quashed the assessment on jurisdiction/validity grounds and had not adjudicated the other grounds raised by the assessee on merits, the Tribunal considered it appropriate, in the interest of justice and fair play, to remit the matter back for fresh adjudication of those remaining issues.
2.11 The Tribunal directed that the remand was for a limited purpose: adjudication of other grounds and issues raised by the assessee, including any additional grounds or additional evidence that may be filed, but excluding reconsideration of the specific ground on which the assessment had earlier been held non est. It clarified that the appellate authority would be free to entertain and decide any other legal issues raised by the assessee.
Conclusions
2.12 The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The matter was restored to the file of the appellate authority for denovo adjudication, confined to grounds other than the validity of the assessment on the basis of section 144B non-compliance, with a direction to the assessee to cooperate and avoid unwarranted adjournments.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether addition on account of alleged bogus purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat" could be sustained in the hands of the assessee when no such purchases were recorded in its books and the related business operations were carried out by another entity operating the assessee's plant on rent.
1.2 Whether the findings for the assessment year 2020-21 regarding the nature of operations and absence of such purchases in the assessee's books apply identically to subsequent assessment years.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Sustainability of addition for alleged bogus purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat"
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Assessing Officer treated purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat" as bogus on the basis of (a) enquiries under section 133(6) from certain suppliers, who allegedly denied having supplied such goods to the assessee, and (b) findings and material relating to another assessee in earlier assessment years, including allegations of round tripping of funds.
2.2 The assessee's consistent case before the Assessing Officer and the first appellate authority was that it had not made any purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat"; the plant at the relevant premises was being run by another company under a rental arrangement, and all such purchases were recorded in the books of that other company.
2.3 The assessee produced material showing that the factory premises were given on rent and that rent income from the other company had been recorded; it was also shown that the suppliers in question were appearing as creditors in the books of the other company, not in the assessee's books.
2.4 The first appellate authority accepted these factual submissions, recorded that no purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat" were booked in the assessee's books of account, and held that the Assessing Officer had wrongly applied data and findings pertaining to another entity to the assessee.
2.5 The Tribunal found that the assessee had not carried out business activities in the leased facility, that the factory had been given on rent, and that the addition was made on an incorrect factual premise arising from a wrong understanding of the assessee's operations.
2.6 The Tribunal agreed with the factual appreciation of the first appellate authority that, in the absence of any such purchases in the assessee's books, the question of treating them as bogus in the assessee's hands did not arise.
Conclusions
2.7 The addition on account of alleged bogus purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat" in the assessee's hands was unsustainable and was rightly deleted by the first appellate authority.
2.8 The Tribunal upheld the deletion and dismissed the revenue's appeals on this issue.
Issue 2 - Applicability of findings for one assessment year to other years
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Tribunal noted that the factual matrix and grounds in the revenue's appeals for the subsequent assessment years were exactly similar to those in the lead assessment year, particularly regarding the rented nature of the plant and absence of purchases of "Raw Boneless Meat" in the assessee's books.
2.10 On this basis, the Tribunal applied its findings for the lead assessment year mutatis mutandis to the subsequent years.
Conclusions
2.11 The additions on account of alleged bogus purchases in the subsequent assessment years were also unsustainable for the same reasons, and the revenue's appeals for those years were likewise dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the bill discounting transaction was a commercial arrangement governed by the contractual terms, so as to exclude application of the Usurious Loans Act and the plea that the agreed interest and monthly rests were unenforceable as penalty or as opposed to public policy. (ii) Whether clause 4 of the sanction letters could be construed against the respondent on the principle of contra proferentem, or treated as requiring a separate notice before withdrawal of the concessional rate of interest.
Issue (i): Whether the bill discounting transaction was a commercial arrangement governed by the contractual terms, so as to exclude application of the Usurious Loans Act and the plea that the agreed interest and monthly rests were unenforceable as penalty or as opposed to public policy.
Analysis: The facility was held to be a commercial bill discounting arrangement and not a loan or debt transaction. The contractual documents expressly provided for joint and several liability, withdrawal of the concessional rate on default, and payment of the normal rate with monthly rests thereafter. On the construction of Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, party autonomy controls the tribunal's discretion where the parties have otherwise agreed on interest. The agreed interest was therefore not open to challenge as unconscionable, excessive, or contrary to public policy merely because the default rate was high. The Court also treated compounding in a commercial contract of this kind as permissible and not penal, especially where the borrower had voluntarily entered the arrangement and derived benefit from it.
Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the respondent; the contractual interest stipulation was held enforceable.
Issue (ii): Whether clause 4 of the sanction letters could be construed against the respondent on the principle of contra proferentem, or treated as requiring a separate notice before withdrawal of the concessional rate of interest.
Analysis: The clause was found to be clear and bilateral, forming part of a negotiated commercial contract between parties of comparable bargaining strength. The contra proferentem rule was held to be inapplicable because it operates only where ambiguity exists and is especially confined to standard form or unequal-bargaining situations. The contention that a separate notice was required before the concessional rate could be withdrawn was also rejected, since no such plea had been consistently raised earlier and, in any event, the contractual text itself specified the consequence of delay or default. The Court further held that a party that has knowingly accepted the contractual benefit cannot later avoid the agreed consequences by alleging unfairness.
Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the respondent; clause 4 was upheld as written.
Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the award and the concurrent High Court orders were sustained on the basis that the parties' commercial bargain governed the interest stipulation and related consequences of default.
Ratio Decidendi: Where sophisticated parties to a commercial contract have expressly agreed to the rate and consequences of default interest, the arbitral tribunal is bound by that agreement under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the stipulated interest cannot be struck down as penal or unconscionable merely because it is high.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay of 159 days in filing the appeal by the assessee deserved condonation on the grounds explained.
1.2 Whether the sum of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- found during survey as cash advances against sale of flats, together with related cash expenses of Rs. 1,35,40,555/-, was assessable as business income or as unexplained cash credit under section 68 read with section 115BBE.
1.3 Whether only the net sum of Rs. 2,85,99,365/- credited in the books could be treated as business income and the balance of Rs. 1,35,40,535/- (offered directly in the computation) could be subjected to section 115BBE.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay in filing appeal
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the explanation tendered by the assessee for the delay of 159 days in filing the appeal. The reasons were found to be bona fide and genuine. The Revenue objected to condonation, but no material was shown to dislodge the assessee's explanation.
Conclusions: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
Issue 2: Characterisation of survey disclosure of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- as business income vs. unexplained cash credit under section 68 / section 115BBE
Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of sections 68, 115BBE, and the presumption under section 292C regarding the truth of contents of documents found during survey under section 133A.
Interpretation and reasoning: The survey revealed documents showing cash receipts of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- as advances against sale of flats and cash expenses of Rs. 1,35,40,555/- towards construction of flats, both outside the books. The key person of the group admitted the amount as undisclosed income on account of cash received as advances against booking of flats. The assessee credited only the net amount of Rs. 2,85,99,365/- (cash receipts minus cash expenses) in its books as additional turnover and offered the balance Rs. 1,35,40,535/- directly in the computation of income. The Assessing Officer, despite noting that the income arose from advances against sale of flats, reduced the disclosed amount from business income and added it as unexplained cash credit under section 68 read with section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that the entire amount of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- was on account of sale of flats, which was the assessee's regular business. The impounded papers themselves showed that the receipts were advances against sale of flats, and by virtue of section 292C their contents were presumed true. There was no separate cash credit in the books which could attract section 68. The assessee had, in fact, offered the entire sum as business income, without claiming deduction of the related cash expenses of Rs. 1,35,40,555/-. The manner of presentation-partly through turnover in the accounts and partly by direct addition in the computation-did not alter its true character as business income. The Tribunal relied on the reasoning adopted in decisions such as that of the Mumbai Bench in ACIT v. Rahil Agencies and the Jodhpur Bench in Lovish Singhal, where income admitted as business-related was not recharacterised as income from other sources or unexplained cash credit when its business nature was established. The Tribunal also noted that, for the year under consideration, the tax rate on business income of an LLP and the rate under section 115BBE were both 30%, rendering the attempted recharacterisation tax neutral.
Conclusions: The entire amount of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- represented business income from sale of flats and was not liable to be assessed as unexplained cash credit under section 68 or subjected to section 115BBE. There being no cash credit in the books corresponding to this amount, section 68 was inapplicable.
Issue 3: Treatment of Rs. 2,85,99,365/- vs. Rs. 1,35,40,535/- and partial application of section 115BBE by the first appellate authority
Interpretation and reasoning: The first appellate authority accepted that Rs. 2,85,99,365/-, being the net amount credited in the books, was business income, but treated the balance Rs. 1,35,40,535/- (offered directly in the computation and not routed through the turnover) as income to which section 115BBE applied, on the ground that it was not part of the turnover. The Tribunal found this approach incorrect. It held that once it was accepted that the full Rs. 4,21,39,900/- comprised business receipts from sale of flats, its taxability as business income could not depend on whether it was recorded as turnover in the profit and loss account or offered directly in the computation. If the full receipts and the corresponding expenses had both been routed through the profit and loss account, the ultimate income figure would remain the same; the assessee had instead offered the gross amount as income without claiming the related out-of-books expenses as a deduction. The substance was that the entire amount had been disclosed and offered as business income, and no portion could be singled out for treatment under section 115BBE merely because it was not included in the turnover line item.
Conclusions: The finding of the first appellate authority that only Rs. 2,85,99,365/- was assessable as business income and that the balance Rs. 1,35,40,535/- was covered by section 115BBE was set aside. The entire sum of Rs. 4,21,39,900/- was held assessable as business income from sale of flats. The Revenue's appeal challenging deletion of the addition under section 68/115BBE was dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objection seeking treatment of Rs. 1,35,40,535/- also as business income was allowed.
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