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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the delay of one day in filing the appeal by the Revenue was liable to be condoned.
1.2 Whether the addition under section 69B read with section 115BBE on account of alleged "on-money" / unexplained investment in land could be sustained solely on the basis of loose sheets and note pads seized from a third party and statements recorded under section 132(4), subsequently retracted.
1.3 Whether loose sheets and private note books seized from a third party, not authored or signed by the assessee or the vendors, and unsupported by independent corroborative evidence, have sufficient evidentiary value to fasten tax liability on the assessee.
1.4 Whether failure of the Assessing Officer to undertake independent enquiry, including examination of vendors and reference to valuation machinery, vitiated the addition based on alleged on-money.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay of one day in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted a delay of one day in filing the Revenue's appeal. An affidavit was filed explaining that the delay was on account of scrutiny time-barring workload.
2.2 After considering the affidavit and hearing both parties, the Tribunal found that there was reasonable cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed time.
Conclusion
2.3 In the interests of justice, the delay of one day was condoned and the Revenue's appeal was admitted.
Issue 2: Sustainability of addition under section 69B read with section 115BBE for alleged "on-money" based on seized loose sheets and statements of a third party
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.4 The assessment was framed under section 143(3) read with section 153C on the basis of documents seized during a search under section 132 in a third party's premises and statements recorded under section 132(4) and section 131(1). The AO invoked section 69B (unexplained investment) read with section 115BBE (rate of tax).
2.5 The assessee and CIT(A) relied on principles laid down inter alia in decisions including K.P. Varghese, P.V. Kalyanasundaram, Common Cause, CBI v. V.C. Shukla, Dhakeswari Cotton Mills and other High Court/Tribunal decisions on: (i) burden of proof on Revenue to establish understatement / on-money, (ii) weak evidentiary value of loose sheets/third-party diaries, (iii) need for corroborative evidence, and (iv) impermissibility of additions based on suspicion or mere private jottings.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The alleged unexplained investment of Rs. 25,78,98,000/- was derived from loose sheets (ANN/KP/GS/LS/S, pages 23-26) and note pads (ANN/SJ/GS/B&D/S-2 & S-3) seized from the premises of a third party (a director of a searched company). The assessee's name, vendors' names, survey numbers, or property identifiers were not found on the loose sheets; no signatures or acknowledgment of either assessee or vendors appeared on them.
2.7 It was an admitted fact that: (i) the assessee purchased 13.85½ acres of land under a registered sale deed for Rs. 1,11,44,800/-, fully paid through banking channels; (ii) the seized loose sheets referred to 15 acres; and (iii) the loose sheets were said by the deponent to be in the handwriting of another person (a retired PWD engineer), who was never examined.
2.8 The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the impugned loose sheets and note pads are "dumb documents": they only contain dates, amounts, and brief notations ("Cash", "DD", abbreviations like "Guru", "Guru MTP Road", "Guru Cash (PWD)") without identifying payer, payee, property, or nature/purpose of transaction. Totals did not reconcile and the entries were incomplete.
2.9 A substantial portion (about 80%) of the alleged cash payments (entries 5 to 9 on page 23 aggregating Rs. 21.50 crores) were shown as dates after the date of registration of the property. The Tribunal concurred with CIT(A) that, on preponderance of probability, it is highly improbable in real estate transactions that such huge cash amounts would be paid long after registration, particularly when title had already transferred, rendering the entries unreliable for the assessee's transaction.
2.10 The Tribunal emphasized the discrepancy that the loose sheets mentioned 15 acres while the assessee's transaction was only for 13.85½ acres, casting further doubt on the linkage of the documents to the assessee's purchase.
2.11 The AO treated statements of the third party recorded u/s 132(4) on 11.03.2021 and 12.03.2021 as conclusive, wherein he linked the entries to the assessee's Tirupur land and admitted on-money payments. However:
(a) The same third party stated in his 11.03.2021 statement that the handwriting in the loose sheets belonged to another person (retired PWD engineer), whose statement was never recorded.
(b) In the subsequent statement u/s 131 on 19.07.2021, he categorically clarified that the entries in the notebooks were merely notings for his reference as a broker, that transactions did not pass through him, and that he neither received nor paid any cash; high-value entries were noted only for commission follow-up, not as cash movements.
(c) He formally retracted the statements recorded u/s 132(4) by letter dated 01.11.2021 (filed on 09.11.2021), alleging irregularities during search, and the AO did not bring any material to discredit or independently investigate the retraction.
2.12 The assessee's own statement u/s 131 dated 29.07.2021 consistently denied payment of any on-money, denied knowledge of the seized loose sheets/notebooks, and denied any role of the said third party in the land purchase. The AO did not confront this denial with any independent evidence, nor did he examine the vendors of the property.
2.13 The Tribunal held that once the assessee denied the transaction and the alleged intermediary retracted his earlier incriminating statement, the burden shifted squarely on the AO to bring cogent corroborative evidence (such as banking trail, confirmations, statements of vendors, or other independent material) demonstrating actual payment of amounts over and above the registered consideration. No such evidence was produced.
2.14 The Tribunal noted that the presumption under sections 132(4A) and 292C, to the extent discussed at appellate stage, operates vis-à-vis the person from whose possession the documents are found and cannot, without more, be used against "any other person" for purposes of section 153C when the documents are neither authored by nor seized from such other person and contain no clear nexus to him.
2.15 The AO's reliance on general market value data from real estate websites to suggest a far higher fair market value (around Rs. 72.39 crores) was held to be conjectural in the absence of:
(a) any reference to the departmental valuation cell,
(b) any action or objection by the registering authority regarding undervaluation, and
(c) any independent valuation or supporting evidence specific to the property.
2.16 Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal reiterated that:
* Loose sheets/diaries seized from third-party premises, not forming part of regular books and not in the handwriting of the assessee, are inherently weak evidence and, absent corroboration, cannot support additions (Common Cause; CBI v. V.C. Shukla; Sant Lal; Sunil Kumar Sharma and several Tribunal decisions).
* There must be "something more than bare suspicion" to make an addition; pure guesswork or reliance on unexplained jottings is impermissible (Dhakeswari Cotton Mills).
* The burden to establish understatement of consideration/on-money remains on the Revenue (K.P. Varghese; P.V. Kalyanasundaram). Casting on the assessee the burden to prove the negative, i.e., that he did not pay any amount beyond recorded consideration, is legally untenable.
* A retracted statement, without corroborative material and without proof that the retraction is motivated, cannot be treated as sole substantive evidence.
2.17 The Tribunal also relied on the jurisdictional High Court decision in P.V. Kalyanasundaram, where an addition based solely on the seller's statement admitting higher consideration was rejected because the AO failed to conduct independent enquiry or reference to the Valuation Officer. The facts were considered analogous, as here also the AO had not independently established higher consideration or actual cash movement.
Conclusions
2.18 The seized loose sheets and note pads, being unsigned, incomplete, not authored by the assessee or vendors, seized from a third party and unsupported by any independent evidence of money flow, were held to be "dumb documents" with no probative value against the assessee.
2.19 The statements of the third party recorded u/s 132(4), having been specifically retracted and uncorroborated, could not form the sole basis of addition, particularly in the absence of any enquiry with the alleged author of the loose sheets, with the vendors, or any proof of actual transfer of cash.
2.20 The AO failed to discharge the burden of proving that the assessee had paid any on-money over and above the registered sale consideration; the addition under section 69B read with section 115BBE was based on suspicion, surmises, and conjectures rather than on legally admissible and corroborated evidence.
2.21 The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s finding that the addition of Rs. 25,78,98,000/- as unexplained investment was unsustainable in law and on facts and therefore liable to be deleted.
Issue 3: Evidentiary value of third-party loose sheets / note books and requirement of corroboration and independent enquiry
Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 The Tribunal endorsed CIT(A)'s reasoning that:
(a) The loose sheets and note books were seized from a third party and were neither written nor signed by the assessee or vendors.
(b) The alleged author of the key loose sheets was admittedly another person (retired PWD engineer), who was never examined; hence authorship and authenticity remained unverified.
(c) The AO ignored exculpatory statements of the third party under section 131 and of the assessee, and relied selectively on incriminating portions without completing the chain of evidence.
2.23 Drawing from multiple judicial precedents (including Sant Lal, Satyapal Wassan, Riveria Properties and other Tribunal decisions cited), the Tribunal reiterated that when a document is incomplete, lacks necessary details of year, ownership, nature, code for deciphering figures, or nexus to the assessee, it is incumbent on the AO to:
* correlate it with other seized materials, regular books, bank/third-party records, and
* record statements of concerned parties to fill gaps and validate inferences.
2.24 No such investigative steps were taken: there was no examination of vendors, no tracing of source or destination of alleged cash, no reference to the valuation cell, and no corroborative bank or documentary trail.
2.25 The Tribunal emphasized that, though strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply, principles against making pure guesses and the requirement of "something more than bare suspicion" still govern income-tax assessments.
Conclusions
2.26 Loose sheets/diaries found at a third-party premises, not shown to be maintained in the regular course of business and not linked to the assessee by independent evidence, cannot be treated as substantive material to support additions.
2.27 Absent corroborative evidence and independent enquiry, such documents remain ineffective and unreliable; they must be treated as "dumb documents" and cannot validly found additions under section 69B.
2.28 Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition and dismissed the Revenue's appeal in toto.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether incentives received from media houses on achievement of advertisement revenue targets are liable to service tax as "business auxiliary service" or as a "declared service" under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.
1.2 Whether, in light of the statement of the Respondent's Manager (Finance) regarding target-based incentive agreements with media houses, the incentives constitute consideration for an independent taxable service rendered to media houses.
1.3 Whether, in the presence of concurrent factual findings of the Adjudicating Authority and the Tribunal, any substantial question of law arises warranting interference under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Taxability of incentives as "business auxiliary service" / "declared service" under Section 66E(e), and effect of target-based incentive agreements
Legal framework
2.1 The Court recorded that selling of space slots for advertisements in print media is non-taxable under Section 66D(g) of the Finance Act, 1994, while service tax is otherwise discharged on advertising services/broadcasting where applicable.
2.2 The Department alleged that incentives received for achieving targets constituted "business promotion" of media owners and were taxable as "business auxiliary service", and further as a "declared service" under Section 66E(e) ("agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or situation, or to do an act").
2.3 The Court referred to Circular No. 214/1/2023-Service Tax dated 28.02.2023 clarifying that Section 66E(e) covers contractual arrangements where one party agrees, expressly or impliedly, to do or abstain from doing something, and the other agrees to pay consideration, with a necessary and sufficient nexus between such agreement and the consideration, and that the arrangement must be an independent contract in its own right.
2.4 The Court also relied on decisions interpreting Section 66E(e), including the view that a "service" requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration, and that "declared service" under Section 66E(e) must involve an agreement to refrain, tolerate, or do an act as a distinct obligation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5 The business model was found to be that of an advertising agency acting for its clients (advertisers), placing advertisements in print and electronic media, charging commission from clients, and already discharging service tax on such commission. Incentives from media houses were paid on achievement of turnover/volume targets.
2.6 Both the Adjudicating Authority and the Tribunal held that, in respect of incentives, no service was being rendered by the advertising agency to media houses; media houses were providing "space booking services" to the agency, and incentives/discounts were not consideration for any separate service to the media houses.
2.7 The Tribunal found that there was no agreement between the advertising agency and media houses under which the agency was obliged to meet any specific target or under which media houses were bound to provide incentives/discounts. The agency's clients were the advertisers; clients approved media plans; and the agency had no discretion to channel advertisements to particular media houses for the purpose of fulfilling any contractual obligation towards them.
2.8 The Department relied on the statement of the Manager (Finance) that the agency "had agreement with various print media and broadcasting media for achieving the revenue target" and, by signing "such agreements", abided by terms and conditions including revenue targets, and that incentives were received on fulfillment of such specified targets and were not passed on to advertisers.
2.9 The Court held that even assuming existence of such target-based incentive arrangements, achieving targets or revenue benchmarks formed part of the normal performance of advertising services already rendered on behalf of clients and did not amount to any "additional service" rendered to media houses.
2.10 The Court held that incentives paid by media houses for achieving business volume are not consideration for any independent activity of "business promotion" of media owners, but arise from the agency's own business operations and performance for its clients.
2.11 On the scope of Section 66E(e), the Court emphasized that:
(a) The provision has three components: (i) agreeing to refrain from an act, (ii) agreeing to tolerate an act or a situation, (iii) agreeing to do an act.
(b) All three limbs presuppose a contract where the service provider agrees to a specific obligation to do or abstain from doing something and receives consideration specifically for that obligation.
2.12 Applying the Circular and case law, the Court found no independent contractual arrangement under which the advertising agency expressly or impliedly agreed, in its own right, to refrain, tolerate, or do any act vis-à-vis media houses in consideration of incentives; the operative contracts with media houses were entered into for and on behalf of the agency's clients.
2.13 The Court noted that the agency was rendering services to its advertisers/clients, not to media houses, and that there was no separate obligation owed to the media houses beyond what was agreed by the clients. Thus, the necessary contractual nexus for "declared service" under Section 66E(e) was absent.
2.14 By analogy, the Court referred to the precedent holding that incentives or target-based payments to intermediaries (such as air travel agents for using central reservation systems) are not "business auxiliary service", and that incentives for achieving targets are not leviable to service tax where the intermediary is essentially promoting its own business or providing its classified main service.
Conclusions
2.15 Incentives received from media houses on achievement of advertisement revenue/volume targets do not constitute consideration for "business auxiliary service" rendered to media houses.
2.16 Such incentives also do not fall within "declared service" under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994, as there is no independent contractual obligation by the advertising agency to refrain from an act, tolerate an act/situation, or do an act for the media houses for consideration.
2.17 No additional or separate service is rendered by the advertising agency to the media houses over and above the advertising services rendered to its clients; hence, the incentives are not susceptible to levy of service tax.
Issue 3: Existence of substantial question of law and interference with concurrent findings
Interpretation and reasoning
2.18 The Court noted that the Adjudicating Authority, by the Order-in-Original, had dropped the service tax demand on incentives, holding that no taxable service was rendered to media houses in respect of incentives, and that media houses themselves confirmed that the agency was not rendering any taxable service to them.
2.19 The Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, upheld the Order-in-Original, affirming that there was no agreement imposing an obligation on the agency towards media houses, nor an obligation on media houses to pay incentives, and that Section 66E(e) was inapplicable.
2.20 The Court held that these findings on the nature of the business relationship, absence of an independent contractual obligation, and characterization of incentives were concurrent and factual.
2.21 In view of the legal position applied to those established facts, the Court found no substantial question of law arising for consideration under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Conclusions
2.22 The concurrent findings of the Adjudicating Authority and the Tribunal that incentives are not liable to service tax as "business auxiliary service" or under Section 66E(e) do not warrant interference in appeal.
2.23 No substantial question of law arises; the appeal is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether interim protection against coercive steps pursuant to impugned show cause notices and/or orders under the CGST regime should be granted to the petitioners in the batch of matters pending final adjudication.
1.2 Whether notice to the Attorney General is required in petitions wherein the constitutional validity of provisions of the CGST Act has been challenged, and consequent directions regarding service and pleadings.
1.3 Case management directions regarding listing, tagging of connected petitions, and timelines for completion of pleadings in the batch of matters concerning levy of GST and challenges to the CGST Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Interim protection against coercive steps based on impugned show cause notices and/or orders
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court recorded that in some of the matters within the batch, ad-interim orders had already been granted earlier.
2.2 The Court noted that the petitioners relied upon a decision of another High Court holding GST not leviable on assignment of leasehold rights in specified circumstances, and that the said decision has been appealed with notice issued by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, did not adjudicate the substantive GST issue at this stage and chose to defer the hearing of all matters in the batch to a later date.
2.3 Considering that the substantive questions, including the effect of the Gujarat High Court decision and the levy of GST in similar transactions, are yet to be decided, the Court deemed it appropriate to preserve the status quo and protect the petitioners from adverse actions in the meantime.
Conclusions
2.4 The Court directed that, until the next date of hearing, in all matters in the batch, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioners based upon the impugned show cause notices and/or orders, if already made.
Issue 2 - Notice to the Attorney General in petitions challenging constitutional validity of CGST Act provisions
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.5 The Court noted that in some petitions in the batch there is a challenge to the constitutional validity of provisions of the CGST Act, and that in such matters notice to the Attorney General is necessary.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Court observed that notices had already been issued to the Attorney General in some such matters and that it was brought to its attention that there are additional petitions in the batch where constitutional validity of provisions of the CGST Act is also under challenge.
2.7 To ensure that all constitutional challenges are properly addressed and that the Union is adequately represented through the Attorney General, the Court considered it appropriate to issue notice in all such petitions where vires of CGST provisions are questioned.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court directed that in all petitions where the constitutional validity of provisions of the CGST Act has been challenged, notice be issued to the learned Attorney General.
2.9 Petitioners in such constitutional challenges were directed to take immediate steps to serve the said notice and to file an affidavit of service.
Issue 3 - Case management: adjournment, completion of pleadings, and tagging of connected matters
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Having heard counsel and in view of the pendency of substantial questions (including those relating to GST on assignment of leasehold rights and constitutional challenges), the Court decided to defer the final hearing of all matters in the batch.
2.11 To facilitate an effective and consolidated hearing, the Court granted liberty to parties to file further pleadings and set a uniform outer limit for completion of pleadings.
2.12 The Court was informed of other writ petitions involving similar or connected issues and found it appropriate to list and "tag" those petitions along with the present batch for being heard together.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court directed that all pleadings in these matters must be completed by 25 January 2026.
2.14 The Court ordered that Writ Petition (ST) No. 36498 of 2025, Writ Petition (ST) No. 35437 of 2025 and Writ Petition (ST) No. 29874 of 2025 be tagged along with the present batch.
2.15 All the matters in the batch were directed to stand over to 6 February 2026 at 3.00 p.m., subject to overnight part-heard matters.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an appeal under the GST regime can be rejected solely on the ground of non-payment of pre-deposit without affording the appellant an opportunity to make the requisite pre-deposit.
1.2 Whether, in a case involving disallowance and recovery of Input Tax Credit, a quantified amount mentioned in the show cause notice attracts the statutory requirement of pre-deposit at the appellate stage.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Rejection of appeal for non-payment of pre-deposit in an ITC disallowance matter; requirement and opportunity to make pre-deposit
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the show cause notice specifically quantified the ITC proposed to be disallowed and recovered, clearly computing the amount at Rs. 61,36,720/-, along with consequential proposals for recovery, interest, and penalty.
2.2 On this basis, the Court held that a pre-deposit in respect of this quantified amount ought to have been made at the time of filing the appeal, and expressed surprise that the appeal had initially been entertained without such pre-deposit.
2.3 The Court, however, held that, even if the pre-deposit had not been made, the appeal could not have been rejected outright without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make the requisite pre-deposit.
2.4 Upon counsel for the petitioner expressing willingness to make the necessary pre-deposit, the Court directed that the requisite pre-deposit be paid within a stipulated time and that, upon proof of such payment, the Appellate Authority must re-hear the appeal on merits.
2.5 The Court further directed that the petitioner be afforded a personal hearing, with due notice to be issued at the specified email address and mobile number.
Conclusions
2.6 Quantified disallowance and proposed recovery of ITC in the show cause notice attract the requirement of pre-deposit at the appellate stage.
2.7 An appeal cannot be rejected merely for non-payment of pre-deposit without first granting the appellant an opportunity to make such pre-deposit.
2.8 The impugned appellate order rejecting the appeal for non-payment of pre-deposit was set aside, the petitioner was permitted to make the requisite pre-deposit within the prescribed time, and the Appellate Authority was directed to re-hear and decide the appeal on merits after granting a personal hearing.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the arrest of the petitioner by GST authorities complied with applicable statutory safeguards, including under BNSS and the CGST Act.
1.2 Whether, in light of the nature of the alleged GST fraud, the stage of investigation, and the materials collected, the petitioner was entitled to bail under Section 483 BNSS, 2023.
1.3 Whether the petitioner could be treated as an innocent service provider or was prima facie a knowing participant in the alleged fraudulent Input Tax Credit racket.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Compliance with statutory safeguards in arrest by GST authorities
Legal framework
2.1 The Court noted that the prosecution invoked Section 132 read with Section 69 of the CGST Act, and that the alleged offences under Section 132(1), in terms of Section 132(5), are cognizable and non-bailable. The Court referred to Section 47 and Section 48 BNSS concerning notices of grounds of arrest to the arrested person and to family/relatives. The Court also relied on the decision reported in (2025) 6 SCC 545, wherein safeguards regarding arrest were held applicable to arrests by GST officials as well, by extending the principles and ratio relating to the power of arrest under comparable statutes.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court recorded that the Investigating Agency had taken due permission from the competent authority of the Commissioner of the Department as required under Section 69 of the CGST Act before arresting the petitioner.
2.3 The Court expressly perused the notices regarding grounds of arrest furnished to the petitioner under Section 47 BNSS and to his family/relatives under Section 48 BNSS, and also examined the authorization dated 14.11.2025 issued by the Principal Commissioner, which referred to detection of fraudulent invoicing causing loss in the range of Rs. 8.59 crores and contained an authorization to arrest under Section 69 of the CGST Act.
2.4 In view of the Supreme Court judgment referred to, the Court treated the safeguards concerning arrest as applicable to the GST authorities and examined whether such safeguards were complied with in the present case by scrutinizing the arrest authorization and the arrest-related notices.
Conclusions
2.5 By noting the existence and contents of the authorization of the Principal Commissioner under Section 69 of the CGST Act and the service of grounds-of-arrest notices under Sections 47 and 48 BNSS, the Court implicitly accepted that the arrest met the required procedural safeguards for the present stage and did not find any infirmity in the arrest to warrant grant of bail on that ground.
Issue 2: Entitlement to bail in the context of nature of offence, role of petitioner, and stage of investigation
Legal framework
2.6 The application was under Section 483 BNSS, 2023 seeking bail. The prosecution asserted that the offences under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act are cognizable and non-bailable in terms of Section 132(5) and are punishable by imprisonment of five years. The Court observed that, in the absence of a specific provision, the prescribed statutory period of BNSS would be applicable for purposes of detention, noting that the maximum punishment for the alleged offences is five years.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The petitioner's counsel contended that the petitioner was a small businessman running a Customer Service Point, merely assisting customers in making entries and registrations of business entities, and that it was neither possible nor practicable for him to verify the correctness of data provided by customers; hence he could not be held liable for fraudulent conduct of others.
2.8 The Court examined the case diary, statements of the petitioner, co-accused and witnesses, and other investigation materials. On this basis, the Court rejected the portrayal of the petitioner as an innocent service provider. The Court found that, if the investigation materials were accepted at face value, they indicated that the petitioner, though operating a Customer Service Point, was aware of and participated in the fraudulent activities and received illegal remuneration for facilitating them.
2.9 The investigation materials showed that the petitioner was evasive about pertinent queries, including his bank accounts and transactions linked to non-existent firms and companies. The Court noted that the petitioner had admitted to receiving illegal remuneration and assisting co-accused and another person in making fraudulent registrations with the object of siphoning off Input Tax Credit.
2.10 The Court also considered the nature and scale of the alleged offence: a major detection of GST fraud involving fraudulent transactions exceeding Rs. 8 crores (approximately Rs. 8.59 crores as per authorization), through non-existent firms, fake invoicing, and passing on fake ITC without corresponding supply of goods and services. It accepted the prosecution's description of a large organized racket or gang, with participants spread across different states, working actively to defraud the revenue.
2.11 The Court found that the investigation, though progressed, was still in an active stage, with the Investigating Authority engaged in ascertaining the full dimensions of the alleged illegal and fraudulent activities. The Court considered that releasing the petitioner on bail at this stage could adversely affect effective and complete investigation.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court held that, given (i) the cognizable and non-bailable character of the alleged offences under Section 132 of the CGST Act, (ii) the gravity and organized nature of the alleged fraud and its substantial revenue implications, (iii) the prima facie material suggesting that the petitioner was a knowing participant receiving illegal remuneration, and (iv) the fact that investigation was still active and ongoing, grant of bail would not be in the best interest of effective and complete investigation.
2.13 The detention of the petitioner since 14.11.2025 was noted, but this factor was held insufficient, in the circumstances and at this stage of investigation, to outweigh the above considerations. Accordingly, the bail application under Section 483 BNSS, 2023 was rejected.
Issue 3: Characterization of petitioner's role as innocent intermediary or participant in fraud
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 On the specific contention that the petitioner was only running a shop to help customers in making entries and registrations and could not check the veracity of customers' data, the Court undertook a prima facie assessment of the investigation materials.
2.15 The Court observed that the materials on record, including the petitioner's statements, indicated that he was not merely an innocent proprietor of a Customer Service Point, but was aware of the fraudulent activities and was part of a network engaged in such activities, for which he obtained a share of illegal remuneration.
2.16 The petitioner's evasiveness regarding his bank accounts and his own admission, as recorded by the Investigating Authority, of having received illegal remuneration for assisting in fraudulent registrations, were treated as significant in negating the plea of innocence and in characterizing him as a participant in the fraudulent scheme.
Conclusions
2.17 For purposes of deciding bail, the Court concluded that the petitioner could not be considered a mere innocent intermediary or service provider and that there was prima facie material showing his conscious involvement in the GST fraud racket. This conclusion formed a material ground for denial of bail at the current stage.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an appellate authority under the MGST Act can reject an appeal as barred by limitation, solely on the basis of the date of the order and without granting the appellant an opportunity of hearing, when the appellant specifically relies on the date of knowledge of the order.
1.2 Whether, in the context of an appeal under section 107 of the MGST Act, the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of the order or from the date of knowledge of the order (left open for decision by the appellate authority).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Rejection of appeal as time-barred without hearing and applicability of principles of natural justice
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court recorded that section 107 of the MGST Act prescribes a 90-day period for filing an appeal with a further one-month period which may be condoned, and that beyond 120 days the appellate authority has no power to condone delay. The format of the impugned order (Form GST APL-02) contains a "Reason for rejection" clause used here to state that the appeal is late filed beyond the time limit specified under section 107.
2.2 The Court referred to the principle that the "principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary", relying on the law declared by the Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that the rejection of the appeal on limitation grounds, in the manner done, visited the petitioner with "severe civil consequences", thereby attracting the requirement of at least minimum compliance with principles of natural justice and fair play.
2.4 The Court rejected the State's contention that, since the statute does not provide for a hearing before dismissal of a time-barred appeal and the appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond 120 days, there is no need to afford a hearing. It held that this submission "begs the question" because the core issue was whether limitation is to be counted from the date of the order or from the date of knowledge.
2.5 The Court noted that this question (date of order vs. date of knowledge) is an "arguable issue, both on the facts and on the law", and that before taking any decision on this issue, the principles of natural justice had to be followed.
2.6 The Court held that the appellate authority could not simply presume delay only on the basis of the date of the order. In view of the petitioner's case that limitation had to be computed from the date of knowledge, such a plea could not be summarily rejected without hearing the petitioner or affording an opportunity to substantiate this contention.
2.7 The Court emphasized that the absence of an express statutory requirement of hearing does not exclude natural justice where an order adversely affects a party; natural justice must be read into the statute in such "unoccupied interstices" unless clearly excluded.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that the order rejecting the appeal as time-barred, without granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing on the question of limitation (including the plea as to date of knowledge), was in breach of the principles of natural justice.
2.9 On that ground alone, the impugned rejection order was quashed and set aside, and the matter remanded to the appellate authority to hear the petitioner and decide the question of limitation afresh, within a fixed time-frame.
Issue 2 - Starting point for limitation under section 107 MGST Act: date of order vs. date of knowledge
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Court expressly identified the "issue" as whether limitation is to be construed from the date of the order or from the date of knowledge of the order and described this as an "arguable issue, both on the facts and on the law".
2.11 The Court refrained from deciding this question on merits in the writ jurisdiction at this stage, stating that it was remanding the matter solely because of violation of natural justice and that the factual and legal contentions on service and date of knowledge must be considered by the appellate authority after hearing the parties.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court left open all contentions of all parties on the computation of limitation, including the petitioner's claim regarding the date of service or date of knowledge of the assessment order.
2.13 The appellate authority has been directed to decide, after granting a hearing, whether the appeal is barred by limitation having regard to the rival contentions on the starting point of limitation (date of order vs. date of knowledge).
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether licence fee paid for use of goodwill and firm name is allowable as business expenditure in light of the Bar Council of India Rules and the Advocates Act, 1961.
(2) Whether Explanation 1 to Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 disallows such licence fee on the ground that it is expenditure incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law.
(3) Whether the arrangement for use of goodwill and payment of licence fee constitutes an impermissible "device" and whether such characterisation is relevant to the allowability of the expenditure.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1) - Allowability of licence fee for use of goodwill in light of Bar Council of India Rules and Advocates Act
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court considered the scope of the Bar Council of India Rules relating to sharing of remuneration by advocates, and their interface with Section 37 of the Income-tax Act.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court followed its prior detailed judgment on the same assessee and issue, holding that: (a) the relevant Bar Council of India Rules proscribe sharing of remuneration/fee earned by a firm of lawyers with a person who is not a member of the legal profession; (b) the expression "sharing" in those Rules contemplates an arrangement where a lawyer parts with or agrees to share a part or portion of fee or revenue earned from legal practice with a non-lawyer; (c) in the facts considered, the licence fee was paid as consideration for the right to use and exploit goodwill in the name of the firm, which constituted a validly acquired and transferable asset; (d) the reference to a percentage of total billing of the firm served only as a measure or formula to compute consideration for use of goodwill, not as a mechanism to share revenue from legal practice; and (e) linking consideration to revenue did not convert the payment into "sharing of remuneration" prohibited by the Bar Council of India Rules.
Conclusions: The licence fee paid for the use of goodwill and firm name was not hit by the Bar Council of India Rules on sharing of remuneration and remained a legitimate business expenditure.
Issue (2) - Applicability of Explanation 1 to Section 37 to disallow licence fee
Legal framework (as discussed): Explanation 1 to Section 37 disallows deduction of expenditure incurred for any purpose which is an offence or is prohibited by law. The Court emphasised the "purpose test" in determining whether expenditure falls within the mischief of this Explanation.
Interpretation and reasoning: Relying on its earlier judgment on the same controversy, the Court reaffirmed that: (a) the disallowance under Explanation 1 is attracted only where expenditure is incurred for the commission of an offence or for a purpose prohibited by law; (b) it is the principal or dominant purpose of the expenditure that is decisive; (c) a breach of the Bar Council of India Rules is not classified as an offence, and, absent an offence, the question is whether the purpose itself is legally prohibited; (d) the primary and sole purpose of incurring the licence fee was to use the goodwill associated with the firm's name and derive the commercial benefit of that goodwill; (e) consideration paid for use of goodwill, being for exploitation of a validly held asset, cannot be regarded as expenditure for an unlawful or prohibited purpose; and (f) reliance on authority concerning "freebies" to medical practitioners was misplaced, as that turned on an express regulatory prohibition on receiving such benefits, which is absent here.
Conclusions: The expenditure on licence fee for use of goodwill did not fall within Explanation 1 to Section 37 and could not be disallowed on the ground of being incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law.
Issue (3) - Relevance of characterising the arrangement as a "device" and scrutiny of underlying gift of goodwill
Interpretation and reasoning: Adopting the reasoning of its prior decision, the Court held that: (a) the sole transaction for tax scrutiny was the payment of licence fee and its allowability as business expenditure; (b) questioning the validity or motive of the prior gift of goodwill, or suggesting that the gift was a "ruse" or part of legacy planning, was an unwarranted digression unrelated to the statutory test under Section 37; (c) the presence of multiple unrelated partners who unanimously resolved to utilise the goodwill and name of a firm with established reputation undermined the contention that the arrangement was a mere tax-avoidance device; and (d) the agreement to utilise goodwill for consideration, even if computed by reference to revenue, could not be treated as a sham or colourable device for sharing fee income.
Conclusions: The alleged "device" of using goodwill and the antecedent gift transaction were not relevant grounds to disallow the licence fee. The expenditure remained allowable, and the substantial questions of law were answered against the Revenue.
Overall disposition of appeals
Applying the same reasoning and legal position already settled in the earlier judgment on identical questions, the Court held that no substantial question of law survived for consideration and dismissed the appeals, answering all framed questions against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a return of income filed in response to a notice under section 148, though belated vis-à-vis the time mentioned in the notice, could be treated as an invalid return for purposes of completing assessment under section 144.
1.2 Whether issue and service of notice under section 143(2) is mandatory before completing an assessment under section 144 pursuant to a notice under section 148, even where the return is filed belatedly.
1.3 Consequence in law of completing assessment under section 144 without issuance of notice under section 143(2) when a return exists on record.
1.4 Necessity of adjudicating grounds on merits when the assessment is set aside on a technical/jurisdictional ground.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of return filed belatedly in response to notice under section 148
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Assessing Officer recorded in the assessment order that the assessee had failed to furnish the return of income for the year and therefore proceeded to complete a best judgment assessment under section 144.
2.2 The record showed that the assessee had filed a return of income on the e-filing portal on 30.04.2022 in response to a notice under section 148 dated 29.03.2022. This was beyond the 30 days mentioned but was only by two days from the date of issue, and there would be no delay if reckoned from the date of receipt of notice.
2.3 The Tribunal noted that the return so filed appeared on the e-filing portal as a valid return and held that the act of the Assessing Officer in treating such belated filing as an invalid return was contrary to the provisions of the Act.
2.4 It was further held that a return of income filed in response to a notice under section 148 cannot be declared invalid merely because it is filed belatedly beyond the period mentioned in the notice, in the factual matrix of a marginal delay as in the present case.
Conclusion
2.5 The return of income filed by the assessee in response to the notice under section 148 was a valid return on record and could not be ignored or treated as invalid for completing assessment under section 144.
Issue 2 - Mandatory nature of notice under section 143(2) where return is filed pursuant to section 148, even if belated
Legal framework discussed
2.6 The Tribunal referred to the ratio that notice under section 143(2) is mandatory where an assessment is framed pursuant to a notice under section 148, irrespective of the fact that the return in response to such notice is filed belatedly.
2.7 It was noted that non-issuance of notice under section 143(2) is not a curable defect under section 292BB when the jurisdictional requirement itself is not satisfied.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Tribunal observed that once a return is filed in response to a notice under section 148 and is available on record as a valid return, the Assessing Officer is required in law to issue a notice under section 143(2) before completing the assessment.
2.9 Reliance was placed on binding judicial precedents to hold that the issue of notice under section 143(2) is mandatory even in cases where the return pursuant to section 148 is filed belatedly, and that failure to do so vitiates the reassessment proceedings.
2.10 The Tribunal further took note that in earlier decisions following the same principle, orders passed under section 144 had been quashed where no notice under section 143(2) was served, even if the return was belated.
Conclusion
2.11 The issue and service of notice under section 143(2) was a mandatory pre-condition for framing the assessment pursuant to the notice under section 148; the Assessing Officer could not dispense with this requirement on the ground that the return was filed belatedly.
Issue 3 - Validity of assessment under section 144 in absence of notice under section 143(2)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The Tribunal found as a fact that the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 144 without issuing any notice under section 143(2) despite there being a valid return of income on record.
2.13 In light of the legal position that notice under section 143(2) is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality, the Tribunal held that the assessment framed under section 144 without such notice is invalid in law.
2.14 It was also implicitly accepted that such a defect, being jurisdictional, is not curable, and therefore the assessment cannot be sustained on the ground that addition on merits was otherwise justified.
Conclusion
2.15 The assessment order passed under section 144 without issuance of notice under section 143(2), despite a valid return being on record, was invalid and liable to be set aside. Consequently, the appellate order affirming such assessment was also set aside.
Issue 4 - Necessity of deciding grounds on merits after setting aside the assessment on technical ground
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 Having set aside the assessment order on the technical/jurisdictional ground of non-issuance of notice under section 143(2), the Tribunal observed that adjudication of the remaining grounds on merits was not required.
Conclusion
2.17 The Tribunal refrained from examining the grounds on merits relating to the addition under section 69A since the assessment itself stood quashed on a technical ground, and the appeal was partly allowed to that extent.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, notwithstanding the statutory bar on condonation of delay by the appellate authority under the Goods and Services Tax regime, the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction can permit the assessee to avail the appellate remedy by directing that the appeal be heard on merits.
1.2 Whether, in the peculiar facts involving non-filing of returns during the COVID-19 period, alleged non-receipt of the show cause notice for cancellation of registration, and cascading consequences of retrospective cancellation, the rejection of the appeal as time-barred ought to be set aside and the appeal restored for consideration on merits.
1.3 To what extent the principles laid down in earlier decisions regarding (i) the inability of the appellate authority to condone delay, (ii) the High Court's power to extend time for filing an appeal, and (iii) the requirement to consider consequences of retrospective cancellation of registration, govern the present case.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Writ jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory bar on condonation of delay by appellate authority
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noticed that earlier precedent has clearly held that the appellate authority under the GST law cannot condone delay beyond the statutorily prescribed period, and this position was not disputed. The rationale in such precedent is that where the statute fixes an outer limit for filing an appeal, the authority exercising appellate powers is bound by that limit and lacks jurisdiction to extend it.
2.2 The Court, however, contrasted this with another decision where, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court had granted additional time to the assessee to file an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and had directed that such appeal, if filed within the extended period, should not be dismissed as barred by limitation and be decided on merits.
2.3 The Court further noted that the said order of the High Court had been considered and the approach effectively endorsed by the Supreme Court, which granted a further window to file the statutory appeal and indicated that the issue of delay should be considered keeping in view that the assessee had been bona fide pursuing remedies before the High Court and the Supreme Court.
2.4 On this basis, the Court distinguished between (i) the lack of power of the appellate authority itself to condone delay beyond the statutory limit, and (ii) the constitutional power of the High Court, in appropriate cases, to issue directions enabling the assessee to avail the appellate remedy and securing a decision on merits despite the statutory limitation.
Conclusions
2.5 The Court held that, although the appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond the statutory period, the High Court in writ jurisdiction can, in suitable and exceptional circumstances, direct that the appeal be entertained and decided on merits, thereby permitting the assessee to avail the appellate remedy despite the delay.
Issue 2 - Justification for setting aside rejection of appeal as time-barred and directing decision on merits
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Court took note that the petitioner's GST registration had been cancelled retrospectively from 01 July 2017 on account of non-filing of returns for six months during the COVID-19 period, and that this cancellation had led to cascading consequences, including notices for reversal of input tax credit received by the petitioner's clients.
2.7 The petitioner's explanation for delay in filing the appeal against the cancellation order was that it had not become aware of the show cause notice until its clients received notices, and that the failure to file returns itself was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court considered these explanations as forming part of the factual matrix requiring examination on merits.
2.8 The Court also took cognizance of earlier precedent which held that retrospective cancellation of GST registration may not be tenable if the authority does not consider the unintended consequences, such as denial of input tax credit to customers, thereby indicating that such matters involve substantive issues that ought to be examined on merits rather than being shut out at the threshold of limitation.
2.9 In light of the Supreme Court's treatment of a similar situation, where the assessee was allowed further time to pursue the statutory appeal due to its bona fide pursuit of remedies in higher courts, the Court considered it appropriate to adopt a similar approach in the present case, confining the relief to the peculiar facts.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court concluded that the petitioner had furnished a reasonable explanation for the delayed appeal, linked to non-receipt of the show cause notice and COVID-related difficulties, and that the substantive consequences of the retrospective cancellation warranted adjudication on merits.
2.11 The appellate order rejecting the appeal solely on the ground of limitation was set aside. The petitioner was permitted to avail the appellate remedy, with a direction that the appeal shall be heard on merits and shall not be treated as barred by limitation.
2.12 The Court directed that the petitioner be afforded a personal hearing by the appellate authority, and that a reasoned order be passed on the merits of the cancellation of registration, clarifying that these directions were issued having regard to the peculiar facts of the case.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reassessment proceedings under sections 147/144/144B are vitiated for non-issuance of mandatory notice under section 143(2) of the Act after filing/consideration of the return in response to notice under section 148.
1.2 Whether the objection regarding non-issuance of notice under section 143(2), not raised before the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority, can be entertained as a jurisdictional ground before the Tribunal.
1.3 Consequential effect on the additions made under section 69C and on account of difference between receipts as per Form 26AS and income declared in the return, once the reassessment order is held invalid for want of notice under section 143(2).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of reassessment for non-issuance of notice under section 143(2)
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal noted that under the law, a notice under section 143(2) is required to be issued even in reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147, and failure to issue such notice vitiates the reassessment proceedings and renders the reassessment order invalid.
2.2 Reliance was placed on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court which held that absence of notice under section 143(2) creates a jurisdictional defect, not cured by section 292BB, and that the requirement of such notice is mandatory even in reassessment.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal examined the assessment records and found that the Assessing Officer had issued notice under section 142(1) and treated the assessee's reply thereto as a response to notice under section 148. The assessment was framed under sections 147/144/144B.
2.4 It was the specific case of the assessee that no notice under section 143(2) was ever issued during the reassessment proceedings. To substantiate this, the assessee produced the e-filing portal records, which did not reflect issuance or communication of any notice under section 143(2).
2.5 The Department failed to produce any document to show that a notice under section 143(2) had been issued or served on the assessee.
2.6 Referring to the jurisdictional High Court judgment, the Tribunal endorsed the following propositions extracted therein:
(i) Absence of notice under section 143(2) in reassessment proceedings is a jurisdictional defect rendering the proceedings invalid.
(ii) After a return is filed or treated as filed in response to notice under section 148, it is mandatory for the Assessing Officer to issue notice under section 143(2); failure to do so invalidates the reassessment.
(iii) Section 292BB cures only defects in "service" of a notice that has been issued; it does not cure a complete "failure to issue" notice under section 143(2).
(iv) The requirement to issue notice under section 143(2) cannot be viewed as a mere procedural irregularity and is not dispensable.
2.7 Applying these principles, the Tribunal held that, in the absence of any evidence of issuance or service of notice under section 143(2), the reassessment order was hit by a jurisdictional defect.
(c) Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal held that non-issuance of mandatory notice under section 143(2) in reassessment proceedings under section 147 vitiated the entire reassessment and rendered the assessment order invalid in law.
2.9 On this ground alone, the reassessment order and the order of the first appellate authority were set aside.
2.10 The Tribunal, however, reserved liberty to the Revenue to file an appropriate application for recall of this order if it is subsequently able to produce tangible material demonstrating that a mandatory notice under section 143(2) was indeed issued and served on the assessee.
Issue 2: Entertaining jurisdictional ground not raised before lower authorities
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Departmental Representative argued that the ground regarding non-issuance of notice under section 143(2) was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not taken before the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority, and therefore should not be entertained.
2.12 The Tribunal proceeded to examine and decide the ground on merits, treating the requirement of notice under section 143(2) as a jurisdictional condition going to the root of the validity of the reassessment.
2.13 By adjudicating the issue and setting aside the assessment on this ground, the Tribunal implicitly accepted that such a jurisdictional objection can be raised and considered even if taken for the first time before the Tribunal.
(b) Conclusions
2.14 The Tribunal entertained the assessee's objection regarding non-issuance of notice under section 143(2) as a pure question of law affecting jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that it had not been raised before the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority.
Issue 3: Consequential effect on additions made in reassessment
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The Revenue's appeal challenged deletion of additions made (i) under section 69C on account of alleged bogus purchases from a shell entity, and (ii) on account of difference between receipts as per Form 26AS and turnover declared in the return.
2.16 Since the reassessment order itself was held to be invalid for want of mandatory notice under section 143(2), the foundation for all additions made therein stood vitiated.
(b) Conclusions
2.17 The Cross Objection was allowed, the reassessment order and the order of the first appellate authority were set aside as invalid.
2.18 As a consequence, the Revenue's appeal against the deletions of additions became infructuous and was dismissed accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reassessment proceedings under section 147 for Assessment Year 2011-12, initiated on the basis of an unsigned notice issued under section 148, were valid in law.
1.2 Whether, for Assessment Year 2011-12, additions made under sections 68 and 69 towards alleged unexplained cash credits and unexplained investments were sustainable where the assessee had furnished confirmations, financials, bank statements of the lender and had repaid the loan through banking channels.
1.3 Whether reassessment proceedings under section 147 for Assessment Year 2012-13 were vitiated when the notice under section 143(2) was issued before the recorded reasons for reopening were supplied/communicated to the assessee, thereby denying an effective opportunity to challenge the assumption of jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of reassessment based on unsigned notice under section 148 (A.Y. 2011-12)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined the requirement that a notice under section 148 must bear the signature (manual or digital) of the issuing officer, and relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court which held that absence of any such signature renders the notice invalid and non est, and consequently vitiates all subsequent proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The assessee produced the impugned notice under section 148 dated 31/03/2018, placed in the paper book, showing that it did not bear any digital or manual signature of the Assessing Officer.
2.3 The Court noted that the notice was completely unsigned and, following the Bombay High Court precedent, held that such an unsigned notice does not confer any jurisdiction on the officer to proceed with reassessment and is invalid in law.
Conclusions
2.4 The notice issued under section 148 being unsigned was held to be non est and invalid; consequently, the reassessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144 for Assessment Year 2011-12 was liable to be quashed. Ground relating to this objection was allowed.
Issue 2 - Sustainability of additions under sections 68 and 69 where loan documentation and repayment established (A.Y. 2011-12)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.5 The Court proceeded on the settled requirement under section 68 that the assessee must establish identity of the creditor, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction. It relied on a co-ordinate Bench decision which held that where loan transactions are supported by cogent evidence, and especially where the loans have been repaid, additions under sections 68 and related additions (including under section 69/69C) are not justified.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The assessee had furnished before the Assessing Officer and again before the Court:
(i) confirmation of accounts of the lender,
(ii) income-tax return acknowledgments of the lender,
(iii) bank statements of the lender, and
(iv) audited financial statements of the lender,
to establish identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the loan transaction.
2.7 The assessee also produced a chart and supporting bank records showing receipt of loan and its repayment through banking channels, including repayment of Rs. 2.75 crores within the same financial year.
2.8 The Court recorded that these documents were on record and that repayment of the loan had in fact taken place, thereby discharging the primary onus cast on the assessee under section 68.
2.9 Relying on the co-ordinate Bench ruling in a similar factual situation, the Court held that:
(a) no further obligation existed on the assessee to prove "source of source" for loan transactions for the relevant year; and
(b) the factum of full repayment, backed by bank trail and returns of the lender, dispelled any presumption of accommodation entry or unexplained cash credit, and rendered additions under sections 68 and 69 unsustainable.
Conclusions
2.10 Since the assessee had produced cogent evidence to establish identity, creditworthiness, genuineness, and had repaid the loan through banking channels, the additions made under sections 68 (unexplained cash credit of Rs. 2.75 crores) and 69 (unexplained investment of Rs. 7,20,34,392/-) and sustained by the first appellate authority were deleted in full. Grounds on merits relating to these additions were allowed.
2.11 In view of the deletion of the additions and the setting aside of the assessment, the remaining jurisdictional and other grounds for Assessment Year 2011-12 were held to be academic and were not adjudicated.
Issue 3 - Validity of reassessment where notice under section 143(2) was issued before supply of recorded reasons (A.Y. 2012-13)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.12 The Court considered the procedural requirement that, after issuance of notice under section 148, the assessee is entitled to be furnished with the reasons recorded for reopening, so as to enable the assessee to object to the assumption of jurisdiction. Issuance of notice under section 143(2) and further assessment proceedings prior to supplying such reasons undermines this safeguard and vitiates the reassessment.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The assessee requested the Assessing Officer, by letter dated 03/06/2019, to provide the reasons recorded for initiating proceedings under section 147.
2.14 The notice under section 143(2) was issued on 20/09/2019, i.e., prior to the date on which the Assessing Officer claimed in the assessment order to have provided the reasons (05/12/2019 along with notice under section 142(1)).
2.15 The assessee specifically denied receipt of any such reasons or notice on 05/12/2019; however, even assuming reasons were supplied on that date, they were admittedly furnished after issuance of the notice under section 143(2).
2.16 The Court held that issuing notice under section 143(2) before communicating the recorded reasons deprived the assessee of the right to challenge the very assumption of jurisdiction under section 147 and constituted a blatant violation of the procedural safeguards built into the Act.
Conclusions
2.17 The reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2012-13, having been conducted with a notice under section 143(2) issued prior to supply of the recorded reasons, were held to be invalid. The assessment order under section 147 and the order of the first appellate authority were set aside. Ground on this jurisdictional defect was allowed.
2.18 Consequent to the setting aside of the reassessment on this ground, all other grounds on merits and on other jurisdictional issues for Assessment Year 2012-13 were treated as infructuous and were not adjudicated.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the Principal Commissioner was competent to invoke revisional jurisdiction under section 263 in respect of additions arising from alleged bogus purchases and accommodation entries when the same matter was already the subject of a pending appeal before the appellate authority, in view of Explanation 1(c) to section 263.
1.2 Whether the assessment order restricting the addition on bogus purchase and sale transactions to commission income at 0.5% of the transaction value, based on incriminating material and statement of the director, was "erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" so as to justify revision under section 263.
1.3 Whether failure by the Assessing Officer to levy or compute interest under section 234A on delayed filing of the return in response to notice under section 153C could be revised under section 263, where this issue was not the subject matter of appeal and had not been examined in the assessment order.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Scope of section 263 when same issue is pending in appeal; nature of AO's order on bogus purchases and commission addition
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The judgment refers to section 263(1) and Explanation 1(c), which provides that where an order of the Assessing Officer "has been the subject matter of any appeal ... the powers of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend ... to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal."
2.2 The assessee relied on Explanation 1(c) and judicial precedents to contend that matters forming the subject matter of appeal cannot be revised under section 263, and that section 263 can apply only to issues not considered and decided (or pending consideration) in such appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The assessment was framed under section 153C on the basis of incriminating material found during search in another case and the statement of the assessee's director, who admitted that purchases and sales through entities controlled by a third party were bogus and that the assessee earned commission @ 0.5% of the transaction value.
2.4 The Assessing Officer, after enquiry, accepted that both purchases and sales were bogus accommodation entries, and made an addition only of 0.5% of the value of the non-genuine transactions as commission income under section 69C.
2.5 The assessee filed an appeal before the appellate authority challenging the assessment order, specifically on the issue of addition on account of commission on bogus purchases and the underlying transactions with the concerned entities.
2.6 The Principal Commissioner, on examining the record, formed the view that the Assessing Officer ought to have added the entire value of bogus purchases as unexplained expenditure under section 69C and taxed it under section 115BBE, instead of restricting the addition to commission income. On this basis, proceedings under section 263 were initiated and the addition was enhanced to the full purchase value.
2.7 The Tribunal noted, on the basis of the paper book and appeal documents, that:
(a) the issue of bogus purchases and corresponding sales, and the quantum/nature of addition thereon, were already under challenge before the appellate authority;
(b) the very same issue of treatment and quantum of addition in respect of bogus purchases and accommodation entries was the foundation for the Principal Commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction under section 263.
2.8 Applying Explanation 1(c) to section 263, the Tribunal held that once an order of the Assessing Officer has become the subject matter of appeal, the revisional powers can extend only to matters "not considered and decided in such appeal", and cannot be invoked on issues which are already part of the appeal proceedings.
2.9 The Tribunal further observed that the incriminating material and the director's statement indicated both bogus purchases and bogus sales. The Assessing Officer had accepted the director's disclosure that only commission at 0.5% was actually earned on these paper transactions, and made an addition accordingly. The Principal Commissioner, however, sought to treat the entire purchase value as unexplained expenditure without addressing the fact that bogus sales were also recorded, which were part of the same pattern of accommodation entries.
2.10 In this backdrop, the Tribunal treated the Assessing Officer's approach-of taxing only the commission income arising from the accommodation entries-as a possible and plausible view taken after enquiry, and considered the Principal Commissioner's attempt to substitute his own conclusion on the same issue (already in appeal) as going beyond the permissible ambit of section 263.
Conclusions
2.11 The Tribunal concluded that, in terms of Explanation 1(c) to section 263, the Principal Commissioner could not invoke revisional jurisdiction on the issue of bogus purchases/accommodation entries and the related quantum of addition, since that very issue was already the subject matter of a pending appeal before the appellate authority.
2.12 The exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 to enhance the addition from 0.5% commission to the entire amount of purchases under section 69C was held to be bad in law and unsustainable.
2.13 Consequently, the revisional order under section 263 was quashed to the extent it related to enhancement of income on account of bogus purchases and commission/addition under section 69C and section 115BBE for the relevant assessment years.
Issue 3: Revisional jurisdiction under section 263 in respect of non-levy / non-computation of interest under section 234A
Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Principal Commissioner, while examining the assessment record, also noted that notice under section 153C required the assessee to file a return within 10 days; however, the assessee filed the return after about two months' delay and no interest under section 234A was charged in the assessment.
3.2 The assessee contended that non-levy or wrong computation of interest under section 234A was at most a "mistake apparent from record" rectifiable under section 154 and did not constitute an "erroneous" order in the jurisdictional sense required for section 263. It argued that conflating rectification under section 154 with revision under section 263 would render the distinction between the two provisions otiose.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.3 The Tribunal noted that, unlike the issue of bogus purchases and accommodation entries, the Assessing Officer had not dealt with the levy of interest under section 234A in the assessment order, and this question was not raised in the grounds of appeal before the appellate authority.
3.4 It held that, being a distinct and new issue, not forming part of the appeal and not previously examined by the Assessing Officer, it fell within the residual field open to the Principal Commissioner under Explanation 1(c) to section 263.
3.5 On this reasoning, the Tribunal differentiated between the barred field (issues already the subject matter of appeal) and the open field (issues not considered or decided in appeal). The non-levy/non-computation of interest under section 234A was treated as falling in the latter category.
Conclusions
3.6 The Tribunal held that, to the extent the Principal Commissioner invoked section 263 on the issue of interest under section 234A-an issue not before the appellate authority and not dealt with in the assessment order-such initiation of revisional proceedings could be sustained.
3.7 Accordingly, while the revisional order was quashed in respect of enhancement on bogus purchases and commission, the Tribunal upheld (and allowed to proceed) the direction of the Principal Commissioner requiring recomputation/levy of interest under section 234A.
3.8 The assessee's appeals were thus partly allowed: revision under section 263 was set aside on the additions relating to bogus purchases/accommodation entries, but sustained on the distinct issue of interest under section 234A for all three assessment years, applying the same reasoning mutatis mutandis.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148, after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, were valid in the absence of any specific failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the original assessment.
1.2 Whether reliance solely on material already on record (audited accounts, annual report and documents filed in the original assessment) to doubt the allowability of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii) constitutes a valid "reason to believe" or merely a change of opinion, rendering the reassessment invalid.
1.3 Consequential effect on the disallowance of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii) once the reassessment proceedings are held to be invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment beyond four years; requirement of failure to disclose fully and truly; change of opinion
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court referred to section 147, along with its first proviso, and the requirement that where an assessment has been completed under section 143(3) and four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, reassessment can be initiated only if income has escaped assessment "by reason of" the failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment.
2.2 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer must have "reason to believe" based on "tangible material" that income has escaped assessment and that this power cannot be used as a device to review a concluded assessment. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kelvinator India Ltd. and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Asian Paints Ltd., which emphasise the conceptual difference between "review" and "reassessment" and the requirement of fresh tangible material, not mere change of opinion.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court recorded that in the original assessment under section 143(3), the assessee's claim for deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii) had been examined and allowed. The project had been recognised/approved by CBDT for eligibility under section 80-IA(4)(iii), and the assessee had furnished necessary details during earlier and current assessment proceedings.
2.4 In the recorded reasons for reopening, the Assessing Officer raised two points: (i) alleged non-compliance with the condition of minimum 52 units for eligibility of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii); and (ii) claim of deduction on profits arising from purchase and resale (stock-in-trade) of certain units. However, the Court observed that these reasons were derived entirely from the annual report, audited profit and loss account, balance sheet and other material already on record during the original assessment.
2.5 The Court held that the Assessing Officer, while recording reasons, had not identified any specific material fact that was not disclosed by the assessee in the original assessment proceedings. The reasons did not spell out what information the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly, nor did they show any new or subsequent tangible material that came to the notice of the Assessing Officer after completion of the original assessment.
2.6 The Court specifically noted that, although the Assessing Officer invoked Explanation 1(c) to section 147 and mentioned that material facts were "embedded" in the accounts and documents, there was no demonstrable failure on the part of the assessee; instead, the reasons showed that the Assessing Officer was merely re-examining the same material which was already available at the time of the earlier scrutiny.
2.7 The Court held that such reappraisal of pre-existing material amounts to a change of opinion, which cannot justify reopening, especially when four years have elapsed and the statutory condition of assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly is not satisfied.
2.8 Applying the principles laid down in Asian Paints Ltd. and Kelvinator India Ltd., the Court concluded that where all primary facts were already before the Assessing Officer at the time of original assessment, the Assessing Officer cannot reopen the assessment merely because he now takes a different view on the same material or believes he had earlier committed an error.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that the reassessment notice issued under section 148 beyond four years from the end of the assessment year, in the absence of any fresh tangible material and without establishing a specific failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, was invalid and unsustainable in law.
2.10 The Court quashed the reassessment proceedings as being vitiated by absence of jurisdictional conditions under the first proviso to section 147 and as based on mere change of opinion.
Issue 3: Consequence for disallowance of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The disallowance of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii) (to the extent of Rs. 98,30,536/-) was made only in the reassessment order passed pursuant to the notice under section 148.
2.12 Once the foundational reassessment proceedings were held to be invalid and quashed, the assessment order passed in consequence of such reopening lost its legal basis.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court held that, as the reassessment itself was void ab initio, the resultant disallowance of deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iii) became merely academic and did not survive for adjudication on merits.
2.14 The appeal was allowed on the legal ground of invalidity of reassessment; the addition/disallowance made in the reassessment order stood annulled without a separate decision on the substantive merits of the section 80-IA(4)(iii) claim.
Issues: (i) Whether deduction under Section 80G is allowable in respect of CSR donation of Rs.3,00,000/- which was disallowed as CSR expenditure; (ii) Whether short-term capital loss of Rs.2,32,67,278/- on sale of a building can be sustained and carried forward or whether the asset forms part of a block of assets for WDV computation; (iii) Whether additions made under Section 69A on account of unexplained/excess stock of 22KT/18KT and 24KT gold (Rs.4,53,63,627/-, Rs.2,12,52,000/-) were rightly deleted by the CIT(A) or require restoration.
Issue (i): Allowability of deduction under Section 80G for CSR payment of Rs.3,00,000/-.
Analysis: The legal framework distinguishes expenditures disallowed under Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) (CSR outlays disallowed as business expenditure) from deductions available under Chapter VIA (including Section 80G) while computing total taxable income. If a payment otherwise satisfies the statutory conditions of Section 80G, denial of business-expense deduction under Section 37(1) does not automatically bar claim under Section 80G. The assessee produced certificates and records; the Tribunal relied on coordinate-bench decisions and the statutory scheme to conclude that eligibility under Section 80G must be verified on its own criteria. The matter of quantum and verification of particulars was not finally quantified and was remitted to the Assessing Officer for determination of allowable amount subject to evidence.
Conclusion: Deduction under Section 80G in respect of the CSR payment is allowable in principle; issue remitted to Assessing Officer to verify and quantify entitlement in accordance with Section 80G.
Issue (ii): Validity of disallowance of short-term capital loss of Rs.2,32,67,278/- and its carry forward.
Analysis: The assessment of whether the sold building formed part of a block of assets for depreciation (and hence its sale proceeds reduce WDV) requires factual determination of whether other assets remained in the block and the accounting treatment adopted across relevant years. Relevant statutory provisions include Section 50 and the concept of WDV of a block. The Tribunal found inconsistencies in accounting and that both parties and the AO had not uniformly applied appropriate accounting for the peculiar facts (demolition, reconstruction, inclusion in block, absence/claim of depreciation). Because the legal consequence (treatment as block asset or separate capital asset) depends on factual verification of block composition, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to modify block computation as necessary and determine the correct tax treatment and eligibility for carry forward.
Conclusion: The claim is partly allowed for statistical purposes and remitted to the Assessing Officer for factual and computational determination whether the loss can be treated as short-term capital loss and carried forward.
Issue (iii): Deletion of additions under Section 69A in respect of excess/explained stock of gold (22KT/18KT and 24KT discrepancies).
Analysis: Section 69A creates a presumption where assets are found and not recorded in books; however, such presumption can be rebutted by satisfactory explanation supported by verifiable documentary evidence and third-party confirmations. The assessee furnished reconciliation, invoices, bank payments, GST/audited records and responses from counterparties to notices under Section 133(6). The CIT(A) evaluated the survey statements, contemporaneous records, and post-survey corroboration and concluded the stock differences arose from timing/entry delays and job-work/export movements. The AOs reliance on un-retracted survey statements and absence of an office stamp on a reconciliation was held insufficient to outweigh documentary proof and third-party confirmations. The Tribunal found no material to disturb the CIT(A)s factual and legal conclusion that the additions were unjustified.
Conclusion: Additions under Section 69A of Rs.4,53,63,627/- and Rs.2,12,52,000/- are deleted; revenues grounds are dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allows the assessees claim on the Section 80G issue (subject to AO verification), partly allows and remits the short-term capital loss issue for factual/computational determination, and upholds deletion of Section 69A additions; overall the appeal is partly allowed in favour of the assessee and the revenues appeal is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Documentary reconciliation supported by verifiable third-party confirmations and audited/GST records can rebut the presumption under Section 69A; CSR payments disallowed under Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) may nonetheless be examined for separate entitlement under Section 80G, and classification of a sold asset as a block asset or separate capital asset depends on factual account-grouping and WDV computation under Section 50.
Issues: Whether the assessment framed under section 153A for Assessment Year 2010-11 was barred as being beyond the extended 10-year period.
Analysis: The assessment year under consideration fell beyond the 10-year period contemplated in Explanation 1 to section 153A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) had followed the binding jurisdictional High Court decision and, in the absence of any contrary judicial precedent or contrary factual material, there was no basis to interfere with that finding.
Conclusion: The assessment was rightly held to be beyond the extended 10-year period and the Revenue's challenge failed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the first appellate authority was justified in admitting and relying upon additional evidence under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and deciding the appeal without a remand report from the Assessing Officer.
1.2 Whether the addition on account of alleged discrepancy between turnover reflected in Form 26AS and gross sales as per profit and loss account was sustainable.
1.3 Whether the addition made towards trade payables disclosed in the balance sheet was justified.
1.4 Whether the addition made towards current liabilities disclosed in the balance sheet was justified.
1.5 Whether the addition made towards exceptional charges/expenses, already disallowed in the computation of income, constituted impermissible double addition.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Admission and use of additional evidence under Rule 46A and absence of remand report
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The Tribunal noted that additional evidence was filed before the first appellate authority under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Such evidence was specifically forwarded to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for a remand report and for enquiries under the Act, and multiple reminders were issued.
2.1.2 No remand report or adverse comments were received from the Assessing Officer despite repeated reminders. The first appellate authority, relying on judicial precedents discussed in the impugned order, proceeded to admit the additional evidence and adjudicate the issues on the basis of the material on record.
2.1.3 The Tribunal accepted that the first appellate authority, having co-terminus powers with the Assessing Officer, was competent to admit the additional evidence and decide the appeal on merits when the Assessing Officer failed to respond to the remand reference.
Conclusion
2.1.4 The challenge to the admission and use of additional evidence under Rule 46A was rejected, and the ground alleging violation of Rule 46A was dismissed.
2.2 Addition for discrepancy between Form 26AS turnover and sales as per profit and loss account
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The addition was originally made solely because turnover as per Form 26AS exceeded gross sales reported in the profit and loss account, without details from the assessee during assessment.
2.2.2 Before the first appellate authority, the assessee explained that the difference of about Rs. 7.86 crore arose from sale of plant and machinery of Rs. 8.01 crore, which was a fixed asset sale and hence not part of business sales turnover.
2.2.3 Additional evidence in the form of GSTR-1 for the relevant financial year, the fixed assets schedule in the audited accounts, and detailed sale invoices for plant and machinery was produced. These showed plant and machinery sales corresponding to the amounts in question, duly recorded in GSTR-1 and in the fixed asset schedule.
2.2.4 The additional evidence was remanded to the Assessing Officer, who did not furnish any adverse comment. The first appellate authority found the explanation consistent and supported by contemporaneous records and accepted that the sale of fixed assets, though appearing in Form 26AS, was correctly excluded from "Gross Sales" in the profit and loss account.
2.2.5 The Tribunal endorsed the factual analysis and reconciliation made by the first appellate authority, holding that the evidences properly explained the difference and that the Assessing Officer's addition was merely based on a mechanical comparison of figures without enquiry.
Conclusion
2.2.6 The addition towards discrepancy in sales turnover was held to be unjustified and was deleted.
2.3 Addition towards trade payables
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Assessing Officer had added the entire closing balance of trade payables (about Rs. 2.66 crore) only because details were not furnished during assessment.
2.3.2 In appeal, the assessee submitted a reconciliation of the trade payable account, showing an opening balance of about Rs. 1.39 crore and a closing balance of about Rs. 2.66 crore, with the principal movement being regrouping of a liability of about Rs. 1.29 crore relating to a single creditor from "Other liabilities" to "Trade payable".
2.3.3 Additional evidence comprising account confirmation and ITR acknowledgement of the creditor was filed and remanded to the Assessing Officer, who did not respond with any adverse report.
2.3.4 The first appellate authority independently issued notice under section 133(6) to the creditor. The creditor confirmed the outstanding balance as on 31.03.2021 and furnished supporting documentation, including the ledger, audited financial statements and ITR acknowledgement.
2.3.5 On this material, it was found that only one creditor's balance had been regrouped to the trade payable head and that the liability was subsisting and confirmed. There was no evidence to treat the trade payable balance as non-genuine or income of the assessee.
2.3.6 The Tribunal agreed that the addition was made solely for lack of details at assessment stage and that, upon full verification in appeal, the liability stood established and could not be taxed.
Conclusion
2.3.7 The addition towards trade payables was held to be unwarranted and was deleted.
2.4 Addition towards current liabilities
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4.1 The entire closing balance of current liabilities (about Rs. 99.86 crore) was added by the Assessing Officer on the ground that no details were filed during assessment.
2.4.2 Before the first appellate authority, a head-wise and party-wise break-up of current liabilities was furnished. It was shown that the opening balance of current liabilities (about Rs. 110.21 crore) exceeded the closing balance, evidencing a reduction rather than increase during the year.
2.4.3 Detailed ledgers and break-ups were filed for personnel expenses payable, other expenses payable and statutory dues payable, and it was explained that additions during the year under statutory dues were minimal and that unpaid PF/ESI dues of Rs. 4.91 lakh had already been added back in the computation of income. The computation of income and return of income were produced to demonstrate such disallowance under sections 36 and 43B.
2.4.4 Under "Capex trade payable" there was no movement during the year, the opening and closing balances being identical.
2.4.5 For the large "Other liabilities" component, the assessee supplied party-wise details and confirmations/ITR acknowledgements of major creditors. The material was remanded to the Assessing Officer, who did not offer any contrary report.
2.4.6 The first appellate authority issued notices under section 133(6) to significant creditors shown under "Other liabilities". These creditors confirmed their respective balances and furnished ledgers, audited financial statements and ITR acknowledgements.
2.4.7 In the case of one party, the material showed a net reduction of outstanding balance during the year, and it was further clarified that, in the subsequent year, liability written back, including that of this party, was offered to tax as income.
2.4.8 On cumulative consideration, it was found that: (i) the total current liabilities had decreased during the year; (ii) the balances were supported by ledgers and confirmations; (iii) significant creditors had independently confirmed the balances upon statutory notices; and (iv) relevant statutory disallowances on unpaid dues had already been made in computation.
2.4.9 The Tribunal concurred with the first appellate authority that the current liabilities were properly explained and substantiated and that the Assessing Officer's wholesale addition of the closing balance, without enquiry, could not be sustained.
Conclusion
2.4.10 The addition of the closing balance of current liabilities was held unjustified and was deleted.
2.5 Addition towards exceptional charges/expenses and issue of double addition
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5.1 The Assessing Officer had added the entire amount of exceptional charges/expenses (about Rs. 71.65 crore) debited to the profit and loss account for want of explanation or evidence during assessment.
2.5.2 In appellate proceedings, the assessee produced the return of income and computation, including Schedule BP, demonstrating that an amount of Rs. 71,71,27,694 debited to the profit and loss account had already been disallowed suo motu under section 37 as not allowable.
2.5.3 The first appellate authority accepted that the very amount characterised as exceptional charges/expenses had already been added back in computing business income and that any further addition by the Assessing Officer in respect of the same amount would amount to double addition.
2.5.4 The Tribunal agreed that once the expenditure was wholly disallowed in the computation by the assessee itself, there was no remaining tax effect to justify an additional disallowance by the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion
2.5.5 The addition towards exceptional charges/expenses was treated as a case of impermissible double addition and was deleted.
2.6 Overall conclusion on the Revenue's appeal
2.6.1 The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority, having co-terminus powers with the Assessing Officer, had correctly admitted additional evidence, conducted necessary verification (including issuing notices under section 133(6)), and adjudicated on the merits.
2.6.2 All grounds raised by the Revenue, including those on Rule 46A and on the four substantive additions, were rejected, and the appeal was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reimbursement in cash of foreign exchange fluctuation loss on repayment of External Commercial Borrowing is taxable as "benefit or perquisite" under section 28(iv) of the Act.
1.2 Whether payments routed through a foreign entity in connection with seconded employees to Indonesia attract disallowance under section 40(a)(iii) for failure to deduct tax at source, and the need for further factual examination.
1.3 Whether reversal of a provision for expenses, which had been fully disallowed in the year of creation under section 40(a)(ia), can again be brought to tax under section 37 on the ground that tax was not deducted at source.
1.4 Effect of non-pressing of grounds relating to a general challenge to the assessment order and disallowance under section 37, and the consequential/premature nature of grounds on interest under section 234B and initiation of penalty.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Taxability under section 28(iv) of reimbursement of foreign exchange fluctuation loss on ECB
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined section 28(iv) of the Act in light of the judicial interpretation that for a "benefit or perquisite" to be taxable thereunder, it must be "other than in the shape of money". Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and of the High Court in IG Petrochemicals Ltd., including the discussion on the Finance Act, 2023 amendment to section 28.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The assessee had availed ECB for capital purposes; unrealised forex losses on restatement in earlier years were suo motu disallowed as capital in nature and not claimed as deduction. On repayment in the relevant year, a net realised forex loss was incurred and, as per agreement, reimbursed in full by the associated enterprise.
2.3 The assessee reduced the reimbursement from taxable income on the basis that: (i) the underlying losses had never been claimed as deduction, and taxing the reimbursement would cause double taxation; (ii) the ECB related to a capital asset and the reimbursement was capital in nature; and (iii) the receipt was a pure reimbursement in cash, without income element or benefit/perquisite.
2.4 The Assessing Officer treated the reimbursement as a benefit taxable under section 28(iv), relying on a High Court decision concerning waiver of liability.
2.5 The Court found that the receipt in question was in the "shape of money" and therefore fell outside the ambit of section 28(iv) as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Court further noted that the forex loss had never been allowed as a deduction and the reimbursement did not contain any profit or income element.
(c) Conclusion
2.6 The reimbursement of foreign exchange fluctuation loss on repayment of ECB, being a monetary receipt without embedded income and relating to an expense never allowed as deduction, is not taxable under section 28(iv) of the Act. The addition was directed to be deleted.
Issue 2: Disallowance under section 40(a)(iii) on payments routed through Indonesian entity for seconded employees
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.7 The Court considered section 40(a)(iii), which disallows deduction of salaries payable outside India or to a non-resident unless tax is deducted at source, read with section 9(1)(ii) regarding income under the head "Salaries" deemed to accrue or arise in India. The India-Indonesia DTAA Article 15 (Dependent Personal Services) was also reproduced and examined by the Assessing Officer for context.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The assessee seconded its employees to Indonesia and entered into an agreement with an Indonesian entity to sponsor work permits/visas and to pay local salaries and social security charges. The assessee reimbursed these costs and also paid a 15% service fee to the Indonesian entity, without withholding tax.
2.9 The Assessing Officer, based on the secondment agreement and factual control, held that: (i) the assessee remained the real employer; (ii) the Indonesian entity merely acted as a paying conduit; and (iii) salaries paid abroad to seconded employees, being chargeable under "Salaries", attracted TDS; failure to deduct tax warranted disallowance under section 40(a)(iii).
2.10 The DRP agreed that the assessee had management and supervisory control over seconded employees and upheld application of section 40(a)(iii).
2.11 Before the Court, the assessee contended that: (i) payments were made to a third-party foreign entity and not to employees; (ii) no employer-employee relationship existed between the assessee and the Indonesian entity; (iii) services were rendered outside India; and (iv) therefore section 9(1)(ii) and section 40(a)(iii) could not apply. Authorities were cited to support these propositions.
2.12 The Court observed that although the Assessing Officer had referred to the secondment agreement and invoices, the DRP did not examine the agreement or the detailed written submissions. The precise nature of the relationship (who is the real employer, to whom the payments are effectively made, whether the sums are chargeable to tax in India) required proper factual verification.
(c) Conclusion
2.13 The disallowance under section 40(a)(iii) was set aside and the matter remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination. The assessee was directed to produce the secondment agreement, invoices, and all relevant evidence to establish: (i) the true employer-employee relationship; and (ii) whether the amounts paid to the Indonesian entity are chargeable to tax in India. The Assessing Officer is to re-decide the issue in accordance with law after such examination.
Issue 3: Taxability of reversal of provision for expenses earlier disallowed under section 40(a)(ia)
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.14 The Court considered the interaction of section 37 (allowability of business expenditure) with section 40(a)(ia) (disallowance for failure to deduct tax at source) in the context of a provision that had already been fully disallowed in a prior year.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The assessee had created a provision for professional and contractor charges in an earlier year and, since tax was not deducted at source, had voluntarily disallowed the entire provision under section 40(a)(ia) in that year.
2.16 In the year under appeal, part of the provision was utilised for actual expenditure on which TDS was duly deducted and remitted; the balance, no longer required, was reversed. As the provision had never been allowed as a deduction (having already been disallowed in the earlier year), the assessee excluded the reversal from income.
2.17 The Assessing Officer nevertheless added the reversed amount to income, and the DRP upheld the addition, on the ground that tax had not been deducted at source on the original provision.
2.18 The Court noted that the provision had already suffered disallowance in the year of creation; consequently, its subsequent reversal did not represent income, as there had been no prior allowance of the expenditure and no tax benefit earlier claimed or granted.
(c) Conclusion
2.19 The reversal of the provision, which had been fully disallowed in the earlier year under section 40(a)(ia), is not chargeable to tax in the present year. The addition was directed to be deleted.
Issue 4: Non-pressed, consequential and premature grounds
2.20 The general ground challenging the assessment order and the ground relating to disallowance of provision for expenses under section 37 were expressly not pressed; both were dismissed without adjudication on merits.
2.21 The ground relating to interest under section 234B was treated as consequential and the ground concerning initiation of penalty proceedings as premature; both were dismissed on that basis.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the disallowance of interest expenditure under section 36(1)(iii) on the allegation of diversion of overdraft borrowings for partners' interest-free drawings was justified.
1.2 Whether, in determining such disallowance, the availability and quantum of interest-free funds, including partners' capital (adjusted for non-cash diminution), current liabilities and trade payables, were required to be taken into account and a presumption drawn that such funds were utilised first.
1.3 Whether partners' drawings routed through the overdraft account could be treated as non-business use of borrowed funds in the absence of a proven direct nexus and despite ample interest-free funds.
1.4 Treatment of grounds relating to levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C, 234D and initiation of penalty under section 270A, in view of the deletion of the substantive disallowance.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) vis-à-vis availability of interest-free funds
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The disallowance was made under section 36(1)(iii) on the premise that a portion of interest on overdraft borrowings was attributable to partners' interest-free drawings and, therefore, not incurred "for the purposes of business". The assessee invoked judicial precedents holding that where interest-free funds exceed the interest-free advances and funds are mixed, a presumption arises that such advances are from interest-free funds and no disallowance of interest is warranted.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer accepted the genuineness of borrowings and their use for business and that disallowance was based solely on the withdrawals by two partners from the overdraft account and the resulting debit balances in their capital accounts.
2.3 It was observed that the Assessing Officer concentrated only on (i) overdraft balance and (ii) debit balances of two partners, without examining the overall availability of interest-free funds, the cumulative partners' capital, additions by way of profits and fresh capital, or the totality of partners' accounts. The debit balances of the two partners were taken in isolation and directly linked to the overdraft interest.
2.4 The Court found that the appellate authority essentially adopted the same approach, presuming that if surplus interest-free funds existed they should have been applied to reduce the overdraft and that partners' withdrawals from the overdraft necessarily implied diversion of borrowed funds. It was noted that this approach treated every withdrawal routed through overdraft as non-business use, without a clear factual finding that the assessee lacked sufficient interest-free funds at the relevant times.
2.5 On facts, the Court relied on the audited figures summarised in Table A to hold that as per the balance sheet, as on 01.04.2015, the assessee had interest-free funds of Rs. 2,06,80,01,543/- (partners' capital, current liabilities and trade payables) and as on 31.03.2016, interest-free funds of Rs. 2,09,31,86,439/-. Even on the revenue's own figures, the impugned partners' withdrawals were only a fraction of these interest-free funds.
2.6 The lower authorities had treated opening negative capital balances of two partners as showing erosion of interest-free capital. The Court held this to be factually and legally flawed because those negative balances arose only from a non-cash book entry of "permanent diminution in value of investments" of Rs. 31,63,41,024/-, apportioned to partners in the prior year and already disallowed by the assessee in computing taxable income. This provision did not involve any outflow of funds.
2.7 After neutralising this non-cash diminution (Table C), the revised cumulative partners' capital as on 01.04.2015 was Rs. 97,46,33,899/- and, together with current liabilities and trade payables, produced interest-free funds of Rs. 2,38,43,42,568/-. As on 31.03.2016, the revised cumulative capital was Rs. 1,22,07,59,057/- and total interest-free funds Rs. 2,40,95,27,464/-. The Court treated these as the relevant "real" own funds for section 36(1)(iii) purposes, holding that a mere accounting provision for diminution cannot be used to infer depletion of interest-free funds.
2.8 The Court also emphasised that partners' capital accounts, seen holistically, contained significant credits during the year from share of profit and capital introduced. These credits remained in the business and were not treated as loans. The authorities had not found them fictitious or unavailable; yet they focused only on withdrawals, ignoring the credit side of capital accounts, which the Court held to be impermissible when examining availability of interest-free funds.
2.9 The assessee's day-wise working (Annexure 2) showed availability of adequate interest-free funds on each date of partners' withdrawals. This working was not specifically rebutted by the Revenue. The Court held that, in the presence of such uncontroverted material, the contrary presumption that withdrawals were from borrowed funds merely because they passed through the overdraft account was untenable.
2.10 Referring to the judicial principle cited by the assessee, the Court reiterated that where an assessee has a common/mixed pool of funds and interest-free funds exceed the interest-free advances, a presumption arises that such advances have been made out of interest-free funds. The assessee is not required to prove a one-to-one nexus for each rupee advanced. The Court found that the appellate authority had failed to consider or distinguish these precedents, instead relying on decisions involving different factual situations (e.g., advances to sister concerns or tax-avoidance structures) where a finding of diversion of borrowed funds was first established on facts.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court concluded that:
(a) The factual premise adopted by the lower authorities-that partners' capital stood eroded and interest-free funds were insufficient-was incorrect once the non-cash diminution entry was neutralised and the full capital, current liabilities and trade payables were considered.
(b) The assessee had demonstrated ample interest-free funds at all relevant times, clearly exceeding the partners' drawings. In such circumstances, the statutory deduction of interest on borrowings could not be denied on a hypothetical nexus theory.
(c) The presumption that interest-free funds are used first in a mixed pool was applicable, and the contrary presumption drawn by the authorities was unsustainable.
(d) The disallowance of interest expenditure of Rs. 2,88,13,592/- under section 36(1)(iii) was not sustainable and was liable to be deleted.
Issue 3: Partners' drawings, commercial expediency and nexus with borrowed funds
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The appellate authority had relied on the concept of "commercial expediency", holding that allowing partners' interest-free drawings when an overdraft subsisted lacked commercial justification, and invoked authorities on lifting the corporate veil and diversion of borrowed funds.
3.2 The Court observed that the assessee is a partnership firm in a capital-intensive ship recycling business and that partners' drawings from capital accounts are a normal incident of the partnership structure. There was no finding that overdraft borrowings were raised primarily to fund partners' personal needs.
3.3 The Court reiterated that the test under section 36(1)(iii) is whether the borrowing is for the purposes of business and whether there is a direct nexus between borrowed funds and non-business advances. On the record, the borrowings and their use for business were not in dispute; the only allegation was based on the routing of drawings through the overdraft account.
3.4 Given that overall interest-free funds (adjusted partners' capital, current liabilities and trade payables) comfortably covered the partners' drawings, the Court held that merely routing drawings through the overdraft account does not, by itself, establish that the interest burden corresponding to such drawings ceased to be for business purposes.
3.5 The Court further held that reliance by the appellate authority on precedents concerning advances to sister concerns or complex restructuring, where clear factual findings of diversion existed, was misplaced in this context where no such factual nexus was established.
Conclusions
3.6 On the test of commercial expediency and nexus, the Court held that:
(a) There was no demonstrated direct nexus between borrowed funds and non-business use through partners' drawings.
(b) The existence of sufficient interest-free funds negated the inference of diversion of overdraft borrowings.
(c) Partners' drawings alone, even if routed through overdraft, could not justify disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) in the factual matrix of this case.
(d) Accordingly, the disallowance based on alleged lack of commercial expediency and diversion of borrowed funds was unsustainable.
Issue 4: Consequential grounds on interest under sections 234A/B/C/D and penalty under section 270A
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 After deleting the substantive disallowance under section 36(1)(iii), the Court noted that the remaining grounds concerning levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C and 234D and initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A were purely consequential in nature.
Conclusions
4.2 The Court directed deletion of the disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) and held that the other grounds, being consequential, did not require independent adjudication and were treated accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether additions under section 68 on account of alleged unexplained cash credits could be sustained solely on the basis of decoded entries in a third-party seized diary, in the absence of any corroboration and in the face of fully recorded cheque-based transactions in the assessee's audited books.
1.2 Whether additions under section 69A on account of alleged unexplained money could be sustained on the same third-party seized diary, where no name or identifier of the assessee appeared, there was no evidence of corresponding cash movement in the assessee's accounts, and the decoded figures did not reconcile with the assessee's books.
1.3 Whether the appellate authority was justified in treating the seized diary of the searched group as a "dumb document" vis-à-vis the assessee and in deleting the additions under sections 68 and 69A for all assessment years.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Sustainability of additions under sections 68 and 69A based solely on third-party seized diary entries
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the statutory scheme of sections 68 and 69A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 relating to unexplained cash credits and unexplained money, and on the evidentiary principles governing reliance on seized material and loose papers/diaries.
2.2 The Court referred to judicial precedents (including decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts) laying down that:
(i) Loose papers, diaries and other third-party documents not forming part of regular books of account are not "books of account" for evidentiary purposes and have no independent probative value without corroboration.
(ii) Even entries in books of account regularly maintained in the ordinary course of business do not by themselves constitute sufficient evidence to fasten tax liability without independent corroborative material proving the reality of the transaction and its nexus with the assessee.
(iii) The statutory presumption under section 132(4A) in respect of seized material does not extend to documents found from third parties when used against another assessee.
(iv) Uncorroborated loose sheets or notings, lacking essential particulars and not matched with real-world transactions, are "dumb documents" and cannot form the sole basis for additions under sections 68 and 69A.
2.3 The authorities cited and relied on for these propositions included, inter alia, decisions in:
- Nishant Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT
- Prarthana Constructions Pvt. Ltd.
- Common Cause vs. Union of India ("Sahara Diaries")
- Hitesh B. Patel
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
Nature of seized material and its linkage to the assessee
2.4 The seized diary/cash book and vouchers were found during a search on the Venus Group at the Terrace of Crystal Arcade/Crystal Plaza, and were owned by a person of that group; no seizure was from the assessee's premises.
2.5 The Court noted that:
(i) The seized diary did not bear the assessee's name anywhere, nor any specific identifier or ledger reference linking any entry to the assessee.
(ii) No entry was in the handwriting of, or signed by, any person connected with the assessee.
(iii) The diary and vouchers were admitted and owned as belonging to the Venus Group; hence, they constituted third-party documents vis-à-vis the assessee.
2.6 The Assessing Officer's entire case rested on the assumption that the name "Kalpesh" appearing in the decoded diary entries referred to a director of the assessee. The Court observed that:
(i) No confirmation from the writer of the diary, no handwriting examination, and no statement from any person of the Venus Group was produced to establish that "Kalpesh" meant the assessee's director.
(ii) In several entries the word "Ganesh" was written with "Kalpesh", further weakening the inference that the reference was to the assessee's director.
(iii) No witness from the Venus Group admitted that any diary entry of cash payment or receipt pertained to the assessee.
2.7 The Court therefore held that the linkage between the seized diary and the assessee was purely presumptive and not supported by any direct or corroborative evidence.
Comparison with assessee's books and bank statements - A.Y. 2011-12
2.8 For A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee's audited books showed:
(i) In the ledger of Sunderdeep Builders, an opening debit balance of Rs. 11.05 crore, further advance of Rs. 0.90 crore, total receivable of Rs. 11.95 crore, and full receipt through cheques during the year, resulting in a nil closing balance.
(ii) In the ledger of Venus Infrastructure & Developers Ltd., an opening debit balance of Rs. 8.90 crore, further advances of Rs. 8.10 crore, receipt of Rs. 5 crore by cheque, and closing debit balance of Rs. 12 crore.
2.9 The Assessing Officer, relying on decoded diary entries, treated:
(i) Alleged cash receipts of Rs. 4 crore (three entries in the name "Kalpesh") as unexplained cash credits under section 68, and
(ii) Alleged cash payments of Rs. 5.80 crore as unexplained money under section 69A.
2.10 The Court, drawing from the CIT(A)'s findings and reproduced tabulations, noted that:
(i) The decoded cash receipts of Rs. 4 crore did not tally in amount, timing, or aggregate with the cheque receipts of Rs. 11.95 crore from Sunderdeep Builders as per the assessee's books.
(ii) The decoded cash payments of Rs. 5.80 crore did not reconcile with the advances of Rs. 8.10 crore made by the assessee to Venus Infrastructure & Developers Ltd., nor did they align with any pattern of recorded banking transactions.
(iii) There was no corresponding cash withdrawal or cash deposit in the assessee's bank accounts or cash book matching the alleged cash transactions.
2.11 It was also emphasised that the assessee's books had not been found defective; all transactions with Sunderdeep Builders and Venus Infrastructure & Developers Ltd. were duly recorded in audited accounts and accepted as such by the Assessing Officer, except for the alleged parallel cash movement presumed from the diary.
2.12 The Court held that the Assessing Officer had selectively correlated a few cheque dates with decoded diary dates, ignoring:
(i) The substantial opening debit balances,
(ii) The complete loan cycle and year-wise movement of funds through banking channels, and
(iii) The closing positions in the accounts.
2.13 When viewed in entirety, the assessee was consistently a creditor to the Venus Group concerns, which contradicted the hypothesis of the assessee providing or receiving unaccounted cash in the manner alleged.
A.Y. 2012-13 and A.Y. 2014-15
2.14 For A.Y. 2012-13, the Assessing Officer alleged cash receipts of Rs. 7.50 crore based on decoded diary entries and treated cheque receipts of an equivalent amount from Sunderdeep Builders as accommodation entries. However, the CIT(A), whose findings were accepted by the Court, recorded that:
(i) The assessee's books fully reflected cheque receipts of Rs. 7.50 crore and the underlying ledger balances.
(ii) No cash outflow or inflow of Rs. 7.50 crore was reflected in the assessee's books or bank statements.
(iii) The alleged cash nexus was merely presumed from diary notings and not established by any independent evidence or bank-trail.
2.15 For A.Y. 2014-15, the Assessing Officer relied on a decoded diary entry of Rs. 1 crore cash allegedly paid on a date proximate to a cheque receipt of Rs. 1 crore from Sunderdeep Builders. The Court noted the following findings of the CIT(A):
(i) There was no name or identifier in the diary entry linking the alleged cash payment to the assessee.
(ii) No corroborative evidence from any person of the Venus Group was obtained.
(iii) The decoded figure did not meaningfully match the ledger and bank transactions when the full account was considered.
(iv) The assessee's ledger reconciliation with Sunderdeep Builders and Venus Infrastructure & Developers Ltd. matched the bank transactions and disclosed no unexplained cash component.
2.16 Across all years, the Court accepted that the Assessing Officer's analysis was "one-sided" and "selective," as it:
(i) Cherry-picked a few decoded entries allegedly relating to "Kalpesh" while ignoring numerous other entries,
(ii) Ignored the opening debit balances, the continuous running accounts, and the closing balances, and
(iii) Proceeded on conjectures that every proximate cheque transaction corresponded to an unrecorded cash movement.
Characterisation of the seized diary as a "dumb document"
2.17 On the cumulative factual and legal position, the Court agreed with the CIT(A) that, as far as the assessee was concerned, the seized diary of the Venus Group was a "dumb document" because:
(i) It was a third-party document not part of the assessee's regular books.
(ii) It did not contain the assessee's name or any specific reference to its accounts.
(iii) The figures could not be reconciled with the assessee's bank statements or audited accounts, either entry-wise or in aggregate.
(iv) No independent corroboration (statement of author, handwriting expert opinion, admission by Venus Group, or matching cash trail) was produced.
(v) The decoding and interpretation of the entries were unilateral exercises by the Assessing Officer.
2.18 Relying on the cited precedents, the Court held that such a diary, in the absence of corroboration and nexus, could not be treated as conclusive or even sufficient evidence to justify additions under sections 68 or 69A.
(c) Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.19 For A.Y. 2011-12, the Court upheld the deletion of:
(i) The addition of Rs. 4,00,00,000/- made under section 68 as alleged unexplained cash credits, and
(ii) The addition of Rs. 5,80,00,000/- made under section 69A as alleged unexplained money,
on the grounds that the additions were based solely on third-party diary entries lacking nexus, corroboration, or reconciliation with the assessee's books and bank records.
2.20 For A.Y. 2012-13, the Court upheld the deletion of the addition of Rs. 7,50,00,000/- made under section 68 as alleged unexplained cash credits, for the same reasons of absence of evidentiary linkage, non-existence of corresponding cash movement in the assessee's accounts, and the selective and presumptive approach of the Assessing Officer.
2.21 For A.Y. 2014-15, the Court upheld the deletion of:
(i) The addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- made under section 68, and
(ii) The addition of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- made under section 69A,
again on the basis that there was no cogent evidence of any unexplained cash credits or unexplained money and that the decoded diary entries could not, in law or on facts, sustain such additions.
Issue 3: Justification of the appellate authority's treatment of the diary as "dumb document" and deletion of additions
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 The Court endorsed the CIT(A)'s approach in:
(i) Treating the seized diary/cash book of the Venus Group as a third-party document vis-à-vis the assessee with no inherent evidentiary value against the assessee in the absence of corroboration.
(ii) Holding that the decoding of dates and amounts, and the inference that "Kalpesh" was the assessee's director, were mere assumptions not backed by statements or objective evidence.
(iii) Recognising that when the assessee's books were examined in full (including opening debit balances, advances, repayments, and closing balances), the assessee's position as creditor to the Venus Group was clear and inconsistent with the theory of unrecorded cash dealings.
(iv) Characterising the diary as a "dumb document" in the light of binding judicial precedents, since it neither contained adequate particulars nor was supported by any external proof connecting it to the assessee.
2.23 The Court further observed that the Revenue had not produced any material to contradict or displace the detailed factual findings of the CIT(A), nor had any infirmity in the CIT(A)'s appreciation of evidence or application of law been demonstrated.
(b) Conclusions on Issue 3
2.24 The Court held that the CIT(A) had correctly applied the law and properly appreciated the evidence in treating the seized diary as a "dumb document" with no probative value against the assessee and in deleting the additions made under sections 68 and 69A for all three assessment years.
2.25 Consequently, all appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed on merits, and the deletions of the impugned additions by the CIT(A) were affirmed in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the materials on record disclose a prima facie commission of offences of cheating and forgery under Sections 318(4), 336, 338 and 340(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
1.2 Whether, notwithstanding that gambling/online betting is not a scheduled offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the funds routed through the shell entities constitute "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) PMLA.
1.3 Whether, on the basis of the above, a prima facie case of the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 PMLA is made out against the applicant.
1.4 Whether, having regard to the nature of accusations and material available, the applicant is entitled to bail under Section 483 BNSS read with Section 45 PMLA.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Prima facie commission of offences under Sections 318(4), 336, 338 and 340(2) BNS
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered the statutory definitions in Sections 2(7) "dishonestly", 2(9) "fraudulently", 2(14) "injury", 2(15) "illegal", 2(31) "valuable security", 2(36) "wrongful gain", 2(37) "wrongful loss", 2(38) "gaining wrongfully and losing wrongfully" of BNS, and the text of Sections 318 (cheating and its aggravated form under sub-section (4)), 335 (making a false document), 336 (forgery), 338 (forgery of valuable security, etc.) and 340(2) (using a forged document as genuine).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 On perusal of the FIR, statements and material, the Court found that the applicant and co-accused induced innocent individuals to part with their identity/KYC documents and to open bank accounts or shell entities on the false promise of employment in APMC. These documents and accounts were then used, without disclosure of the true purpose, to establish and operate shell entities (including M/s Hardik Enterprises and M/s Haresh Trading Co.).
2.3 The Court held that if such deception had not been practised, the concerned individuals would not have opened accounts nor handed over signed cheque-books and debit cards. Thus, there was clear "deception" and "dishonest" inducement within the meaning of Section 318 BNS.
2.4 Bank accounts were treated as "property" and the right to operate them as an asset, the wrongful transfer of control over which constituted "wrongful loss" to the account-holders and "wrongful gain" to the accused, within Sections 2(36)-(38) BNS. Reference was made to the Supreme Court's view that bank accounts are "property" in the context of seizure (State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy).
2.5 The Court inferred that, for effecting withdrawals, the accused must have filled in their own names or beneficiaries' names as payees in blank, pre-signed cheques. Writing the payee's name without authority on such cheques amounted to making a "false document" and thereby "forgery" of a "valuable security" (cheques being bills of exchange and "valuable security"), attracting Sections 335, 336 and 338 BNS.
2.6 Use of those cheques and related documents for encashment and transfers, with knowledge that they were so created/altered, constituted "using as genuine" forged documents under Section 340(2) BNS. The deception extended to the banks, which were induced to honour such instruments as genuine.
2.7 The Court rejected the contention that the documents were "genuine" merely because they belonged to real persons. It held that the critical factor was the deceptive manner in which the documents and accounts were obtained and used, and the unauthorised completion and use of signed cheque-leaves, which satisfied the elements of cheating and forgery.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that there is a strong prima facie case that the applicant and co-accused cheated the individual account-holders and the banks, made false documents/forged valuable securities (cheques) and used them as genuine, thereby attracting Sections 318(4), 338 and 340(2) BNS (with the elements of forgery as per Section 336 being satisfied).
Issue 2: Whether the funds constitute "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) PMLA, despite gambling not being a scheduled offence
Legal framework
2.9 The Court referred to Section 2(1)(u) PMLA, including its Explanation, defining "proceeds of crime" as any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, including property indirectly derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity "relatable" to such scheduled offence.
2.10 The Court noted the exposition of "proceeds of crime" in the Supreme Court decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, emphasising: (i) strict construction; (ii) the requirement that property be derived/obtained "as a result of" criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence; and (iii) the clarificatory nature of the 2019 Explanation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court accepted that gambling or online betting per se is not a scheduled offence, and that mere proceeds of gambling would not, by themselves, constitute "proceeds of crime" under PMLA.
2.12 However, on facts, the Court found that the criminal scheme did not merely involve gambling proceeds, but a layered process whereby: (a) individuals were cheated and their identities and accounts were misused; (b) shell-company bank accounts were opened and operated through deception and forgery; and (c) large sums, allegedly generated from illegal business/online gambling, were routed through these forged/cheated channels and withdrawn in cash.
2.13 The Court held that associating funds (allegedly from gambling/illegal business) with shell accounts opened through cheating and forgery, and projecting them as legitimate APMC/business transactions, created a direct nexus between the funds and the scheduled offences (cheating/forgery). The "criminal overlay" of cheating/forgery turned the funds into property derived/obtained "as a result of" criminal activity relating to scheduled offences.
2.14 The Court reasoned that the Explanation to Section 2(1)(u) PMLA covers property indirectly derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence. Here, the scheduled offences (Sections 318(4), 338 and 340(2) BNS) were integral to routing, disguising and withdrawing the funds; thus, the funds withdrawn became "tainted" as proceeds of those offences, even if they originally arose from non-scheduled gambling operations.
2.15 The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's illustration (in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary) concerning unaccounted property acquired by legal means, noting that the present case involves property associated with criminal activity of cheating and forgery (scheduled offences), not merely untaxed legal income. It observed that excluding such laundered funds from PMLA would defeat the Act's object and allow illegally accumulated money to be easily "legalised".
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that the money credited into and ultimately withdrawn from the shell-company bank accounts, operated through deception and forged instruments, constituted "proceeds of crime" within Section 2(1)(u) PMLA, notwithstanding that gambling itself is not a scheduled offence.
Issue 3: Prima facie existence of the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 PMLA
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 Having held that the funds routed through the shell accounts were "proceeds of crime" arising from or relatable to scheduled offences of cheating and forgery, the Court examined the applicant's role in dealing with such proceeds.
2.18 The material, including statements under Section 50 PMLA and witnesses' accounts, indicated that: (a) the applicant worked in close concert with co-accused; (b) he participated in establishing shell entities and opening/operating their bank accounts; (c) he, along with others, effected cash withdrawals and other transactions from those accounts; and (d) he received commission for facilitating these withdrawals.
2.19 The Court inferred that the applicant knowingly assisted in the processes and activities connected with the projection, layering and withdrawal of the crime proceeds, thereby facilitating laundering and the appearance of legitimate business income, consistent with the mischief targeted by Section 3 PMLA.
2.20 The Court noted the applicant's arguments that his statement under Section 50 PMLA lacked corroboration and that custodial statements are of limited evidentiary value, but, at the bail stage, found there was sufficient additional material (including bank records, witness statements and the modus operandi) to show prima facie involvement.
Conclusions
2.21 The Court held that a strong prima facie case exists that the applicant was actively involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, thereby attracting Section 3 PMLA.
Issue 4: Entitlement of the applicant to bail under Section 483 BNSS read with Section 45 PMLA
Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 In light of the above findings, the Court assessed whether the twin conditions and the stringent standard under PMLA for grant of bail were satisfied.
2.23 The Court observed that the allegations involve a well-designed and sophisticated scheme of cheating and forgery, large-scale laundering of funds running into hundreds of crores, and exploitation of the vulnerabilities of APMC-related accounts and shell entities to disguise criminal proceeds.
2.24 Given the applicant's alleged central role in opening and operating the accounts, executing withdrawals, and receiving commission, the Court found there to be a "strong case" of his involvement in the scheduled offences and in money-laundering.
2.25 The Court further held that, considering the nature and scale of the offence and the applicant's position in the operation, there existed: (i) a strong possibility of the applicant causing disappearance of evidence if released; and (ii) no assurance that he would not commit further offences while on bail.
Conclusions
2.26 The Court concluded that the applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for bail under Section 45 PMLA and that the gravity of the offence, the strength of the material, and the likelihood of tampering and re-offending justified continued custody. The bail application was therefore rejected.
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