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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether consultancy/advisory/support services rendered under agreements with overseas clients, involving collection and reporting of market/technical information relating to goods and potential users in India, fall under Rule 3 (location of recipient) or Rule 4(a) (performance-based services in respect of goods physically made available) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 for determining taxability.
(ii) Whether, on the Tribunal's findings on place of provision and the contractual scope of services, the services qualify as "export of service" and the service tax paid under protest is refundable.
(iii) Whether the Revenue can sustain rejection of refund for the disputed period when, on the same service model, refunds for subsequent periods were sanctioned, and where the Court applies the principle that the location of an Indian beneficiary is not determinative if the contractual recipient is overseas.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Applicability of Rule 3 vs Rule 4(a) of POPS Rules, 2012
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal): Rule 3 provides that the place of provision is the location of the recipient. Rule 4(a) applies to services "provided in respect of goods" where the goods are "required to be made physically available" by the recipient to the provider in order to provide the service, in which case the place of provision is where the services are actually performed.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the agreements and found the appellant's role was limited to consultancy and support activities such as identifying requirements of potential users, sharing field observations, and assisting the overseas client with strategy and customer credibility checks. The agreements expressly negated any authority to act on behalf of the overseas entity, negotiate or conclude contracts/pricing, bind the overseas entity, or provide services to end customers as an agent/intermediary. Crucially, the Tribunal held that the appellant's mode of providing consultancy/support did not involve goods being physically made available by the overseas recipient to the appellant; the services were informational/advisory and did not require supply or physical availability of the goods to render the service.
Conclusion: Rule 4(a) was held inapplicable because the services did not require goods to be made physically available. The services appropriately fell under Rule 3, making the place of provision the location of the overseas recipient.
Issue (ii): Whether the services constitute export and refund entitlement
Legal framework (as applied by the Tribunal): Since Rule 3 governed the place of provision, services rendered to recipients located outside India were treated as export of services for the purpose of non-taxability and consequent refund eligibility. The Tribunal also noted that consideration was received in convertible foreign exchange evidenced by FIRCs (and treated this as undisputed on record).
Interpretation and reasoning: Having held the place of provision to be outside India, and having found no intermediary/agency role or contractual service to Indian customers, the Tribunal concluded that the services were provided to overseas clients and qualified as export. The lower authority's approach-treating "use/consumption in India" and Indian market focus as sufficient to shift the place of provision to India under Rule 4(a)-was rejected because the statutory trigger for Rule 4(a) (physical availability of goods to the provider) was not satisfied.
Conclusion: The services were conclusively held to be "export of service"; therefore, service tax paid under protest on such exported services was refundable, and rejection of refund was unsustainable.
Issue (iii): Effect of subsequent refund sanctions and beneficiary-in-India argument
Legal framework/principle applied by the Tribunal (from content it adopted): The Tribunal applied the reasoning that service tax is contract-based for identifying the service recipient; the mere fact that a beneficiary may be located in India is not determinative if the contractual recipient is outside India and the service is provided to that overseas recipient. The Tribunal also applied the principle that once the department has accepted and allowed refunds on the same issue for the same assessee in later periods, it cannot take a contrary stand on the same issue.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that for subsequent periods, jurisdictional authorities sanctioned refunds holding the services to be exported. This reinforced the conclusion that the Revenue should not maintain a contrary position for the disputed period on the same service arrangement. Separately, the Tribunal rejected the lower authority's emphasis that the "benefit" accrued in India, holding instead that recipient-location and contractual privity determine export characterization.
Conclusion: The Revenue's basis for denial-Indian beneficiary/use in India-was rejected, and inconsistency with later sanctioned refunds further supported allowing the claim. The impugned order was set aside and refund eligibility affirmed with consequential relief as per law.
Issues: (i) Whether the adjudication order was vitiated because the tax confirmed exceeded the amount specified in the show cause notice, contrary to the statutory ceiling; (ii) Whether denial of a requested personal hearing violated the mandatory requirement of natural justice and rendered the ex parte order unsustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the adjudication order was vitiated because the tax confirmed exceeded the amount specified in the show cause notice, contrary to the statutory ceiling.
Analysis: The amount confirmed in the final order exceeded the demand set out in the show cause notice. The statutory scheme bars the authority from travelling beyond the notice, and the excess confirmation could not be justified as a mere calculative correction. The final demand therefore lacked statutory foundation and was beyond jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether denial of a requested personal hearing violated the mandatory requirement of natural justice and rendered the ex parte order unsustainable.
Analysis: Once a personal hearing was specifically sought, the statutory provision made hearing obligatory. Passing the final order ex parte despite that request amounted to a breach of audi alteram partem and a fatal procedural infirmity affecting the validity of the assessment.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessment and appellate orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication from the stage of reply with an effective opportunity of hearing and compliance with the statutory limit on the demand.
Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicating authority under the GST law cannot confirm a demand beyond the amount specified in the show cause notice, and where a personal hearing is statutorily mandated on request, denial of that hearing vitiates the order as a breach of natural justice.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of anticipatory bail after joining the investigation and where custodial interrogation was no longer required.
Analysis: The petitioner was directed to join the investigation and complied with that direction. The State confirmed that the petitioner had joined the investigation and that custodial interrogation was not required for the purpose of investigation. In these circumstances, the basis for continuing the interim protection from arrest ceased to exist. The Court therefore confirmed the interim relief, while directing compliance with the condition regarding surrender of passport or filing of an affidavit of non-possession.
Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to confirmation of anticipatory bail.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the First Appellate Authority committed a material error in computing limitation under Section 107 of the CGST Act by treating the appeal as filed beyond the condonable period.
(ii) Whether, on the facts placed on record, the petitioner established "sufficient cause" warranting condonation of delay within the additional one month contemplated by Section 107(4) of the CGST Act, and whether refusal to interfere under Article 226 was justified.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Computation of limitation and the condonable window under Section 107
Legal framework: The Court considered the statutory scheme under Section 107 of the CGST Act, including the three-month period to file an appeal and the First Appellate Authority's jurisdiction to condone a further period of one month upon showing sufficient cause.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the assessment order was communicated on 21.04.2023; therefore, the three-month period expired on 21.07.2023, and the additional condonable one month extended up to 21.08.2023. The Court held that, while calculating limitation, the date of communication/passing is to be excluded. On this basis, it found that the First Appellate Authority was incorrect in holding that the appeal was filed beyond four months and hence non-condonable.
Conclusion: The Court conclusively determined that the First Appellate Authority erred in stating that the appeal was beyond the statutory outer limit, since the appeal date (21.08.2023) fell within the condonable one-month window, subject to proof of sufficient cause.
Issue (ii): Sufficiency of cause for condonation and scope of interference under Article 226
Legal framework: The Court applied the requirement that condonation within the additional one month is permissible only if "sufficient cause" is shown, and examined whether writ interference was warranted where the petitioner failed to substantiate the stated cause.
Interpretation and reasoning: The petitioner relied on the explanation that the appeal could not be filed earlier because the entrusted counsel's wife was hospitalised in June-July 2023, leading to engagement of another counsel and filing on 21.08.2023. The Court, however, found that the petitioner had not produced any supporting medical documents or any declaration from the concerned counsel before the First Appellate Authority, and the same deficiency persisted in the writ proceedings: no document evidencing hospitalisation, no description of ailment, and no supporting material was annexed even with the writ petition. The Court declined the request to grant further time to produce documents, noting repeated opportunities and delays, including refiling after removal of registry objections and multiple adjournments, without any effort to place the requisite material on record.
Conclusion: The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for delay and found no ground to interfere in exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction. The writ petition was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed in limine because the petitioner invoked Article 226 by willful misrepresentation and deliberate suppression of material facts relating to the appellate insolvency order.
(ii) Whether, on merits, the petitioner could deny liability to pay transfer fee by asserting that the transaction was only a change in shareholding and not a transfer of leasehold interest, despite the resolution plan expressly contemplating transfer of the lease.
(iii) Whether the land allotment/transfer policy brought into effect on 26.12.2012 was applicable to the post-approval transfer of leasehold rights arising from the resolution plan approved on 04.09.2019.
(iv) Whether the petitioner could rely on Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the "clean slate" principle to contend that WBIDC's transfer fee demand stood frozen/waived, notwithstanding that the adjudicating authority did not approve the waiver and left exemption/waiver to be decided by the competent authority.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(i) Clean hands in writ jurisdiction: effect of misrepresentation/suppression
Legal framework: The Court treated Article 226 jurisdiction as extraordinary, discretionary, and equitable, requiring the litigant to approach the Court with clean hands.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the pleadings (particularly paragraphs 9-12 of the writ petition) and found that the petitioner represented that certain portions of the insolvency appellate order were "observations" of the appellate tribunal, when in fact they were the petitioner's own submissions recorded in that order. The Court also found that the petitioner pleaded that the resolution plan suffered "no variation" except a minor aspect, despite the adjudicating authority's explicit refusal to approve the waiver/exemption component embedded in the clause dealing with transfer. Further, the petition stated that the purported "observations" were confirmed by the Supreme Court, reinforcing the misleading impression. The Court held this distortion was aimed at supporting the contention that the transfer fee demand was already adjudicated as impermissible.
Conclusions: The Court affirmed the finding that there was willful misrepresentation and deliberate suppression of material facts, disentitling the petitioner to any relief under Article 226, and that dismissal could rest on this ground alone.
(ii) Whether the case involved only change in shareholding or a transfer of leasehold rights
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held the "change in shareholding is not a transfer" argument was untenable on the facts because the approved resolution plan itself contemplated transfer of the lease of the industrial land in favour of the corporate debtor/beneficiary from the effective date. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioner on the basis that those matters concerned a demand triggered merely by transfer of shares, without an issue of transfer of leasehold rights. Here, the petitioner had itself sought transfer of leasehold interest through the plan; therefore it could not assert that no transfer was involved.
Conclusions: The Court conclusively found that the present matter was not confined to change in shareholding; it involved transfer of leasehold interest, and the petitioner could not avoid transfer fee liability on the "share transfer only" theory.
(iii) Applicability of the 26.12.2012 policy to the transfer contemplated by the resolution plan
Legal framework: The Court relied on the policy's own applicability clause stating it applies to land owned/held by State departments or State-funded agencies.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found no dispute that the land was held by a State agency. Since the resolution plan contemplated transfer of leasehold rights and the plan was approved in 2019 (after the policy came into force), the Court reasoned the policy applied to the transfer of leasehold rights undertaken pursuant to the resolution plan. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument of impermissible retrospectivity because the relevant transfer event arose post-policy.
Conclusions: The Court held the policy applied to the transfer arising from the resolution plan approved after the policy's commencement.
(iv) Section 31 IBC / "clean slate" and whether transfer fee demand was frozen or barred
Legal framework: The Court considered the effect of the resolution plan as approved under Section 31, and the adjudicating authority's treatment of waiver/exemption claims in the plan.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the plan clause sought transfer of the lease without payment of any fee/premium and sought extinguishment/waiver of arrears/penalties/interest; however, the adjudicating authority did not approve the waiver/exemption component and explicitly left exemption/waiver to be determined by the competent authority if applied for. The Court held that, because no waiver of transfer fee was approved and the question was left open for determination by the authority, there was no basis to contend that the transfer fee demand stood frozen under Section 31 or barred on a "clean slate" theory. The Court further held that rights and obligations must be assessed from the resolution plan as approved and the adjudicating authority's order, not from positions taken in submissions during the insolvency process. The Court treated the matter regarding waiver of transfer fee as having attained finality in the insolvency proceedings up to the Supreme Court to the extent that waiver was not granted and the issue was left to the appropriate authority.
Conclusions: The Court rejected the contention that Section 31/"clean slate" prevented the transfer fee demand. Since waiver was not approved and the issue was left open to the authority, the petitioner could not maintain that the demand was impermissible or frozen, and the writ challenge to the demand failed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the assessee was a "person searched" in a search conducted under section 132, so as to trigger the special assessment code under sections 153A to 153D and the limitation under section 153B, thereby excluding recourse to reassessment under section 147.
(ii) Whether, for the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted, the assessment was required to be completed within the time limit prescribed under section 153B(1)(b), and if so, whether the assessment made under section 147 was time-barred and void.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Status of assessee as a "person searched" and consequent applicability of the special search assessment regime
Legal framework (as applied by the Court): The Court treated sections 153A to 153D as a special code for assessments in search cases with overriding effect over general assessment/reassessment provisions, including section 147, once a valid search under section 132 is conducted on the assessee.
Interpretation and reasoning: On examining the panchnama dated 05 January 2018, the Court found that (a) the search authorization covered the assessee, (b) the searched locker stood in the assessee's name, (c) the search was resumed and concluded in the assessee's presence, and (d) gold coins and jewellery were found and seized from that locker. On these recorded facts, the Court rejected the contention that the search was on "another person/third party" and held that the assessee was one of the persons searched.
Conclusions: The assessee was a valid "searched person"; therefore, the special provisions governing search assessments and their limitation regime were attracted, and the Revenue's contrary argument was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the assessment for the year of search was time-barred under section 153B and whether section 147 could be used to bypass that limitation
Legal framework (as applied by the Court): The Court applied section 153B(1)(b) as prescribing a mandatory outer time limit for completing assessment/reassessment for the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted, computed as 21 months from the end of the financial year in which the last authorization was executed. The Court further applied the principle that the general reassessment power under section 147 cannot override or circumvent the special search regime and its limitation.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that although section 153A covers six assessment years preceding the year of search and, on that limited point, the assessment year corresponding to the year of search does not fall within those "six preceding years"; hence, the contention that the assessment for that year had to be framed under section 153A was rejected. However, the Court held that section 153B nonetheless expressly governs the limitation not only for the six preceding years but also for the assessment year relevant to the year of search. Since the last panchnama was drawn on 05 January 2018, the financial year of execution was FY 2017-18, and 21 months from 31 March 2018 expired on 31 December 2019. The assessment order having been passed on 25 March 2023 was held to be far beyond the statutory deadline. The Court held that invoking section 147 in such circumstances amounted to an impermissible attempt to bypass the special limitation scheme under section 153B, rendering the assessment a nullity.
Conclusions: The assessment was barred by limitation under section 153B(1)(b) and was invalid and void ab initio. Consequently, the assessment was quashed, and the additions did not survive; the merits of the additions were not adjudicated as they became infructuous.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the issuance of a Look Out Circular against the Petitioners was permissible under the consolidated guidelines/Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021, in the absence of any registered cognizable criminal case and when only proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962 were pending.
(2) Whether the continued operation and renewals of the Look Out Circular, without periodic review by the Originating Agency, were valid in light of the Office Memorandum and the right to travel under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
(3) Whether the Look Out Circular could be justified on the ground of alleged non-cooperation in investigation and the seriousness of alleged economic offences, including by invoking the "exceptional cases" clause relating to economic/strategic interests of India.
(4) Whether the Petitioners' withdrawal of earlier writ proceedings before another High Court without liberty to file afresh operated as a bar to the present writ petitions.
(5) Whether a stay of the quashing of the Look Out Circular ought to be granted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Validity of issuance of LOC in absence of cognizable offence / criminal case
Legal framework
The Court considered the consolidated guidelines in the Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021 governing issuance of Look Out Circulars, including clauses (H), (I) and (L): recourse to LOC is to be taken in cognizable offences under IPC or other penal laws; in cases where there is no cognizable offence, the LOC subject cannot be detained/arrested or prevented from leaving the country, and only intimation of arrival/departure can be requested; and in exceptional cases LOC may be issued where departure is detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, strategic and/or economic interests of India or larger public interest.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court found that no cognizable offence under IPC or other penal laws had been registered against the Petitioners; only proceedings under the Customs Act in the form of investigations and show cause notices were undertaken, some already adjudicated and some pending. The Petitioners had been granted anticipatory bail; no steps for its cancellation had been taken. The action against the Petitioners was essentially in the nature of fiscal/administrative proceedings rather than criminal prosecution.
The Court held that the guidelines clearly require that, for an LOC involving detention/prevention from travel, there must be a cognizable offence and reasons recorded that the person is evading arrest or likely to flee. Mere pendency of investigation under the Customs Act or issuance of show cause notices, without registration of a cognizable criminal case, did not satisfy the threshold of clause (H). The consolidated guidelines envisage that, where there is no cognizable offence, only a request for intimation of travel movements can be made, not detention or restriction on travel as in the present LOC.
The Court examined the internal notings produced and found no specific or reasoned order directing issuance of an LOC; instead, at the relevant time, in light of an earlier High Court order restraining coercive steps, it had been advised that LOC, being a coercive measure, should not be issued and only summons should be used. The Court thus found that even at the departmental level the basis for LOC was not transparently or properly recorded.
Conclusions
The issuance of the LOC against the Petitioners did not meet the parameters of the Office Memorandum, as there was no cognizable offence or criminal case, nor were the conditions for recourse to LOC in such circumstances fulfilled. The LOC was therefore contrary to the guidelines and invalid ab initio.
Issue (2): Legality of continued operation of LOC without review and impact on Article 21 right to travel
Legal framework
The Court relied on clause (J) of the consolidated guidelines, which stipulates that an LOC remains in force until deletion is requested by the Originator, but the Originating Agency must review LOCs quarterly and annually and submit proposals to delete them where appropriate, so that "liberty of the individual is not jeopardized". The Court further recognised the right to travel abroad as a facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Interpretation and reasoning
The LOC had remained in force for more than three years from 19/20.04.2022. The Court recorded the concession of the Respondent's counsel that no review of the LOC had been undertaken. This was directly contrary to clause (J), which mandates periodic review.
The Court observed that during this period, investigations had concluded in substantial part and show cause notices were issued and adjudicated, with appeals pending; yet no criminal proceedings were initiated. The Department had consciously resorted to proceedings under the Customs Act rather than criminal prosecution. Therefore, pendency of investigation or adjudication under the Customs Act could not justify indefinite continuation of an LOC.
The Court noted that, on multiple occasions, it had permitted the Petitioners to travel abroad for business; they had returned each time, which undermined any assertion of flight risk. The Petitioners had longstanding business operations, immovable properties, factories and roots in India. In this factual background, continued restriction on their travel was held to be an unjustified encroachment on their Article 21 right to travel.
The Court held that LOC, being a coercive measure, cannot be used as a substitute for statutory modes of investigation or enforcement, nor can it be kept in force indefinitely without review, especially when the foundational circumstances (investigation stage, absence of criminal case, cooperation of the Petitioners) did not warrant such a measure.
Conclusions
The continuation and renewals of the LOC without any periodic review were contrary to clause (J) of the Office Memorandum and constituted an unlawful and disproportionate restriction on the Petitioners' Article 21 right to travel. The LOC could not be allowed to remain in force indefinitely.
Issue (3): Justification of LOC based on alleged non-cooperation and seriousness of economic offence, including reliance on "exceptional cases" clause
Legal framework
The Respondents invoked the guidelines' emphasis on serious offences and the "exceptional cases" clause (L), which allows LOCs even beyond standard categories where departure is detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations or the strategic/economic interests of India, or where larger public interest so requires.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Respondents argued that the Petitioners had not honoured summons and were non-cooperative, that there was a prima facie case of high-value duty drawback fraud causing huge economic loss to the exchequer, and that economic offences, especially during a pandemic, warranted strict measures such as LOC.
The Court held that mere assertions of non-cooperation and seriousness of economic offences, without a cognizable criminal case and without the Petitioners being shown to be evading arrest or trial, could not justify an LOC that detains or restricts travel, given the clear stipulation in clause (H) and (I). The Court accepted the Petitioners' position that they had appeared before the authorities and their statements were recorded, investigation had culminated in show cause notices and adjudication, and the Department had sufficient statutory powers under the Customs Act to secure documents or enforce compliance.
The Court specifically held that the insistence of the Respondent on obtaining US customs declarations from the Petitioners could not be a basis for invoking or continuing an LOC; if such documents were required, there were "ways and means" under the statute to secure them. LOC could not be converted into an investigative tool to compel production of documents.
As to clause (L), the Court did not find any material or reasoning that departure of the Petitioners would be detrimental to sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, strategic or economic interests of India in the sense contemplated by that clause, nor that larger public interest required their departure to be blocked. The assertion of "economic offences" alone, at an investigative/adjudicatory stage under the Customs Act and without criminal prosecution, was insufficient to invoke the exceptional clause.
Conclusions
Alleged non-cooperation, pendency of investigation, and the gravity of supposed economic offences did not, in the facts of the case, satisfy the conditions of the consolidated guidelines, including the "exceptional cases" clause. These grounds were insufficient to justify either issuance or continuation of the LOC.
Issue (4): Effect of withdrawal of earlier writ petitions before another High Court without liberty
Interpretation and reasoning
The Respondents, relying on precedent, contended that the Petitioners' earlier withdrawal of writ petitions before another High Court without liberty to file afresh barred the present petitions. The Court noted this objection but proceeded to examine and decide the merits of the challenges to the LOC, including scrutiny of the Office Memorandum, internal notings, and factual matrix of investigation and travel permissions.
No finding was recorded that the present petitions were barred on this ground; conversely, the Court entertained and allowed the writ petitions, implying that the prior withdrawal did not preclude the present proceedings.
Conclusions
The objection based on earlier withdrawal of writ proceedings did not operate as a bar to the present writ petitions; the Court proceeded to and did adjudicate the matter on merits.
Issue (5): Request for stay of order quashing LOC
Interpretation and reasoning
Post-judgment, the Respondents sought a stay of the order quashing the LOC. The Court referred to its conclusions that (i) the LOC could not have been validly issued against the Petitioners under the applicable guidelines, and (ii) it could not have been continued without proper review and extension. In light of these merits, and given that the LOC was found to be contrary to the Office Memorandum and to have illegally restricted the Petitioners' liberty, the Court declined to suspend its operative directions.
Conclusions
The prayer for stay of the judgment and order quashing the LOC and its renewals was rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act can be imposed solely on the basis of non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, in the absence of any finding regarding intention to evade tax.
1.2 Whether a technical glitch preventing completion of Part B of the e-way bill, when all other documents are in order and goods match the tax invoice, justifies seizure and penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act.
1.3 Whether, upon setting aside the seizure and penalty orders, the authority is bound to refund amounts deposited pursuant to the impugned proceedings.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Imposition of penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act for non-filling of Part B of e-way bill in absence of intention to evade tax
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court proceeded on section 129(3) of the GST Act, which provides for levy of penalty in cases of detention/seizure of goods in transit. The Court relied on prior decisions holding that non-filling of an e-way bill, by itself, does not attract penalty under section 129(3) absent intention to evade tax.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the only ground for interception and seizure was that Part B of the e-way bill had not been generated. It found that all other requisite documents were produced at the time of interception and that the goods were found in accordance with the description in the tax invoice. The Court observed that in the penalty order under section 129(3), no reasons had been assigned indicating any intention to evade tax, and none of the authorities below had recorded any finding on such intention. Referring to the Division Bench decision which had "categorically held that non-filling of e-way bill will not attract penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act," and to other coordinate decisions reiterating the same view, the Court applied that legal position to the present facts.
Conclusions: The Court held that mere non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, without any finding or material indicating intention to evade tax, does not justify imposition of penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act. The impugned penalty order and appellate order could not be sustained in law.
Issue 2: Effect of technical glitch preventing completion of Part B of the e-way bill when other documents are in order
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded the petitioner's stand that Part B could not be filled due to a technical glitch, and noted from the record that this explanation, based on technical error, had not been disputed at any stage. It further noted that all other documents were duly filled and the goods in transit matched the tax invoice description. The State could not dispute the legal proposition laid down in the precedents cited by the petitioner. In absence of any contrary material or challenge to the plea of technical error, and in view of the settled position that non-filling of e-way bill alone does not attract section 129(3) penalty, the Court accepted that there was no intention to evade tax.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that the non-filling of Part B of the e-way bill, occasioned by a technical glitch and accompanied by complete and correct supporting documents, could not trigger valid proceedings for seizure or penalty under section 129(3) of the GST Act.
Issue 3: Consequential relief and refund of amount deposited
Interpretation and reasoning: Having found that there was no intention to evade tax and that penalty under section 129(3) was unsustainable, the Court held that the impugned orders of penalty and dismissal of appeal were liable to be quashed. It then considered the consequence of such quashing on amounts already deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned proceedings.
Conclusions: The Court quashed the impugned orders, allowed the writ petition, and directed the concerned authority to refund any amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the proceedings within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.
Issues: (i) Whether the penalty imposed by the Settlement Commission on the importing company deserved interference and reduction; (ii) Whether the penalties imposed on the directors were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the penalty imposed by the Settlement Commission on the importing company deserved interference and reduction.
Analysis: The import of broadcasting equipment was found to have been misdeclared as temporary removal for "DEMO" use, whereas the goods were actually moved for commercial purposes. The Court accepted that the duty liability had arisen because of the misdeclaration and that the Settlement Commission was justified in treating the conduct as culpable. At the same time, the Court noted that the customs duty already paid was substantial and that the petition involved a temporary import arrangement, so the quantum of penalty required moderation.
Conclusion: The penalty on the company was upheld in principle but reduced to Rs. 50,00,000/-, with credit for the amount already deposited.
Issue (ii): Whether the penalties imposed on the directors were sustainable.
Analysis: The findings showed awareness of the misdeclaration, but the benefit of the arrangement accrued to the company in its business capacity rather than to the directors in their personal capacity. In those circumstances, the Court found that individual penal liability of the directors was not warranted on the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The penalties imposed on the directors were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part. The company's penalty was substantially reduced, the directors were relieved of penalty, and the remaining amount ordered by the Court was to be paid to complete the settlement.
Ratio Decidendi: Where misdeclaration in customs matters is established, the penalty may be sustained, but the Court may calibrate the quantum on equitable facts; individual penalties on directors will not be sustained where the benefit and liability are essentially attributable to the company alone.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether service of the pre-show-cause notice in Form DRC-01A, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order by uploading them only under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal constituted proper and due communication to the assessee.
1.2 Whether passing an order under Section 73 without affording an opportunity of personal hearing, where an adverse decision was contemplated, violated Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017 and the principles of natural justice.
1.3 What consequential directions were warranted upon finding that the adjudication order was not duly communicated and was passed in breach of Section 75(4) and natural justice.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of service by uploading notices and order only under "additional notices and orders" tab on GST portal
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The proceedings arose under Section 73 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017. The Court referred to a coordinate Bench decision which, relying on a Division Bench decision, held that accessibility of a notice only under the "additional" tab on the GST portal, as opposed to the "normal" tab, does not constitute proper communication or uploading as contemplated under Section 73(1) read with the applicable Rules.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that the pre-show-cause notice in Form DRC-01A, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order were all uploaded only under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal.
2.3 The petitioners asserted that they had no reason to access the said tab, remained unaware of the notices and the order, and came to know of the proceedings only upon recovery being effected from their electronic cash ledger after issuance of a recovery notice in Form DRC-13 to their bank.
2.4 The Court, following the reasoning in the coordinate Bench decision, held that uploading notices only under the "additional notices and orders" tab cannot be treated as due or proper communication/ service upon a person against whom an adverse decision is contemplated.
2.5 In the light of these facts and precedents, the Court held that it could not be said that the petitioners had due knowledge of the proceedings or the adjudication order at any time proximate to their issuance.
Conclusions
2.6 Service of the pre-show-cause notice, the show-cause notice under Section 73 and the adjudication order solely by uploading them under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal did not amount to proper or due service/communication in law.
2.7 The petitioners were prevented by sufficient cause from participating in the adjudication and from challenging the order in time, owing to such defective mode of service.
Issue 2 - Requirement of personal hearing under Section 75(4) and principles of natural justice
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.8 The Court reproduced and relied upon a coordinate Bench judgment which interpreted Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017. As there noted, Section 75(4) mandates that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted: (a) where a request in writing is received from the person chargeable with tax or penalty; or (b) where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The coordinate Bench had held that issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 73(1) clearly indicates that an adverse decision is contemplated, thereby triggering the statutory obligation on the Proper Officer to afford an opportunity of hearing before passing an order under Section 73(9).
2.10 The Court found the facts in the present case to be identical to those considered earlier: the show-cause notice contemplated an adverse decision, yet the adjudication order was passed without granting any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners.
2.11 The Court observed that the adjudication order was passed ex parte without hearing the petitioners, and this was directly contrary to the mandate of Section 75(4) and to the principles of natural justice.
Conclusions
2.12 Since the show-cause notice contemplated an adverse decision, the Proper Officer was under a statutory obligation under Section 75(4) to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing prior to passing the order under Section 73.
2.13 Failure to grant such hearing rendered the adjudication order violative of Section 75(4) and the principles of natural justice and therefore unsustainable.
Issue 3 - Consequential relief and directions
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The Court noted the combined effect of: (i) improper service of the show-cause notice and order by uploading under the "additional notices and orders" tab only; and (ii) absence of mandatory opportunity of hearing despite an adverse decision being contemplated.
2.15 Relying on the approach adopted in the coordinate Bench decision, the Court found no reason to depart from that view and considered it appropriate to set aside the impugned adjudication order while preserving the proceedings at the show-cause notice stage and granting a further opportunity to the petitioners.
Conclusions
2.16 The adjudication order dated April 24, 2024 was set aside on the dual grounds that it was neither appropriately served nor passed in accordance with Section 75(4) of the Act of 2017.
2.17 The petitioners were granted two weeks' time from the date of the order to file their reply to the show-cause notice dated December 19, 2023.
2.18 The adjudicating authority was directed to conclude the proceedings as early as possible, preferably within four weeks from the date of filing of the reply, without granting unnecessary adjournments.
2.19 No order as to costs was made.
Issues: Whether the faceless assessment order and consequential demand and penalty proceedings were vitiated for want of adequate opportunity, non-consideration of the assessee's adjournment request and reply, and breach of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The final show cause notice granted less than the prescribed seven days under the assessment scheme, the adjournment request was not dealt with, and the assessee had in fact transmitted its objections by email before the assessment order was passed. The record therefore did not justify the finding that no reply had been furnished. Section 144B(1)(xv) required consideration of the assessee's reply and all material available with the assessment unit before finalising the assessment. On these facts, the assessment was passed without proper consideration of the assessee's response and without a fair opportunity of hearing, amounting to procedural unfairness and breach of natural justice.
Conclusion: The impugned assessment order and consequential proceedings could not be sustained and were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The matter was restored to the stage of the show cause notice for fresh consideration by the faceless assessing authority, with directions to reopen the portal, consider the existing and additional replies, and afford a hearing through video conferencing.
Ratio Decidendi: Under faceless assessment, failure to give adequate notice time, to consider an adjournment request, and to take into account a timely filed reply before passing the final assessment order vitiates the assessment for breach of Section 144B and the principles of natural justice.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the timelines and interest requirement under Schedule I, Rule 12 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 for payment of balance sale consideration are mandatory and attracted in this auction sale.
1.2 Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of balance sale consideration and, if so, what is the effect of such extension on the auction purchaser's liability to pay interest.
1.3 Whether the attachment of the auctioned land by the State Tax Department and the Liquidator's inability to immediately convey title/execute a sale deed could relieve the auction purchaser from (a) the obligation to adhere to the statutory payment schedule, and (b) liability for statutory interest.
1.4 Whether the doctrine of reciprocal promises under Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 could be invoked by the auction purchaser to resist payment of interest on the balance sale consideration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Mandatory nature and applicability of Schedule I, Rule 12 timelines and interest
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined Schedule I, Clauses 12 and 13 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. Clause 12 mandates that the highest bidder must pay the balance sale consideration within ninety days or such period as mentioned in the auction notice, with the first proviso stipulating that payments after thirty days shall attract interest at 12% per annum, and the second proviso stipulating that the sale shall be cancelled if payment is not received within that period. Clause 13 contemplates completion of sale and execution of the sale certificate/deed "on payment of the full amount".
2.2 The Court relied on the decision in V.S. Palanivel v. Sri Lakshmi Hotels (P) Ltd., where it was held that Rule 12 of Schedule I is mandatory and that the consequence of non-payment within 90 days is cancellation of the sale.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tender Document and Sale Confirmation Advice expressly incorporated the Liquidation Process Regulations, provided that the sale was on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is and non-recourse basis", and stipulated that (a) the balance amount must be paid within 30 days without interest; (b) the amount could be paid within 90 days with 12% interest after 30 days, in line with Regulation 33 and Schedule I; and (c) the transfer process is an independent process and shall not in any way affect the payment schedule.
2.4 The Court rejected the Adjudicating Authority's observation that the timeline for payment of sale price is only directory. Following V.S. Palanivel, it held that Rule 12 is mandatory: both (i) the outer limit of 90 days and (ii) the stipulation that payments made after 30 days shall attract 12% interest must be treated as mandatory.
2.5 The Court noted that the Sale Confirmation Advice was issued on 29.12.2022; the 30-day period expired on 28.01.2023. By that time only Rs. 20 crores had been paid and Rs. 305 crores remained as balance. Under Rule 12, payment of the balance after 30 days necessarily attracted 12% interest. The subsequent payment of Rs. 50 crores on 13.03.2023, though within 90 days, did not alter the statutory requirement of interest after the initial 30 days.
2.6 The Court further held, following V.S. Palanivel, that Rule 12 and Rule 13 are not interlinked; Rule 12 governs timelines and consequences for payment, while Rule 13 only prescribes the procedure for completion of sale after full payment. No adverse consequence is attached to non-compliance with Rule 13, whereas Rule 12 explicitly provides for cancellation for non-payment within time, reinforcing its mandatory character.
Conclusions
2.7 The statutory timelines under Schedule I, Rule 12 are mandatory. The auction purchaser was statutorily liable to pay 12% interest on the unpaid balance consideration after the expiry of 30 days from 29.12.2022.
2.8 The Adjudicating Authority's finding that the timelines were merely directory, and its consequent exoneration of the auction purchaser from interest on that basis, is unsustainable in law.
Issue 2 - Jurisdiction to extend time and impact on interest liability
Legal framework
2.9 The Court considered Section 35 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Liquidator's powers "subject to the directions of the Adjudicating Authority") and Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 (inherent powers to make orders to meet the ends of justice). Relying on V.S. Palanivel and Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., it noted that while the Liquidator cannot extend the Rule 12 timeline, the Adjudicating Authority can, in appropriate cases, extend time under its statutory and inherent powers.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Adjudicating Authority's order dated 15.06.2023 on IA/364(AHM)2023: (a) required the Liquidator to intimate the State Tax Department regarding its treatment as secured creditor; (b) directed the governing bidder to lift the attachment within 10 days of such intimation; (c) directed the Liquidator to intimate the successful bidder within 2 days of lifting of attachment; and (d) directed the successful bidder to pay the balance Rs. 255 crores within 5 days of such intimation. It expressly postponed consideration of prayer (b) for waiver of interest.
2.11 The Court held that this order effectively extended the time for payment of balance sale consideration, and such extension was granted by the Adjudicating Authority, not by the Liquidator. In light of V.S. Palanivel, the Adjudicating Authority was competent to grant such extension by exercising powers under Section 35 IBC read with Rule 11 NCLT Rules in appropriate circumstances.
2.12 The order dated 15.06.2023 was never challenged by any party and therefore attained finality. It was not a bare extension of timeline; it structured a sequence of steps linked to lifting of attachment before the obligation to pay the remaining amount arose.
2.13 The Court drew a temporal distinction: (a) the period from expiry of the initial 30 days (29.12.2022 + 30 days) up to 15.06.2023, when there was no protective order suspending the statutory obligation, and (b) the period after 15.06.2023, when the Adjudicating Authority's order was in force and temporarily relieved the auction purchaser from the obligation to pay until the specified preconditions were met.
Conclusions
2.14 The Adjudicating Authority validly exercised jurisdiction to extend the time for payment by its order dated 15.06.2023; that order, being unchallenged, binds the parties.
2.15 The auction purchaser remained liable to pay interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance consideration from the expiry of the 30-day period after 29.12.2022 until 15.06.2023.
2.16 For the period covered by the operative extension (post 15.06.2023), when the obligation to pay balance consideration stood deferred by order of the Adjudicating Authority, the auction purchaser cannot be saddled with interest; liability to pay interest for that extended period stands waived.
Issue 3 - Effect of State Tax attachment and Liquidator's inability to immediately convey title
Legal framework
2.17 The Court examined the Tender Document, including: (a) disclaimers that the information was not comprehensive and bidders must conduct independent due diligence; (b) stipulations that the land was to be sold on "as is where is", "as is what is", "whatever there is" and "no recourse" basis; (c) express advisory that bidders should verify revenue records, title, encumbrances, liens, statutory dues etc.; and (d) Clause 4.2(g), stating that the seller shall ensure transfer of title "as available", that the transfer process is an independent process, and that it shall not in any way affect the payment schedule under Clause 4.10, framed in accordance with Regulation 33 and Schedule I.
2.18 The Court relied on V.S. Palanivel, where it was held that an auction purchaser who participates in an auction conducted on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is" basis, with knowledge of an income tax attachment, cannot later contend that payment of balance consideration was contingent upon lifting of such attachment.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.19 The auction purchaser had raised queries in March 2023 about encroachment, State Tax attachment and revenue entries. The Liquidator, by letter dated 20.03.2023, reiterated that: (a) all documents had been shared earlier; (b) the sale was on "as is where is, as is what is, whatever there is and no recourse basis"; (c) Clause 4.2(g) clearly stipulated transfer as an independent process not affecting the payment schedule; and (d) though registration of sale deed was not possible until attachment was removed, the sale would stand confirmed once the sale certificate was issued against full payment and possession would be handed over.
2.20 The Court held that the Tender Document clearly allocated the risk of existing encumbrances, including statutory attachments, to the bidders. Payment timelines were expressly decoupled from completion of title-transfer formalities. Thus, the existence of State Tax attachment did not legally suspend or condition the obligation to pay under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.21 Referring to V.S. Palanivel, the Court held that Rule 12 (timelines and interest/cancellation consequence) is not contingent on removal of encumbrances or completion of procedures under Rule 13. The inability to immediately execute a conveyance deed due to attachment does not negate or postpone the obligation to pay within the statutory schedule.
Conclusions
2.22 The attachment of the land by the State Tax Department and the Liquidator's temporary inability to execute a registered sale deed did not relieve the auction purchaser from complying with the statutory payment schedule under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.23 The contention that no obligation to pay arose until lifting of the attachment was rejected in view of the auction's express "as is where is" terms and the clear separation between payment schedule and transfer process.
2.24 The Court held that the Adjudicating Authority erred in reasoning that because the Liquidator could not then convey title due to attachment, the purchaser could not be compelled to pay the balance or interest.
Issue 4 - Applicability of Section 51, Indian Contract Act, 1872 and reciprocal promises
Legal framework
2.25 The auction purchaser invoked Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, arguing that, in the absence of performance of reciprocal promises by the promisee (Liquidator's ability to convey title free of attachment), the promisor (purchaser) was not bound to perform its obligation to pay. Reliance was placed on Nathulal v. Phoolchand, Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, and a Delhi High Court decision in I.C.M. Airport Technics v. International Airports Authority of India.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.26 The Court distinguished these precedents as arising from conventional contractual disputes (including those under the Arbitration Act, 1940) where contractual covenants and sequences of reciprocal obligations governed performance.
2.27 It held that the instant matter concerns sale of liquidation assets governed by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. The payment obligations and timelines of an auction purchaser in liquidation are primarily statutory and regulatory in character, not purely contractual.
2.28 The Tender Document expressly subjected the sale to the provisions of the IBC and Liquidation Process Regulations, and clearly stipulated that the transfer process is independent and will not affect the payment schedule. Therefore, the premise that the Liquidator's ability to convey clear title was a reciprocal condition precedent to the purchaser's payment obligation was inconsistent with the governing statutory and tender terms.
Conclusions
2.29 Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act and the doctrine of reciprocal promises do not apply in the manner contended so as to suspend or negate the statutory obligation to pay balance consideration with interest under Schedule I, Rule 12.
2.30 The authorities cited on reciprocal promises and contractual sequencing do not assist the auction purchaser in the context of a liquidation sale conducted under the IBC framework and binding Tender Document clauses.
Overall determination on interest liability
2.31 The auction purchaser was liable to pay 12% interest on the balance sale consideration for the period starting after the expiry of 30 days from 29.12.2022 up to 15.06.2023, when the Adjudicating Authority first granted extension of time.
2.32 For the period during which the extension order dated 15.06.2023 operated, the obligation to pay balance consideration stood deferred by judicial order; consequently, interest for that extended period stands waived.
2.33 The direction of the Adjudicating Authority fully exonerating the auction purchaser from payment of interest on the balance consideration was set aside and substituted with a limited direction that the auction purchaser must pay 12% interest on the balance sale consideration for the period after 30 days from 29.12.2022 until 15.06.2023, to be paid within two weeks, while the remainder of the impugned order was left undisturbed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether amounts received as "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" for advertising, promotion and marketing of beverages bearing the PEPSI brand are liable to service tax under "Business Auxiliary Service" under section 65(19)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994.
1.2 Whether the judgment concerning availment of CENVAT credit on advertisement services in relation to aerated waters is applicable for determining liability under "Business Auxiliary Service" in the present case.
1.3 Whether promotion of a client's brand name/trademark, in the factual matrix of this case, is covered by the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" prior to and after insertion of a specific taxable entry for brand promotion service.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Service tax liability on "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" under Business Auxiliary Service
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal, through the Larger Bench order referred to and relied on, examined section 65(19)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994, defining "Business Auxiliary Service" as any service in relation to promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The client in the present arrangement is Pepsi Foods, which produces "concentrates", while the appellant manufactures "aerated water" using such concentrate as a raw material.
2.3 The definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" in section 65(19)(ii) does not employ the phrase "directly or indirectly", nor does it refer to promotion/marketing of inputs or raw materials used by the service provider. It contemplates promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
2.4 The promotion schemes and advertisements undertaken by the appellant related to aerated water and beverages manufactured by the appellant, and did not relate to "concentrates" manufactured by Pepsi Foods.
2.5 The departmental stand that advertisement of aerated water indirectly enhances the sale of concentrates, and therefore constitutes BAS rendered to Pepsi Foods, was held to be too farfetched and not supported by the language of section 65(19)(ii).
2.6 The Larger Bench, after reviewing similar bottler agreements and consistent Tribunal precedents (including Superior Drinks, Narmada Drinks, Brindavan Bottlers, Wave Beverages, Kandhari Beverages, Ludhiana Beverages and Beltek Canadian Water), found that receipt of incentives for advertising, promoting and marketing the brand did not amount to BAS provided to the concentrate manufacturer.
2.7 It was further held that the appellant undertook marketing and promotion essentially on its own account for its own products, with financial support from Pepsi Foods, and not as a service "for" Pepsi Foods in the sense required under BAS.
Conclusions
2.8 Amounts received as "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" for advertising, promotion and marketing of beverages bearing the PEPSI brand are not consideration for "Business Auxiliary Service" to Pepsi Foods under section 65(19)(ii).
2.9 The demand of service tax, interest and penalties on such receipts under BAS is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
Issue 2 - Applicability of the judgment on input service credit (Coca Cola) to BAS liability
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.10 The Larger Bench examined rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, defining "input service", particularly clause 2(l)(ii), which covers services used directly or indirectly, in or in relation to manufacture of final products and includes "advertisement or sales promotion" and "activities relating to business".
2.11 The Bombay High Court in Coca Cola considered whether advertisement and sales promotion of aerated waters by a manufacturer of "concentrates" qualified as "input service" to allow CENVAT credit of service tax paid on such advertisement.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The High Court's reasoning turned on the wide, inclusive definition of "input service", particularly the expressions "directly or indirectly" and "activities relating to business", enabling credit when advertisement of aerated water indirectly promoted the sale of concentrates.
2.13 By contrast, the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" in section 65(19) contains no similar language ("directly or indirectly", "activities relating to business") and is more restrictive, requiring that the service be in relation to promotion or marketing of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client.
2.14 The issue in Coca Cola concerned eligibility to CENVAT credit for the person incurring advertisement expense, not liability to pay service tax by treating another entity's promotional activity as BAS. Hence, the factual and legal contexts were distinct.
2.15 Several Tribunal decisions in analogous bottler cases had already distinguished Coca Cola in the BAS context, holding that its rationale, derived from the specific wording of rule 2(l), could not be extended to impose BAS liability.
Conclusions
2.16 The judgment relating to input service credit on advertisement in respect of aerated waters has no application to determine BAS liability in the present case.
2.17 The earlier Tribunal decision in favour of the appellant, holding that BAS demand is not sustainable, does not require reconsideration in light of Coca Cola.
Issue 3 - Coverage of brand/trademark promotion within BAS and effect of specific brand promotion entry
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.18 The Larger Bench noted that section 65(19) does not cover promotion of brand name or trademark of a client.
2.19 Brand promotion service was made taxable separately with effect from 01.07.2010 under section 65(105)(zzzzq) of the Finance Act.
2.20 Reference was made to the principle laid down by the Bombay High Court in Indian National Shipowners' Association that introduction of a new taxable entry, specifically covering certain services, presupposes that such services were not covered under earlier entries.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21 The activities for which the appellant received incentives were found to be advertising, promoting and marketing the PEPSI trademark/brand name.
2.22 Since section 65(19) did not, by its text, encompass promotion of a client's brand name or trademark, such activities could not be brought within BAS merely because they might incidentally support the client's business.
2.23 The later specific entry taxing brand promotion indicated that, prior to its introduction, such services were not envisaged within existing categories like BAS, and the new entry was not a mere carve-out or clarification of BAS.
Conclusions
2.24 Promotion of the PEPSI brand name/trademark for which "net incentive" and "support and other receipt" were paid is not covered by the definition of BAS under section 65(19).
2.25 In light of the Larger Bench's analysis and the earlier final order in the appellant's own case, the impugned order confirming BAS demand is unsustainable and is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether deduction of interest on borrowed capital under section 24(b) was allowable in absence of a housing loan interest certificate and sanction letter.
1.2 Whether consultancy charges of Rs. 5,00,000 for A.Y. 2019-20 were genuine and allowable as business expenditure.
1.3 Whether disallowance of Rs. 5,70,774 out of sales promotion and travelling expenses for A.Y. 2019-20 was justified.
1.4 Whether disallowance under section 43B of GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777 for A.Y. 2019-20 was warranted.
1.5 Whether addition of unsecured loans of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 for A.Y. 2019-20 was sustainable.
1.6 Whether deduction under section 80C of Rs. 1,50,000 towards principal repayment of housing loan was allowable without proper housing loan evidence.
1.7 For A.Y. 2020-21, whether addition of Rs. 4,70,316 being difference between contract receipts as per Form 26AS and receipts shown in the profit and loss account was justified.
1.8 Whether disallowance of Rs. 6,75,012 under section 36(1)(va) on account of ESIC contribution (linked to A.Y. 2019-20) was permissible or resulted in double disallowance.
1.9 Whether consultancy charges of Rs. 60,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 were substantiated and allowable.
1.10 Whether disallowance of Rs. 3,03,218 out of sales promotion and travelling expenses for A.Y. 2020-21 was justified.
1.11 Whether disallowance of Rs. 1,98,089 on account of bonus and ex-gratia payable for A.Y. 2020-21 was correct.
1.12 Whether disallowance under section 43B of GST payable of Rs. 90,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 was warranted.
1.13 Whether addition of Rs. 1,165 towards interest from a co-operative bank for A.Y. 2020-21 was warranted when assessee claimed it was already included in returned income.
1.14 Whether capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 during A.Y. 2020-21 was satisfactorily explained as arising from sale proceeds of agricultural land.
1.15 Whether unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises for A.Y. 2020-21 was liable to addition under section 68.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deduction of interest on housing loan under section 24(b) (A.Y. 2019-20)
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal reproduced section 24(b) and its provisos, especially the proviso stipulating that no enhanced deduction shall be allowed unless the assessee furnishes a certificate from the lender specifying the amount of interest payable for acquisition or construction of the property.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The claim of Rs. 55,292 as interest on borrowed capital for a self-occupied property was supported only by an SBI "loan statement".
2.3 The loan statement did not indicate that it related to a home loan, nor did it specify the property for which the loan was taken.
2.4 No interest certificate or loan sanction letter from the bank was produced either before the Assessing Officer, first appellate authority, or the Tribunal.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that the statutory proviso requires a certificate from the lender; in absence of such certificate, the conditions for allowance were not met.
Conclusion
2.6 Deduction of Rs. 55,292 under section 24(b) was rightly disallowed and the disallowance was upheld.
Issue 2: Allowability and genuineness of consultancy charges of Rs. 5,00,000 (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The assessee claimed consultancy expenses of Rs. 5,00,000 allegedly paid to one consultant for liaison with Government Departments, supported by five invoices and ledger account.
2.8 The first appellate authority doubted genuineness due to: invoices being simple computer printouts, absence of GST number, serial numbering 1-5 all in favour of the assessee only, no TDS deduction, absence of written agreement, and the fact that almost all receipts were from a private company, making "government liaison" inexplicable.
2.9 The Tribunal noted that the invoices carried a PAN of the consultant and once such documents were produced, the Assessing Officer ought to have conducted further enquiry, including verification from the consultant.
2.10 The Tribunal found that no such enquiry had been carried out, though the onus was initially on the assessee; in the given circumstances, further factual verification was necessary.
Conclusion
2.11 The disallowance of Rs. 5,00,000 was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after proper enquiry, including possible summons under section 131. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 3: Disallowance of sales promotion and travelling expenses (Rs. 5,70,774) - A.Y. 2019-20
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The assessee debited Rs. 3,07,352 as sales promotion and Rs. 8,34,195 as travelling expenses. The Assessing Officer disallowed 50% (Rs. 5,70,774) due to failure to establish that expenses were wholly and exclusively for business, particularly when almost all receipts were from a single company with a labour-supply / job-work arrangement.
2.13 Sample invoices submitted were deficient: absence of GST and PAN, incomplete or vague addresses (e.g., only partial address for one payee), and no substantive supporting detail.
2.14 Even before the Tribunal, no improved or concrete evidence was furnished beyond the assertion that payments were through banking channels, which was held insufficient to establish business nexus or genuineness.
Conclusion
2.15 The onus to prove business purpose and genuineness was not discharged; the disallowance of Rs. 5,70,774 was upheld.
Issue 4: Disallowance of GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777 under section 43B (A.Y. 2019-20)
Legal framework
2.16 Section 43B allows deduction for certain statutory dues, including taxes, only on actual payment, with allowance if payment is made up to the due date for filing the return of income.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The assessee had shown GST payable of Rs. 11,84,777. No proof of payment was produced before the Assessing Officer, leading to disallowance under section 43B.
2.18 Before the first appellate authority, GSTR-3B returns for December 2018 to March 2019 were furnished. A tabulation of these returns showed that the GST liability was largely discharged in cash, not via input tax credit, contradicting the assessee's claim.
2.19 As no tax payment challans were produced to substantiate cash payments, the first appellate authority confirmed the disallowance.
2.20 The Tribunal observed that GSTR-3B data indicated apparent payment of GST on specified dates. Given the nature of section 43B, the decisive factor was whether payment was made before the due date of filing the return.
Conclusion
2.21 The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify, including from GST authorities if necessary, whether the GST amount was actually paid before the due date of filing the return. Disallowance was set aside for this limited verification; ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 5: Addition of unsecured loans of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 Unsecured loans from four creditors aggregating to Rs. 64,81,702 were credited. The assessee failed before the Assessing Officer to furnish confirmations, income-tax returns or bank statements of creditors and the addition was made under section 68.
2.23 Before the first appellate authority, confirmations and returns for some creditors (M.P. Enterprises and Tip Top Services) and confirmation of one individual creditor were filed, though one creditor's return of income remained unfiled.
2.24 The first appellate authority sustained the addition, holding that the assessee had not satisfactorily discharged the burden regarding identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.
2.25 Before the Tribunal, the assessee claimed that all unsecured loans had been repaid in subsequent years, but this fact had not been placed on record earlier.
Conclusion
2.26 In the interest of justice and considering new assertions regarding repayment, the entire addition of Rs. 64,81,702 under section 68 was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after full verification. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 6: Deduction under section 80C of Rs. 1,50,000 for principal repayment of housing loan (A.Y. 2019-20)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.27 The assessee claimed deduction under section 80C on account of principal repayment, relying only on an SBI loan statement.
2.28 The statement did not indicate that the loan was a housing loan nor identify the property acquired.
2.29 No loan sanction letter or bank certificate was produced at any stage, including before the Tribunal, to establish that the borrowing was specifically for acquisition of a residential house.
Conclusion
2.30 The requirement to establish that the repayment related to a qualifying housing loan was not met; disallowance of Rs. 1,50,000 was upheld.
Issue 7: Difference in contract receipts vis-à-vis Form 26AS (Rs. 4,70,316) - A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.31 There was a difference between contract receipts as per Form 26AS and revenue from operations in the profit and loss account, leading to an addition of Rs. 4,70,316.
2.32 The assessee contended before the Tribunal, with reference to computation of income, that the differential amount had already been considered in taxable income under other heads.
Conclusion
2.33 As this assertion required factual verification, the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after providing opportunity to the assessee. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 8: Disallowance of ESIC contribution under section 36(1)(va) - Rs. 6,75,012 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.34 The assessee claimed that the amount represented ESIC contribution of A.Y. 2019-20, already disallowed earlier, and that allowing disallowance again would be duplicative.
2.35 The first appellate authority examined the earlier year's assessment and appellate proceedings and recorded that the originally disallowed employer's ESIC contribution of Rs. 5,71,290 for A.Y. 2019-20 had been fully allowed in appeal, as payments were made in April 2019.
2.36 It was thus found that there was no subsisting disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20 which could justify a corresponding allowance in A.Y. 2020-21; allowing the assessee's claim would result in double deduction.
2.37 The assessee failed to substantiate that Rs. 6,75,012 had been taxed in earlier year and corresponded to employer's ESIC contribution.
Conclusion
2.38 The disallowance of Rs. 6,75,012 under section 36(1)(va) was confirmed; the claim was rejected as it would otherwise amount to double deduction.
Issue 9: Consultancy charges of Rs. 60,000 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.39 The assessee described consultancy expenses as cash payments for PF/ESIC return filing, accounting charges, GST filing through bank, and income-tax return filing charges, aggregating to Rs. 60,000.
2.40 The particulars furnished only indicated general nature of expenses, with no names, addresses or PAN of recipients (except one item indicating a name but without further particulars), and no supporting invoices, despite specific requisition by the Assessing Officer.
2.41 The Tribunal agreed that mere ledger entries and generic descriptions without supporting evidence do not satisfy the onus under section 37 to prove genuineness and business purpose.
Conclusion
2.42 The disallowance of Rs. 60,000 was upheld.
Issue 10: Disallowance of sales promotion and travelling expenses (Rs. 3,03,218) - A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.43 The nature of this disallowance and the assessee's failure to substantiate business nexus paralleled the disallowance examined for A.Y. 2019-20.
2.44 The Tribunal applied its reasoning for A.Y. 2019-20 mutatis mutandis, noting absence of sufficient supporting evidence and failure to discharge the onus of proving that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business.
Conclusion
2.45 The disallowance of Rs. 3,03,218 was upheld.
Issue 11: Disallowance of bonus and ex-gratia payable - Rs. 1,98,089 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.46 The assessee contended that this liability had already been disallowed in A.Y. 2019-20.
2.47 The first appellate authority found that no such self-disallowance had been made in the return for A.Y. 2019-20; instead, an addition of Rs. 1,98,089 made by the Assessing Officer in that year had been deleted in appeal because payment was made on 23.04.2019.
2.48 For A.Y. 2020-21, the amount of Rs. 1,98,089 was reflected as outstanding as on 31.03.2020, indicating that a liability was recorded in F.Y. 2019-20 which remained unpaid till the date of filing the return.
2.49 In absence of evidence of payment or justification for deduction on any other basis, the disallowance was considered appropriate.
Conclusion
2.50 The disallowance of Rs. 1,98,089 was upheld.
Issue 12: Disallowance of GST payable of Rs. 90,000 under section 43B (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.51 The disallowance was made for GST shown as payable, for which no proof of payment was furnished.
2.52 The Tribunal held that its reasoning in relation to the larger GST disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20 should apply mutatis mutandis, focusing on whether actual payment had been made before the due date of filing the return.
Conclusion
2.53 The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify actual payment (including, if necessary, by obtaining information from GST authorities). Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 13: Addition of interest income of Rs. 1,165 from co-operative bank (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.54 The addition was made for interest of Rs. 1,165 from a co-operative bank not specifically identified as included in the declared income.
2.55 The assessee claimed before the Tribunal that total interest income of Rs. 32,195 in the return already included this amount, but no supporting break-up had been given earlier to the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion
2.56 The issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo verification whether the amount of Rs. 1,165 formed part of the interest income already offered. Ground allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 14: Capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 during A.Y. 2020-21
Interpretation and reasoning
2.57 The Assessing Officer noticed that the capital account disclosed income from other sources of Rs. 8,07,195, whereas the computation reflected only Rs. 4,57,195 under that head, leading to an unexplained difference of Rs. 3,50,000 treated as unexplained capital introduction.
2.58 The assessee claimed that this represented part of sale proceeds of land transferred to a purchaser by a registered sale deed.
2.59 The Tribunal examined the sale deed: it recorded total consideration of Rs. 11,55,000, stated to have been paid on various dates, but did not specify individual dates or modes of payment. The deed was dated and registered on 25.06.2018 (relevant to an earlier financial year).
2.60 On this basis, the Tribunal inferred that the consideration must have been received on or before 25.06.2018 and not during the financial year corresponding to A.Y. 2020-21. No other evidence linked the alleged receipt to the capital introduced in the later year.
Conclusion
2.61 The assessee failed to substantiate the source of capital introduction of Rs. 3,50,000 in A.Y. 2020-21. The addition was confirmed.
Issue 15: Unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises under section 68 (A.Y. 2020-21)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.62 The auditor reported unsecured loan of Rs. 3,75,000 from M.P. Enterprises. The addition under section 68 was made for failure to substantiate identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.
2.63 The Tribunal had already remanded the broader unsecured loan issue involving M.P. Enterprises for A.Y. 2019-20 for de novo adjudication.
Conclusion
2.64 Consistently, the Tribunal set aside the addition of Rs. 3,75,000 for A.Y. 2020-21 and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination along with the related issue in the earlier year.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the rejection by the competent authority of the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking condonation of a 30-month delay in filing the income tax return for AY 2018-19, to enable carry forward of loss and refund of TDS, was legally justified.
1.2 Whether internal disputes between directors and financial hardship of a company constitute "genuine hardship" within the meaning of Section 119(2)(b) so as to warrant condonation of such delay.
1.3 Whether the case law relied upon by the assessee regarding liberal construction of "genuine hardship" and refund claims under Section 119(2)(b) was applicable to the facts of the present matter.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification of rejection under Section 119(2)(b); scope of "genuine hardship" for condoning 30-month delay
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empowers the competent authority to condone delay in specified cases where "genuine hardship" is shown, and on CBDT Circular No. 09/2015 which emphasizes that such power is to be exercised in cases of genuine hardship and extraordinary circumstances, and not routinely.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court recorded that the due date for filing the return for AY 2018-19 (for a company) was 30.09.2018, extended first to 15.10.2018 and thereafter to 31.10.2018, whereas the return was actually filed on 20.09.2021, resulting in a delay of about 30 months.
2.3 The assessee's explanation was: (i) internal dispute and lack of cohesion among directors; (ii) consequent resignations and management disruptions; (iii) serious financial crunch; and (iv) that these factors collectively made it impossible to ensure timely statutory compliance.
2.4 The Court found this explanation unconvincing. It accepted the stand of the revenue that internal disputes among directors of a company do not, by themselves, constitute "genuine hardship" in law for non-compliance with statutory filing timelines, since the company is a separate legal entity which is obliged to comply with the Act.
2.5 The Court emphasized that, even if a company's management faces internal disputes, that cannot, in the absence of cogent supporting material, justify total failure to file the return for such a long period when the business remains an ongoing concern. The statutory obligation to file an ITR is independent and continuing.
2.6 The Court noted there was no documentary material produced either before the authorities or before the Court to substantiate any serious or litigated dispute between the directors, or any other extraordinary circumstance that rendered timely filing impossible.
2.7 The Court further reasoned that the conduct of the assessee in filing returns for AYs 2017-18 and 2019-20 showed that returns could and were being filed in proximate years, contradicting the plea that disputes made it impossible to comply for AY 2018-19 alone. The fact that the return for AY 2018-19 was filed much later than those for AYs 2017-18 and 2019-20 undermined the contention that the same dispute had disabled filing only for that particular year during the prescribed/extended period.
2.8 The Court also took note of the revenue's contention that the extensions of statutory due dates up to 31.10.2018 afforded sufficient time and opportunity to file the return, which the assessee failed to utilize, and that the narrative of financial hardship and personal circumstances of one director was unsubstantiated by documentary evidence.
2.9 The Court aligned with the approach, as cited from a recent decision, that statutory time limits for filing returns and availing deductions/refunds must retain sanctity, and that powers of condonation under Section 119(2)(b) can only be exercised in "extraordinary circumstances" and not upon a generic plea of inadvertence or internal management issues.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court held that internal disputes among directors and unsubstantiated allegations of financial hardship, in the facts presented, did not amount to "genuine hardship" under Section 119(2)(b).
2.11 Absence of documentary proof of any severe dispute or litigation impacting the ability to file the return, coupled with the fact of timely filing for neighbouring assessment years, led the Court to uphold the authority's refusal to condone the 30-month delay.
2.12 Consequently, the rejection of the assessee's application under Section 119(2)(b) seeking condonation of delay, and thereby the consequential denial of carry forward of loss and TDS refund for AY 2018-19, was held to be justified, and the writ petition was dismissed.
Issue 3: Applicability of cited precedents on liberal construction of "genuine hardship" and refund under Section 119(2)(b)
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.13 The Court examined a series of authorities relied upon by the assessee concerning (i) liberal interpretation of "genuine hardship" under Section 119(2)(b); and (ii) the need to avoid denial of legitimate refunds and prevent unjust enrichment of the State. The Court compared the factual matrices and legal holdings in these decisions with the present case.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 With respect to a decision where delay was condoned owing to internal disputes between management and promoters/investors, the Court observed that in that case the disputes were supported by cogent evidence, including proceedings before the Company Law Board and appellate proceedings before a High Court, and an auditor had been appointed by order of court to complete statutory audits and enable filing of returns. Those "glaring" facts, judicially recognized, demonstrated genuine hardship. In contrast, in the present matter, no litigation records or equivalent documentary proof of disabling disputes were produced.
2.15 The Court also noted that while the Supreme Court had declined to interfere in that matter on facts, it expressly kept open the legal question regarding the scope of CBDT's power under Section 119(2)(b) and directed that the judgment should not be treated as a precedent, further limiting its applicability.
2.16 Regarding a case where deduction under Section 80IC was denied because an audit report (Form 10CCB) had not been uploaded though the return was filed in time and the accounts were duly audited, the Court recorded that the assessee there had substantially complied with statutory obligations and the lapse related to a procedural omission despite bona fide efforts. That factual setting, showing clear and timely compliance except for a technical lapse, was held to constitute "genuine hardship." The present case, involving complete non-filing of the return for 30 months without extraordinary substantiated cause, was held to be materially different.
2.17 As to a decision where a delay of 60 days occurred due to the accountant's poor health, the Court held that a short delay supported by a specific, medically explained inadvertence is not comparable with a prolonged delay of 30 months based on generic assertions of director disputes, without documentation.
2.18 Concerning a precedent which elaborates that "genuine hardship" should be construed liberally and that substantive justice should generally prevail over technicalities in refund and limitation matters, the Court accepted the principle but held that a liberal construction cannot be stretched to the extent of condoning a delay of 30 months on a vague and unsubstantiated plea. Doing so, the Court held, would itself amount to a travesty of the very legislative intent behind Section 119(2)(b).
2.19 With respect to a Kerala decision relied upon to argue about absence of limitation for filing a Section 119(2)(b) application, the Court noted that: (i) it dealt with the question of limitation for moving a condonation application, not with the determination of "genuine hardship" on facts; and (ii) it has been overruled by a Division Bench of the same High Court, rendering it inapplicable in any event.
2.20 The Court also noted, in alignment with another recent decision cited by the revenue, that statutory timelines must not be rendered nugatory by routine condonation; powers under Section 119(2)(b) are reserved for extraordinary circumstances and must be exercised sparingly.
Conclusions
2.21 The Court held that none of the precedents cited by the assessee assisted it on the specific facts of this case, as each turned on materially different circumstances where either (i) substantial statutory compliance was demonstrably made; (ii) the hardship was convincingly established through objective evidence; or (iii) the legal issue concerned limitation or refund principles distinct from the present factual context.
2.22 The general principles of liberal interpretation of "genuine hardship" and avoidance of unjust enrichment of the State were not considered sufficient, in the absence of extraordinary, proven hardship, to justify condonation of a 30-month delay in filing the return. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rejection of the condonation application and dismissed the petition.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, after issuance of the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 introducing the "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022", a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can validly be issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), or whether it is mandatory that such notice be issued only by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO).
1.2 Whether the notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024, issued by the JAO and not by the FAO/NFAC, is invalid for non-compliance with the said CBDT Scheme and the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court.
1.3 What is the effect, if any, of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions by the Supreme Court, including in related matters, on (a) the applicability of the doctrine of merger and (b) the binding nature of High Court decisions under Article 141 of the Constitution, in relation to the jurisdictional issue under section 148.
1.4 Whether the Tribunal is bound to follow the jurisdictional High Court's decision holding that notices under section 148 issued by the JAO, instead of the FAO, are invalid, and whether similar liberty for revival should be preserved if the Supreme Court reverses that view.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of section 148 notice issued by JAO after CBDT "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022"
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal noted CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 formulating the "e-assessment of income assessment Scheme, 2022". As recorded in the order, the Scheme provides inter alia that: (i) assessment/re-assessment or re-computation under section 147, and (ii) issuance of notice under section 148 shall be through automated allocation, in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board, and in a faceless manner to the extent provided in section 144B of the Act.
2.2 The Tribunal also referred to multiple High Court decisions (Telangana, Bombay, and Delhi) which have examined the post-29.03.2022 regime and the requirement that notices under section 148 be issued by FAO/NFAC in a faceless manner, including decisions setting aside notices issued by JAO in violation of the Scheme.
2.3 The jurisdictional High Court's Division Bench decision was specifically relied upon, wherein, following the Bombay High Court judgment in "Hexaware Technologies Ltd", it was held that it is mandatory for the FAO to issue the concerned notices and that issuance by the JAO would render the notice invalid.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal recorded that the impugned notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 was issued by the Income Tax Officer, Ward 1, Tiruvarur (JAO) and not by NFAC/FAO.
2.5 Since the notice was issued after the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, the Tribunal held that the Scheme of 29.03.2022 squarely applied, requiring automated allocation and faceless issuance of notices under section 148.
2.6 Relying on the decisions of the Telangana High Court (including Kankanala Ravindra Reddy, Ta Infra Projects, Sri Venkatramana Reddy Patloola, and Deepanjan Roy) and the Bombay High Court (Hexaware Technologies Ltd), the Tribunal noted that the consistent judicial view in those cases was that non-compliance with the mandatory faceless procedure and issuance of notices by JAO instead of FAO under the Scheme vitiates the notices and consequential assessments.
2.7 The Tribunal particularly noted the finding of the Telangana High Court that failure to issue section 148 notices in a faceless manner in accordance with the Scheme renders "the entire further proceeding founded upon it and assessment orders" vitiated and liable to be set aside.
2.8 The Tribunal then turned to the jurisdictional High Court's Division Bench order, which (a) recognised divergent single-judge views, (b) followed the Bombay High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd, and (c) expressly held that it is mandatory for the FAO to issue the notices and that issuance by JAO makes the notices invalid, quashing such notices while reserving liberty to Revenue to seek revival if the Supreme Court reverses Hexaware.
2.9 The Tribunal also noted the Departmental Representative's argument that the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022 is not applicable; however, in light of the wording of the Scheme, the timing of the notice (post-Notification), and the jurisdictional High Court's adoption of the Hexaware ratio, the Tribunal rejected this contention and treated the Scheme as directly applicable.
(c) Conclusions
2.10 The Tribunal held that, post-CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, issuance of notices under section 148 is required to be done through automated allocation and in a faceless manner by FAO/NFAC as per the Scheme and section 144B, and that a JAO-initiated notice is contrary to this mandatory framework.
2.11 Following the binding jurisdictional High Court decision, which in turn followed Hexaware, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned section 148 notice dated 28.03.2024 issued by the JAO is invalid and not sustainable in law.
2.12 Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 and all consequential orders/proceedings, thereby allowing the assessee's jurisdictional ground.
Issue 3: Effect of Supreme Court's dismissal of SLPs - doctrine of merger and Article 141
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Tribunal discussed the doctrine of merger and the effect of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, with reference to the Supreme Court decisions in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, and reiterated the settled principles, namely:
- Merger occurs when a superior forum, in appellate or revisional jurisdiction, modifies, reverses or affirms the order under challenge; in such a case, the subordinate forum's decision merges into the superior forum's order.
- Jurisdiction under Article 136 has two stages; the doctrine of merger applies only after leave is granted and appellate jurisdiction is exercised, not at the stage of dismissal of an SLP.
- An order refusing special leave (speaking or non-speaking) does not attract the doctrine of merger and does not substitute the High Court's order.
- A speaking order refusing special leave may constitute a "declaration of law" under Article 141, but still does not result in merger of the High Court's order into the Supreme Court's order.
3.2 The Tribunal further noted Supreme Court reiteration of these principles in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and other cases, and the distinction between dismissal of SLP at the threshold and decisions rendered after grant of leave.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
3.3 The Tribunal examined the Supreme Court order dated 16.07.2025 dismissing the Revenue's SLP (Civil) against the Telangana High Court's decision in Deepanjan Roy, and observed that the SLP was dismissed at the admission stage, with the Supreme Court stating that it found no good reason to interfere with the impugned order.
3.4 Applying Kunhayammed and related authorities, the Tribunal reasoned that such dismissal of SLP at the threshold does not result in merger of the High Court's judgment into the Supreme Court's order and does not, by itself, constitute a binding declaration of law under Article 141 beyond what is explicitly stated as law in the Supreme Court's own order.
3.5 On that basis, the Tribunal held that simplicitor dismissal of the Revenue's SLP in Deepanjan Roy does not create an independent binding precedent under Article 141 and does not alter the legal position beyond affirming that the Supreme Court did not see any reason to interfere in that particular matter.
3.6 The Tribunal also noted that the Revenue's SLP against the Bombay High Court judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd is still pending, and hence no merger or final Supreme Court pronouncement exists thereon as yet.
(c) Conclusions
3.7 The Tribunal concluded that the doctrine of merger is not attracted to the mere dismissal of SLPs at the threshold and that such dismissal does not, by itself, operate as a binding declaration of law under Article 141 except to the limited extent of any law expressly stated in a speaking order.
3.8 Accordingly, while the Tribunal noted the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere in Deepanjan Roy, it grounded its decision primarily on the binding jurisdictional High Court judgment and the statutory Scheme, not on any supposed merger or Article 141 effect of the SLP dismissal.
Issue 4: Binding effect of jurisdictional High Court decision and liberty to revive in event of Supreme Court reversal
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 The Tribunal recognised that the jurisdictional High Court, faced with conflicting single-judge views on whether JAO or FAO can issue section 148 notices post-Scheme, constituted a Division Bench, which then followed the Bombay High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd and held that it is mandatory for FAO to issue the notices and that JAO-issued notices are invalid.
4.2 The Tribunal noted that the jurisdictional High Court, while quashing such JAO-issued notices, expressly kept open all rights and contentions of parties and granted liberty to apply for revival of the petitions if the Supreme Court were to reverse Hexaware Technologies Ltd, thereby recognising the possibility of a change in law pursuant to a future Supreme Court decision.
4.3 Being subordinate to the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal held itself bound to apply the law as laid down therein, namely that only FAO has jurisdiction to issue section 148 notices under the post-29.03.2022 faceless scheme, and that JAO-issued notices are invalid.
(b) Conclusions
4.4 Respectfully following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal set aside the impugned notice under section 148 dated 28.03.2024 and the consequential assessment orders, allowing the assessee's jurisdictional ground.
4.5 In line with paragraph 8 of the jurisdictional High Court's judgment, the Tribunal expressly kept open the rights and contentions of both parties and reserved liberty to either party to approach the Tribunal for revival of the present appeal in case the Revenue succeeds before the Supreme Court. In the event of such revival, the assessee would retain the right to argue all grounds originally raised in the appeal.
4.6 On this basis, the appeal was allowed "in terms above", solely on the jurisdictional ground relating to the invalidity of the section 148 notice issued by the JAO under the post-Scheme regime.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay of 155 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on the grounds shown by the appellant.
1.2 Whether estimation of business income at 8% (earlier 25%) of certain contract receipts, after rejection of books, was justified in light of the assessee's past profit history and nature of business.
1.3 Whether separate addition on account of cash deposits, when the same represented business receipts already subjected to profit estimation, resulted in impermissible double taxation.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Condonation of delay of 155 days in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal examined the affidavit explaining reasons for delay and heard both parties. The reasons stated were found to be bona fide and such as actually prevented timely filing of the appeal.
Conclusion:
The delay of 155 days in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
Issue 2 - Validity and quantum of profit estimation on contract receipts after rejection of books
Legal framework (as discussed):
The Tribunal applied the settled principle that, once books are rejected, estimation of income must be fair and reasonable, and that an assessee's own past history is an established and reliable basis for such estimation. Courts have repeatedly held that arbitrary or ad hoc rates without supporting material are not justified.
Interpretation and reasoning:
The assessee was engaged in advertisement services, acting as an intermediary, a line of business which ordinarily operates on thin margins. The Tribunal noted:
- Past profit ratios from earlier assessment years (AYs 2009-10 to 2012-13) consistently ranged between about 3.16% and 3.70%, with an average of about 3.5%.
- For the relevant year, the assessee disclosed contract receipts of Rs. 8,40,12,821 and net profit of Rs. 28,72,757, yielding a profit ratio of 3.42%.
- The income declared under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016, was consistent with the profit shown in audited financials and supported the claim of low margins.
The Tribunal found no material brought by the Assessing Officer to justify estimation at 25% or even 8%, such as comparable cases, industry benchmarks, evidence of inflation of expenses, or specific defects in financials. In the absence of such material, the estimation at higher rates was regarded as ad hoc and excessive.
Considering the assessee's average past profit margin of 3.5%, the thin-margin nature of the advertisement agency business, and the requirement of a fair and reasonable estimate, the Tribunal held that a profit rate moderately higher than past margins would meet the ends of justice.
Conclusion:
Income was directed to be estimated at 5% of the contract receipts of Rs. 8,40,12,821, resulting in income of Rs. 42,00,641 (approx.). The Assessing Officer was directed to adopt this figure in place of the addition sustained by the first appellate authority and recompute the assessed income accordingly.
Issue 3 - Separate addition on account of cash deposits leading to double taxation
Interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal accepted the contention that the cash deposits in question formed part of the business receipts already taken into account while estimating profit. Making a separate addition on such deposits, after income had been estimated on the total contract receipts, would amount to taxing the same income twice, which is not permissible.
Conclusion:
The entire separate addition relating to cash deposits was deleted as it resulted in double taxation of income already embedded in the estimated business receipts.
Note
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