Issues: (i) whether dyeing and processing units engaged on job work basis were liable to cess under Section 5A of the Textile Committee Act, 1963; and (ii) whether the demand notices issued after the prescribed period were barred by limitation under Rule 10 of the Textile Committee (Cess) Rules, 1975.

Issue (i): whether dyeing and processing units engaged on job work basis were liable to cess under Section 5A of the Textile Committee Act, 1963.

Analysis: The charging provision levied cess on textiles and textile machinery manufactured in India, but the Act did not define manufacture in a manner that incorporated the wider excise-based concept. The Court held that the definition of manufacture under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Chapter Notes of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 could not be imported into the Textile Committee Act, 1963 in the absence of an express legislative provision. The record also showed that the Committee itself had long treated independent processors as outside the cess net, and later resolved to shift the burden away from such units.

Conclusion: The levy of cess on independent processing units was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the demand notices issued after the prescribed period were barred by limitation under Rule 10 of the Textile Committee (Cess) Rules, 1975.

Analysis: Rule 10 required recovery of short-levied cess by notice made within one year from the date on which the cess had been paid. The notices in question related to periods several years earlier and were issued well beyond the one-year period. The Court therefore held that the demands could not survive on the ground of limitation. The Tribunal's dismissal of the appeal was also found to be non-speaking and mechanical.

Conclusion: The demand notices were time-barred and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the petitions were allowed, resulting in relief to the petitioners on both the levy and limitation issues.

Ratio Decidendi: A taxing statute cannot be enlarged by importing a definition from another enactment unless the legislature expressly so provides, and a demand issued beyond the period prescribed for recovery of short levy is unenforceable.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the adjudication order confirming tax, interest and penalty was liable to be set aside and the matter remanded where the show cause notice and reminder were uploaded on the GST portal's "Additional Notices Tab" (prior to portal changes), resulting in no effective notice, no reply, and no personal hearing.

(ii) What remedial directions were required to restore a fair opportunity of participation in adjudication, including timelines, costs, communication mode for hearing notice, and portal access.

(iii) Whether the Court should decide the validity of the challenged notifications extending time limits, or leave that issue open in view of pending consideration before the Supreme Court and a pending lead matter before this Court.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Validity of ex parte adjudication where SCN/reminder were placed in "Additional Notices Tab" leading to absence of reply and hearing

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court applied the requirement that adjudication should not be concluded "in default" and that the noticee must get a fair opportunity to file a reply and be heard, consistent with principles of natural justice, as reflected in the Court's approach in similar matters.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that the show cause notice (issued in September 2023) and reminder (issued in November 2023) were uploaded on the "Additional Notices Tab" on the GST portal at a time when that tab was not suitably visible (changes being made only after January 2024). On these facts, the Court accepted that the notices did not appear to have come to the petitioner's knowledge, leading to non-filing of reply and non-attendance at personal hearing, and consequently an ex parte adjudication with adverse demand. In such circumstances, the Court held that the petitioner did not receive a proper opportunity to be heard and therefore the matter warranted remand for adjudication afresh after participation.

Conclusion: The Court set aside the impugned adjudication order and remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority, specifically because the petitioner had no effective notice and consequently no meaningful opportunity to reply or be heard.

Issue (ii): Scope of remand and directions to ensure effective opportunity

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court proceeded on ensuring procedural fairness through a renewed opportunity to submit a reply and attend personal hearing, and requiring a "fresh reasoned order".

Interpretation and reasoning: To cure the defect of ineffective portal communication and absence of hearing, the Court prescribed a structured opportunity: (a) time to file reply to the show cause notice; (b) a condition of costs; (c) an obligation on the adjudicating authority to issue a personal hearing notice and communicate it through specified electronic means; (d) a requirement to consider the reply and hearing submissions and pass a reasoned order; and (e) ensuring portal access so the reply and documents can be accessed and uploaded.

Conclusion: The Court granted time up to 31 January 2026 to file the reply, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited by 10 January 2026; directed that after the reply, a personal hearing notice be issued and communicated to the petitioner via the stated e-mail and mobile contact; directed a fresh reasoned order after considering submissions; and directed that GST portal access be provided within one week to enable uploading and access to notices/documents.

Issue (iii): Adjudication of the validity of the challenged notifications

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that the validity of the relevant notifications was under consideration before the Supreme Court, and that certain matters concerning parallel State notifications were being considered in a separate lead matter before this Court.

Interpretation and reasoning: Given the pending consideration of the notification-validity questions at higher and coordinate levels, and because the present case could be disposed of on the narrower ground of lack of effective opportunity to respond and be heard, the Court declined to finally decide the notification challenge in this petition.

Conclusion: The Court expressly left open the issue of validity of the impugned notifications. It further directed that any fresh adjudication order would remain subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings concerning the relevant notification issues and the pending lead matter before this Court, while keeping all rights and remedies of the parties open.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the Court should grant a mandatory stay of recovery pursuant to notices of demand issued under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when the assessee's appellate remedy before the Tribunal has not yet been restored and the assessee had communicated a willingness to pay the outstanding demand in instalments.

(ii) What directions, if any, should be issued regarding the assessee's pending application under Section 220(6) seeking stay of demand, including the timeframe and the nature of discretion to be exercised by the Revenue authorities.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Grant of mandatory stay of demand under Section 156

Legal framework (as noticed by the Court): The impugned recovery steps flowed from notices issued under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court also considered the status of the assessee's appellate proceedings before the Tribunal, noting that restoration had not yet occurred and only a fresh restoration-related application was pending.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated two circumstances as decisive against granting a mandatory stay: (a) the assessee's appeal before the Tribunal had not yet been restored; and (b) the assessee's own letter/e-mail dated October 17, 2025 recorded an indication that the assessee would pay the outstanding demand by instalments, which had led to lifting of the bank attachment. The Court rejected the prayer for a court-directed stay in view of these facts, notwithstanding the assessee's contention that it had never undertaken to pay.

Conclusion: No mandatory order staying the demand/recovery arising from the Section 156 notices was granted.

Issue (ii): Direction for decision on the pending Section 220(6) stay application

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court recognised that the assessee had filed an application under Section 220(6) seeking stay of the demand, and treated it as a matter to be decided by the competent Revenue authority "strictly in accordance with law."

Interpretation and reasoning: While declining to impose a judicial stay, the Court noted the existence of the assessee's stay request and directed the Revenue authorities to decide it expeditiously. The Court also clarified that its order should not be construed as any mandate to grant stay; the authority was required to exercise independent discretion under law.

Conclusion: The Revenue authorities were directed to decide the Section 220(6) stay application as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four weeks from communication of the order, with an express clarification that there was no court-mandated stay and the authority remained free to decide independently in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking implementation of the Order-in-Original could be granted in view of the Customs Department having preferred an appeal, and whether the petitioner was entitled to a personal hearing in that appeal.

Analysis: The petition was not decided on the merits of the customs dispute. The order notes the existence of an appeal against the Order-in-Original and the absence of intimation to the petitioner about such appeal. In that context, the Court directed that the petitioner be afforded a personal hearing and that the Appellate Authority pass a reasoned order within the stipulated time. The possible relevance of the WPC approval and the legality of detention was left for consideration by the Appellate Authority.

Outcome: No final adjudication was made on the validity of the detention, confiscation, penalty, or the requested implementation of the Order-in-Original; the matter was disposed of with directions to the Appellate Authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the sole remaining shareholder could continue the writ petition after the company withdrew from the proceeding; (ii) whether the RBI's permission for allotment of shares against imported second-hand equipment on non-repatriation basis was illegal or contrary to the applicable policy and statutory framework; (iii) whether the challenge was barred by res judicata or issue estoppel in view of the earlier company law proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the sole remaining shareholder could continue the writ petition after the company withdrew from the proceeding.

Analysis: The dispute concerned an RBI permission that directly affected the shareholding pattern and control of the company. The withdrawal by the company did not, by itself, extinguish the individual grievance of the shareholder, where the impugned decision was said to cause distinct injury to his proprietary and corporate interest. Judicial review under Article 226 is available in appropriate cases where statutory action affects individual rights, even if the company is also affected.

Conclusion: The shareholder was held entitled to maintain the writ petition in his individual capacity.

Issue (ii): Whether the RBI's permission for allotment of shares against imported second-hand equipment on non-repatriation basis was illegal or contrary to the applicable policy and statutory framework.

Analysis: The RBI acted under its statutory power under FERA and relied on the Government's policy directive that direct payment by an NRI against import of second-hand capital goods supported only non-repatriable investment. The Court held that the SIA approval and foreign investment policy did not govern the changed mode of investment adopted in the transaction. The decision was taken on relevant material, after hearing the parties, and no perversity, lack of jurisdiction, or violation of natural justice was established. In judicial review, the Court would not sit in appeal over a reasoned statutory decision taken within jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The RBI permission was upheld and the challenge to it was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the challenge was barred by res judicata or issue estoppel in view of the earlier company law proceedings.

Analysis: The earlier company law proceedings did not adjudicate the validity of the specific RBI permission for issuance of 30,55,329 shares against the imported equipment. The pending writ petition had been expressly noticed in the earlier proceedings, and no final finding on the impugned RBI permission had been rendered there. Therefore, the necessary elements of res judicata or issue estoppel were absent.

Conclusion: The objection based on res judicata or issue estoppel was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The intra-court appeal failed, the judgment under challenge was affirmed, and the writ petition challenge to the RBI permission did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: A shareholder may maintain a writ petition where a statutory order directly affects his individual rights and the company's control structure, but the Court will not interfere with a reasoned statutory permission granted within jurisdiction and in accordance with the applicable policy, absent perversity, mala fide, or violation of natural justice.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1) Whether, on the facts found, the Applicant satisfied the statutory "twin conditions" for bail under Section 45 PMLA and the general "triple test" (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence), warranting regular bail.

2) Whether "necessity of arrest", in the context of long-standing investigation, prior cooperation, and documentary nature of evidence, was relevant and could be examined in bail proceedings to assess entitlement to bail.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Satisfaction of Section 45 PMLA "twin conditions" and the "triple test"

Legal framework: The Court proceeded on the basis that bail under PMLA must satisfy Section 45 "twin conditions" in addition to ordinary bail considerations, and assessed the "triple test" of (i) flight risk, (ii) possibility of influencing witnesses, and (iii) possibility of tampering with evidence.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated as significant that the Applicant was not alleged to have conceived, controlled, or executed the predicate investment scheme, but was implicated primarily due to alleged directorships in overseas entities through which proceeds of crime were said to have been laundered. The Court found it material that large parts of the alleged fund diversions occurred before the Applicant assumed directorial positions, making the allegation of "active and knowing" laundering based only on office-holding less persuasive at the bail stage. The Court also considered that the Applicant had been on bail in the predicate offence without misuse, had repeatedly travelled abroad with court permission and returned on time, and had "deep roots in society," supporting the conclusion that he was not a flight risk. Since the case was "essentially" documentary and the investigation had been completed with the supplementary complaint already filed, the Court found little likelihood of tampering with evidence or obstructing investigation; conditions could ensure attendance and compliance.

Conclusions: The Court held that the Applicant satisfied both the Section 45 PMLA twin conditions and the triple test, and granted regular bail with conditions ensuring appearance, non-interference, and travel restrictions.

Issue 2: Relevance and examinability of "necessity of arrest" in bail proceedings

Legal framework: The Court considered "necessity of arrest" as a relevant factor while deciding bail, particularly where the Applicant had been granted liberty to agitate it in bail proceedings.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that, given the predicate investigation commenced years earlier and the Applicant had "throughout joined the investigation," the contention that there was no necessity to arrest had "some substance." The Court rejected the objection that this issue could not be examined because a writ challenging arrest had been withdrawn, holding that liberty had been expressly granted to raise it in bail. The Court also did not accept that conduct attributed to the Applicant's wife or other suspects could be used to deny bail to him. As to the allegation of deletion of WhatsApp data, the Court treated it as a "moot point" and a matter for trial; in any case, with investigation complete, the likelihood of interference was low.

Conclusions: The Court held that "necessity of arrest" could be considered in the bail determination on these facts; the long prior investigation, consistent cooperation, and documentary nature of evidence supported bail rather than continued custody.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the activities performed under the impugned contracts, involving textile processing/job work executed in the principal manufacturer's premises on per kg/per unit job rates, are classifiable as Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Service or as job work services, for the purpose of service tax liability.

(ii) Consequent to the classification on merits, whether the service tax demands, interest and penalties sustained by the lower authorities are sustainable, and whether it was necessary to examine limitation once the merits were decided in favour of the appellants.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Classification-Manpower supply versus job work textile processing

Legal framework (as discussed/applied by the Tribunal): The Tribunal determined the correct taxable category by examining the nature of the service in light of the contractual terms and the distinguishing features between manpower supply and job work, as already applied in an earlier Tribunal decision involving materially similar contracts and textile-processing activities. The Tribunal treated the principles in the discussed Board Circular (contrasting manpower supply with job work, focusing on control, accountability, and valuation basis) as applicable to the factual determination of the service category.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that, on the facts, both matters involved textile processing carried out on a job work basis. The contracts produced showed that consideration was fixed on per kg/per metre (i.e., quantum of output) rather than on a per person or manpower-deployed basis. The Tribunal accepted that the service recipient was concerned with completion of specified processing work, while the job worker retained responsibility for execution and quality and could decide the manpower required. The Tribunal also noted contractual responsibility for loss/damage and performance, which aligned with a job work arrangement rather than mere provision of personnel "at the disposal" of the recipient. The Tribunal relied on its own earlier final order concerning similar textile processes and similar contract terms, where it was held that such arrangements "remotely" did not indicate manpower recruitment/supply, because payment was linked to output irrespective of number of workers deputed.

Conclusions: The Tribunal conclusively held that the impugned activities were those of a job worker undertaking textile processing on job work basis and did not constitute Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Service. Accordingly, the service tax demands raised by classifying the activity as manpower supply were held not sustainable on merits.

Issue (ii): Sustainability of demands/penalties and necessity of deciding limitation

Legal framework (as applied): Having found the demands unsustainable on merits due to misclassification, the Tribunal treated the consequential interest and penalties as not surviving. The Tribunal expressly stated that it was not necessary to examine limitation once the demands failed on merits.

Interpretation and reasoning: Since the very basis of taxability (classification as manpower supply) was rejected, the Tribunal held there was no foundation to sustain the confirmed demands. In that view, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders and allowed the appeals, explicitly doing so "without going into limitation issue".

Conclusions: The Tribunal set aside the confirmed service tax demands along with consequential liabilities, allowed both appeals, and declined to rule on limitation because the matter was disposed of on merits in favour of the appellants.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1) Whether refusal to condone a 2262-day delay in filing a statutory appeal was justified, when the delay was attributed to a bona fide attempt to resolve the dispute through the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, and when the Tribunal treated the conduct as "total negligence."

2) Whether, in assessing "sufficient cause," the Tribunal adopted an impermissibly hyper-technical approach by (i) insisting on a strict explanation for the pre-scheme period and (ii) rejecting the plea of ignorance of the scheme-application rejection despite pandemic-era realities, thereby defeating adjudication on merits of a significant penalty.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Justification for refusing condonation of delay as "total negligence" despite pursuit of a settlement scheme

Legal framework: The Court examined the standard of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that it must be construed liberally to advance substantial justice rather than defeat substantive rights on procedural rigidity.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the Tribunal's characterization of the appellant's conduct as "total negligence" was unsustainable because the appellant's conduct showed an intent to resolve liability through a beneficial, State-sponsored dispute resolution mechanism. Even if the appellant's scheme application ultimately failed (including on eligibility), the act of applying reflected bona fide pursuit of settlement and could not be treated as a dilatory or mala fide tactic warranting denial of adjudication on merits.

Conclusions: The Tribunal was not justified in refusing condonation on the ground of "total negligence." The Court set aside the impugned refusal and held that the delay deserved to be condoned, subject to balancing equities through costs.

Issue 2: Whether the Tribunal's approach to the "unexplained" periods and portal-based "ignorance" was hyper-technical, including the effect of pandemic disruption

Legal framework: The Court applied the principle that limitation law should not operate as an "extinguishing engine" for substantive rights, and considered the judicially recognized exclusion of limitation during the COVID-19 disruption period (as referenced by the Court) as relevant to evaluating diligence expectations.

Interpretation and reasoning: (i) On the Tribunal's insistence that the period between expiry of limitation and the scheme application was unaccounted for, the Court reasoned that once the later delay was shown to be rooted in bona fide pursuit of settlement, a broader and justice-oriented view could be taken of the preceding period rather than treating it as fatal. (ii) On the Tribunal's view that rejection status being available on a public portal defeated the plea of ignorance, the Court found the expectation of constant monitoring-particularly during the pandemic-era disruption-unrealistic and divorced from ground realities. The Court also stressed that denying a hearing on merits in a matter involving a significant penalty merely due to non-deliberate delay would be unconscionable and contrary to substantial justice.

Conclusions: The Tribunal adopted a hyper-technical approach by treating the portal availability and the earlier period as determinative against condonation, without giving due weight to bona fide pursuit of settlement and pandemic realities. The Court answered the substantial question of law in favour of the appellant, condoned the 2262-day delay, and directed restoration of the appeal for decision on merits, subject to payment of costs to the Revenue within a fixed time.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's delayed GST appeal, rejected by the appellate authority under Section 107, could be restored and heard on merits on terms, and whether consequential relief against the bank account attachment could follow upon compliance.

Analysis: The petitioner was an individual and a senior citizen who had been depending on a tax consultant for GST-related compliance. The writ record showed that the notices and orders had been uploaded on the GST portal under the relevant tab, but the petitioner's explanation for the failure to track the e-mail and proceedings was otherwise limited. In view of the petitioner's personal circumstances, the Court exercised its discretion to grant an opportunity to prosecute the appeal on merits, subject to payment of costs to the High Court Legal Services Committee and production of proof before the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to have the appeal restored and heard on merits upon payment of Rs. 15,000/- within the stipulated time, whereupon the appellate authority's delay-based dismissal would lose effect and the bank account attachment would stand lifted. Failure to comply would deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the order.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with conditional relief enabling restoration of the appeal on compliance with the payment condition.

Ratio Decidendi: A delayed statutory appeal may be restored for decision on merits where the Court, exercising equitable discretion, finds sufficient cause arising from the petitioner's circumstances and imposes conditions to balance the equities.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether initiation of reassessment for the relevant assessment year, after scrutiny assessment had examined the alleged cash payments/transactions with a particular group and then "dropped" the issue due to lack of verification, was barred as a mere change of opinion.

(ii) Whether, on the facts found, the impugned reassessment steps were founded on new and tangible material (as opposed to a reappraisal of the same material already considered), thereby negating the plea of change of opinion.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i) & (ii): Reopening after earlier scrutiny-change of opinion vs. reopening based on new tangible material

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that reassessment cannot be initiated on a "change of opinion". For establishing "change of opinion", there must first be a prior formation of opinion by the assessing authority on the relevant issue; only thereafter can a later contrary view amount to a change. The Court further proceeded on the basis that reopening is permissible where the authority forms "reason to believe" based on material having a live link to escapement and not on conjecture, and that conditions governing reopening must be satisfied before issuing notice.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the earlier scrutiny record and found that the transactions now relied upon had indeed been put to the assessee during scrutiny. The assessee had denied the allegations entirely, and the assessment order recorded that verification attempts did not yield relevant data concerning the alleged counterparty; hence the assessing authority stated it could not verify whether any business relationship existed. The Court treated this as a case where the issue was "dropped" because the assessing authority was unable to form an opinion due to lack of usable material for verification. In the Court's view, absence of verifiable data meant no concluded opinion was formed on "no escapement"; therefore, a later reopening could not automatically be characterised as a prohibited review on change of opinion.

The Court further held that the impugned reassessment action was not based merely on the assessee's financial statements or the same static material earlier scrutinised. It found that the impugned order proceeded on the basis of additional material identifying the relationship/transactions, which was stated to have been non-existent at the time of the earlier scrutiny. On that factual premise, the Court concluded the reopening was founded on new tangible material rather than a reappraisal of an already-formed view.

Conclusions: The Court rejected the challenge founded on "change of opinion" and held that no jurisdictional error was established on that ground. It concluded that, because the earlier scrutiny did not result in a formed opinion on the merits (the issue having been dropped due to inability to verify), and because the impugned action was based on new tangible material, the reassessment steps were not vitiated as a change of opinion.

Limited protective direction: While permitting the reassessment proceedings to continue, the Court directed that any decision taken in such proceedings shall not be implemented without express leave of the Court, noting that a separate jurisdictional question (relating to competence to issue notice in view of a statutory scheme) may require detailed consideration, though it had not been argued.

Issues: Whether the payment made for global partnership and advertising rights under the agreement could be treated in part as royalty for the right to use the ICC trademark, attracting withholding tax under the Income-tax Act and the Indo-Singapore DTAA.

Analysis: The agreement conferred not merely advertising space but also a substantive right to use the ICC Mark and Event Mark throughout the licensed territory in advertising material, along with official status and related promotional rights. The petitioner itself acknowledged an element of trademark use, and the attempt to treat it as merely incidental was rejected. The arrangement therefore fell within the statutory definition of royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the corresponding treaty article. The apportionment adopted by the revisional authority between advertisement value and trademark royalty was also found unobjectionable.

Conclusion: The payment was rightly treated in part as royalty, and the withholding of tax on the apportioned royalty component was upheld in favour of Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether in-shell walnuts are covered by the DFIA descriptions of "nut and nut products" and "dietary fibre" so as to qualify for exemption from basic customs duty under Notification No. 25/2023-Cus dated 01.04.2023; (ii) Whether the importer was required to establish a separate ITC(HS) match or technical correlation between the imported walnuts and the exported product for claiming DFIA benefit.

Issue (i): Whether in-shell walnuts are covered by the DFIA descriptions of "nut and nut products" and "dietary fibre" so as to qualify for exemption from basic customs duty under Notification No. 25/2023-Cus dated 01.04.2023.

Analysis: The transferability of the DFIA scheme, the relevant SION entries for confectionary products and biscuits, and the earlier judicial view on walnuts as an input falling within the dietary fibre description were relied upon. The decision also noted that the authority had accepted the import under the generic input descriptions contained in the DFIA and that no breach of the value-based limitation was shown.

Conclusion: The import of in-shell walnuts was held to be permissible under the DFIA entries and the exemption was not disturbed.

Issue (ii): Whether the importer was required to establish a separate ITC(HS) match or technical correlation between the imported walnuts and the exported product for claiming DFIA benefit.

Analysis: The decision accepted the view that, for inputs outside the specifically restricted category under the FTP, the DFIA scheme does not insist on a separate technical correlation or ITC(HS) matching beyond the input description and quantity. The later clarificatory circular was also taken into account as reinforcing that position.

Conclusion: No separate ITC(HS) matching or technical correlation was held necessary for the claim.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, as the questions sought to be raised were treated as already answered by existing precedent and the clarificatory circular, leaving no basis for interference with the advance ruling.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the DFIA scheme, where the imported goods fit the relevant input description and quantity in the authorization and are not hit by a specific FTP restriction, exemption cannot be denied merely for want of a separate ITC(HS) match or technical correlation.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether attachment under PMLA can be sustained against persons whose names do not appear as accused in the FIR/charge-sheet for the scheduled offence, if the properties are alleged to represent proceeds of crime or are held in connection therewith.

(ii) Whether immovable properties acquired prior to the alleged period of criminal activity can be attached as "value" of proceeds of crime when the alleged tainted property is not traceable/available.

(iii) Whether release of attached properties is warranted for absence of a direct nexus between the specific properties and the proceeds of crime, where attachment is also justified on the basis of indirect acquisition or "value thereof".

(iv) Whether the fact that properties are mortgaged to banks negates the statutory basis for attachment and/or the "reason to believe" regarding likelihood of frustration of proceedings, and whether attachment can still be maintained to prevent alienation.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Attachment of property held by persons not named as accused in scheduled offence

Legal framework: The Tribunal examined the reach of attachment under the PMLA as applied to persons other than those named as accused in the scheduled offence.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal held that the statutory sweep of attachment is not confined to persons arraigned in the scheduled offence case. It accepted that property can be attached in the hands of "any person" if it is connected with proceeds of crime, and that attachment may extend beyond those charge-sheeted for the predicate offence.

Conclusion: The plea for release merely because certain appellants were not named in the FIR/charge-sheet was rejected; attachment was held maintainable against non-accused holders as well.

Issue (ii) & (iii) (Grouped): Attachment of pre-offence properties; necessity of direct nexus; attachment as "value thereof" and indirect proceeds

Legal framework: The Tribunal applied the definition of "proceeds of crime" as including not only property derived/obtained directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also "the value of any such property".

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal reasoned that the definition has multiple limbs, one permitting attachment of property representing the "value" of proceeds of crime. On the facts, it noted the finding that the proceeds of crime were misappropriated/laundered and were not available/traced during investigation, and that immovable properties were therefore attached as "value thereof" and/or as indirectly acquired from proceeds of crime. It further held that establishing a direct connection of each attached property with the proceeds of crime is not essential where the property is attached as indirect proceeds or as equivalent value under the statutory definition.

Conclusion: Properties acquired even prior to the alleged period of offence were not treated as immune from attachment where attachment was justified as "value" of proceeds of crime and the tainted assets were not traceable. The contention that properties must have a direct, demonstrated nexus with the proceeds of crime to sustain attachment was rejected.

Issue (iv): Effect of mortgage; "reason to believe" and apprehension of frustration; continued attachment despite security interest

Legal framework: The Tribunal considered the statutory threshold concerning apprehension/likelihood of frustration of proceedings underlying attachment, and the purpose of attachment to preserve property for potential confiscation upon conclusion of trial.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal held that mortgage does not eliminate the possibility of alienation: settlement with the secured creditor could enable transfer to a buyer with payment of dues directly to the bank, creating new third-party claims and frustrating attachment/confiscation objectives. It also considered that if attachment were lifted merely due to mortgage, it could enable restructuring/takeover of the mortgage by another lender and further dealings, thereby undermining effective preservation. It emphasized that attachment under PMLA is for protection of property pending trial and cannot be equated with physical possession concepts under other recovery regimes. It further reasoned that once a prosecution complaint relying on the attached properties is filed, the properties are to be preserved for adjudication of confiscation and rival claims by the competent PMLA Court, and should not be released on alleged irregularities at the attachment stage.

Conclusion: Mortgaged status was held not to bar attachment; the Tribunal upheld the "reason to believe" that absence of attachment could permit alienation and frustrate proceedings. It indicated that secured creditors may seek permission from the PMLA Court to auction, subject to safeguarding excess sale proceeds (after loan adjustment) by deposit/FDR to be dealt with as per the PMLA's confiscation/disposal framework.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, considering the gravity and nature of the alleged tax-evasion/offences involving substantial public revenue, the petitioners were entitled to regular bail.

(ii) Whether the petitioners' asserted grounds-documentary nature of evidence, completion of investigation/adjudication, lack of need for custodial interrogation, and claimed applicability of the bail approach in Satender Kumar Antil-warranted grant of bail, in light of the Court's findings on non-cooperation and risk factors.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Entitlement to regular bail in alleged serious economic offences involving large-scale tax evasion

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court applied the principle that economic offences constitute a class apart and require a different approach in bail matters, keeping in view factors such as the nature of accusation, nature of evidence, severity of punishment, character and circumstances of the accused, likelihood of securing presence at trial, and the larger public/state interest.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the allegations as grave: the petitioners, being in control of the company's affairs, were found to have received large amounts for taxable services and were alleged to have contravened legal requirements by failing to properly self-assess liability and comply with return/registration obligations. The Court emphasised that their tax liability had already been assessed/adjudicated at about Rs. 55 crores, and concluded that they were the "master minds and beneficiaries" of the alleged duty-evasion scheme. The Court further considered their involvement in numerous other criminal cases as a factor bearing on the bail decision, and viewed the alleged evasion as a serious economic offence affecting public revenue and the economy.

Conclusion: On the Court's assessment of gravity, magnitude of liability, and attendant circumstances, the petitioners were held not entitled to regular bail.

Issue (ii): Whether documentary nature of case, absence of custodial interrogation, and reliance on Satender Kumar Antil justified bail despite the Court's findings

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the reliance placed on Satender Kumar Antil but noted that even there, a caveat existed where an accused does not cooperate with investigation by not appearing or not responding to summons. The Court treated non-cooperation as material to bail discretion in the context of economic offences.

Interpretation and reasoning: The petitioners contended that the matter was complaint-based and documentary, that they were not required for custodial interrogation, and that the maximum punishment being up to seven years supported bail. The Court, however, found from the material that they did not furnish requisite record despite notices and avoided joining proceedings/investigation over a prolonged period. The Court treated this conduct-along with the scale of alleged evasion and their involvement in multiple other cases-as outweighing the argument that custodial interrogation was unnecessary. It also accepted the seriousness of the allegations as a relevant counterweight to the plea for bail.

Conclusion: The Court held that, in view of the petitioners' non-cooperation/delay, the magnitude and seriousness of the alleged economic offence, and other adverse factors, the reliance on Satender Kumar Antil did not warrant bail; the bail request was therefore rejected.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether proceedings under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed at the threshold under Section 528 BNSS on the ground that the accused director had resigned before dishonour of the cheques and issuance of statutory notice.

(ii) Whether Form DIR-12/MCA master data reflecting cessation of directorship constituted "unimpeachable, incontrovertible material" sufficient to dislodge the complaints' foundation, where the complainant disputed the genuineness/effect of resignation and alleged continued control, and the accused was the signatory of the cheques.

(iii) Whether, on the pleadings and admitted signing of the cheques, the complaints and summoning orders disclosed the basic ingredients of an offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 NI Act against the accused, such that disputed factual questions had to be left for trial in view of statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Quashing at threshold on the basis of resignation prior to dishonour/notice

Legal framework: The Court stated that at the quashing stage it may interdict proceedings only where, even accepting the complaint averments in full, the basic ingredients are not disclosed, or where "unimpeachable, incontrovertible" material completely dislodges the accusation. It reiterated that Section 138 comprises a sequence of acts (drawing, presentation, dishonour, notice, and non-payment), and that Section 141 fastens liability on persons who, at the time the offence was committed, were in charge of and responsible for the company's business, and also separately on those whose consent/connivance/neglect is alleged.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that responsibility for Section 141 purposes is not to be "frozen" only to the date of dishonour, because Section 138 is a composite offence involving multiple legally relevant stages. The Court found that deciding whether resignation insulated the accused would require adjudicating contested facts about the timing, bona fides, and effect of resignation, and about continued involvement in the companies' affairs-matters not suitable for determination in Section 528 BNSS proceedings.

Conclusion: The Court refused to quash on the resignation plea, holding that the case did not fall within the narrow category where threshold quashing is warranted on clear, undisputed disengagement.

Issue (ii): Whether DIR-12/MCA records were unimpeachable exculpatory material in the present facts

Legal framework: The Court applied the "unimpeachable and incontrovertible material" standard for quashing, emphasizing that competing versions are not to be weighed and evidence is not to be evaluated as at trial.

Interpretation and reasoning: While acknowledging that DIR-12/MCA extracts may be genuine corporate records, the Court noted that the complainant disputed their timing and legal effect and alleged the accused continued to control/influence the borrower entities "from behind the curtain." The Court also relied on the chronology: defaults arose before/around the recorded resignations, with one resignation being very close to the first default date, supporting the complainant's contention that the resignations could be a device after the accounts slipped into default. Because these aspects directly affected whether the accused was "in charge of and responsible" during the relevant period (issuance/presentation/dishonour/non-payment), the Court held the material could not be treated as unimpeachable exculpatory evidence at the threshold.

Conclusion: DIR-12/MCA filings, in the face of a live dispute on bona fides/effect and alleged continued control, did not satisfy the exacting standard required to quash the prosecution at inception.

Issue (iii): Sufficiency of complaint averments and effect of cheque-signatory status and statutory presumptions

Legal framework: The Court noted that for Section 141(1) the complaint must contain basic averments that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time; and that a cheque signatory occupies a distinct position. The Court further held that once execution of cheques is shown, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act operate in favour of the complainant, and rebuttal on a preponderance of probability is a matter for trial.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found the complaints specifically attributed to the accused (a) being in charge/responsible for the companies' business, (b) negotiating loan facilities, (c) executing documents, and (d) signing the cheques. It emphasized there was no dispute that the accused signed the cheques and did not allege forgery or signing by another. Given these pleadings and the cheque-signatory role, the complaints disclosed the basic ingredients of offences under Section 138 read with Section 141. The Court held that the accused's defence (resignation and lack of responsibility; circumstances of issuance; alleged inconsistency regarding issuance) was fact-intensive and could only be tested through evidence, especially in light of the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the summoning/orders and declined quashing, holding that the complaints disclosed the requisite ingredients against the accused as cheque signatory and as a person alleged to be responsible at relevant stages; rebuttal and factual determination were left to trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the alleged non-compliance with Section 103 of the Customs Act, 1962 vitiated the prosecution case or furnished a ground for bail. (ii) Whether the alleged defect in sampling and non-compliance with Section 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 entitled the petitioner to bail. (iii) Whether the statutory bar under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was satisfied for grant of bail in a case involving commercial quantity of heroin.

Issue (i): Whether the alleged non-compliance with Section 103 of the Customs Act, 1962 vitiated the prosecution case or furnished a ground for bail.

Analysis: The relevant safeguard under Section 103 contemplates magistrate supervision where secreted body goods are to be searched or brought out. However, the petitioner had responded to the notice by admitting that capsules were concealed in her body and had voluntarily submitted to the medical process for bringing them out. In such a situation, the statutory consequence under Section 103(8) excludes the application of the earlier procedural requirements. The question whether the period spent in hospital was medically justified was treated as a matter for trial, not a ground for bail.

Conclusion: The alleged non-compliance with Section 103 of the Customs Act, 1962 did not justify grant of bail.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged defect in sampling and non-compliance with Section 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 entitled the petitioner to bail.

Analysis: The challenge to mixing of the contents of the capsules and the alleged breach of sampling procedure was held to raise matters for evidentiary appreciation at trial. Non-compliance with Section 52A was treated as directory in nature and, by itself, insufficient to render the seizure or investigation void for the purpose of bail. The alleged irregularity did not dislodge the prima facie case at the stage of bail.

Conclusion: The alleged defect in sampling and Section 52A compliance did not furnish a ground for bail.

Issue (iii): Whether the statutory bar under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was satisfied for grant of bail in a case involving commercial quantity of heroin.

Analysis: The recovered contraband was of commercial quantity, attracting the mandatory twin conditions under Section 37. On the record, there was sufficient material indicating conscious possession and active participation by the petitioner in ingesting and concealing the narcotic substance. The foreign nationality of the petitioner also strengthened the apprehension of flight risk. In these circumstances, the twin conditions for release on bail were not met.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Final Conclusion: The bail request failed because the statutory restrictions governing commercial-quantity NDPS offences were not overcome and the asserted procedural objections did not displace the prima facie case against the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: In a commercial-quantity NDPS case, procedural objections to seizure, sampling, or body-search compliance do not by themselves warrant bail unless the twin conditions under Section 37 are satisfied on a prima facie assessment.

Issues: Whether the Forensic Audit Report could validly form the basis of the show-cause notices and consequential fraud proceedings when the report was prepared and signed by an entity and signatory who were not qualified Chartered Accountants under the relevant statutes, and whether the banks could rely on the 2024 RBI Master Directions to sustain such action.

Analysis: The challenge raised was to the very foundation of the proceedings, namely the competence of the forensic auditor and the legal validity of the report. The Court held that the expression "external auditor" in the RBI framework had to be read harmoniously with the applicable statutory qualifications, particularly the Companies Act, 2013, which requires that only a Chartered Accountant may be appointed as auditor and that, where a firm or LLP is appointed, the partner authorised to sign must also be a Chartered Accountant. It was found that the report had been signed by a person who was admittedly not a Chartered Accountant, and that the firm itself was not a Chartered Accountants firm registered with ICAI. The Court further found that the later RBI directions, including the footnote referring to auditors qualified under relevant statutes, were clarificatory and could not be used to sustain an otherwise infirm report; the report was also treated as the sole foundation for the impugned notices and consequential steps. The Court rejected the limitation and waiver objections at the interim stage and held that the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case, with balance of convenience and irreparable injury also favouring protection against further action based on the impugned report.

Conclusion: The report and the consequential show-cause and fraud-related actions were held not fit to be allowed to continue at the interim stage, and interim relief was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a forensic audit report is the foundation of fraud proceedings, it must be prepared and signed in conformity with the statutory qualifications governing auditors; a report issued by an unqualified signatory cannot be relied upon to sustain coercive action, and later clarificatory regulatory language cannot cure that foundational defect retrospectively.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the amount paid under a settlement deed to a municipal body was liable to service tax as a Declared Service under Section 66E(e) (agreeing to refrain/tolerate/do an act), attracting reverse charge, or whether it was in substance payment towards Renting of Immovable Property Service already subjected to service tax by the municipal body.

(ii) Whether the demand for the said amount could be sustained when the same consideration had already suffered service tax in the hands of the municipal body, i.e., whether the same amount could be subjected to service tax twice under different classifications.

(iii) Whether the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) could be invoked and whether penalty under Section 78 was imposable, in absence of suppression/mis-statement/fraud or mens rea.

(iv) Whether penalty under Section 77(2) was sustainable without findings identifying the specific contravention warranting such penalty.

(v) Whether any dispute survived regarding service tax on legal services received under reverse charge, where the assessee accepted liability and paid tax with interest before adjudication.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(i)-(ii) Taxability/classification of settlement amount and impermissibility of taxing the same amount twice

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 (Declared Service relating to agreeing to refrain from an act / tolerate an act or situation / do an act) and the reverse charge basis invoked by the department for the settlement payment.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the "short issue" as whether the payment under the settlement deed represented outstanding rent or consideration for "tolerating an act." It found that the municipal body had treated the settlement receipt as rent and had paid service tax under Renting of Immovable Property Service. The Court held that, in such circumstances, revenue could not again demand service tax from the payer on reverse charge by re-characterising the same payment as a Declared Service. It expressly answered that the same amount cannot suffer service tax twice. The Court further held that even on merits, the elements of Section 66E(e) were not present; there was an absence of the requisite obligation to refrain/tolerate/do an act embedded in the settlement, and therefore the amount could not be treated as consideration for a Declared Service.

Conclusion: The demand on the settlement amount under Section 66E(e) on reverse charge was held not sustainable, both because the same amount had already borne service tax as rent and because the payment did not constitute consideration for a Declared Service.

(iii) Extended limitation and penalty under Section 78

Legal framework: The Court applied the proviso to Section 73(1) (extended period) and Section 78 (penalty linked to intent/suppression) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found no suppression, mis-statement, or fraudulent declaration to the department, and therefore held that the statutory ingredients for invoking the extended period were missing. On the same reasoning, it held that penalty under Section 78 was not imposable because there was no mens rea to evade service tax.

Conclusion: Extended period was not invokable, and penalty under Section 78 was set aside.

(iv) Penalty under Section 77(2)

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 77(2) relating to penalty for specified contraventions under the Finance Act, 1994.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that neither the adjudicating authority nor the appellate authority recorded findings as to what provisions were contravened to justify penalty under Section 77(2). A bare assertion of liability without justification was held insufficient.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed under Section 77(2) was held unsustainable and was set aside.

(v) Legal services under reverse charge

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the assessee did not dispute the service tax demand on legal services and had paid the tax along with interest prior to adjudication; accordingly, no substantive dispute survived on that aspect.

Conclusion: The Court treated the legal-services liability as not in dispute and did not grant relief on that admitted component.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer without following the faceless-assessment procedure was valid.

Analysis: The statutory framework required reassessment proceedings to conform to the faceless procedure under Section 144B read with Section 151A. The notice under Section 148 was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer rather than through the prescribed faceless mechanism. The jurisdictional High Court decisions and consistent coordinate-bench decisions treated such non-faceless initiation as a jurisdictional defect. The pendency of the issue before the Supreme Court did not warrant withholding application of the prevailing jurisdictional view.

Conclusion: The Section 148 notice issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer was invalid and quashed; the consequential reassessment order was vitiated, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether sale proceeds from the sale of shares could be treated as unexplained cash credit and the claimed long-term capital gains exemption denied.

Analysis: Section 68 required a satisfactory explanation of the credit, while the exemption claim under section 10(38) depended on the genuineness of the share transaction. The documentary trail of purchase through banking channels, allotment of shares following amalgamation, dematerialisation, sale contract notes, payment of securities transaction tax and receipt of sale consideration through bank established the transaction. The shares had been held for over 30 months, were sold through a recognised stock exchange, and part of the holding remained with the assessee. These materials discharged the prima facie onus. No corroborative material connected the assessee with price rigging or routing of unaccounted money, and no adverse action or allegation against the assessee by SEBI or the Revenue authorities was established. General investigation material and an unusual rise in the scrip price, without such evidence, could not displace the documented transaction.

Conclusion: The share sale was genuine, the addition under section 68 was unsustainable, and the claimed exemption under section 10(38) was allowable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.