Issues: (i) Whether the appellant is eligible for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 in respect of input services used in exported services; (ii) Whether the matter should be remanded for verification of FIRCs/bank documents correlating exports with receipt of foreign inward remittances.

Issue (i): Eligibility for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The relevant statutory framework includes Rule 5 and Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, Rule 2(l) (definition of input services), Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) dated 14.03.2006 and its amendment by Notification No. 7/2010-C.E. (N.T.) dated 27.02.2010, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and clarificatory Circular/letter regarding a simplified refund scheme. Rule 14 prescribes recovery procedure and does not provide a ground to deny refund under Rule 5. The amended scheme and departmental clarifications permit refund of duties/taxes paid on input services in the ratio of export turnover to total turnover and relax strict correlation requirements, allowing indirect use to qualify. Documentary evidence produced by the appellant (debit notes, CA certificate) and Tribunal precedents treating invoice/address defects and procedural noncompliances as not fatal were considered.

Conclusion: The appellant is eligible for refund under Rule 5 subject to satisfaction of documentary proof linking the input services to exported output services and the applicable temporal limit under Section 11B; denial of refund on grounds of alleged irregular availment recoverable under Rule 14 or on procedural invoice/address defects is not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal should be remanded for verification of FIRCs/bank documents.

Analysis: The appeal record shows FIRCs and related export documents are central to establishing the relevant date and entitlement to refund. The Tribunal found that some documents require verification and that certified bank statements may be accepted in lieu of FIRCs per Board guidance. Given factual issues on correlation between debit notes, FIRCs and export receipts, limited remand for verification and opportunity to the appellant to produce/clarify records is appropriate.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in part by remanding the matter to the adjudicating authority for verification of FIRCs/bank statements and related documents and for granting the appellant opportunity to produce records; on such verification the entitlement to refund is to be decided in accordance with Rule 5 and applicable provisions.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirmed the appellant's substantive entitlement to claim refund under Rule 5 subject to documentary verification and procedural compliance, and therefore remitted the matter for limited factual verification of FIRCs/bank documents rather than finally adjudicating the refund claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery procedure under Rule 14 does not justify denial of refund under Rule 5; entitlement to refund under the amended Rule 5/notifications depends on qualification as input services and satisfaction of documentary proof linking exports with receipt of foreign exchange, and procedural invoice/address defects are not determinative where sufficient corroborative evidence exists.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant, in respect of construction of residential houses under a real estate project commencing after 01-04-2019, is liable to pay GST at the concessional rates under entries 3(i) and 3(ia) of the relevant notification, or can instead be taxed at 18% only on the construction component with separate exclusion of land value as per the sale deed; (ii) whether, for valuation of the construction service, the actual land value stated in the sale deed can be deducted instead of the deemed one-third value prescribed in the notification.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant, in respect of construction of residential houses under a real estate project commencing after 01-04-2019, is liable to pay GST at the concessional rates under entries 3(i) and 3(ia) of the relevant notification, or can instead be taxed at 18% only on the construction component with separate exclusion of land value as per the sale deed.

Analysis: The activity was held to be a supply of service under paragraph 5(b) of Schedule II to the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, because the applicant entered into an arrangement for sale of land together with construction of residential houses as one composite transaction. The project was treated as a residential real estate project undertaken by a promoter, and the construction commencing after 01-04-2019 attracted the amended rate entries under Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate), as amended by Notification No. 03/2019-CT (Rate) and the corresponding State notification. The valuation and rate framework for such construction services was therefore governed by the specific concessional entries applicable to residential apartments, subject to their conditions.

Conclusion: The applicant is entitled only to the concessional treatment under entries 3(i) and 3(ia) and is liable to pay GST at 1.5% for affordable residential apartments and 7.5% for other than affordable residential apartments, subject to the prescribed conditions. The alternative claim for 18% GST only on the construction component is rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether, for valuation of the construction service, the actual land value stated in the sale deed can be deducted instead of the deemed one-third value prescribed in the notification.

Analysis: Paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) specifically prescribes the valuation mechanism for construction services involving transfer of land or undivided share of land by deeming the land value to be one-third of the total amount charged. The order held that this special valuation rule applies notwithstanding the actual land value reflected in the sale deed, and that the legislative intent was to provide a uniform abatement mechanism rather than permit case-specific deduction of actual land value. The applicant could therefore not substitute actual land value for the deemed value under the notification.

Conclusion: The taxable value must be computed only by deducting one-third of the total amount charged, and the actual land value in the sale deed cannot be deducted instead.

Final Conclusion: The ruling settles that the applicant's construction activity is taxable under the concessional real estate entries, and valuation must follow the statutory one-third land abatement mechanism without recourse to actual land value.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a construction service involving transfer of land falls within the specific real estate valuation entry, the notification's deemed one-third deduction for land is mandatory and overrides any actual land value disclosed in private agreements or sale deeds.

Issues: Whether service tax is leviable on sale, marketing and distribution of lottery tickets (i.e., whether activities of lottery distributors/selling agents amount to 'Business Auxiliary Service' or other taxable service under the Finance Act, 1994).

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory amendments to the Finance Act, 1994 (including provisions defining taxable services and the Negative List) and the character of the relationship between the State and lottery distributors. The judgment relied on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions Pvt. Ltd., which analysed successive amendments and held that the distributor of lottery tickets acts in its own right (principal to principal) rather than as an agent of the State. The decision reasoned that inclusion of betting, gambling and lottery in the Negative List and subsequent explanatory amendments did not convert the distributor's purchase-and-resale activity into a taxable 'service' of the State; the conduct of a lottery remains within the domain of betting/gambling and taxation by the State, and the distributor's transactions are transactions in actionable claims or resale in its own capacity.

Conclusion: Service tax is not leviable on the sale, marketing and distribution of lottery tickets; the impugned demands under 'Business Auxiliary Service' are set aside and the appeals are allowed in favour of the appellants.

Issues: (i) Whether the CERC tariff rate can be mechanically adopted as the ALP for transfer of bagasse (specified domestic transaction) between the assessee's sugar and power divisions; (ii) Whether write-off of loans/advances to the wholly owned Ghana subsidiary is allowable as a business loss under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Whether harvesting and transportation charges paid on behalf of farmers attract TDS under section 194C and consequent disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iv) Whether interest claimed as deduction is allowable under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or requires verification (recomputation/remand).

Issue (i): Whether the CERC-prescribed bagasse price is the appropriate benchmark for ALP of bagasse transferred intra-group to captive power units.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined factual matrix showing bagasse is an in-house by-product captively consumed by co-generation units; the CERC rate is framed for tariff determination assuming external procurement and inclusion of transport/handling; alternative indicators relied upon by assessee (KERC tariff, FRP-based cost computation, TERI study, independent third-party quotations and limited third-party sales) were considered. The Tribunal held that mechanical adoption of CERC rates without testing applicability to the assessee's factual model is not justified and noted the absence of cogent contrary material from Revenue to reject third-party sales evidence.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee -- the transfer price of Rs.1,500 per ton adopted by the assessee is reasonable and satisfies the arm's length principle; directions of DRP and TPO adopting CERC rate set aside; AO/TPO directed to accept assessee's transfer price.

Issue (ii): Whether the write-off of Rs.3,79,70,871 of loans/advances to the wholly owned Ghana subsidiary is allowable as business loss under section 37(1).

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed the substance over form: funds were advanced to set up the subsidiary engaged in same business, payments routed as loans/advances to vendors to establish operations, and the subsidiary later wound up making sums irrecoverable. The Tribunal applied commercial expediency test, considered relevant precedents (including coordinate High Court and Tribunal decisions) and rejected the Revenue's distinction between equity and loan nomenclature as immaterial given identical business nexus.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee -- the write-off is a business loss incurred on grounds of commercial expediency and allowable under section 37(1); addition deleted.

Issue (iii): Whether harvesting and transportation charges paid on behalf of farmers are subject to TDS under section 194C and disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).

Analysis: The Tribunal found the payments formed part of cane purchase price and were paid on behalf of farmers, not as independent contractual payments to contractors. The Tribunal followed a binding decision of a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for an earlier year (no appeal by Revenue) and held the DRP's reliance on alleged inconsistencies and missing Form 26Q details did not rebut the settled legal and factual position.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee -- provisions of section 194C are not applicable to such harvesting and transportation charges; disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether interest claimed as paid and allowable under section 43B is to be disallowed or requires remand for verification.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted discrepancies between interest claimed and lender confirmations under section 133(6), acknowledged the assessee's ability to furnish full reconciliations and bank evidence, and that the matter principally involves verification of payments and documents which is best undertaken by the Assessing Officer after affording reasonable opportunity. The Tribunal directed verification and recomputation rather than deciding allowance on merits.

Conclusion: Neutral (alternate remedy) -- issue set aside/remitted to Assessing Officer for fresh verification and speaking order after giving reasonable opportunity; AO to examine and decide in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: material substantive issues (ALP of bagasse, write-off of loans to subsidiary, and TDS applicability on harvesting charges) are decided in favour of the assessee and corresponding additions deleted; the claim under section 43B is remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification. The overall effect is partly in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a by-product is captively consumed and regulatory tariff rates are based on assumptions of external procurement and added costs, such regulatory rates cannot be mechanically adopted as ALP without testing applicability to the taxpayer's factual model; commercial expediency determines allowability of losses on failed wholly owned subsidiaries under section 37(1).

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 20.08.2024 confirming demand for the tax period April 2019 - March 2020 is barred by limitation and whether the notifications extending time limits under Section 73(10) (Notification No.9/2023-C.T. dated 31.03.2023 and Notification No.56/2023-C.T. dated 28.12.2023) apply so as to validate the issuance of the order.

Analysis: The Court examined the temporal effect of the statutory limitation under Section 73 and the scope of the executive notifications issued under Section 168A of the CGST Act, 2017 which extend the time limit specified under subsection (10) of Section 73 for issuance of order under subsection (9) of Section 73 for recovery of tax not paid or short paid or of input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised. The Court noted that the relevant notifications extend the operative deadline for the financial year 2019-20 to 31.08.2024 and observed that the impugned order (dated 20.08.2024) falls within the extended period. The Court also considered that the impugned order was passed ex parte due to the petitioner's failure to file a reply to the Show Cause Notice and followed its established practice in similar situations by requiring partial pre-deposit and remitting the matter for fresh adjudication on merits.

Conclusion: The challenge to the impugned order on limitation grounds is rejected and the petition is not allowed on that basis; the Writ Petition is disposed of by remitting the matter to the respondent for fresh adjudication on merits subject to the petitioner depositing 50% of the disputed tax within 30 days and filing a reply to the Show Cause Notice, with adjustments of any amounts already paid and vacatur of bank attachment upon compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether the Enforcement Directorate was required to conduct an independent investigation into the predicate offence; (ii) whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation were unsupported by reason to believe under the Act; (iii) whether the appellants were entitled to benefit of alleged undisclosed income; (iv) whether the appellants discharged the burden under section 24 of the Act; and (v) whether property could be attached as equivalent value in the absence of direct proof of acquisition from proceeds of crime.

Issue: Whether the Enforcement Directorate was required to conduct an independent investigation into the predicate offence.

Analysis: The investigation into the scheduled offence is the responsibility of the police or the investigating agency for the predicate case. The Enforcement Directorate is not a supervisory agency for re-investigating that offence; its inquiry is confined to identifying prima facie material, the generation of proceeds of crime, layering or tracing of such proceeds, dissipation of the tainted assets, and the genuineness of claimants to attached properties.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue: Whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation were unsupported by reason to believe under the Act.

Analysis: The attachment was sustained on material showing large unexplained cash deposits, acquisition of properties in the names of family members, lack of credible source of funds, and the likelihood that the properties would be concealed or dealt with so as to frustrate proceedings. The statutory threshold of reason to believe was treated as satisfied on the material before the authority.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue: Whether the appellants were entitled to benefit of alleged undisclosed income.

Analysis: The claimed agricultural, dairy, and business income was found unsubstantiated by acceptable documentary support. The omission to disclose such income in returns and service-related declarations weighed against the appellants, and the plea was treated as an afterthought to explain the assets.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue: Whether the appellants discharged the burden under section 24 of the Act.

Analysis: In the face of the material collected during investigation, the appellants failed to provide a credible and documented explanation for the cash investments, the bank deposits, and the acquisition of movable and immovable properties. The burden under the Act was therefore not discharged.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue: Whether property could be attached as equivalent value in the absence of direct proof of acquisition from proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The definition of proceeds of crime was applied to include not only property directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity but also the value of such property. On that basis, properties representing equivalent value could be proceeded against even where the exact tainted asset was not traceable, and the challenge to attachment on that ground was rejected.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The attachment was upheld and the appeals failed in entirety, with the Tribunal affirming that the properties were liable to be proceeded against under the money-laundering framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, attachment may be sustained on the basis of reason to believe founded on material indicating proceeds of crime, the burden shifts to the noticee to explain the source of the assets, and property of equivalent value is also liable where the tainted asset is not directly traceable.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 1,93,48,000/- made by the Assessing Officer under sections 68/69A/115BBE, by treating cash deposits during the demonetisation period as unexplained income after rejection of books under section 145(3), is sustainable; (ii) Whether the partial disallowance of Rs. 23,06,000/- made under section 40A(2)(b) in respect of salaries paid to specified relatives is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposits of Rs. 1,93,48,000/- represent unexplained income and the addition is warranted where books were rejected u/s 145(3) and assessee failed to prove genuineness of purchases, sales and stock.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment and appellate records including absence of cash books, lack of bills/vouchers, inconsistencies in bank deposits and claimed transactions during the demonetisation period, and the finding that claimed sales/purchases were not credibly supported. The AO's reliance on patterns of transactions, failure to explain opening balances and deposits, and rejection of books u/s 145(3) were considered. The Tribunal noted that whether claimed transactions are genuine is a question of fact and that precedents relied upon by the assessee had distinguishable factual matrices. The Tribunal applied principles concerning human probability and the consequences of rejected books in assessing the credibility of claimed sales and purchases.

Conclusion: Addition of Rs. 1,93,48,000/- is sustained and treated as unexplained income; issue decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Assessing Officer rightly disallowed Rs. 23,06,000/- under section 40A(2)(b) as excessive/unreasonable remuneration to specified relatives.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that genuineness of payment was not in dispute but the quantum was. The AO made a factual determination that part of the salary payments to relatives was excessive having regard to fair market value and legitimate needs; the AO allowed a portion of the claim and disallowed the remainder. No material was produced to persuade the Tribunal that the amount allowed was inadequate. The Tribunal applied the statutory reasonableness test under section 40A(2).

Conclusion: Disallowance of Rs. 23,06,000/- under section 40A(2)(b) is confirmed; issue decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found the revenue's case sustainable on facts for both the addition under sections 68/69A/115BBE after rejection of books and the partial disallowance under section 40A(2)(b), and dismissed the assessee's appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where books are rejected under section 145(3) and claimed sales/purchases, stock and supporting evidence are not credibly established, cash deposits during the demonetisation period can be treated as unexplained income under sections 68/69A/115BBE; separately, under section 40A(2) the quantum of payments to specified relatives may be partly disallowed if found excessive or unreasonable in view of fair market value and legitimate needs.

Issues: Whether services rendered in the construction of private railway sidings for commercial use fall within Notification No. 17/2005-S.T. and are exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The notification exempts site formation, excavation, earthmoving, demolition and similar services when provided in the course of construction of railways. On a plain reading, the notification does not distinguish between Government railways and private railways, nor does it exclude railway infrastructure laid for commercial purposes. In construing a fiscal exemption, the text must be read as it stands, without adding words or limitations not expressed. The definition of railway in the Railways Act, 1989 was considered, but the notification itself controlled the scope of exemption and contained no express restriction to railways for public carriage only. The object of the notification was to encourage infrastructure projects, and railway sidings laid for industrial or commercial use were treated as part of railway infrastructure for that purpose.

Conclusion: Services rendered in relation to construction of private railway sidings are covered by the exemption and service tax is not payable.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption notification for railway construction must be given its plain meaning, and in the absence of an express exclusion, services rendered for construction of private or commercially used railway infrastructure cannot be denied exemption by reading in a restriction not found in the notification.

Issues: Whether failure to furnish a properly signed audit report in Form No.56F along with the return of income (or defects in the filed Form 56F) precludes allowance of deduction under section 10AA read with section 10A(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the Form 56F filed by the assessee satisfied the statutory condition of furnishing an accountant's audit report in the prescribed form along with the return of income as required by section 10A(5) (made applicable to section 10AA by section 10AA(8)). The Court considered the binding pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pr. CIT v. Wipro Ltd. holding that filing the requisite document within the time and manner prescribed for claiming an exemption/deduction is mandatory and not merely directory. The Tribunal reviewed the facts that the assessee's Form 56F as before the AO/reassessment proceedings lacked certain particulars and an addendum was later filed; the AO treated the original report as defective and rejected the claim. The Bench also considered competing authorities and subsequently-applicable decisions relied upon by the parties, and evaluated whether the defect was curable and whether substantive compliance existed so as to avoid denial of the deduction.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the claim for deduction under section 10AA cannot be allowed where the statutory condition of furnishing the audit report in Form No.56F along with the return is not satisfied. The requirement under section 10A(5) (as applied to section 10AA by section 10AA(8)) is mandatory. Consequently, the disallowance of the deduction made in the intimation under section 143(1) is sustainable and the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The legal effect is that statutory conditions requiring filing of the prescribed audit report with the return are to be treated as mandatory for claiming the specified deduction; non-compliance permits disallowance of the deduction under the Income-tax Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a deduction or exemption statute expressly requires furnishing an accountant's report in a prescribed form along with the return, that requirement is mandatory (not directory) and failure to furnish the report in the prescribed manner with the return disentitles the assessee to the deduction.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest on the refund of VAT of Rs.2,87,538/- for the quarter ending 31.03.2009 under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) read with Section 42 of the DVAT Act, 2004, and if so, from which date and at what rate.

Analysis: The statutory framework under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) prescribes refund timelines for quarterly filers and Section 42 provides for entitlement to interest on refunds at the rate prescribed by notification, to be computed daily. Rule 34 prescribes the procedural steps for sanctioning refunds and recording calculations. The assessment order dated 01.09.2011 rejecting the refund was not shown to have been served or uploaded on the portal; the appellate authority remanded the matter for fresh adjudication and the assessing authority subsequently allowed the refund, which was credited on 15.01.2025. The petitioner filed the return on 26.04.2009, making 25.06.2009 the date when the refund became due after the statutory 60-day period. The factual record does not establish that delay in processing the refund was attributable to the petitioner, and prior orders preserved the question of limitation and service/upload for adjudication by the appellate authority. Precedent on entitlement to interest for delayed refunds supports the claim.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to simple interest on the refunded amount of Rs.2,87,538/- at the rate of 6% per annum from 25.06.2009 until the date the refund was credited (15.01.2025); the respondent is directed to calculate and pay the accrued interest within 12 weeks.

Issues: (i) whether criminal proceedings could be quashed merely because the dispute also had a civil dimension and civil proceedings concerning the same settlement deeds had been decided; (ii) whether, at the stage of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court could assess the complainant's conduct, delay in filing the complaint, and the credibility of disputed factual allegations.

Issue (i): Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed merely because the dispute also had a civil dimension and civil proceedings concerning the same settlement deeds had been decided.

Analysis: The existence of civil proceedings on the same subject matter does not by itself bar a criminal prosecution where the allegations disclose ingredients of cognizable offences. Civil adjudication proceeds on a different footing and does not determine criminal intent, forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents. At the quashment stage, the Court is required to see whether the allegations, if accepted at face value, disclose a cognizable offence. Where the complaint alleges dishonest inducement, fabrication, and wrongful use of documents, the matter cannot be terminated only because a civil suit has also been filed or decided.

Conclusion: The quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground of civil dispute was not justified and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether, at the stage of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court could assess the complainant's conduct, delay in filing the complaint, and the credibility of disputed factual allegations.

Analysis: The inherent power under Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial, embark upon a roving inquiry into disputed facts, or pronounce on the reliability of allegations. Questions such as the complainant's state of mind, the alleged delay, suppression, and the truthfulness of the prosecution version are matters for trial and appreciation of evidence. Delay by itself is not a ground to quash proceedings at the threshold when the complaint otherwise discloses a factual foundation for prosecution.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in relying on disputed factual aspects and delay to quash the proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The criminal case was directed to proceed to trial, and the accused were not entitled to quashing at the threshold.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of quashing, civil proceedings on the same facts do not bar criminal prosecution if the complaint discloses a prima facie cognizable offence, and the High Court cannot decide disputed facts, credibility, or delay as if conducting a trial.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to permission to travel to Canada and stay there for six months during pendency of the PMLA complaint, subject to safeguards.

Analysis: The proceedings in the prosecution complaint remained stayed because the final report in the predicate offence had not been filed. The petitioner had earlier been permitted to travel abroad, had complied with the direction to return to India, had been appearing through video conferencing, and had not breached any condition imposed by the Court. No material was produced to show a prima facie apprehension that he would flee from justice merely because he had acquired Canadian citizenship. In these circumstances, and in view of the availability of virtual appearance and physical presence of counsel, the request for travel permission could be granted with protective conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to travel to Canada and stay there for six months, subject to furnishing surety and bank guarantee and complying with the conditions imposed.

Final Conclusion: Permission to travel abroad was granted with safeguards to secure the petitioner's presence and participation in the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the proceedings are already stayed, the accused has complied with prior travel conditions, and no prima facie material shows a risk of absconding, travel abroad may be permitted subject to conditions securing attendance.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned notifications fixing Minimum Import Price (MIP) were ultra vires Section 3(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 because they were issued/published by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade instead of the Central Government or because they were styled as notifications rather than Orders; (ii) Whether failure to lay the Orders/notifications before both Houses of Parliament in terms of Section 19(3) of the FTDR Act renders the impugned instruments void.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned instruments imposing MIP are invalid as not being Orders made by the Central Government under Section 3(2) of the FTDR Act.

Analysis: The power to prohibit, restrict or regulate imports is conferred on the Central Government by Section 3(2) of the FTDR Act. The impugned instruments record publication by the Ministry/Directorate and recite exercise of power under Section 3. Authority to act may be traced to the Central Government even where publication is effected by DGFT. Established authorities recognise that validity of subordinate legislation is determined by substance and traceability to enabling statute rather than by nomenclature or stylistic formalities; errors in reciting the source or labelling do not defeat statutory competence where the power is otherwise traceable.

Conclusion: The challenge that the instruments are invalid because they were issued/published by DGFT or styled as notifications rather than Orders is rejected; the instruments are intra vires Section 3(2) of the FTDR Act. Conclusion is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with Section 19(3) (laying the Order/notification before both Houses of Parliament) renders the impugned instruments void.

Analysis: Section 19(3) requires that every Order be laid before each House for a statutory period and contemplates that Parliament may modify or annul such Order, saving validity of prior acts. Authorities interpreting similar laying provisions have held that such provisions are generally directory where no consequence of automatic invalidation is prescribed; the Legislature's omission of a termination consequence and precedent decisions establish that failure to lay does not, by itself, render the instrument void. Comparative statutory provisions and authoritative decisions support treating the laying requirement under Section 19(3) as directory.

Conclusion: The challenge that non-laying under Section 19(3) invalidates the instruments is rejected; the laying requirement is directory and does not itself vitiate the impugned instruments. Conclusion is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The impugned notifications/orders imposing Minimum Import Prices are valid and the writ petitions challenging their validity are dismissed; petitioners retain statutory remedies (filing objections to show-cause notices or appeals against adjudication) subject to the terms specified in the order.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a subordinate legislative instrument effects a restriction traceable to the enabling statute, courts will look to substance and traceability to the statutory power rather than nomenclature or formal defects, and a laying requirement that prescribes no automatic consequence for non-compliance is directory and does not, by itself, render the instrument void.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice in FORM GST MOV-7 and the order in FORM GST MOV-9 dated 25.08.2025 are invalid for failure to comply with the time limits under Section 129(3) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and related portal-upload requirements. (ii) Whether the impugned order is vitiated for not affording personal hearing before passing the order.

Issue (i): Whether the notice and order comply with the time limits and mandatory upload/service requirements prescribed by Section 129(3) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 142(5) of the GST Rules, 2017.

Analysis: The detention occurred on 19.08.2025 and FORM GST MOV-06 was issued on 22.08.2025. The petitioner paid tax and penalty on 25.08.2025. The respondents admit that the impugned order in FORM GST MOV-09 was uploaded on the portal only on 27.09.2025, after a delay of about one month. The affidavit-in-reply is silent on compliance with the seven-day communication/upload requirement under Section 129(3). Documentary discrepancies exist as to signatures and the prescribed format of FORM MOV-7; the transporter has stated signatures were taken on blank papers. Rule 142(5) mandates uploading of the order; no satisfactory explanation for the belated upload is furnished.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order is invalid for being passed without affording personal hearing to the petitioner.

Analysis: The respondents concede that no opportunity of personal hearing was provided before passing the order under Section 129(3). The procedural requirement of hearing before imposing penalty and passing the order is not complied with and the record shows the order was issued ex parte. The absence of personal hearing, combined with defects in service and uploading, undermines the validity of the notice and order.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The show cause notice in FORM GST MOV-7 and the order in FORM GST MOV-9 dated 25.08.2025 are quashed and set aside on the grounds of non-compliance with statutory time limits, upload/service requirements and failure to afford personal hearing; the writ petition is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-compliance with the time limits and mandatory communication/upload requirements under Section 129(3) read with Rule 142(5), together with failure to afford personal hearing before passing an order, renders the show cause notice and order invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether uploading notices/orders in the web-portal under the category "Additional Notices/Orders" constitutes valid service under Section 169 of the GST Act; (ii) Whether the rejection of the rectification application under Section 161 and the ex parte assessment order under Section 73 are vitiated for want of opportunity of hearing and for being non-speaking/arbitrary.

Issue (i): Whether service effected by uploading notices/orders under "Additional Notices/Orders" on the GST portal is valid service under Section 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The portal placement of communications under the "Additional Notices/Orders" category was not prominent or easily accessible, resulting in non-receipt of notice by the taxpayer and consequent non-participation in proceedings. Precedent from multiple High Courts demonstrates that where portal architecture or placement prevents a taxpayer from reasonably discovering notices, such uploading does not satisfy the statutory modes of service for purposes of enabling participation in quasi-judicial proceedings. The factual matrix shows inability to access the specific tab and resultant prejudice to the taxpayer's right to be heard.

Conclusion: Service by uploading notices/orders solely under the "Additional Notices/Orders" tab, where such placement is not reasonably accessible to the taxpayer, does not constitute valid service under Section 169 of the GST Act and vitiates subsequent proceedings dependent on such service.

Issue (ii): Whether the order rejecting the rectification application under Section 161 and the ex parte order under Section 73 are liable to be quashed for lack of opportunity of hearing and absence of reasons.

Analysis: The rectification provision in Section 161 permits correction of errors apparent on the face of record, and where records/documents uploaded on the portal could have been examined, the authority ought to have considered them before rejecting rectification. The rejection order is laconic and does not disclose consideration of the material relied upon in the rectification application. Principles requiring a reasoned order and audi alteram partem protection apply to quasi-judicial tax proceedings; non-speaking orders and absence of opportunity to explain facts and figures cause prejudice and indicate arbitrariness.

Conclusion: The rejection of the rectification application and the ex parte assessment order are quashed for want of a fair opportunity to be heard and for being non-speaking/arbitrary; the matter is remanded for fresh, reasoned consideration in accordance with Sections 161 and 73 of the GST Act.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders are set aside on the stated factual grounds and the matter is remanded for fresh adjudication, with directions to afford the taxpayer a prompt and effective opportunity to be heard and for the authority to pass a reasoned order after considering available portal records and submissions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where electronic service via a departmental portal places notices in a section that is not reasonably accessible or prominent to the taxpayer, such uploading does not effect valid service for purposes of quasi-judicial proceedings under the GST Act; consequent orders passed without affording a fair opportunity to be heard or without recording reasons are liable to be quashed and remitted for fresh, reasoned disposal.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be validly availed during the period after omission of Rule 12B of the Central Excise Rules, 2002; (ii) Whether the addendum to the show cause notice was legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be validly availed during the period after omission of Rule 12B of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: Rule 12B had provided a special job-work procedure for textile traders and the accompanying facility was withdrawn by the amending notification. The governing circular issued by the departmental authority treated the omission as a transitional issue and clarified that persons who had operated under the erstwhile rule could continue to clear goods lying with them, including for export, and that the job worker was not to bear the duty burden. The reasoning was supported by earlier tribunal and High Court decisions recognising that a statutory facility already availed cannot be taken away retrospectively unless the law clearly so provides.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit was held to be admissible for the disputed period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addendum to the show cause notice was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The addendum introduced a fresh allegation of fraudulent availment on the basis of fake or bogus invoices, which was not part of the original notice. Such a new ground required separate invocation within the period prescribed under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. As the addendum was issued long after the original notice and beyond the permissible period, it could not be sustained either on limitation or on merits of procedure.

Conclusion: The addendum was held to be unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand and consequential confirmation against the appellant were set aside and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory credit-linked facility already accrued under a transitional job-work regime cannot be denied retrospectively in the absence of clear authority, and a later addendum introducing a new allegation must independently satisfy the statutory limitation for issuance of a demand notice.

Issues: Whether substantial questions of law arise warranting interference with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's order that set aside the CIT(A)'s disallowance of claimed capital trading losses from penny stocks and directed set off of those losses against interest/other income for the assessment years under consideration.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the Tribunal's reliance on its earlier decisions and the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal constituted a situation giving rise to substantial questions of law. The Tribunal had applied its precedents and found absence of direct substantial evidence establishing rigging or accommodation entries for the trading in specified penny scrips, observed that transactions occurred on recognized stock exchanges under SEBI oversight, and directed set off of the trading losses against interest/other income. The revenue's challenge based on investigation material and the jurisdictional High Court decision in Swati Bajaj was considered by comparing factual matrices; the Court found no demonstration that the Tribunal disregarded applicable legal tests or that a legal question of sufficient substance was disclosed for interference.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arises; the appeal by the revenue is dismissed and the Tribunal's order deleting the disallowance and directing set off of the trading losses is maintained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether revision under section 263 was valid on the ground of proposed disallowance under section 14A in the absence of exempt income; (ii) Whether revision under section 263 was valid on the ground of proposed disallowance of interest under section 36(1)(iii) in respect of alleged diversion of borrowed funds.

Issue (i): Whether revision under section 263 was valid on the ground of proposed disallowance under section 14A in the absence of exempt income.

Analysis: The assessment was sought to be revised because the Assessing Officer had not made a disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D. The record showed that no exempt income had been earned during the year. The settled legal position, as applied in the decision, is that disallowance under section 14A cannot be made where there is no exempt income.

Conclusion: The revision on this issue was not sustainable and is held against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether revision under section 263 was valid on the ground of proposed disallowance of interest under section 36(1)(iii) in respect of alleged diversion of borrowed funds.

Analysis: The alleged interest-free advances were found to have been made in earlier years, not during the year under consideration. The assessee also had sufficient own interest-free funds. On these facts, diversion of current year borrowed funds was not established, and the precondition for disallowance of interest was absent. Applying the principle that section 263 can be invoked only when the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to revenue, the order did not satisfy the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The revision on this issue was not sustainable and is held against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The revisional order was quashed because the prerequisites for invoking section 263 were not met, and the assessment order was restored to that extent in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 can be invoked only when the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue, and a disallowance under section 14A cannot be made in the absence of exempt income.

Issues: (i) Whether service of the show cause notice and hearing notices by affixation at the last known address was valid and whether the appellant suffered any prejudice from the alleged delayed receipt of the adjudication order. (ii) Whether the appellant's involvement in the contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 warranted maintenance of the original penalty or justified reduction of the penalty imposed on her.

Issue (i): Whether service of the show cause notice and hearing notices by affixation at the last known address was valid and whether the appellant suffered any prejudice from the alleged delayed receipt of the adjudication order.

Analysis: The notices were stated to have been served by affixation at the last known address in accordance with Rule 10(c) of the Adjudication and Appeal Rules, 1974 read with Section 49(3) and Section 49(4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. The record also indicated that the appellant continued to own the property at that address, and no convincing prejudice was shown from the late receipt of the adjudication order, especially when the delay had been condoned.

Conclusion: The service was treated as valid and no prejudice was accepted on account of delayed communication.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant's involvement in the contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 warranted maintenance of the original penalty or justified reduction of the penalty imposed on her.

Analysis: The repeated and frequent deposits in the joint NRE accounts over the relevant period established contravention of the foreign exchange law. At the same time, the material did not establish that the appellant was the active participant in the violation, although her status as a joint account holder and the use of the accounts for the deposits could not be ignored. The adjudication also reflected that the banks had been penalized for lack of due diligence, and the overall circumstances justified moderation of the appellant's penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty on the appellant was reduced to Rs. 3,00,000/-.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed only to the extent of reduction of the appellant's penalty, while the finding of contravention was not disturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Service effected by affixation at the last known address may be treated as valid where the recipient continues to control the premises and no real prejudice is shown, and a penalty for foreign exchange contravention may be moderated where the person is only a joint account holder and active participation is not established.

Issues: (i) Whether the data retrieved from the seized pen drive was admissible and could be relied upon without a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (ii) Whether the appellants' conduct fell within Section 3(d) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and attracted liability under Section 42(1) and (2) of that Act; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed required reduction.

Issue (i): Whether the data retrieved from the seized pen drive was admissible and could be relied upon without a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Analysis: The pen drive was seized from the business premises and treated as the original electronic record. The contents were opened in the presence of the concerned persons, printouts were taken, and the entries were confirmed by the persons associated with the transactions. The Tribunal also applied the statutory presumption under Section 39 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to documents seized from a person's custody or control and noted the supporting presumption reflected in Section 132(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On that basis, the objection that a Section 65B certificate was mandatory was rejected.

Conclusion: The electronic material was held admissible and reliable against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants' conduct fell within Section 3(d) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and attracted liability under Section 42(1) and (2) of that Act

Analysis: The arrangement involved payment of Indian currency in India for securing foreign exchange abroad to meet the under-invoiced component of imports. The Tribunal held that such payments constituted a financial transaction in India in consideration of acquisition of an asset outside India, namely foreign exchange, and therefore fell within the scope of Section 3(d). It further found that the managing director and the other directors were involved in or responsible for the arrangement, and the requirements for fastening liability under Section 42(1) and (2) were satisfied on the facts found.

Conclusion: The contravention under Section 3(d) was upheld and liability under Section 42 was sustained against the concerned appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed required reduction

Analysis: Although the contraventions were affirmed, the Tribunal considered the penalty excessive in the circumstances and exercised appellate discretion to bring the monetary liability to a lower figure consistent with the findings recorded.

Conclusion: The penalties were reduced to the extent directed by the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the limited extent of reduction in penalty, while the findings on admissibility of the electronic evidence and commission of contravention were maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: A seized electronic record can be relied upon as primary evidence without a Section 65B certificate where its custody, contents, and authenticity are otherwise established, and a payment arrangement in India to secure foreign exchange abroad for settling import liabilities falls within Section 3(d) of FEMA.