Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer is required to grant a prior opportunity of hearing to the assessee before making a reference under the second proviso to section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the Commissioner (Exemptions) cancelled registration under section 12AB(4) by treating the case as a "specified violation" under clause (b) of the Explanation without affording an opportunity to the assessee on that specific clause and whether relief in the form of admission of additional evidence and restoration for fresh adjudication is warranted.

Issue (i): Whether the AO must grant a hearing before making a reference under the second proviso to section 143(3).

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the second proviso to section 143(3) permits the AO to send a reference to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner where the AO is satisfied that a trust has committed a specified violation; the power to cancel or refuse cancellation of registration is vested with the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under section 12AB(4). Comparable statutory schemes (for example, section 92CA dealing with references to the Transfer Pricing Officer) have been interpreted to allow the AO to make references without a prior hearing, with the authority receiving the reference being obliged to afford hearing before taking a prejudicial decision. The text of section 12AB(4) requires the Commissioner to call for documents and afford a reasonable opportunity before passing an order cancelling registration.

Conclusion: The AO is not required to grant a prior hearing before making a reference under the second proviso to section 143(3). (Conclusion: in favour of Revenue)

Issue (ii): Whether the Commissioner cancelled registration by relying on clause (b) of the Explanation to section 12AB(4) without giving the assessee an opportunity on that specific allegation and whether the impugned order should be set aside with admission of additional evidence and remand for de novo adjudication.

Analysis: The Explanation to section 12AB(4) distinguishes multiple, specific bases for "specified violation", including clause (b) (non-maintenance of separate books for business incidental to objects) and clause (e) (activity not genuine). The show cause notice focused on general allegations of activities not being genuine and did not specify clause (b) as the basis. The impugned order, however, relied on clause (b) findings without having afforded the assessee an opportunity to meet that specific charge and without considering evidence now tendered before the tribunal. Admission of additional evidence is appropriate where it relates to a matter not put to the party below and where fresh adjudication is necessary for complete and fair disposal.

Conclusion: The cancellation order is vitiated insofar as it proceeded on clause (b) without giving a hearing on that specific allegation; additional evidence is admitted and the matter is restored to the Commissioner (Exemptions) for de novo adjudication after affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the assessee. (Conclusion: in favour of Assessee)

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes by upholding that the AO need not grant a prior hearing before making a reference under the second proviso to section 143(3), while setting aside and restoring the Commissioner's order insofar as it relied on clause (b) of the Explanation to section 12AB(4) without giving the assessee a specific opportunity to be heard; the Commissioner (Exemptions) is directed to decide afresh after considering admitted evidence and providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: An Assessing Officer may make a reference under the second proviso to section 143(3) without affording a prior hearing; however, the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner exercising power under section 12AB(4) must call for documents and afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing before cancelling registration, and reliance on a specific limb of the Explanation to section 12AB(4) requires that the assessee be given an opportunity to meet that specific allegation.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST recovery order dated 25.02.2025 should be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration on merits subject to a pre-deposit by the petitioner.

Analysis: The writ petition challenges the impugned order confirming tax demand and records that the limitation for statutory appeal has expired. The petitioner contends that excess ITC was reversed in subsequent returns and portions of the disputed tax were already recovered/paid. The Court notes precedents permitting quashment and remand where statutory remedies are time-barred, subject to safeguards to protect revenue interests. Balancing the competing interests, the Court examines the adequacy of a conditional pre-deposit and requirement to permit fresh, de novo consideration of the show cause notice on merits within a specified timeframe.

Conclusion: The impugned order is quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration on merits subject to the petitioner depositing 25% of the disputed tax from the Electronic Cash Register within thirty days and filing a reply with supporting documents; bank attachment shall be vacated upon compliance and amounts already recovered shall be set off against the pre-deposit. This outcome is in favour of the Assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appeal period has lapsed and the court exercises writ jurisdiction, the appropriate remedy is to quash the impugned order and remit the matter for fresh consideration on merits subject to a reasonable pre-deposit as a condition to protect revenue, with set-off of amounts already recovered.

Issues: (i) Whether EPFO assessment and demand raised during the moratorium period could form the basis of an admissible claim in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. (ii) Whether the approved resolution plan could be interfered with for providing only a nominal amount towards EPFO dues.

Issue (i): Whether EPFO assessment and demand raised during the moratorium period could form the basis of an admissible claim in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

Analysis: The claim of the provident fund authority was not supported by contemporaneous deduction records in the corporate debtor's books and the assessment was initiated and revised only after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium. A claim founded on assessment proceedings undertaken in the moratorium period could not be admitted in CIRP. The statutory bar on continuing or initiating such proceedings during moratorium was treated as decisive, and the later assessment was held incapable of fastenings liability in the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The claim based on assessment made during moratorium was not admissible in CIRP and the objection failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the approved resolution plan could be interfered with for providing only a nominal amount towards EPFO dues.

Analysis: The resolution professional had taken note of the provident fund claim, included it in the information memorandum, and the successful resolution applicant made a provision in the plan. The plan had already been approved by the committee of creditors and the adjudicating authority. In these circumstances, the amount provided for the disputed provident fund dues fell within the commercial framework of the plan and did not warrant judicial interference, especially when the claim itself was founded on a moratorium-hit assessment.

Conclusion: The approved plan was not liable to be set aside on the ground of inadequate provision for EPFO dues.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the approval of the resolution plan was upheld with the connected applications also disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: Claims founded on assessment proceedings initiated or continued during moratorium under the insolvency law cannot be admitted in CIRP, and a duly approved resolution plan will not be disturbed on that basis.

Issues: (i) Whether the service tax demand and penalties confirmed by the adjudicating authority on the basis of Form 26AS and related proceedings are sustainable; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under proviso to Section 73(1) is valid in the absence of a finding of fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax; (iii) Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the availability of statutory alternative remedies.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned demand of service tax and penalties confirmed against the petitioner on the basis of Form 26AS and without proper appreciation of payment challans and reverse charge liability is sustainable.

Analysis: The material before the authority included evidence that (a) receipts from IOC/IOC Marketing were subject to reverse charge and were discharged by the recipients, (b) the petitioner produced challans showing payment of service tax in respect of ONGC receipts, and (c) amounts reflected in Form 26AS relating to sale of flats were not service receipts. The adjudicating authority proceeded to levy tax principally on inferences from Form 26AS without determining whether specific receipts were taxable in the hands of the petitioner or whether tax had already been discharged by recipients or by the petitioner as evidenced by challans.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax and penalties confirmed on that basis is not sustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended five-year limitation under proviso to Section 73(1) was valid where there was no conclusive finding of fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 73(1) permits extension only if any of the specified conditions (fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade) are found. Jurisprudence requires such conditions to be established by cogent findings of willful conduct or intent. The adjudicating authority invoked the extended period without reaching a conclusive, fact-based finding that the petitioner had acted with the requisite willful intent to evade tax; mere non-filing or reliance on Form 26AS without examination of submitted documents does not satisfy the statutory preconditions for extension.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period under proviso to Section 73(1) was unlawful and held to be invalid; therefore the show cause notice and consequent demand premised on extended limitation are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite available statutory appellate remedies.

Analysis: Interference by prerogative writ is permissible where the impugned action is arbitrary, without jurisdiction, procedurally infirm, or where a jurisdictional error is apparent on the face of the record. The adjudicating authority assumed extended jurisdiction under Section 73(1) without fulfilling statutory preconditions and levied tax arbitrarily without considering relevant materials; these defects go to the root of jurisdiction and justify exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition is maintainable and entertained; relief is granted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned show cause notice and the Order-in-Original dated 23.05.2022 are quashed and set aside; consequently the demand, interest and penalties confirmed therein are vacated and the petitioner succeeds.

Ratio Decidendi: For demands under Section 73(1) by invoking the extended period, the adjudicating authority must record a conclusive, fact-based finding that one or more of the proviso conditions (fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade tax) are satisfied; absent such a finding, invocation of extended limitation and any demand based solely on Form 26AS or analogous inference is unauthorized and void.

Issues: Whether the acquittal recorded in the cheque dishonour prosecution was liable to be set aside, in particular whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: The cheque and signature were admitted, attracting the statutory presumptions that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a debt or liability. The accused's plea that the cheque was a security cheque and that the complainant lacked financial capacity was not supported by cogent evidence. The defence version regarding repayment was not proved, and the fact that the cheque particulars were filled in a different ink did not displace the presumption, since a signed cheque handed over voluntarily remains effective unless the drawer rebuts the presumption by evidence. The complainant's evidence remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination.

Conclusion: The presumption of legally enforceable liability was not rebutted. The acquittal was unsustainable and the accused was held guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of the cheque and signature are admitted, the law raises a rebuttable presumption of liability, and the accused must displace it by a probable defence supported by evidence; mere denial, security-cheque pleas, or reliance on the complainant's alleged lack of funds is insufficient without proof.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was justified in admitting and considering additional evidence filed on grievance portal and deciding the first appeal on merits without obtaining and awaiting a remand report from the Assessing Officer under Rule 46A(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and without giving the Assessing Officer an effective and reasonable opportunity to examine the additional evidence.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined Rule 46A(1)-(4) and the mandate that additional evidence filed before the first appellate authority may be admitted only in prescribed circumstances and, if admitted, the assessing officer must be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence and to produce rebuttal evidence (Rule 46A(3)). The appellate authority had forwarded the additional evidence to the Assessing Officer and issued reminders by e-mail, but no remand report was received; the appellate authority proceeded to decide the appeal on merits by relying on the additional evidence without an effective remand process. The Tribunal applied the mandatory and strict requirements of Rule 46A, the principle that the Assessing Officer must be allowed a real and sufficient opportunity to verify voluminous and complex additional evidence, and authorities holding that Rule 46A procedural steps cannot be bypassed by relying on the appellate authority's suo moto powers. The Tribunal found that two portal e-mail reminders within a short time-frame were not an adequate or effective opportunity in the circumstances, given the volume and nature of the documents and the need for verification, cross-verification and enquiries by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The admission and consideration of the additional evidence by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) without obtaining an effective remand report and without giving the Assessing Officer a reasonable and meaningful opportunity under Rule 46A(3) was procedurally infirm; the appellate order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for fresh disposal after obtaining the remand report and giving appropriate opportunities. This conclusion is against the assessee (i.e., in favour of the Revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the service tax demand confirmed against the petitioner based solely on third-party Form 26AS and without a conclusive finding that the services were taxable or not exempt under Notification No.25/2012 is sustainable; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly available and whether the writ petition was maintainable despite availability of alternative statutory remedies.

Issue (i): Whether the service tax demand confirmed on the basis of Form 26AS without a conclusive determination of tax liability and without considering claimed exemption under Notification No.25/2012 is sustainable.

Analysis: The adjudication relied principally on third-party Form 26AS entries showing receipts and tax deducted at source, without a reasoned finding that the receipts constituted taxable services or that the exemption under Notification No.25/2012 did not apply. The position that tax cannot be imposed by inference or analogy and that liability must be declared under the taxing statute was applied. The material filed by the petitioner, including contracts and audited accounts claiming exemption for railway contracts, was not adequately considered by the authority before confirming demand.

Conclusion: The demand confirmed against the petitioner on the basis of Form 26AS without conclusively determining taxability or considering the claimed exemption is unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) could be validly invoked in the absence of a finding of fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade, and whether the writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding alternative statutory remedies.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 73(1) permits invocation of a five-year limitation only upon a finding of one or more specified conditions (fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression, or contravention with intent to evade). The impugned order does not record any conclusive finding that such conditions were established; instead the authority proceeded on the basis of inferences from Form 26AS and perceived non-furnishing of documents. The legal principles requiring strict proof of willful suppression and that mere omission or reliance on third-party tax records does not satisfy the proviso were applied. The exercise of writ jurisdiction was addressed as permissible because the authority was found to have assumed jurisdiction not conferred by statute, producing a decision that was palpably without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation under Section 73(1) without the requisite conclusive findings was unlawful; the assumption of jurisdiction to levy tax and penalties under the extended period is invalid and the writ petition is maintainable. The result is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order-in-original confirming service tax demand, interest and penalty is quashed and set aside; the writ petition is allowed and the relief granted is for the petitioner (assessee).

Ratio Decidendi: The extended period under Section 73(1) can be invoked only after a reasoned and conclusive finding that one or more of the proviso conditions (fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade) are established; reliance solely on third-party Form 26AS or inference without specific findings of such conditions is insufficient to sustain a demand under the extended period.

Issues: (i) Whether the order-in-original dated 31.12.2025 passed during pendency of an interim order should be set aside for violation of the interim order; (ii) Whether the proceedings raising GST demand require re-adjudication in view of the contention that the activity is an 'educational activity' and therefore outside levy.

Issue (i): Whether the order-in-original dated 31.12.2025 passed during the pendency of the writ petition and interim order should be set aside for violation of the interim order.

Analysis: The impugned order-in-original was passed while an interim order restrained the respondents from taking coercive steps. The order-in-original is ex-parte and was produced before the Court. The Court considered the fact of the interim order and the subsequent adjudication during its pendency and found that the impugned order cannot stand in those circumstances.

Conclusion: The order-in-original dated 31.12.2025 is set aside for having been passed during the pendency of the interim order.

Issue (ii): Whether the matter should be remitted for re-adjudication taking into account the petitioners contention that the activity constitutes 'educational activity' and is not subject to levy.

Analysis: The petitioner raised a substantive legal contention that the activity falls within educational activity exemption, relying on a prior Division Bench decision and its dismissal in SLP by the Apex Court. Given the legal contention and the ex-parte nature of the impugned adjudication, the appropriate course is to remit the proceedings to the authority to consider the reply to the show cause notice and the legal position asserted by the petitioner and to decide the matter in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The proceedings are remitted to the authority to re-adjudicate from the stage of reply to the show cause notice, with directions to consider the petitioners contention that the activity is an educational activity and to dispose of the proceedings in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudicatory order is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh adjudication, permitting the petitioner to file a reply and requiring the authority to consider the legal position regarding educational activity in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory order passed in violation of an interim injunction must be set aside and, where a substantive legal contention (here, that the activity is educational and not leviable) is raised, the matter should be remitted for re-adjudication so the authority can consider the contention and decide in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs.37,50,000 made under section 41(1) arising from alleged cessation of liability to EBZ Online Private Limited is sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs.1,92,80,966 made under section 41(1) on account of alleged loan from Shree Suvarna Sahakari Bank Ltd. is sustainable; (iii) Whether the addition of Rs.19,19,890 made under section 68 as share application money pending allotment is sustainable.

Issue (i): Addition of Rs.37,50,000 under section 41(1) for alleged cessation of liability to EBZ Online Private Limited.

Analysis: Documents on record show the amount was credited in the books in FY 2009-10 pursuant to a business purchase agreement and treated as capital work in progress payable; the liability is shown as continuing and the transaction relates to a year within the three-year limitation applicable to the assessment year under consideration.

Conclusion: Addition under section 41(1) of Rs.37,50,000 is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Addition of Rs.1,92,80,966 under section 41(1) on account of alleged loan from Shree Suvarna Sahakari Bank Ltd.

Analysis: Independent information obtained under section 133(6) from the bank/liquidator shows the claim against the assessee remained active and had increased, with recovery actions pending; therefore the liability had not ceased as on the relevant date.

Conclusion: Addition under section 41(1) of Rs.1,92,80,966 is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Addition of Rs.19,19,890 under section 68 as unexplained share application money pending allotment.

Analysis: Audited balance sheet and note to accounts establish that the share application money was an opening balance and no fresh receipt was credited during the year under consideration; section 68 applies to sums credited/received during the relevant previous year which the assessee cannot satisfactorily explain.

Conclusion: Addition under section 68 of Rs.19,19,890 is deleted and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in respect of the substantive additions under sections 41(1) and 68, resulting in deletion of the impugned additions and reversal of the appellate authority's findings.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 41(1) is applicable only where a previously allowed deduction/liability has ceased (remission/cessation) and is not applicable while the liability remains active; section 68 can be invoked only for sums credited/received in the relevant previous year which the assessee fails to satisfactorily explain.

Issues: (i) Whether reduction in value of inputs/work-in-progress by making a provision in the financial books (book write-down) amounts to writing off of inputs/capital goods so as to attract reversal of Cenvat credit under Rule 3(5B) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and related demand, interest and penalty.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the accounting provision reducing inventory value constituted a physical write-off of inputs or capital goods on which Cenvat credit had been availed and whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked. The Tribunal relied on prior decisions holding that a book entry or write-down made for accounting or income-tax purposes, without evidence of removal or physical unavailability of inputs, does not amount to writing off for the purposes of Rule 3(5B). The admitted factual position that no physical verification showed removal of inputs and that the write-down was made to normalise inflated financial figures were considered. The Tribunal noted authorities where reduction in book value, absent evidence of physical depletion or utilization of credit, did not require reversal of credit and where demands and penalties were set aside. The Tribunal also addressed the contention on extended limitation, observing that invocation for extended period requires specific allegations of fraud/collusion or suppression, which were not substantiated on record.

Conclusion: The impugned order confirming demand, interest and penalty under Rule 3(5B) read with Rule 14 and Sections 11A(4) and 11A(5) is set aside. The reduction in inventory value by way of accounting provision, without evidence of physical write-off or removal of inputs, does not compel reversal of Cenvat credit; appeal is allowed with consequential relief as per law (in favour of the assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether the Review Petitions should be entertained on the ground that the original judgment was passed without giving the Revenue an opportunity to file a counter affidavit; (ii) Whether the Review Petitions should be entertained on the ground that the original judgment failed to decide whether the returns were validly filed.

Issue (i): Whether the Review Petitions are maintainable because the original judgment was passed without granting the Revenue an opportunity to file its counter affidavit.

Analysis: The record shows representation and hearing afforded to the Revenue through counsel at the time the original judgment was pronounced. The relied upon precedent where no one had appeared for respondents is distinguishable on that factual basis. The review jurisdiction does not permit re-examination of a judgment where an opportunity to be heard was in fact provided.

Conclusion: The Review Petitions are not maintainable on this ground; this contention is rejected in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Review Petitions are maintainable because the original judgment did not decide whether the returns were validly filed.

Analysis: The original judgment directed that the returns be processed in accordance with law and recorded that if the statutory period for processing had expired the returns must be accepted at face value. The scope of review is limited to corrigible errors apparent on the face of the record or discovery of new evidence; it is not a forum for re-arguing matters or for converting review into an appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The Review Petitions are not maintainable on this ground; this contention is rejected in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Review Petitions fail to identify any error apparent on the face of the record or any new evidence warranting review; consequently the Review Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A review petition is maintainable only for errors apparent on the face of the record or discovery of new and important facts; absence of a substantive error of that character or presence of an opportunity to be heard precludes reopening the judgment.

Issues: (i) Whether the goods produced at the batching plants are "Ready Mix Concrete (RMC)" liable to excise duty or are "concrete mix" exempt when produced/used at construction site; (ii) Whether the appellant is the manufacturer liable to duty or the subcontractor who installed and operated the batching plants is the proper person to be held liable;

Issue (i): Whether the impugned product is classifiable as Ready Mix Concrete (RMC) attracting excise duty or as concrete mix manufactured at site and exempt under the notifications.

Analysis: Classification hinges on the process and features of production: RMC conforms to IS 4926 and requires integrated automated batching, quality controls, and factory production/transport; concrete mix as per IS 456 is conventionally produced and used at the construction site and is the subject of Notification No. 04/1997-CE. Circular No. 368/1/98-CX and Board Circular No. 237/71/96-CX provide that the process of preparation determines whether the product is RMC or on-site concrete mix. Absence of admissible evidence as to the manufacturing process and compliance with RMC standards precludes treating the product as RMC. Substitution in Notification No. 12/2016-CE extended exemption to RMC, and amendments by substitution apply retrospectively where applicable.

Conclusion: The product cannot be held to be RMC in the absence of evidence that it was manufactured as per RMC standards and process; classification as RMC is unsustainable and the impugned finding is set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant, having subcontracted the work, can be held as manufacturer liable to excise duty for production at the subcontractor's plants.

Analysis: Liability to excise as manufacturer depends on who undertook and controlled the manufacturing activity. Contractual allocation of responsibilities to the subcontractor and statements indicating that subcontractor installed and operated the plants are material. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the appellant controlled or carried out the manufacture, duty cannot be confirmed against the appellant.

Conclusion: The appellant is not the maker of the goods for excise liability on the available evidence; any demand should be directed to the entity that actually manufactured the product.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming excise duty and penalties is unsustainable for want of admissible evidence on process-based classification and for lack of basis to fasten manufacture liability on the appellant; the appeal is allowed with consequential relief in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification between RMC and on-site concrete mix is determined by the manufacturing process and compliance with applicable IS standards; absent admissible evidence that production met RMC process standards, excise duty cannot be sustained and liability cannot be imposed on a party who did not demonstrably undertake the manufacture.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to avail input tax credit (ITC) for invoices/debit notes pertaining to FYs 2017-18 to 2020-21 which would otherwise be barred by the time-limit in Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, in view of the amendment inserting Section 16(5) and its retrospective effect.

Analysis: The legal framework comprises Section 16(4) which prescribes the cut-off for claiming ITC and the subsequently enacted Section 16(5) which, with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017, permits registered persons to take ITC in any return under Section 39 filed up to 30.11.2021 for invoices/debit notes pertaining to FYs 2017-18 to 2020-21. The impugned departmental orders reversed ITC claims on the ground of limitation under Section 16(4). In light of the insertion of Section 16(5) and the notifications/circulars implementing the amendment, the claim of ITC falling within the period permitted by Section 16(5) cannot be sustainedly denied on limitation grounds. Consequential reliefs flowing from quashing of such orders include restraint on recovery proceedings based on limitation, de-freezing of bank accounts frozen pursuant to the impugned order, and refund/adjustment of amounts standing in cash/credit ledgers.

Conclusion: The impugned order is quashed insofar as it denies ITC claims barred by Section 16(4) but allowable within the period prescribed by Section 16(5); relief is granted in favour of the petitioner on that issue.

Issues: Whether the matter should be remitted to the Directorate General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) for reinvestigation in view of corrected/accurate figures submitted by the respondent, affecting the assessment of alleged profiteering under the CGST Act.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the respondent submitted written material and annexures containing corrected figures which, according to the respondent, render the DGAP's profiteering calculation erroneous. The DGAP accepted the procedural course of remand under the relevant provision. The Tribunal did not adjudicate the merits of the profiteering calculation but evaluated the appropriateness of permitting reinvestigation in light of the new material and the statutory provision authorising referral back to the DGAP for further inquiry.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the DGAP for reinvestigation and submission of a fresh report taking into account the respondent's written submissions and annexures; no determination on the substantive question of profiteering is made by the Tribunal.

Issues: (i) Whether the relationship between the parties is that of principal-to-principal or that of job-worker to principal; (ii) Whether the delayed appeals (208 days) filed by the appellant can be entertained.

Issue (i): Whether the relationship between the parties is that of principal-to-principal or that of job-worker to principal.

Analysis: The Tribunal found on the facts that the parties were in a principal-to-principal relationship rather than a job-worker arrangement. That finding of fact was examined and no perversity was found in the Tribunal's conclusion on the record.

Conclusion: The finding that the relationship is principal-to-principal is upheld; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals filed with a delay of 208 days can be entertained.

Analysis: The appeals were considered on both delay and merits. Having examined the record, the Court declined to condone the delay and entertained the appeals only to the extent of examining merits which did not warrant interference.

Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed both on account of delay and on merits, sustaining the Tribunal's factual finding regarding the nature of the parties' relationship.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court will not interfere with a Tribunal's finding of fact which is free from perversity; where such a factual finding sustains the Tribunal's conclusion on the nature of the contractual relationship, the appeal must be dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the arrest under section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was vitiated for want of statutory safeguards, absence of adequate material, or non-application of mind in recording reasons to believe; (ii) Whether the grievance regarding non-production before the Magistrate within 24 hours rendered the custody illegal.

Issue (i): Whether the arrest under section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was vitiated for want of statutory safeguards, absence of adequate material, or non-application of mind in recording reasons to believe.

Analysis: The challenge to arrest was tested on the settled principle that writ interference in arrest matters is warranted only in exceptional cases of mala fide, extraneous considerations, or clear breach of statutory procedure. The record disclosed search material, statements of persons involved, and contemporaneous grounds of arrest showing a prima facie case of large-scale GST evasion through parallel accounts and electronic records. The Court found that the authorities had material to form the requisite belief and that the arrest was not a mere fishing enquiry or suspicion-based action.

Conclusion: The arrest was held to be in accordance with law and the challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the grievance regarding non-production before the Magistrate within 24 hours rendered the custody illegal.

Analysis: The Court accepted the explanation that the arrested person had to be moved for medical treatment to a higher medical centre in view of his health condition. In those circumstances, immediate production before the Magistrate was found not to be a legally warranted course. The Court also noted the absence of a challenge to the remand order and held that the custody objection could not succeed on the facts presented.

Conclusion: The custody was not held illegal on the ground of non-production within 24 hours.

Final Conclusion: No interference was called for in exercise of writ jurisdiction, and the petition was rejected on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: An arrest under the GST law will not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction where the authority has relevant material, records reasons to believe, and complies substantially with the statutory safeguards; a custody objection based on delayed production fails where immediate production is impracticable for bona fide medical reasons.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment/re-opening under section 147/148 leading to addition u/s 69B on account of alleged cash payment ("on money") is sustainable where the departmental case relies on third-party statements and seized electronic records; (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to lead valuation evidence to rebut the departmental material.

Issue (i): Whether addition of Rs. 70,00,000 made u/s 69B based on seized records and third-party statements is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material relied upon by the A.O., which primarily comprised statements and electronic data seized from the seller (Nirav Modi/Firestar Group) indicating receipt of "on money" and an excel sheet showing a cash component. There was no direct admission or documentary corroboration found with the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the A.O. did not obtain an independent valuation of the jewellery to establish that the cheque payment was inadequate relative to the ring's value; the departmental case therefore depended on third-party records and statements rather than material found with the assessee. The Tribunal held that when additions are founded on such third-party electronic/seized material, the assessee must be afforded a fair opportunity to meet and rebut that material.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee the addition u/s 69B based solely on the seized third-party records and statements could not be sustained without giving the assessee an opportunity to rebut by valuation and other evidence.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to cross-examine the declarants/witnesses and to have an opportunity to establish valuation to rebut the "on money" allegation.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the principles governing the right to cross-examination in the context of revenue proceedings and electronic/seized evidence. While recognizing that cross-examination is not an absolute right in every administrative or revenue inquiry, the Tribunal found that fairness required that where the department's case rests on statements and electronic records of third parties and no corroborative material exists with the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity to cross-examine relevant declarants and to lead valuation evidence to rebut the inference of undisclosed cash payment. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not appreciated this aspect adequately and therefore directed that the matter be restored to the file of the A.O. for fresh adjudication with opportunities to the assessee to cross-examine and to produce valuation evidence.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee the assessee is entitled to opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witnesses and to file valuation or other rebuttal evidence; matter to be remanded to AO for fresh assessment proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and the assessment is set aside and restored to the file of the A.O. for de novo consideration permitting the assessee to cross-examine witnesses and to produce valuation and other rebuttal evidence; resultant proceedings to be completed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where additions in a reassessment are founded principally on third-party statements and seized electronic records without corroborative material with the assessee, natural justice requires that the assessee be given an opportunity to rebut through cross-examination of relevant declarants and by adducing valuation or other evidence before sustaining additions under section 69B.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessees unutilised accumulated fund for AY 2009-10 could be taxed in AY 2015-16; (ii) Whether the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for AY 2015-16 was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the unutilised accumulated fund of AY 2009-10 became assessable income in AY 2015-16.

Analysis: The accumulated fund was set aside for building acquisition and partly utilised; remaining amount could not be utilised within five years due to an injunction issued by the High Court and related deposit of funds with the Court. The assessee relied on the principle allowing set-off of earlier years excess application of funds against later year income as applied in the Subros Educational Society line of authority. Relevant documentary evidence of injunction and related assessments was admitted below and considered.

Conclusion: The unutilised accumulated fund did not result in taxable income in AY 2015-16; the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition and granted relief to the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 147 for AY 2015-16 was validly based on formation of belief that income had escaped assessment.

Analysis: Once earlier years excess application of funds is available for set-off and the unutilisation was due to an injunction beyond the assessees control, there remained no income that had escaped assessment for AY 2015-16. The consequence is that the foundational belief for reopening was undermined on the legal facet considered; the cross objection raised by the assessee on jurisdictional validity was examined and allowed on that legal ground.

Conclusion: The assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was flawed on the legal facet addressed and the assessees cross objection is allowed on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The revenues appeal is dismissed and the assessees cross objection is allowed; the order under challenge is set aside to the extent indicated by the conclusions above.

Ratio Decidendi: Where accumulated funds of a charitable entity remain unutilised due to an injunction beyond the entitys control and earlier years excess application of funds is available for set-off under the governing authority, such unutilised funds do not constitute taxable income in the subsequent year and cannot sustain a valid reopening under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether seized perishable consignment (areca nuts) should be released to the claimant-appellant as owner on deposit of the penalty quantified in the notice under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, and related interim relief measures.

Analysis: The Court examined documentary evidence accompanying the consignment, noting that documents of title were seized with the goods and that no other claimants challenged ownership. The Court considered the Circular dated December 31, 2018 concerning determination of ownership where invoice or specified documents accompany goods. The impugned notice under Section 129(3) assessed the liability of the owner at Rs. 5,23,264/-. The perishable nature of the goods and precedents concerning interim release on furnishing security were also considered, with distinction drawn where factual scenarios differ (for example, release of vehicle in other cases).

Conclusion: The appellant is to be treated as owner of the seized consignment for the purpose of interim relief; the appellant is directed to deposit Rs. 5,23,264/- within seven days by bank draft or equivalent instrument, upon which the respondent authorities shall release the seized consignment forthwith; the deposit shall abide the result of the pending writ petition.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made under section 69A in respect of cash payments for purchase of property (A.Y. 2019-20) was justified where the assessee now produces drawings ledger and audited financial statements asserting withdrawals as source of funds; (ii) Whether the assessment officer was justified in estimating net profit at 8% of turnover (A.Y. 2020-21) contrary to the assessee's audited books showing 7%.

Issue (i): Whether addition under section 69A for cash payments is sustainable where the assessee has ledger entries of drawings and supporting financial statements.

Analysis: The assessee's ledger extracts and monthly summary of drawings account, now produced, indicate cash withdrawals linked to the property purchase and audited financial statements show available funds. These documents were not placed before the AO during assessment. The Tribunal finds evidential material on record supporting the contention that cash payments originated from drawings of the proprietary concern and permits the AO to reassess the issue after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard on documents produced before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: Addition under section 69A is not finally sustained by the Tribunal; the matter is remitted to the AO for fresh consideration after hearing the assessee. The appeal in respect of this issue is partly allowed for statistical purposes.

Issue (ii): Whether the AO can estimate net profit at 8% when the assessee's audited books report net profit at 7% and comparable industry data support the declared margin.

Analysis: The assessee maintained audited books supporting a 7% net profit. The nature of the construction business reasonably involves cash disbursements (e.g., wages) and the Tribunal finds no convincing material or seized incriminating evidence to justify increasing the profit rate to 8%. Comparable entities' margins submitted by the assessee further support the declared rate. The AO's reliance on statements and non-retractions, absent material defects in the audited accounts, is insufficient to disturb the audited profit margin.

Conclusion: The AO's estimation of net profit at 8% is set aside and the declared 7% net profit is accepted; the appeal for A.Y. 2020-21 is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: One assessment (A.Y. 2019-20) is partly allowed and remitted to the assessing officer for fresh consideration of the documents produced before the Tribunal; the other assessment (A.Y. 2020-21) is allowed in favour of the assessee, producing an overall outcome partly in favour of the assessee.