Outcome: Delay condoned. Special leave petition dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, disposed of.

Issues: Whether the DGAP report finding profiteering by the Respondent and the question of passing on of ITC benefit to flat buyers (under Rule 128 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017) should be accepted and the matter closed.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the DGAP investigation report which quantified profiteering and concluded there was an entitlement to GST/ITC related benefit. The Applicant (flat buyers association) informed the Tribunal that the dispute regarding passing on of ITC benefit had been settled with the Respondent through a Memorandum of Understanding dated 05.10.2019 and provided documentary evidence (MOU) showing appropriate benefits/price reductions were allowed to the allottees. The Tribunal examined the DGAP report and the settlement documents and found that the issue of passing of ITC benefit had been resolved between the parties.

Conclusion: The DGAP report is accepted and, in view of the settlement reflected in the MOU, the matter is closed; decision is against the Respondent and in favour of the Revenue.

Outcome: The application for condonation of delay and the special leave petition were dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether a sanction for prosecution granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority was valid under the constitutional and statutory scheme. (ii) Whether a fresh sanction could be obtained after withdrawal of general consent under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Issue (i): Whether a sanction for prosecution granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority was valid under the constitutional and statutory scheme.

Analysis: The requirement of sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is tied to competence of the authority to remove the public servant, and therefore operates in harmony with Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Where the sanction is granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, the defect is not a mere irregularity but one going to the root of jurisdiction. Departmental notifications cannot override this constitutional limitation. The sanction in issue was therefore void ab initio.

Conclusion: The sanction was invalid and the discharge could not be faulted on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether a fresh sanction could be obtained after withdrawal of general consent under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Analysis: Although a defective sanction may ordinarily be capable of being cured by obtaining a fresh sanction, that course presupposes the continuing competence of the investigating agency to initiate the necessary fresh exercise of jurisdiction. Once general consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 stood withdrawn, the agency was divested of authority to undertake a new substantive exercise of power within the State in respect of concluded matters. In that situation, a fresh sanction was not a permissible curative step.

Conclusion: A fresh sanction was barred and the defect was incurable in the facts of the case.

Final Conclusion: The revisional challenge failed, the discharge order was sustained, and the criminal proceedings stood finally terminated.

Ratio Decidendi: A sanction for prosecution granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is jurisdictionally void, and where the investigating agency has been divested of power by withdrawal of general consent, a fresh sanction cannot be obtained to cure that defect.

Outcome: Special leave petition dismissed on the ground of delay and the delay-condonation application rejected.

Outcome: Special Leave Petition dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay, with pending interlocutory application(s) disposed of.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay in filing.

Issues: (i) Whether additions under Section 69C for alleged bogus purchases can be sustained where the assessee produced books of account, invoices, GST records and bank payments and several suppliers did not respond to notices issued under Section 133(6); (ii) Whether additions on account of alleged non-deduction of tax at source from amounts paid to contractors for freight can be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 15,17,83,873/- on account of alleged bogus purchases is sustainable.

Analysis: The issue was examined on the legal framework governing Section 69C and the evidentiary value of third-party responses to notices under Section 133(6). The material included audited books, invoices, bank payment evidence, GST returns (GSTR-2A) and confirmations from several suppliers; some suppliers had responded to notices while others had not. The Tribunal considered precedent principles that mere non-response to Section 133(6) notices does not by itself establish transactions as bogus, and that where books and corresponding sales are accepted and documentary evidence exists, the Revenue must further investigate and cannot base additions solely on non-responses. The Tribunal applied these principles to the facts and noted the Assessing Officer did not reject the books of account nor point to specific discrepancies warranting invocation of Section 69C.

Conclusion: Addition under Section 69C for alleged bogus purchases is deleted; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions on account of alleged non-deduction of TDS from amounts paid to contractors for freight (Rs. 97,49,289/-) are sustainable.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer's examination of TDS/TCS information and 26AS was considered. The record shows the AO accepted the explanations offered by the assessee regarding the relevant entries and there was no substantive finding impairing the assessee's explanation.

Conclusion: Addition on account of alleged non-deduction of tax at source is dismissed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both grounds of the Revenue's appeals for the assessment years 2021-22 and 2022-23 are dismissed, resulting in deletion of the contested additions and rulings favourable to the assessee on the decided issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-response to notices issued under Section 133(6) is not by itself conclusive proof of bogus transactions; where the assessee produces reliable books of account, corroborative invoices, bank payment evidence and GST records and the AO has not identified specific defects in the books, additions under Section 69C cannot be sustained absent further investigation by the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the deletion of disallowance of deduction under section 80-IA (amounting to specified sums) was legally sustainable in view of the concept of "initial assessment year" and set-off of notional/carry forward losses; (ii) Whether the deletion of disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was legally sustainable where exempt income and investment characterization were in dispute.

Issue (i): Deletion of disallowance of deduction claimed under section 80-IA in respect of eligible undertaking/profits, in light of section 80-IA(5), CBDT Circular No.1/2016 and prior judicial decisions.

Analysis: The issue was examined with reference to the statutory concept of "initial assessment year" under section 80-IA(5) and the effect of notional/carry forward losses on computation of eligible business profits. Consideration was given to CBDT Circular No.1/2016 and relevant High Court authority addressing the definition and choice of initial assessment year. The reasoning applied in a prior jurisdictional High Court decision in the assessee's own case was followed and the position that an assessee may choose the year from which to claim the deduction under section 80-IA was applied mutatis mutandis to the assessment years before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Issue (ii): Deletion of disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D regarding expenditure in relation to exempt income and characterization of investments.

Analysis: The issue was considered in light of settled principle that disallowance under section 14A cannot exceed the amount of exempt income and relevant precedents constraining computation under Rule 8D. The limitation on disallowance relative to exempt income was applied to the facts of the assessment year.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals filed by the Revenue against the deletion of disallowances under section 80-IA and under section 14A read with Rule 8D are dismissed and the lower authority's grant of relief to the Assessee is upheld for the assessment years considered.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee is permitted by section 80-IA(5) to choose the initial assessment year for claiming deduction, notional or carried-forward losses from earlier years do not, as a matter of law, automatically negate the entitlement to deduction under section 80-IA; and disallowance under section 14A is limited by the quantum of exempt income.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order dated 31.08.2022 is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue for failure to initiate penalty proceedings under section 271E for alleged violation of section 269T; (ii) Whether the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax could, in exercise of powers under section 263, direct initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271E in absence of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial for not initiating penalty u/s 271E for alleged violation of section 269T.

Analysis: The assessment record and tax audit report (Form 3CD) reported a repayment of Rs.11,00,000 otherwise than by permitted banking modes, which on its face indicated contravention of section 269T. The revisioning authority placed reliance on the tax audit report to conclude violation of section 269T and attraction of penalty under section 271E. Counterclaims that the entry was an adjustment of security deposit and a mere book entry were not shown to have been corrected by obtaining a revised audit report or certificate from the auditor.

Conclusion: The facts as reported in Form 3CD could not be treated as conclusively corrected at the revision stage; however, this finding alone does not sustain direction for initiation of penalty absent the requirement in law addressed in Issue (ii).

Issue (ii): Whether the revisionary authority could direct initiation of penalty u/s 271E under section 263 without satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Established authorities require recording of satisfaction before initiation of certain penalty proceedings and the Supreme Court has held that initiation/levy of penalty under provisions pari materia cannot be sustained without such satisfaction in the assessment order. The impugned order directed initiation of penalty u/s 271E despite absence of any recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order. The revisionary direction to initiate separate penal proceedings in absence of AO's satisfaction was held inconsistent with the legal requirement applicable to initiation of penalty under section 271E.

Conclusion: The direction to the Assessing Officer to initiate penalty proceedings u/s 271E in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO is not sustainable; the revisionary order is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed and the order passed under section 263 is set aside, resulting in quashing of the direction to initiate penalty proceedings under section 271E in absence of AO's recorded satisfaction.

Ratio Decidendi: Initiation or levy of penalty under section 271E cannot be directed or sustained in exercise of revisionary powers under section 263 where the Assessing Officer has not recorded the requisite satisfaction in the assessment order for initiation of such penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether the Principal Commissioner validly assumed revisional jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the reassessment order. (ii) Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land is taxable under section 56(2)(viii) read with section 145B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and not exempt under section 10(37).

Issue (i): Whether the Principal Commissioner validly assumed revisional jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the reassessment order.

Analysis: The reassessment order was found to be passed without proper inquiry into the applicable statutory position and binding precedent on the taxability of interest on enhanced compensation. The order was therefore treated as both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, bringing it within the scope of revisional interference under section 263, including Explanation 2 to section 263(1).

Conclusion: The assumption of revisional jurisdiction was upheld and is in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land is taxable under section 56(2)(viii) read with section 145B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and not exempt under section 10(37).

Analysis: The amended scheme of sections 56(2)(viii), 57(iv), and 145B(1) treats interest on compensation or enhanced compensation as income chargeable under the head "Income from other sources" in the year of receipt. The exemption in section 10(37) extends only to compensation arising from compulsory acquisition and does not cover interest on such compensation. On that basis, the claim of exemption was held to be unsustainable.

Conclusion: The interest on enhanced compensation was held taxable under section 56(2)(viii) read with section 145B(1), and the exemption claim under section 10(37) failed, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The revisional order was sustained because the assessment had been made without proper inquiry into the tax treatment of interest on enhanced compensation, and such interest was held to be taxable as income from other sources.

Ratio Decidendi: After the 2010 amendment, interest on compensation or enhanced compensation is separately taxable as income from other sources on receipt basis and is outside the exemption for compensation under section 10(37); an assessment order ignoring this position can be revised under section 263 if it is erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the reopening of assessment and related proceedings under sections 147, 148, 148A and sanction under section 151 are valid and within the scope of the show cause notice; (ii) Whether the disallowance of donations claimed under section 80GGC (additions confirmed by the authorities) was sustainable where the Assessing Officer relied on Investigation Wing material without taking cognizance of the assessee's supporting documents and without permitting cross-examination of third parties.

Issue (i): Validity and scope of reopening under sections 147/148/148A and validity of sanction under section 151.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the show cause notice and related records and found that the notice related to donations to registered un-recognized political parties and encompassed the total deduction claimed of Rs.10,00,000/-. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not travel beyond the scope of the show cause notice and that the sanctioning authority and procedural prerequisites under the proviso to section 148A were appropriately considered in the factual matrix of the case. The appellant's reliance on precedents with different facts was noted but held not applicable.

Conclusion: The grounds challenging the validity/scope of reopening and the sanction are dismissed; the reopening and sanction are held valid and within the scope of the show cause notice.

Issue (ii): Sustainability of additions/disallowance of donations under section 80GGC where reliance was placed on Investigation Wing material and third-party statements without allowing effective confrontation and where the assessee produced bank evidence, receipts and registration particulars.

Analysis: The Tribunal observed that the assessee produced bank statements, donation receipts and registration documents which were not taken into account by the Assessing Officer or the CIT(A). The additions were substantially based on the Investigation Wing's report and extracts of third-party statements; the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to test or have those materials properly confronted. In light of these omissions, the Tribunal found that the matter requires fresh consideration by the Assessing Officer with due regard to the materials produced by the assessee and statutory requirements for adjudication.

Conclusion: The findings confirming the additions are not upheld at this stage; the matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication taking cognizance of the assessee's supporting documents and deciding the claim in accordance with the Income-tax statute.

Final Conclusion: The procedural challenges to reopening and sanction are rejected, while the substantive dispute on disallowance of donations is remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration of the evidence produced by the assessee; the appeal is allowed in part for statistical purposes and the substantive claims are to be re-adjudicated as directed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessing authority confirms additions primarily on the basis of investigation reports and third-party statements without taking cognizance of the assessee's contemporaneous bank evidence, receipts and registration details, the matter must be remitted for fresh adjudication to enable a decision after proper application of mind and opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be levied for claiming lease operating expenses on straight-line basis (AS-19) when the claim represents a plausible view and was fully disclosed in audited accounts.

Issue (i): Levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) for claiming lease operating expenses on straight-line method in accordance with AS-19 despite assessment addition.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the assessee's change in accounting policy to recognise lease rentals on straight-line basis was a bona fide, plausible view and whether full disclosure of that change in the audited accounts negated the applicability of penalty under section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal noted that (a) the assessee disclosed the change in accounting policy in the audited financial statements, (b) divergent decisions of coordinate benches existed on the allowability of straight-lining under AS-19, and (c) the Tribunal in the related quantum proceedings observed that the method is tax neutral over the lease term. The Tribunal applied the principle that mere rejection of a claim by the revenue does not, by itself, establish furnishing of inaccurate particulars where the assessee has advanced a plausible, legally tenable view and has made full disclosure.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(c) is quashed; the levy of penalty is not sustainable where the claim was based on a plausible view, was disclosed in the audited accounts, and there was no evidence of falsehood or mala fide concealment.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by quashing the penalty orders under section 271(1)(c) for the assessment years in question; grounds not substantively argued were dismissed. The decision leaves open the differing judicial views on the tax treatment but removes penal consequences where disclosure and plausibility exist.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer adopts a plausible, disclosed accounting view (here AS-19 straight-lining) and there is no evidence of falsehood or mala fide concealment, mere disallowance of the claim on assessment does not justify imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the condition imposed for provisional release of seized goods requiring the petitioner to furnish a Bank Guarantee equal to 100% of the estimated differential duty together with estimated redemption fine and penalties is justified, or whether it should be modified to require a Bank Guarantee equal to 50% of the estimated differential duty.

Analysis: The provisional release order required full security to cover estimated differential duty and anticipated fines and penalties pursuant to CBIC Circular No. 35/2017-Customs and Sections 110A, 112(a), 114A and 125(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner demonstrated that identical goods imported subsequently were provisionally assessed and cleared on a bond for value and a Bank Guarantee equal to 50% of estimated differential duty under the Faceless Assessment regime and applicable AEO benefits reflected in Circulars Nos. 33/2016 and 38/2016. The distinction in Bank Guarantee quantum for provisional release under Section 110A versus provisional assessment was examined in light of consistency and parity of treatment; while AEO concessions provide reduced BG where applicable, the benefit is not ordinarily extended to provisional release orders unless consistent with administrative practice. Given the admitted factual parity between the seized consignment and the subsequently cleared consignment, imposing a higher quantum for the seized goods resulted in inconsistent treatment absent distinguishing considerations.

Conclusion: The condition requiring a Bank Guarantee equal to 100% of the estimated differential duty and anticipated fines and penalties is modified. The seized goods shall be provisionally released upon furnishing a Bank Guarantee for 50% of the estimated differential duty, with all other conditions of provisional release remaining unchanged, which is favourable to the petitioner.

Outcome: The special leave petitions were dismissed as not pressed, with liberty to avail the remedy under the West Bengal Sales Tax (Settlement of Dispute) Act, 1999 as amended in 2025.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment initiated under sections 147/148 read with section 144B and preceded by notices under section 148A(b) and order under section 148A(d) was valid where the issues in the final assessment differed from those indicated in the reopening notices; (ii) Whether notice under section 148 was permissible in the absence of "information" as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148 (first proviso to section 148).

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings were vitiated by a change of allegations between the reopening notice / section 148A proceedings and the ultimate assessment.

Analysis: The reopening notice and the proceedings under section 148A(b)/(d) identified a particular basis for reopening. The subsequent assessment advanced materially different allegations and treated purchases as bogus without that issue being the foundation of the section 148A notice and enquiry. Such divergence constitutes a change of the factual/legal basis on which the case was reopened and results in a shift of the goalposts during assessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings are vitiated for change of goalpost and the assessment founded on that altered basis is unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether issuance of notice under section 148 was valid in the absence of "information" as per Explanation 1 to section 148.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires existence of "information" as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148 before issuance of a notice under section 148 (first proviso). The proceedings record did not establish such information forming the basis for the notice; consequently the jurisdictional precondition for reopening was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was issued without satisfying the requirement of "information" under Explanation 1 and therefore the reassessment is invalid, favouring the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both issues being decided against the Revenue, the appeal is allowed and the impugned assessment is quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment under section 147/148 is invalid if (a) the notice under section 148 is issued without "information" as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148, or (b) the assessing process changes the factual/legal basis after section 148A proceedings such that there is a material change of the issues (change of goalpost), and such defects vitiate the reassessment.

Issues: (i) Whether the matter should be remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication to permit the assessee to file a revised return and to consider grant of exemption of arrears of salary under Section 89/89A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The appeal concerns denial of opportunity to submit a revised return and to seek relief under Sections 89/89A in respect of retirement/arrears of salary. The record shows that no adjudication on the merits was made because the assessee was not afforded the opportunity to file a revised return or to be heard before the question of relief under Section 89A was decided. In view of the procedural deficiency, the appropriate course is to remit the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with principles of natural justice, allowing the assessee to file a revised return and to present submissions on eligibility for exemption under Section 89A.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and the matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with directions to afford the assessee an opportunity to file a revised return and to be heard on the claim under Sections 89/89A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice was bad for want of jurisdiction on account of centralization/transfer of the case. (ii) Whether interference with the High Court's order is justified.

Issue (i): Whether the notice was bad for want of jurisdiction because the case was centralized with Central Circle-II, Chandigarh.

Analysis: The transfer order dated 26.12.2016 records that the assessee gave no objection to centralization of the case with Central Circle-II, Chandigarh. On that factual foundation the challenge to the notice on jurisdictional grounds was examined and rejected.

Conclusion: Held against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court's order requires interference by this Court.

Analysis: Having regard to the finding on centralization and absence of a sustaining jurisdictional defect, no sufficient reason was found to disturb the High Court's decision; delay in filing was condoned.

Conclusion: Held in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is dismissed and the High Court's order is left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a transfer order records that the assessee consented to centralization of proceedings, an objection to notices on the ground of lack of jurisdiction arising from such centralization cannot be sustained.