Issues: (i) Whether approval of the resolution plan and subsequent modification/alteration effected on 01.04.2025 violated the time-limit under Section 12(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the approved resolution plan contravenes Section 30(2)(b) of the IBC and Section 53 by providing an inadequate payout to operational creditors (including employees) and failing to protect statutory dues.

Issue (i): Whether the approval of the resolution plan and the modification of the acquisition structure on 01.04.2025 violated the 180-day time-limit under Section 12(1) of the IBC.

Analysis: The CIRP commenced on 30.09.2024, making the 180-day period expire on 28.03.2025. The CoC approved the resolution plan in the 10th CoC meetings held on 19.02.2025 and 21.02.2025, a Letter of Intent was issued on 24.02.2025, accepted on 24.02.2025, and performance security was submitted on 27.02.2025. The approved resolution plan expressly reserved under Clause 3.7.1 the right of the SRA to alter the acquisition structure without changing amounts payable to stakeholders, subject to CoC approval. The revised acquisition structure approved by the CoC on 01.04.2025 did not alter amounts receivable by stakeholders and was within the contractual power retained under the approved plan; the RP had already filed the application for approval before expiry of 180 days.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that there was no violation of Section 12(1); the resolution plan was approved by the CoC within 180 days and the modification under Clause 3.7.1 did not contravene the statutory timeline.

Issue (ii): Whether the resolution plan violated Section 30(2)(b) of the IBC and Section 53 by providing only Rs. 1 crore to operational creditors including employees and by not protecting provident fund and gratuity dues.

Analysis: Section 30(2)(b) requires that operational creditors receive not less than what they would obtain under liquidation as per Section 53. The liquidation value of the corporate debtor was shown to be insufficient to satisfy financial creditors and left operational creditors effectively with nil liquidation recovery. The plan provided Rs. 1 crore to operational creditors (0.18% of admitted operational claims) which is not less than their liquidation entitlement in the factual matrix. The adjudicating authority expressly directed payment in full of Employees Provident Fund and gratuity dues (paragraph 12.12), excluding those statutory dues from the Rs. 1 crore outer limit.

Conclusion: The Court held that the resolution plan did not violate Section 30(2)(b) or Section 53; payment to operational creditors was not less than liquidation value and statutory PF and gratuity dues are to be paid in full as directed by the adjudicating authority.

Final Conclusion: The appeals do not disclose any valid ground to interfere with the adjudicating authority's approval of the resolution plan; the challenges on timeline and inadequate payment to operational creditors fail and the impugned order approving the resolution plan is upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors within the 180-day CIRP period and the approved plan expressly reserves a contractual right to modify acquisition structure without altering amounts payable to stakeholders, such post-approval modifications (with CoC approval) do not constitute a breach of Section 12(1); and under Section 30(2)(b) operational creditors must receive not less than their liquidation entitlement, so a plan providing amounts not less than liquidation value (with statutory dues protected) complies with the Code.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in allowing I.A. No. 2234/2024 and condoning the delay to admit the belated claim of Punjab Small Industries & Export Corporation Ltd., and directing its admission for consequential action in the ongoing CIRP.

Analysis: The Information Memorandum expressly recorded that PSIEC had claims regarding enhancement of land rates and that the Resolution Professional had requested PSIEC to submit claims by specified emails; despite this, no claim was filed within the prescribed period. The Adjudicating Authority examined the position of the leasehold title over the industrial plot, observed that the Corporate Debtor never had absolute ownership and that any defect in title would pass to the SRA, and noted that curing the defect (payment of statutory dues) is necessary to perfect title. Given that the Information Memorandum disclosed the potential claim and prospective resolution applicants were warned to make independent inquiries, the Adjudicating Authority exercised its discretion to condone delay and admit the belated claim, enabling the RP and SRA to submit any necessary addendum to the Resolution Plan for consideration.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority's order allowing the application, condoning the delay, and directing admission of the belated claim is upheld; the appeal is dismissed (in favour of Respondent).

Ratio Decidendi: Where an Information Memorandum discloses a creditor's claim and prospective resolution applicants are put on notice, the Adjudicating Authority may, in the exercise of its discretion, condone delay and admit a belated claim so that the RP and SRA can take consequential steps to address the claim in the resolution process, subject to the legal position that a SRA cannot obtain a better title than the Corporate Debtor possessed.

Issues: (i) Whether Mixed Xylene was classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 2902 44 00 or Chapter sub-heading 2707 30 00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Mixed Xylene was classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 2902 44 00 or Chapter sub-heading 2707 30 00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: The classification turned on whether Ethylbenzene could be treated as an isomer of Xylene for the purpose of applying the HSN note to Heading 2902. The HSN explanation to Heading 2902 states that Xylene comprises only o-xylene, m-xylene and p-xylene, and that Xylene must contain 95% or more by weight of xylene isomers, all isomers being taken together. The Tribunal applied the settled view that Ethylbenzene is a different organic compound and cannot be included among xylene isomers. On the admitted composition, the product did not satisfy the 95% threshold for Heading 2902.

Conclusion: Mixed Xylene was correctly classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 2707 30 00, not under Chapter sub-heading 2902 44 00.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had informed the Department about the product, filed returns declaring the classification adopted, and its records had been regularly audited. The Department was aware of the product composition and no case of suppression with intent to evade duty was made out. In these circumstances, invocation of the extended period was not justified. Since the dispute was one of classification on the facts available on record and the extended period failed, penalty was also unwarranted.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not sustainable and the penalty was not leviable.

Final Conclusion: The classification adopted by the Revenue was upheld, but the demand was confined to the normal period of limitation and the penalty was set aside, resulting in only partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For classification under Heading 2902, only the xylene isomers specified in the HSN can be counted toward the 95% purity threshold, and where the Department had prior knowledge of the declared classification and product composition, suppression with intent to evade duty cannot be inferred for invoking the extended period.

Issues: Whether the penalty of Rs.10,000/- imposed under section 272A(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for non-compliance with notice under section 142(1) should be deleted on the ground of reasonable cause under section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that the assessee, a farmer residing in a remote village, had engaged an advocate who provided an email address in the PAN application and purportedly received departmental communications. The assessee did not receive notices physically and did not monitor the advocate's email due to non-payment of fees and lack of access to internet facilities. The Tribunal noted that the quantum assessment was set aside by a Coordinate Bench and remanded for hearing, which corroborates that the assessee did not earlier receive opportunity to be heard. The Revenue admitted that no physical notice was served on the assessee during penalty proceedings until the Verification Unit physically served a final notice. Applying section 273B, the Tribunal treated the assessee's lack of knowledge and the failure of service/communication as constituting reasonable cause for non-compliance. The Tribunal therefore found the statutory preconditions for imposing the penalty as not satisfied in the factual matrix and exercised its power to relieve the assessee from penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs.10,000/- imposed under section 272A(1)(d) is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was correct in deleting the assessing officer's addition of Rs. 2,40,00,000 under section 40A(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for excess/ unreasonable remuneration to whole-time directors; (ii) Whether the findings of the CIT(A) on disallowances under section 37(1) relating to expenditure on spray dryer and computer software (including allowance of depreciation/additional depreciation under section 32) are liable to be set aside.

Issue (i): Whether deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 2,40,00,000 under section 40A(2)(b) was correct.

Analysis: The assessing officer relied on comparative internal remuneration, accumulated profits with no dividend distribution, and tax impact to treat part of managerial remuneration as a device to distribute profits and invoked section 40A(2)(b). The CIT(A) held the directors were full-time, experienced, and the remuneration was reasonable, deleting the addition. On appeal, the Tribunal examined the assessing officer's comparisons, retained profits, disparity with other senior employees, and the tax-effect analysis indicating potential tax avoidance, and found the assessing officer's conclusion that remuneration was excessive and a device for tax evasion was sustainable.

Conclusion: Issue (i) is decided in favour of the Revenue; the deletion by the CIT(A) is set aside and the disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) of Rs. 2,40,00,000 is restored.

Issue (ii): Whether the CIT(A)'s conclusions on disallowances under section 37(1) for spray dryer and computer software should be disturbed.

Analysis: For the spray dryer, the assessing officer treated the expense as capital in nature, noting absence of convincing evidence that the dryer was discarded annually; the CIT(A) examined records and directed allowance of depreciation aspects in appeal effect. For computer software, the CIT(A) applied the statutory treatment that software falls within the head of 'computer' allowing depreciation at the prescribed rate and directed appropriate adjustment. The assessee's cross-objections lacked documentary material to overturn the CIT(A)'s findings and directions regarding depreciation and additional depreciation under section 32 and related rules.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) is decided against the assessee; the cross-objections challenging the CIT(A)'s findings on the spray dryer and computer software are dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order is modified to restore the assessing officer's disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) and the assessee's cross-objections are dismissed, leaving the CIT(A)'s determinations on depreciation and related reliefs intact where directed for appeal effect.

Issues: Whether the activity of printing on Government of Karnataka watermarked paper used for issuance of RTC attracts duty under Chapter sub-heading 4820 40 00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or is classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 4901 99 00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: The dispute concerned printed RTC forms prepared on supplied watermarked paper bearing the Government of Karnataka logo. The governing approach was drawn from prior tribunal decisions and the Board's Circular No. 1052/1/2017-CX dated 23.02.2017, which clarifies classification of printed articles by reference to the nature of the printed product and the relevant chapter notes and interpretative rules. The Tribunal accepted that printing on such paper, used for issuance of RTC, falls within the line of authority treating similar printed forms as classifiable under Chapter 49 rather than Chapter 48. The reliance placed by the Revenue on the Karnataka High Court decision concerning pattadar pass book-cum-title deed was found factually distinguishable, because the present goods were not in book form and the printed RTC forms stood on a different footing for tariff classification.

Conclusion: The goods were held classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 4901 99 00 and chargeable to nil rate of duty; the demand under Chapter sub-heading 4820 40 00 was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the duty demand was set aside with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Printed forms prepared on supplied paper for issuance of RTC, where printing is the operative feature for the finished article, are classifiable under Chapter 49 and not under Chapter 48 when the applicable tariff guidance and interpretative rules so require.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant is eligible to avail Input Tax Credit (ITC) on food and beverage services under Section 17(5) when such supplies are part of event management and tourism services; (ii) Whether separate invoices from hotel vendors are required for claiming ITC on food and beverage services; (iii) Whether the applicant is eligible to claim ITC where the hotel invoices food and beverage to the applicant and the applicant recharges the client with a margin issuing its own invoice; (iv) Whether ITC is available on the entire value where conference hall and food charges are inseparable and invoiced as a single "conference package"; (v) Whether ITC is available on a consolidated hotel package (room, conference hall, food) invoiced without bifurcation.

Issue (i): Eligibility to avail ITC on food and beverage services under Section 17(5) in event management and tourism services.

Analysis: Event management services, as described, comprise naturally bundled supplies where event management is the principal supply and other components (room, hall, food) are ancillary. Section 2(30) defines composite supply; the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i) permits ITC where the inward supply of food and beverages is used as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply or for making an outward taxable supply of the same category. Application of these provisions depends on the characterisation of the outward supply as a taxable composite supply and compliance with conditions in Section 16(2).

Conclusion: ITC on food and beverage services is allowed where such supplies are used as an element of the applicant's taxable composite supply of event management (answer in the affirmative) in accordance with the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i).

Issue (ii): Requirement of separate invoices from hotel vendors for claiming ITC on food and beverage services.

Analysis: Section 16(2) requires possession of a valid tax invoice and other statutory conditions for claiming ITC but contains no mandate that components of a composite supply must be separately invoiced. Where the supplier issues a single invoice for a composite inward supply and tax is charged consistent with the principal supply, the recipient can meet the documentary requirements under Section 16(2).

Conclusion: Separate invoices for individual components are not mandatory; a single consolidated invoice complying with Section 16(2) suffices (answer: No separate invoice required).

Issue (iii): Eligibility to claim ITC when the hotel invoices food to the applicant and the applicant recharges the client with a margin issuing its own invoice.

Analysis: Where the applicant procures food from the hotel and re-supplies it to the client (either as a distinct taxable supply or as part of a composite event management supply), the inward supply is used in furtherance of business and qualifies under Section 16(2) and the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i). If the applicant treats the food as an element of the composite outward supply, the applicant's invoice to the client must reflect the tax rate applicable to the principal supply.

Conclusion: The applicant is eligible to claim ITC in such cases (answer in the affirmative), subject to compliance with Section 16(2) and correct taxation of the outward composite supply.

Issue (iv): Eligibility to avail ITC on the entire value where conference hall and food charges are inseparable and invoiced as a single "conference package".

Analysis: A bundled inward supply invoiced as a single composite package, where the package is an inward composite supply used in providing an outward taxable composite supply, will have its components lose individual identity. If the supplier charges tax consistent with the principal supply and statutory ITC conditions are met, the recipient's ITC claim on the entire invoiced value is governed by the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i).

Conclusion: ITC is admissible on the entire value of such a consolidated conference package when statutory conditions and applicable tax rate are satisfied (answer in the affirmative).

Issue (v): Eligibility to avail ITC on a consolidated hotel package (room accommodation, conference hall, food) invoiced without bifurcation.

Analysis: The availability of ITC on a consolidated package depends on supplier's tax treatment and applicable rate. If the hotel charges 18% (i.e., is functioning as a specified premises where ITC is available upstream) and the inward supply is used in making the applicant's taxable composite outward supply, the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i) permits ITC on the total invoice. Conversely, where the supplier applies a concessional rate (e.g., 5% without ITC applicable upstream), the flow of credit is blocked irrespective of the recipient's use.

Conclusion: ITC is admissible on the total consolidated invoice amount provided the hotel has charged the appropriate rate (18%) and other statutory conditions are met; if the hotel has applied a rate/notification that disallows upstream ITC (e.g., concessional 5%), the credit is blocked.

Final Conclusion: Subject to compliance with Section 16(2) documentation and the supplier's applicable tax treatment, the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i) permits the applicant to claim ITC on inward supplies of food and beverages when such supplies are elements of the applicant's taxable composite supply of event management; consolidated invoices are acceptable; re-invoicing with margin does not defeat ITC provided outward taxation aligns with the principal supply.

Ratio Decidendi: Where inward food and beverage supplies form part of a taxable composite supply and the recipient satisfies the documentary and statutory conditions of Section 16(2), the proviso to Section 17(5)(b)(i) authorises availing input tax credit on such supplies, subject to the supplier having charged the tax rate that permits upstream credit transfer.

Outcome: The special leave petition was disposed of on the same terms as the earlier order.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in treating amounts shown as finished goods/advances as sales for the assessment year 2018-19 and making an addition of Rs.2,13,49,415.

Analysis: The assessee consistently followed the project completion method of accounting under which revenue is recognized on execution of sale deed and delivery of possession; costs of construction were capitalized as inventory/work-in-progress until such recognition. The assessee subsequently disclosed sales and paid tax in later assessment years in respect of the same stock; financial statements and year-wise sales data show turnover arising in subsequent years. Jurisprudence establishes that recognized accounting methods such as project completion method are permissible and that where amounts are taxed in subsequent years with no loss to revenue, making an addition earlier may result in double taxation. The assessing officer's treatment of the entire closing stock as sales ignored the accounting method regularly employed and the fact of subsequent taxation on those sales.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.2,13,49,415 treating finished goods/advances as sales is deleted; all grounds of appeal are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Civil Appeal Diary No. 59982/2024 is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed for delay; (ii) Whether Civil Appeal Diary No. 15943/2024 filed in the name of Jaiprakash Associates Limited while CIRP is pending without amendment of cause title can be entertained; (iii) Whether pending appeals/applications concerning acceptance of refund by home buyers and related intervention applications should be adjudicated given the offer by the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) to refund amounts and the timelines fixed by the Court.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal filed with a delay of 242 days is condonable under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and thus maintainable.

Analysis: Section 62 prescribes a maximum condonable delay of 15 days beyond the stipulated limitation period of 45 days for filing appeals under the Code. The appeal in question was filed 242 days late, exceeding the statutory maximum condonable period. The Court applied the statutory limitation framework to the facts of the filing delay.

Conclusion: The appeal is time-barred and dismissed for delay.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal filed in the name of Jaiprakash Associates Limited represented by its erstwhile management can be entertained after CIRP has been initiated against that company without amendment to bring the Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional on record.

Analysis: The appellant remained represented by the erstwhile management while CIRP had been initiated against the company; no steps were taken to amend the cause title to reflect the Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional. The procedural requirement to have the appropriate corporate representative on record was applied to determine maintainability.

Conclusion: The appeal filed in the name of the erstwhile management is not maintainable and is dismissed.

Issue (iii): Whether pending appeals and miscellaneous/intervention applications by home buyers should be adjudicated when the SRA has offered refunds within Court-fixed timelines and has published notices setting cut-off dates.

Analysis: The SRA made a recorded offer to permit home buyers who complied with the Court-fixed timelines to choose refund or allotment in specified earlier proceedings, and later agreed to refund amounts to certain late claimants within an extended cut-off. The Court considered the published notices, the timeline extensions, and that many applications were filed after earlier disposal; applications by third parties in disposed matters were treated as not maintainable. The Court also specified that claimants who submitted belated claims within the extended cut-off would be entitled only to refunds and not to late allotment claims.

Conclusion: Appeals and applications are dismissed as disposed of or not maintainable, subject to the SRA's recorded offer to refund amounts to eligible home buyers who submitted claims within the Court-fixed cut-off; such eligible claimants are entitled only to refunds and not to allotment.

Final Conclusion: The Court dismissed the specified appeals and applications on the stated procedural and limitation grounds while recording and enforcing the SRA's offer to refund amounts to qualifying home buyers within the timelines fixed by the Court; the substantive approval of the resolution plan stands affirmed by the dismissal of these challenges.

Ratio Decidendi: Appeals under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed beyond the statutory maximum condonable period provided in Section 62 are time-barred and liable to be dismissed; appeals filed in the name of a corporate debtor during CIRP must be prosecuted by the Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional to be maintainable.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order and demand notice passed by the Assessing Officer without considering objections filed by the assessee before the Dispute Resolution Panel (and without the AO receiving a copy of those objections) is liable to be quashed for breach of the assessee's right to be heard under Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Court examined the faceless assessment scheme under Section 144C, the procedural requirement in Section 144C(2)(b) that the assessee must forward a copy of objections to the Assessing Officer, and the operation of Section 144C(4) enabling the AO to proceed where no objection is received by him. The Court recognised that under the faceless regime the AO may reasonably infer non-filing if he does not receive a copy of objections, but also noted that the statutory scheme envisages automatic deferral and consideration by the DRP when objections are filed. The Court observed that in the present case the objections were factually filed before the DRP but were not sent to the AO, resulting in the AO passing the final order and demand without hearing the assessee or awaiting DRP's view, thereby producing an adverse consequence to the assessee.

Conclusion: The impugned final assessment order and the demand notice dated 18.12.2025 are quashed and set aside; relief is granted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)/NFAC) could dismiss grounds as "not adjudicated" and remit the issue without deciding merits in contravention of section 251(1) and section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 418,66,34,625 made under section 56(2)(viib) is sustainable where shares were allotted to non-resident subscribers and where the Assessing Officer subsequently rectified the assessment under section 154.

Issue (i): Whether the CIT(A)'s order dismissing grounds as "not adjudicated" for want of facts and thereby failing to decide the appeal on merits was permissible under sections 250(6) and 251(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the scope of powers of the first appellate authority under section 251(1)(a) and the duty of the FAA to decide appeals on merits (confirm, reduce, enhance or annul). The Accountant Member held that the FAA cannot merely record that an issue "cannot be adjudicated" and must either decide the issue on merits or exercise the powers under section 251(1)(a) to pass an appropriate order; accordingly the FAA's dismissal as "not adjudicated" was set aside for fresh adjudication. The Judicial Member and Third Member concurred that an appellate authority must respect final orders (e.g., rectification) but agreed that the FAA cannot mechanically dismiss on mere lack of facts without proper application of section 251(1)(a) and section 250(6).

Conclusion: The Tribunal holds in favour of the Assessee on this issue to the extent that the FAA cannot dismiss substantive grounds as "not adjudicated"; the Accountant Member set aside the CIT(A) order on that procedural defect and directed fresh adjudication, while the majority outcome treated the matter consistent with the merged rectification (see Issue (ii)).

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 418,66,34,625 under section 56(2)(viib) survives where (a) the shares were allotted to non-resident subscribers supported by TRCs and FIRCs, and (b) the Assessing Officer passed a rectification order under section 154 deleting the addition.

Analysis: The Third Member (majority) analysed: (a) evidence on record showing initial allotment to non-resident entities supported by Foreign Inward Remittance Certificates and Tax Residency Certificates; (b) the PCIT's view in section 263 show-cause that section 56(2)(viib) applies to receipts from residents; (c) the Assessing Officer's rectification order under section 154 deleting the addition which merged with the assessment; and (d) legal precedents on effect of rectification and on treatment of TRCs and POEM. The Judicial Member dissented, finding material and factual issues (alleged round-tripping, need to examine POEM and share movement) warranting remand for verification. The Third Member concluded that where the AO has validly rectified the assessment deleting the addition and the rectification has attained finality, the appellate authority could not ignore the rectification and restore the addition; on merits, the majority also concluded section 56(2)(viib) did not apply because the subscribers were non-residents as evidenced on record.

Conclusion: The Tribunal (majority) answers in favour of the Assessee and deletes the addition of Rs. 418,66,34,625 under section 56(2)(viib); the CIT(A)'s confirmation is reversed. The dissenting member disagreed on the same issue and favoured remand for further enquiry.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed; the Tribunal, by majority, directs deletion of the section 56(2)(viib) addition of Rs. 418,66,34,625 and otherwise disposes the other grounds as recorded (some grounds set aside for fresh adjudication by the Accountant Member and some dismissed), resulting in a partly allowed appeal overall.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessing officer validly rectifies an assessment under section 154 deleting an addition and that rectification attains finality and is supported by documentary evidence establishing non-resident status (e.g., TRCs, FIRCs), the rectification merges with the assessment and the appellate authority cannot ignore the rectification to restore the deleted addition; section 56(2)(viib) applies to receipts from residents and does not apply to share subscriptions by non-residents shown to be non-resident on record.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2025 passed by the NCLT, which limited oral arguments and directed filing of short written notes, denied the appellants a fair hearing and amounted to a violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference by the Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The Appellate Tribunal examined the impugned order, the course of events on 28.11.2025 and earlier proceedings including hearings on 31.10.2025; considered the extent of oral hearing actually afforded to the appellant; and applied the governing principle that procedural rules are subject to the requirement of natural justice but do not guarantee unlimited oral advocacy. The Tribunal relied on authority establishing that the right to be heard requires a fair and reasonable opportunity which may be satisfied by limited oral argument supplemented by written submissions where oral presentation is not essential. It noted the NCLT's power to regulate its procedure, the fact that the appellant had been heard orally for about an hour, and that the NCLT had directed filing of short notes to be considered before reserving orders.

Conclusion: The Appellate Tribunal concluded that there was no denial of a fair hearing or breach of natural justice in the impugned order and that interference was not warranted. The appeal is therefore disposed of without upsetting the impugned order; pending applications referred to were directed to be considered by the NCLT and specific listed pending applications were disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal may, consistent with natural justice, regulate oral advocacy including limiting oral argument and directing written notes where a reasonable and fair opportunity to be heard has been given; such procedural regulation does not amount to denial of hearing if parties receive a fair opportunity and the tribunal applies an instructed, impartial mind to the submissions.

Issues: Whether the High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution, condone delay beyond the maximum period permitted by the statute (aggregate period of 120 days under Section 107 and its proviso) and entertain a writ challenging rejection of statutory appeal for delay.

Analysis: Legal framework: Section 107 provides the statutory right of appeal against a demand/order and Section 107(4) permits the appellate authority to allow an additional period (one month) only upon satisfaction of "sufficient cause", thereby fixing a maximum condonable period. Provisions of the Limitation Act (Section 5 and Section 29) and the doctrine of special legislation require that when a statute prescribes a maximum limitation period for condonation, courts must give effect to the legislative intent. Precedents of the Supreme Court hold that High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot routinely disregard or extend a statutory maximum limitation period so as to render the legislative prescription otiose. Where an alternative efficacious remedy by way of statutory appeal exists and the appeal is filed beyond the maximum condonable period, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition as a matter of course. Factual application: the appeal was filed beyond the aggregate condonable period and the explanation offered did not constitute a justification sufficient to override the statutory bar.

Conclusion: The High Court cannot condone delay beyond the statutory maximum period and therefore cannot entertain the writ; decision is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the ex-parte order rejecting the refund application should be quashed for failure to grant adjournment and opportunity of hearing as mandated by Section 75(5) of the CGST Act and Rule 92(3) of the GST Rules.

Analysis: The petition challenges an ex-parte rejection of a refund application where the applicant sought adjournment within the statutory timeline under Section 75(5) and Rule 92(3). The statutory provision mandates that the proper officer shall grant time and adjourn the hearing where sufficient cause is shown, subject to a limitation of not more than three adjournments. The factual timeline is undisputed: the request for adjournment was made within the stipulated period and no determination was shown that the statutorily permitted adjournments had been exhausted. The authority passed the impugned order on the same date the adjournment request was made without recording reasons or granting the hearing opportunity required by Section 75(5).

Conclusion: The impugned ex-parte order is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the authority to decide the refund application afresh in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing, to be completed within twelve weeks from receipt of the order.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority erred in directing the adjudicating authority to verify the admissibility of the petitioners refund claim with reference to period of limitation and remanding the matter instead of directing disposal, and whether the petitioner is entitled to quashing of the impugned appellate order and direction to the respondents to process the refund claim of IGST paid on ocean freight under Entry 10 of the Notification No.10/2017-IGST.

Analysis: The Court examined the legal framework governing refund of IGST paid on ocean freight under Entry 10 of Notification No.10/2017-IGST and the statutory procedure for refund under Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017. The Court considered precedents addressing refund claims made pursuant to declarations of invalidity of notifications (including Mohit Minerals and subsequent Gujarat High Court decisions) and principles governing limitation where payment is made under a mistake of law, including application of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellate orders paragraph directing verification of limitation and remanding for further adjudication was compared with earlier decisions which require that once the notification has been declared ultra vires, authorities should process refund claims without raising technical or limitation objections, and where administrative orders inconsistent with those principles should be quashed. The Court also noted the absence of a genuine hearing opportunity to the petitioner as alleged, and found the appellate authoritys observation on limitation to be unnecessary and contrary to settled precedents requiring processing of such refund claims.

Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed; the appellate order dated 30.10.2023 is quashed and set aside to the extent it directed verification of limitation and remand. The respondents are directed to process the petitioners refund claim in Form RFD-01 through the online portal for the relevant period and to grant consequential interest at 6% per annum.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority erred in rejecting the appeal as time-barred without considering the petitioners explanation for a 13-day delay beyond the statutory 90-day period and whether the impugned original order, summary order and appellate order should be quashed and remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The petition challenges orders raising tax demand on account of alleged non-reversal of input tax credit corresponding to post-supply discounts. The appellate authority rejected the petitioners appeal on ground of delay though the appeal was filed within 30 days beyond the 90-day period and Section 107(4) of the CGST Act confers discretion to condone delay for sufficient cause. The petitioners explanationnon-receipt of the original order due to closure/sale of premises and subsequent receipt of the orderwas uncontroverted on record. The Court observed that the appellate authority was required to apply its mind to the reasons furnished for the belated filing and that manual filing alone was not a valid ground to reject the appeal without consideration on merits. The appellate authority therefore failed to exercise the statutory discretion under Section 107(4) and did not consider whether the facts constituted "sufficient cause" to condone the delay.

Conclusion: The impugned Order-in-Original dated 09.01.2024, the summary order in Form DRC-07 dated 15.04.2024 and the appellate order dated 12.03.2025 are quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for fresh consideration; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the application for condonation of delay of 558 days in filing the Special Leave Petition should be allowed; (ii) Whether the Special Leave Petition should be entertained despite the delay.

Issue (i): Whether the application for condonation of delay of 558 days should be allowed.

Analysis: The petition record shows a delay of 558 days in filing the petition and the application for condonation of delay was examined. The Court found that the explanation furnished did not adequately justify condonation of such a large delay and therefore the requisite satisfaction for condonation under the governing principles was not reached.

Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Whether the Special Leave Petition should be entertained notwithstanding the dismissed condonation application.

Analysis: Given the dismissal of the condonation application for inordinate delay and inadequate justification, the petition cannot be admitted for consideration on merits. The Court consequently considered the appropriate consequential order, including imposition of costs for filing the petition after such delay.

Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is dismissed and costs of 7,50,000 are imposed on the petitioner to be deposited within four weeks.

Final Conclusion: The petition is dismissed for want of condonation of delay and is finally disposed of; pending applications stand disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: An inordinate delay in filing a petition without an adequate explanation does not satisfy the test for condonation of delay and warrants dismissal of the petition, with consequential costs where appropriate.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was correct in rejecting the Section 9 application on the ground of a pre-existing dispute raised by the corporate debtor in reply to the demand notice.

Analysis: The Appellate Tribunal examined the reply to the demand notice issued by the corporate debtor and the letter dated 16.08.2024 referenced therein. The letter, signed by a director of the operational creditor, acknowledged that most invoices had been settled and quantified a remaining outstanding amount. The Tribunal treated the corporate debtor's reply as a valid notice of dispute within the meaning of Sections 8 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Tribunal observed that where such a notice of dispute exists, Section 9(5)(ii)(d) requires the Adjudicating Authority to reject the Section 9 application. The Tribunal found that the reply was supported by material (the director's letter) and was not a frivolous or sham defence; therefore the Adjudicating Authority's conclusion of a pre-existing dispute was sustainabl e.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the Section 9 application on the ground of a pre-existing dispute is upheld; decision is in favour of the Respondent.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 11.03.2024 granting prayers (a), (b) and (c) of I.A. No. 1576 of 2022 is illegal or unsustainable, or is a permissible consequential order implementing earlier final orders approving the resolution plan and setting aside the lease deed.

Analysis: The Tribunal examines the impugned order in the context of earlier orders dated 04.07.2022: (i) approval of the resolution plan under the Code which included certain third-party lands as assets of the corporate debtor and imposed obligations on personal guarantors pursuant to Section 31, and (ii) an avoidance order under Sections 43, 45, 49 and 66 setting aside the lease deed and vesting the land in the corporate debtor. The Appellate Tribunal had previously dismissed appeals against those orders (CA (AT) (Ins) Nos. 1267 of 2022 and 985 of 2022), and those appellate dismissals were not challenged before the Supreme Court, rendering the earlier orders final and binding. The impugned order merely issues consequential directions to effect registration and payment directions consistent with the approved resolution plan and the avoidance order. The Tribunal therefore treats the I.A. No. 1576/2022 reliefs as implementation of the final orders and not as fresh or independent adjudication of title or jurisdictional matters already finally decided.

Conclusion: The appeal is devoid of merit. The impugned order dated 11.03.2024 is not illegal; it is a consequential implementation of the earlier final orders approving the resolution plan and setting aside the lease deed. The appeal is dismissed.