Issues: Whether provisional attachment of cash and gold already seized and attached by the Income Tax Department was valid under Section 24(3) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Analysis: Section 24(3) permits provisional attachment only where the Initiating Officer forms an opinion that the person in possession of benami property may alienate it during the notice period. The cash and gold were already in the custody and under attachment of the Income Tax Department, and no factual basis established a risk that the appellants could alienate them. A possible future tax adjustment or release by the Income Tax Department did not itself establish the statutory apprehension of alienation; fresh action could be taken if circumstances satisfying the provision arose upon release.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment order and its confirmation were unsustainable for failure to satisfy the statutory condition of apprehended alienation.

Issues: Whether the difference between the assessee's personal capital balance and capital balance in a partnership firm could be assessed as unexplained credit under Section 68.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had disclosed substantial proprietor's capital in returns for assessment years preceding the relevant year, and the opening capital for the relevant year was not nil. The difference resulted from an incorrect comparison of the assessee's total personal capital with his capital account in the partnership firm. The actual increase during the relevant year was supported by disclosed share of partnership profit, remuneration and other recorded receipts. Revenue produced no material to dislodge the continuity of capital reflected in earlier returns.

Conclusion: The addition of INR 10,63,03,637 as unexplained credit under Section 68 was not sustainable and was rightly deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a co-operative bank was required to deduct tax at source on interest exceeding the prescribed threshold paid on time deposits to co-operative housing societies; (ii) Whether relief from being treated as an assessee in default was available where the recipient trust had included the interest income in its return.

Issue (i): Whether a co-operative bank was required to deduct tax at source on interest exceeding the prescribed threshold paid on time deposits to co-operative housing societies.

Analysis: Section 194A(3)(i)(b) confines the exemption available to a co-operative society engaged in banking to interest not exceeding the prescribed threshold, while section 194A(3)(viia)(b) excludes time deposits with such banking co-operative societies from the stated exemption. The second limb of section 194A(3)(v), concerning payments by one co-operative society to another, was treated as a general provision. The specific provisions applicable to a co-operative society carrying on banking business prevail over that general provision. The explanatory circular could not override the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The co-operative bank was liable to deduct tax at source on the impugned interest payments and was rightly treated as an assessee in default. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether relief from being treated as an assessee in default was available where the recipient trust had included the interest income in its return.

Analysis: The proviso to section 201(1) applies where the payee has furnished its return, accounted for the relevant sum in computing income, and fulfilled the other prescribed conditions. Verification of those conditions was required.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and grant of relief if the statutory conditions are fulfilled. This issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The TDS liability on interest paid to co-operative housing societies remains sustained, while the limited claim concerning recipient-return compliance requires fresh verification.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a banking co-operative society is governed by specific TDS provisions, a general exemption for inter-co-operative-society interest payments cannot displace those specific provisions.

Issues: Whether revision of the assessment under section 23 was valid on the ground that the assessment accepting the declared foreign trust interest had been made without necessary inquiry or verification.

Analysis: The revisionary power under section 23 of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 is materially parallel to section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Its exercise requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; an order is deemed so erroneous where required inquiries or verification were not made.

Analysis: The assessment record showed repeated inquiries concerning the discretionary trust, the trustee minutes, alleged income and capital distributions, foreign assets, and bank accounts. The assessee had furnished explanations and had declared and paid tax and penalty on the determined share of the trust assets under section 59. The material subsequently relied upon for revision, including the trustee minutes, had already formed part of, and been addressed during, the original assessment. The revisionary authority did not identify any falsity or specific defect in the inquiries undertaken. Reconsidering an issue already examined, merely because another view was possible or inquiry was alleged to be inadequate, does not justify revision.

Analysis: The declared trust assets were valued under the prescribed rules, and the applicable clarification provided that an asset declared under the compliance scheme and subjected to tax and penalty would not again be chargeable upon distribution to beneficiaries. The alleged undisclosed foreign accounts and properties did not establish an unexamined or undisclosed asset attributable to the assessee; the assessee's disclosed foreign accounts were already reported in Schedule FA, while the trustee minutes lacked particulars establishing actual receipt of the alleged distributions.

Conclusion: The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; consequently, the revision order under section 23 was invalid.

Issues: Whether re-rubberisation of old and used printing rollers is classifiable as Business Auxiliary Service or as Management, Maintenance or Repair Service.

Analysis: The activity involved removal of worn-out rubber, application of fresh rubber compound, vulcanisation and grinding of the rollers. It constituted processing of goods received from clients and was consequently covered by Business Auxiliary Service. Although reconditioning could also fall within Management, Maintenance or Repair Service, the activity was prima facie classifiable under both categories. Applying the classification rule for competing taxable-service entries, neither service was more specific nor did either furnish an essential character distinct from the other; classification therefore followed the entry occurring first, namely Business Auxiliary Service under section 65(105)(zzb), before Management, Maintenance or Repair Service under section 65(105)(zzr).

Conclusion: Re-rubberisation of the printing rollers is classifiable as Business Auxiliary Service and not as Management, Maintenance or Repair Service; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned GST assessment order confirming the demand could be sustained when it disclosed no clear discussion on the assessee's reply and required interference. (ii) Whether the procedure followed by the assessing authority in calling for a personal hearing and reply required corrective directions.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned GST assessment order confirming the demand could be sustained when it disclosed no clear discussion on the assessee's reply and required interference.

Analysis: The assessment order was found to contain no clear discussion showing application of mind to the reply submitted by the assessee. In the absence of a proper consideration of the reply and the supporting materials, the confirmation of demand could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order was liable to be set aside and the matter was required to be reconsidered afresh.

Issue (ii): Whether the procedure followed by the assessing authority in calling for a personal hearing and reply required corrective directions.

Analysis: The sequence adopted by the authority in first fixing personal hearing and thereafter calling upon the assessee to file a reply was held to be procedurally improper and needing correction. The Court also directed that due notice be granted before any fresh order is passed and that proper guidelines be framed and circulated to ensure observance of due process.

Conclusion: Corrective directions were issued to the Department, and fresh adjudication was ordered after due notice.

Final Conclusion: The assessment order was quashed, the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law, and procedural safeguards were directed to be followed in future GST adjudications.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order confirming tax demand cannot be sustained when it fails to show meaningful consideration of the assessee's reply and the adjudicatory procedure departs from due process.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction of gratuity actually paid during the year under section 43B, and whether the disallowance was sustainable for want of evidence.

Analysis: The assessee produced audited financial statements, notes to accounts, computation of income, ledger accounts, and salary vouchers to show that a gratuity provision was created on actuarial basis and that gratuity of Rs. 11,84,163 was actually paid to two employees during the year. These materials showed that the amount claimed was not a mere provision but an actual payment covered by section 43B. The finding of the first appellate authority that no evidence had been furnished was held to be incorrect on the record.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 43B was deleted and the claim for deduction of gratuity actually paid was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cash discount availed by the manufacturer from its vendors for prompt payment could be treated as consideration for a taxable service under Banking and Other Financial Services and made liable to service tax.

Analysis: The discount arose from an agreed trade practice under the supply arrangement and was only a reduction from the invoice value for early payment. No independent taxable service was rendered by the appellant to the vendors, and the essential relationship of service provider and service recipient was absent. The Tribunal also noted that the goods were already subjected to central excise duty and the same transaction could not be re-characterised as provision of a service so as to fasten service tax liability. The view was consistent with the principle that a trade discount or incentive linked to sale terms does not, by itself, constitute consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The cash discount was not taxable as Banking and Other Financial Services, and the service tax demand sustained in the impugned order was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the demand confirmed against the appellant was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A prompt-payment cash discount given under a trade arrangement, without any independent service and without a service provider-service recipient relationship, cannot be treated as consideration for a taxable service.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal against the assessment order, with the appellate authority directed to consider the matter if the appeal is filed within the stipulated time and after due notice to the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the services rendered as General Sales Agent were export of services for the period after the Export of Services Rules, 2005 came into force; (ii) whether receipt of overriding commission in Indian rupees satisfied the condition for exemption under the circular and notification governing export of services; (iii) whether the extended period of limitation under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked.

Issue (i): Whether the services rendered as General Sales Agent were export of services for the period after the Export of Services Rules, 2005 came into force.

Analysis: The governing rule treated taxable services as export where the recipient was outside India and, in the case of business-related services, the services were delivered and used outside India and payment was received in convertible foreign exchange. For the post-2005 period, the conditions were found to be satisfied in relation to one appellant, since the services were delivered outside India, used in business outside India, and the consideration was received in foreign exchange.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee for the post-2005 period.

Issue (ii): Whether receipt of overriding commission in Indian rupees satisfied the condition for exemption under the circular and notification governing export of services.

Analysis: The circular and notification granted exemption only where payment for the taxable service was received in India in convertible foreign exchange. The condition was held to be mandatory and to call for strict compliance. The assessee received the commission through credit notes in Indian currency, which did not meet the stipulated precondition. The reliance placed on earlier income-tax and other decisions was distinguished on facts because those cases involved foreign-exchange remittances or retention from foreign-currency receipts, unlike the present mode of payment.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked.

Analysis: The record showed repeated correspondence, legal opinions, and awareness that service tax liability could arise on the overriding commission. Despite that knowledge, the assessees continued the same billing and receipt mechanism and did not disclose the position in a manner that would negate suppression. The surrounding circumstances were held sufficient to attract the proviso to section 73(1).

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The common judgment granted relief only to the extent of recognising export treatment for the post-2005 period in one appeal, while upholding taxability on the INR receipts and sustaining the invocation of extended limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim to export-of-service exemption must satisfy every statutory condition strictly, and where the recipient has an office in India, the service is treated as export only if the delivery, use, and receipt conditions are all fulfilled; conscious continuation of a contrary payment structure after legal advice can justify invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: Whether rejection of an application in Form No. 10AB under section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, solely on the ground of delay is sustainable where the delay is satisfactorily explained as bona fide arising from transition-regime confusion, and whether the delay should be condoned and the application restored for merits consideration.

Analysis: The application for regular approval under section 80G(5) was rejected exclusively on limitation grounds based on clause (iii) of the first proviso to section 80G(5). Contemporaneous material on record includes notarised affidavits explaining the existence of two separate Form No.10AC orders with differing terminal years, prompt filing of Form No.10AB upon discovery, and parallel grant of regular registration under section 12AB(1)(b) accepting the charitable nature of activities. Administrative acknowledgement of transition-related confusion appears in Circular No. 7/2024. Coordinate Tribunal authority has addressed similar procedural rejections under the new regime and held that where delay is satisfactorily explained and substantive eligibility is not controverted, outright rejection on technical limitation alone is legally unsustainable. The combination of a plausible documentary explanation, absence of mala fide conduct, and acceptance of charitable status in concurrent proceedings weighs in favour of permitting adjudication on merits rather than imposing irreversible consequences for a procedural lapse.

Conclusion: The rejection of the application in Form No. 10AB solely on the ground of delay is not sustainable; the delay is condoned as bona fide and unintentional, and the matter is to be restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) for examination of the application on merits in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in filing an application for statutory approval is satisfactorily explained as bona fide arising from genuine transition-regime confusion, and the institution's substantive eligibility is not negatived (including acceptance in parallel proceedings), a mechanical rejection on limitation alone is legally unsustainable and the application must be considered on merits after condoning the delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee's claim for deduction under section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made for reinvestment of capital gains arising from sale of a depreciable asset though not claimed in the original return, could be entertained at the appellate stage and, if so, whether the matter should be remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification of statutory conditions.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the legal position distinguishing the limited restriction on the Assessing Officer from the broader powers of appellate authorities to entertain points of law and fresh claims; it relied on the principle that the limitation on AO's power to admit claims by way of revised return does not curtail the appellate forum's jurisdiction to consider a claim in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted relevant precedents recognising availability of exemptions under sections 54E/54F in respect of capital gains on depreciable assets but observed that factual and statutory conditions under section 54F (nature and character of assets, timing and quantum of investment, and compliance with statutory conditions) had not been verified by the authorities below. In the interest of substantial justice and having regard to the appellate jurisdiction, the Tribunal directed a de novo examination by the Assessing Officer after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Conclusion: The omission to claim deduction under section 54F in the original return does not, by itself, preclude appellate consideration; the issue is remitted to the Assessing Officer for de novo verification of statutory conditions and a speaking order after hearing the assessee. This result is partly in favour of the assessee and the grounds are allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues: Whether rejection of the appellant's application for registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that income was applied outside India (contrary to Section 11(1)(c)) was justified where the assessee paid an educational grant in Indian currency to an Indian student who subsequently used those funds for study abroad.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the factual finding that the assessee disbursed the grant in India in Indian currency to an Indian student and noted absence of evidence that payment was made directly to a foreign university. The Tribunal considered legal principle from coordinate-bench authority holding that where money is applied for a charitable purpose in India, subsequent execution of the charitable purpose abroad does not automatically constitute application of funds outside India for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). The Tribunal also considered that no opportunity to explain was given before rejection and remitted the matter to the assessing authority to decide the registration claim in light of the cited ratio.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the rejection of registration under Section 12AB on the sole ground that the student utilised the grant for studies abroad was not justified where the assessee applied the funds in India by paying the Indian student in Indian currency; the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) for reconsideration in light of the relevant precedent.

Issues: Whether mentioning "charitable purpose" in Form No.10 without further specification is sufficient compliance with Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to claim accumulation of income for the purpose of maintenance and development of an eco friendly crematorium.

Analysis: Section 11(2) permits accumulation of income for a specific purpose; courts require the purpose to be concrete and identifiable to enable monitoring and application of funds. However, where the declaration in Form No.10, though general, is supported by the trust's objects and the assessee furnishes relevant information and documentary evidence (including objects clause, governing body resolution and details of utilization) during assessment proceedings such that the Assessing Officer is aware of the real purpose and the information is not false, the technical omission of precise wording in Form No.10 does not defeat the claim. The facts show the assessee's objects expressly include promotion of an eco friendly crematorium, the assessee provided supporting documents and details to the Assessing Officer, and there was a bonafide inadvertent omission in Form No.10; therefore the claim falls within the principle that a vague description is not fatal when the true specific purpose is ascertainable from records and falls within the trust's objects.

Conclusion: The accumulation claimed under Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable; the Assessing Officer's and the CIT(A)'s disallowance is set aside and the grounds of appeal are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the interest expenditure of Rs. 8,61,629/- paid on a cash credit account is allowable against the gross bank fixed deposit interest income for Assessment Year 2010-11.

Analysis: Relevant facts include that the assessee previously carried on a chemicals business as a sole proprietorship which ceased operations in financial year 2008-09, the assessee had cash credit facilities with a bank, audited financial statements were filed up to A.Y. 2009-10, and interest on the cash credit account was paid during the year to discharge outstanding creditors relating to the erstwhile business. The assessee declared bank fixed deposit interest as income and claimed the cash credit interest as expenditure in the computation. Documentary linkage between the cash credit account and the erstwhile business was acknowledged by the tax officer, including bank enquiry u/s. 133(6) of the Act. On these facts, the interest expenditure arises out of business-related liabilities and is connected to income from bank deposits which were part of the financial transactions of the erstwhile business. The disallowance confirmed by the lower authority did not outweigh the established nexus and documentary record showing the business origin of the liabilities and payment of interest.

Conclusion: The interest expenditure of Rs. 8,61,629/- is allowable against the gross bank fixed deposit interest income; the disallowance by the assessing and appellate authorities is set aside and the claim is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the demand for service tax for the financial year 2014-15 could be sustained by invoking the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 (extended period of limitation) when the appellant had a bona fide belief that the service tax liability was on the service recipient under Notification No.30/2012-ST and where there was no finding of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: The impugned orders relied on Income Tax data and absence/incompleteness of ST-3 returns to invoke the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 and demand tax, interest and penalties. The material shows the appellant was registered and provided services characterized as rent-a-cab; Notification No.30/2012-ST placed liability on the service recipient for such services, giving rise to a plausible and reasonable belief that the recipient bore the tax liability. The record does not contain specific averments in the show-cause notice alleging fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, nor is there documentary evidence establishing transfer of possession and control of vehicles or positive acts of concealment by the appellant. Established precedents require positive evidence of mala fide conduct to invoke the extended limitation period; mere non-payment or filing deficiencies do not suffice. Given the absence of specific allegations and proof of intent to evade, invocation of the extended period was legally impermissible and the resultant demand is time-barred.

Conclusion: The invocation of the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 to extend the period of limitation is not sustainable; the appellant's appeal is allowed and the demand made under the extended period is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for service tax, interest and penalties raised by invoking the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 (read with other provisions), is sustainable or is time-barred.

Analysis: Issue (i): Legal framework includes the ordinary limitation for service tax demands and the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 which permits invocation of an extended limitation period only where non-payment or short-payment arises from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade tax; Section 75, Section 77(1)(c) and Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 provide for interest and penalties; Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is pari materia and judicial authorities require a positive, deliberate act to attract the proviso; Section 6 of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 concerns temporal extension. Applying these principles to the facts: the department relied on information from the Income Tax Department and the absence of documentary explanation by the assessee; however, invoking the proviso requires positive evidence of deliberate suppression or intent to evade, not merely nonpayment or receipt of third-party data; authorities cited establish that mere failure to disclose or negligence does not automatically attract the extended period and that the initial burden is on the department to produce material showing suppression, with the burden shifting only after such material is produced.

Conclusion: Issue (i): The invocation of the extended period of limitation is not sustainable because the requisite positive evidence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade payment is absent; accordingly, the demand for service tax, interest and penalties raised under the extended period is time-barred and is set aside.

Issues: Whether the notice dated 28 March 2021 under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (and the order dated 9 February 2022 disposing of objections) was validly issued/assumed where reopening was predicated on absence of a certificate under the third proviso to Section 24(b), more than four years after the assessment; and whether Explanation 1 to Section 147 or an audit objection supplied the requisite post-assessment tangible material or established a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

Analysis: Applicable legal framework includes the requirements for reopening under Section 147 (and the proviso applicable where original assessment under Section 143(3) was completed more than four years earlier), the need for a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, the proviso that such escapement must result from failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the test that the belief must have a rational nexus to the material relied upon (not a mere change of opinion), the role of Explanation 1 to Section 147 regarding discovery of primary facts with due diligence, and the requirement of tangible material coming into the Assessing Officer's possession after completion of the original assessment. The recorded reasons relied solely on the absence of a certificate under the third proviso to Section 24(b) despite undisputed primary facts showing the property was let out and the annual value was not taken to be nil under Section 23(2). The third proviso's certificate requirement applies only where the second proviso (special capped deduction for certain self-occupied situations) is attracted; it was not attracted here. The reasons thus lacked a legally relevant link between the material and the belief of escapement; no fresh tangible material post-assessment was shown in the reasons; disclosures in the return and documents filed with it and in specific replies during assessment could not be equated to a failure to disclose within the proviso to Section 147 or to fall within Explanation 1 so as to sustain reopening.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 dated 28 March 2021 and the order disposing of objections dated 9 February 2022 are quashed and set aside; the assumption of jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings is not valid.

Issues: Whether the Deputy Commissioner erred in refusing the application for cancellation of out of charge and recall and re-assessment of the bill of entry to correct the unit price under Section 149 read with Section 154 of the Customs Act.

Analysis: The petitioner's application asserted an inadvertent typographical error in the commercial documents and invoices producing an incorrect unit price, and sought correction and re-assessment. The departmental communication refused the request solely by reference to a Supreme Court decision and a standing order, without addressing the petitioner's documentary evidence and pleas. The matter therefore required examination of the petitioner's submitted documents, consideration of whether the error was bona fide, and an opportunity of hearing before a conclusive decision under the cited statutory provisions could be rendered.

Conclusion: The impugned communication is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Group III/JNCH, to examine the petitioner's application for cancellation of out of charge and recall and re-assessment of the bill of entry, consider all relevant documents and pleas, grant an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, and pass a reasoned decision expeditiously and within six weeks from presentation of this order.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory application for rectification or re-assessment under Sections 149 and 154 of the Customs Act raises a bona fide clerical error supported by documents, the adjudicating authority must examine the materials, afford an opportunity of hearing and decide on the merits rather than rejecting the application solely by reference to precedent or administrative instruction.

Issues: Whether, in the presence of an Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC) issued by the DGFT evidencing fulfillment of export obligation in respect of goods imported under the EPCG scheme, the Customs authorities can confirm demand, confiscate the goods and impose redemption fine without prior adjudication or cancellation of the EODC by DGFT.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the EODC issued by the competent licensing authority conclusively evidenced discharge of export obligation and whether Customs had jurisdiction to re-open or disregard that certificate in the absence of any cancellation or adjudication by DGFT. The analysis considered DGFT clarifications regarding use of imported vehicles and inclusion of related foreign exchange earnings towards discharge of export obligation, and subsequent Tribunal and High Court/Supreme Court authorities addressing relative jurisdictions of DGFT and Customs. The conclusion in the cited authorities that where EODC remains valid and uncancelled, Customs cannot sit in judgment over the certificate and cannot confirm demand or impose penalties without DGFT action was applied to the facts at hand.

Conclusion: The demand, confiscation and imposition of redemption fine by Customs are not sustainable in the absence of any adjudication or cancellation of the EODC by DGFT; decision set aside and appeal allowed in favour of the assessee.