Issues: (i) Whether the relevant market should be defined as the provision of common user coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port excluding Krishnapatnam Port; (ii) Whether Chettinad International Coal Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CICTPL) held a dominant position in the relevant market during the relevant period; (iii) Whether CICTPL abused its dominant position by imposing mandatory coordination and liaisoning charges through third-party entities.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant geographic market is confined to in and around Kamarajar Port or includes Krishnapatnam Port.

Analysis: Consideration was given to transport costs, plant proximity, consumer preferences of fixed-location thermal power producers, hinterland analysis (captive versus contestable), sample user data collected by the DG, and comparative port volumes. Evidence showed most affected power producers were located near Kamarajar Port, significant transport cost disadvantages existed for alternative ports, and the DG's supplementary analysis delineated a distinct hinterland for Kamarajar Port. The CCI's inclusion of Krishnapatnam rested on overlapping usage and larger aggregate volumes, but the DG's focused analysis on end-user locations and switching behaviour indicates limited practical substitutability for the fixed consumers at issue.

Conclusion: The relevant geographic market is confined to the provision of common user coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port; Krishnapatnam Port is excluded for the purpose of assessing market power as applied to the aggrieved users.

Issue (ii): Whether CICTPL was dominant in the defined relevant market during the relevant period.

Analysis: Market shares, number and strength of competitors within the defined geographic market, presence of only one common-user coal berth at Kamarajar Port, high entry barriers, user dependence due to transport economics, and growth of traffic at CICTPL despite tariff increases were examined. DG supplementary findings showed CICTPL was the sole common-user provider at the port and that sizable proportions of relevant users coal volumes were handled at CICTPL, supporting an ability to operate independently of competitive forces within the defined market.

Conclusion: CICTPL held a dominant position in the relevant market during the relevant period.

Issue (iii): Whether CICTPL abused its dominant position by imposing mandatory coordination and liaisoning charges through third-party entities.

Analysis: The findings reviewed include user responses to DG enquiries showing many importers treated the charges as mandatory, documentary evidence of links between the third-party entities and the Chettinad Group, the absence of transparent commercial justification for the services, and the fact that such charges were collected outside published tariffs thereby avoiding port revenue sharing. The DG and the CCI recorded that the charges were effectively mandatory; when combined with a finding of dominance, imposition of such mandatory, non-transparent third-party charges amounts to conduct that imposes unfair conditions and diverts commercial value from the competitive tariff framework.

Conclusion: CICTPL abused its dominant position by imposing mandatory coordination and liaisoning charges through related third-party entities, amounting to an appreciable adverse effect on competition.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order that excluded Krishnapatnam Port from the relevant market assessment and declined to treat CICTPL as dominant is set aside; the matter is remitted to the Commission for fresh consideration consistent with the corrected market definition, the finding of dominance, and examination of abuse and remedies after hearing the parties and considering further investigation if necessary.

Ratio Decidendi: For assessing dominance and abuse under Section 4, the relevant market must be defined with regard to end-use, transport costs, and consum­er-specific substitutability; where a single common-user terminal services a distinct local hinterland and users are transport-cost constrained, that terminal can possess dominance, and imposition of mandatory, opaque third-party charges by related entities constitutes abuse.

Issues: Whether the attachment of the petitioners' bank accounts and the imposition of liability on the petitioners, who were directors of a company in liquidation, under Section 88(3) of the GST enactment was justified and whether the petitioners could be permitted to seek relief from such liability and attachment.

Analysis: Section 88(3) of the GST enactment imposes joint and several liability on persons who were directors of a private company during the relevant period for recovery of tax, interest or penalty where such amounts cannot be recovered from the company, subject to proof that non-recovery is not attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty by the director. The record shows that tax has been recovered from the company's credit ledger and that liquidation proceedings were in effect with an appointed liquidator. The available material does not establish that the petitioners, as individual directors, cannot seek to displace liability by making an application under the statutory framework; procedural opportunity to investigate and determine whether non-recovery is attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty remains available to the assessing authority. The impugned attachment was executed without final adjudication of the directors' personal liability under the statutory test and without affording the procedural opportunity contemplated by the statute.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee. The petitioners are entitled to file a suitable application to the respondents to seek exclusion from liability under Section 88(3); the attachment of the petitioners' bank accounts is to stand vacated subject to the outcome of the application, and the respondents are to decide the application on merits after hearing the petitioners within the directed timeframe.

Issues: Whether the Customs Act, 1962 empowered customs authorities to confiscate foreign currency and impose penalties under section 113(d) and section 114 in respect of cross-border currency dealings governed by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA), or whether such proceedings were beyond the competence of customs authorities absent statutory deeming or valid delegation under FEMA.

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed the historical and statutory evolution of foreign exchange regulation and customs law, including prior deeming provisions in earlier foreign exchange statutes that had enabled customs enforcement. The Court examined the text and scheme of Customs Act, 1962 (including section 2(22) and section 113(d)), the repeal of earlier deeming provisions when FEMA, 1999 was enacted, and the absence of any provision in the Customs Act that now deems prohibitions under FEMA to be prohibitions under the Customs Act. The Tribunal considered administrative instruments and standing orders purporting to delegate FEMA powers to customs officers, the government's archival correspondence about authorising customs officers under FEMA, and precedents relied upon by the parties. Applying principles of statutory interpretation on the relationship between later special legislation (FEMA) and earlier general legislation (Customs Act), the Tribunal concluded that in the absence of express statutory deeming or proper delegation under FEMA, customs authorities lack competence to invoke Customs Act confiscatory and penalty provisions based on RBI/FEMA prohibitions; proceedings purporting to do so amount to extra-legal exercise beyond the Customs Act's empowerment.

Conclusion: The confiscation of foreign currency and the imposition of penalties under the Customs Act, 1962 insofar as they rested on prohibitions or instructions under FEMA, 1999 were beyond the competence of the customs authorities. The confiscation and penalties affirmed in the impugned order were set aside and the appeals were allowed in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Absent an express deeming provision in the Customs Act or valid statutory delegation under FEMA, customs authorities cannot invoke confiscation or penalty provisions of the Customs Act on the basis of prohibitions created by FEMA; the later, special statutory scheme (FEMA) governs foreign-exchange regulation and displaces the earlier general enforcement route through customs for such prohibitions.

Issues: Whether the imported "Window Glass" merits classification under Tariff item 8529 90 90 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Analysis: The question falls within the scope of advance rulings under Section 28H(2)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962. Classification must be determined by the terms of the headings and relevant Section/Chapter Notes (GIR 1), aided by HSN Explanatory Notes. Two competing headings arise: 7007 (safety glass) and 8529 (parts suitable for use solely or principally with apparatus of headings 85248528). Note 2 to Section XVI directs that parts suitable for use solely or principally with goods of heading 8524 are to be classified under heading 8529. The product is chemically toughened glass but is engineered, tailored and imported for permanent bonding into flat panel display modules (display assemblies) and has no separate end-use outside that assembly. Given that the glass is an integral, essential component of a display assembly classifiable under heading 8524 and is suitable solely or principally for that use, it meets Note 2(b) criteria and is classifiable as a part under heading 8529. Further, if equal classification under 7007 and 8529 were arguable, Rule 3(c) of the GIRs directs classification under the heading occurring last in numerical order, which supports heading 8529.

Conclusion: The product is classifiable under Tariff item 8529 90 90 (parts suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of headings 8524 to 8528). The advance ruling is in favour of the Applicant (assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's claim was only a contingent liability bound by the rehabilitation scheme, or whether the corporate debtor was obliged to make payment in terms of the scheme and the appellant remained entitled to invoke section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority was required to examine existence of debt, default, and pre-existing dispute and admit the section 9 petition instead of directing payment under the scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's claim was only a contingent liability bound by the rehabilitation scheme, or whether the corporate debtor was obliged to make payment in terms of the scheme and the appellant remained entitled to invoke section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The claim of the appellant was shown in the rehabilitation scheme and in the financial records as contingent liability, not as an unsecured creditor's admitted dues. The scheme itself contemplated payment to unsecured creditors in five instalments where the creditor was treated as such, but the appellant was not shown in the unsecured creditor list. The corporate debtor's own treatment of the claim as contingent did not justify treating the appellant as finally bound by the scheme in the manner directed by the Adjudicating Authority.

Conclusion: The appellant was not bound to accept the belated payment direction as a substitute for its insolvency remedy, and the claim could not be finally treated as concluded merely by reference to the rehabilitation scheme.

Issue (ii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority was required to examine existence of debt, default, and pre-existing dispute and admit the section 9 petition instead of directing payment under the scheme.

Analysis: The appellate tribunal held that the Adjudicating Authority was duty bound to determine whether operational debt existed, whether default had occurred, and whether any pre-existing dispute survived. Instead of conducting that statutory inquiry, it directed payment of a quantified sum on equitable considerations linked to the scheme. The proper course, if debt and default were established and no pre-existing dispute existed, was admission of the section 9 petition.

Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand, and the section 9 petition ought to be considered afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the original insolvency petition was restored to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a claim is treated as contingent rather than as admitted unsecured debt, the Adjudicating Authority cannot bypass the statutory insolvency inquiry under sections 8 and 9 of the Code by issuing an equitable payment direction under a rehabilitation scheme; it must first determine debt, default, and pre-existing dispute in accordance with the Code.

Issues: Whether mortgaged properties attached under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be permitted to be auctioned by the secured creditor for recovery of its dues before conclusion of the trial, and whether the secured creditor's rights under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 could be given effect to in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The attachment was treated as attachment of value property, and it was recognised that property in possession of the accused or connected persons may be attached even if direct proceeds of crime are not traced. At the same time, the properties were mortgaged to the appellant bank long before the relevant offence period, and no useful purpose would be served by requiring the bank to await the end of trial before enforcing its security. The secured creditor was therefore permitted to proceed under the SARFAESI mechanism, with the safeguard that any surplus remaining after satisfaction of its dues would be deposited with the enforcement authority by way of fixed deposit receipt, and prior notice would be given to the co-mortgagee.

Conclusion: The mortgaged properties were allowed to be auctioned by the appellant bank in accordance with SARFAESI, subject to deposit of the surplus with the enforcement authority and notice to the co-mortgagee.

Ratio Decidendi: A mortgaged property attached as value property under the prevention of money laundering regime may, in appropriate facts, be permitted to be enforced by the secured creditor under SARFAESI where the bank's security predates the offence period and the interests of justice are protected by preserving the surplus for the enforcement authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order-in-original dated 3rd April, 2024 (passed on ground of non-prosecution) is vitiated by non-service of the show cause notice and reminders where the notices were uploaded under the "Additional Notices" tab on the GST portal, resulting in denial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Analysis: The petition challenges the mode of service consisting of uploading the show cause notice and reminders under the "Additional Notices" tab which, on the material before the Court, was not open or accessible to the petitioner and therefore did not impart knowledge of the proceedings. The matter is considered in the context of interlocutory rulings of this Court (Neelgiri Machinery) and subsequent authorities which treat non-communication by such upload as affecting the entitlement to a hearing. Having regard to those decisions and the absence of effective service here, the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to file a reply and to seek personal hearing before adjudication; the impugned order was passed on the sole ground of non-prosecution without affording that opportunity. The Court therefore considered remand to permit filing of reply, grant of personal hearing, and fresh reasoned adjudication by the authority.

Conclusion: The impugned order-in-original dated 3rd April, 2024 is quashed and set aside; the petitioner is permitted to file a reply within four weeks and to seek personal hearing on the fixed date, and the adjudicating authority is directed to pass a reasoned order after personal hearing within three months.

Issues: Whether the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 without a savings clause nullifies or lapses pending proceedings initiated under that provision.

Analysis: The Court considered the legal effect of deleting a statutory provision (Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017) in the absence of any savings clause preserving actions initiated under that provision. The decision applies the principle that continuation of proceedings commenced under a provision that is subsequently omitted is permissible only if the legislative omission is accompanied by an express saving clause; otherwise, the omission operates to terminate pending proceedings, subject to the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court followed consistent rulings of other High Courts which held that omission of Rule 96(10) without a savings clause nullifies pending proceedings under that rule.

Conclusion: The omission of Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017 without any savings clause results in the lapsing of pending proceedings initiated under that provision; the impugned assessment orders dated 09.01.2025 and 17.06.2025 are set aside and amounts recovered under those proceedings are liable to be refunded. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amendment to the formula in Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules is clarificatory and retrospective in effect, and whether prior orders rejecting refund claims under the pre-amendment formula should be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration applying the modified formula.

Analysis: The petitioner sought refund of accumulated input tax credit on account of inverted duty structure for specified periods; original and appellate authorities rejected the claims under the then-applicable text of Rule 89(5). A High Court judgment setting aside an administrative circular that characterised the amendment as non-clarificatory was relied upon to treat the amendment as clarificatory and retrospective. The petitioner had continued to pursue the refund claims after the earlier orders, and the amendment to the formula was held to address anomalies in the pre-existing computation.

Conclusion: The orders of rejection and the appellate orders are set aside and the refund applications are to be considered afresh by the primary authority applying the modified formula in Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules.

Issues: Whether the order cancelling the petitioners GST registration dated 12.09.2025 should be quashed and set aside on the ground that the petitioners reply dated 13.08.2025 (filed on the GST Portal) was not considered, warranting remand for fresh decision after providing opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The petition challenges the cancellation order passed under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 pursuant to a show-cause notice issued in Form GST REG-17 and relying upon a confidential communication. The material on record shows that the petitioner filed a reply with supporting documents on 13.08.2025 through the GST Portal. The impugned order does not record any findings addressing or appreciating the explanation and documents furnished by the petitioner. The statutory scheme and procedural fairness require that a reply to a show-cause notice and supporting material must be considered and an opportunity of hearing provided before a decision to cancel registration is finally taken. The absence of any recorded consideration of the petitioners reply vitiates the order and necessitates fresh consideration by the authority. All contentions of the parties were kept open for reconsideration by the authority.

Conclusion: The cancellation order dated 12.09.2025 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Superintendent, Range III, Ahmedabad for passing a fresh order after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing; fresh order to be passed within 12 weeks. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer validly assumed jurisdiction to reopen assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and whether the 10% ad hoc disallowance of certain expenses is sustainable.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated on the basis of information suggesting under-reported sale consideration, but during reassessment the Assessing Officer accepted the audited books with respect to the sale issue and did not make any addition on that ground. The Assessing Officer nonetheless made a 10% ad hoc disallowance of expenses without rejecting the books under Section 145(3). Established authorities require that additions on issues not stated in the reasons recorded (including under Explanation 3 to Section 147) can be sustained only if the addition which formed the basis for reopening is also made. Where the original issue which prompted reopening is not added, the statutory belief underlying assumption of jurisdiction fails. The impugned reassessment therefore lacks the necessary foundation and the ad hoc disallowance made without rejection of books lacks statutory basis.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings are quashed as void ab initio and the 10% ad hoc disallowance of expenses is deleted; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An Assessing Officer may not sustain additions on issues not recorded in the reasons for reopening unless the addition which formed the basis for reopening is itself made; failure to do so renders the reassessment void ab initio and precludes ad hoc disallowance where books of account have been accepted and not rejected under Section 145(3).

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 27,05,519 made by the Assessing Officer on account of unexplained deposits in the bank could be sustained; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 4,19,16,000 made under Section 69 on account of alleged unaccounted investment in construction of flats could be sustained on the basis of the DVO report estimating market value.

Issue (i): Deletion of addition of Rs. 27,05,519 made on account of unexplained deposits in bank.

Analysis: The CIT(A) found and the Tribunal records that the amount of Rs. 27,05,519 was part of the sale consideration of flats and was offered to tax in the return filed by the assessee; Revenue failed to rebut the factual finding that the amount had already been included in income and that separate addition would amount to double taxation.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 27,05,519 is upheld; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Deletion of addition of Rs. 4,19,16,000 under Section 69 on account of unaccounted investment in flats based on DVO report.

Analysis: The Tribunal agrees with the CIT(A) that the DVO assessed fair market value rather than the cost of construction and did not compute per square feet construction cost or bifurcate material and labour costs as per CPWD/State PWD rates; the DVO report did not demonstrate that the construction cost claimed by the assessee was incorrect nor did it perform the required scientific exercise to determine cost of construction. The Tribunal also records that no construction/investment was made in the relevant year and that AOs addition based on market value is not sustainable for invoking Section 69.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 4,19,16,000 is upheld; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeal is dismissed and the orders of the CIT(A) deleting the additions under challenge are confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A DVO report estimating market value cannot be equated with cost of construction for the purpose of making additions under Section 69; valuation for cost of construction requires a detailed, itemised assessment (per square feet rates, material and labour bifurcation) consistent with CPWD/State PWD guidelines and the absence of such methodology renders additions unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the reopening of assessment under sections 147/148 read with section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly initiated and sustained. (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 4,34,09,924 as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 (and related addition under Section 69) was justified.

Issue (i): Validity of reopening of assessment under sections 147/148 r.w. 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Reasons recorded referred to information from investigation indicating provision of accommodation entries by a third party and specific transaction details matching the assessee's records; the Assessing Officer issued show-cause, considered the assessee's reply and passed an order under section 148A(d) before framing assessment under section 148. The recorded reasons and the order under section 148A(d) demonstrate application of mind to the material on file.

Conclusion: The reopening of assessment is valid and is upheld against the challenge.

Issue (ii): Legitimacy of adding the entire sale consideration of Rs. 4,34,09,924 as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 and related addition under Section 69.

Analysis: The assessee's books disclosed the sales, banking receipts and the profit element was offered to tax; books of account were not rejected and there was no evidence that unaccounted income was routed through the sales. Even if sales were found to be bogus, undisputed purchases indicate the possibility that stock was sold to other parties; therefore only the profit element could be subject to tax rather than the entire sale consideration.

Conclusion: The addition of the entire sale consideration is not justified and is deleted; consequential addition under Section 69 is also deleted.

Final Conclusion: The reopening of assessment is sustained while the substantive additions of the entire sale consideration and related unexplained expenditure are deleted, resulting in the appeal being partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where books of account are not rejected and the profit element on disclosed transactions has been offered to tax, an addition cannot be sustained by taxing the entire sale consideration; at best only the profit element may be added when sales are alleged to be bogus.

Issues: Whether, in reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148 read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer can make an addition on a ground not forming part of the reasons for reopening after having accepted the explanation in respect of the very subject-matter on which reassessment was initiated.

Analysis: The challenge concerns reassessment initiated on the basis of alleged property transactions and whether, having accepted the explanation regarding the source of that investment, the Assessing Officer remained competent to make an addition on a different head of income not reflected in the recorded reasons for reopening. Relevant statutory provisions include sections 147 and 148 and the procedural safeguards in section 148A. Precedents establish that the foundational material or reasons for reopening govern the scope of reassessment and that, if the Assessing Officer ultimately concludes no addition is required on the subject-matter forming the basis of reopening, he cannot thereafter proceed to make additions on unrelated matters; the Assessing Officer cannot supplement or improve upon the reason which formed the basis for initiating reassessment. Applying these principles, the Assessing Officer accepted the source explanation for the transactions that formed the basis of the notice; consequently, assessing income on a different ground fell outside the scope of the reassessment as justified by the recorded reasons.

Conclusion: The addition made by the Assessing Officer on a ground not forming part of the reasons for reopening is not sustainable; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee and the addition of Rs. 35,43,224/- is deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority was justified in dismissing the appeals as infructuous where assessments were completed under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to raise fresh/additional claims in returns filed in response to notices under section 153C where prior assessments had abated.

Issue (i): Whether dismissing the appeals as infructuous was justified.

Analysis: The appeal challenges the CIT(A)'s conclusion that the appeals were infructuous because the assessing officer had merely adopted figures from an earlier intimation under section 143(1). The Tribunal examined authorities addressing assessments arising from search/requisition provisions and the legal effect of abatement under the second proviso to section 153A(1). It distinguished cases dealing with regular assessments under section 143(3) / re-opening under section 147 from assessments under section 153C where the return filed in response to notice substitutes the earlier return for abated proceedings.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that dismissal as infructuous was incorrect and the appeals should not have been treated as infructuous.

Issue (ii): Whether fresh or additional claims can be raised in returns filed in response to notices under section 153C for abated assessments.

Analysis: The Tribunal relied on the statutory scheme embodied in section 153A/153C and authoritative decisions recognizing that where assessments pending at the time of search abate, the return filed under section 153A/153C is to be treated as a return under section 139(1). Consequently, assessment under section 153A/153C is a fresh assessment for the abated years and both revenue and assessee can raise matters (including fresh claims) in that proceeding. The Tribunal contrasted this with decisions applicable to unabated/completed assessments and noted that those decisions do not prohibit fresh claims in abated assessments.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the assessee is entitled to raise additional/fresh claims in the proceedings under section 153C where the earlier assessment had abated, and therefore the issues should be decided on merits by the First Appellate Authority.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes and the matters remitted to the First Appellate Authority for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where assessments pending on initiation of search stand abated under the second proviso to section 153A(1), the return filed in response to notices under section 153A/153C is to be treated as a return under section 139(1), permitting the assessee to lodge fresh claims in the resulting assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority allowing the Resolution Professional's application under Sections 43, 44, 66 and 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to avoid preferential and fraudulent transactions and to direct contributors should be upheld.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the transaction audit report, the documentary material available (primarily bank statements and third-party sources), and the conduct of the suspended directors including their non-cooperation in providing books and facilitating retrieval of seized records. The legal framework centred on Sections 43 and 44 of the Code, as explained in Anuj Jain v. Axis Bank: (i) Sections 43(2) and 43(4) create a deeming fiction such that transfers to related parties within the prescribed look-back period are treated as preferential; (ii) once the twin conditions are satisfied the statutory presumption applies and the burden shifts to recipients to prove the transactions were in the ordinary course of business; and (iii) Section 44 permits reversal or directions to restore benefits to the corporate debtor. The Tribunal found the transaction auditor performed a cautious exercise based on available bank records and third-party documents; the appellants did not supply documents or explanations demonstrating the transactions were in the ordinary course of business; and the appellants were, inter alia, legal heirs/representatives of the proprietorship that benefited. The Tribunal also addressed typographical errors in pleaded amounts and held that unchallenged findings against non-appealing parties stand final.

Conclusion: The findings of the Adjudicating Authority that specified transactions were preferential/fraudulent and the consequent directions under Section 44 are affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. In favour of Respondent.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order dated February 24, 2025, which held that the goods dealt in by the petitioners were not exempt and directed reversal of ITC, is vitiated for non-compliance with Section 75(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by deciding a ground not raised in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice framed the discrepancy as "ITC found reversible in proportion to exempt supply, if any" and required documentary reconciliation of exempted inward and outward supplies. The adjudication order proceeded to determine that the product did not qualify as exempt supply although that specific factual/legal question was not put to the petitioners in the notice. Section 75(7) mandates that grounds of adjudication must be those which the noticee was required to meet; a determination on a new ground without prior notice deprives the noticee of an opportunity to answer. The adjudication therefore proceeded on a basis materially different from the notice and failed to afford the petitioners the required opportunity to meet the specific charge which formed the basis of the adverse finding. The Court excluded the period from the date of the impugned order to the date of disposal from computation of limitation for any fresh proceedings and permitted initiation of fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The adjudication order dated February 24, 2025 is set aside for non-compliance with Section 75(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; respondents are free to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law and the period from February 24, 2025 until disposal of the writ or receipt of certified copy is excluded for limitation purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty order dated 12.08.2024 passed u/s 271(1)(c) should be quashed as being in substance a repeat of an earlier penalty order; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in passing a fresh assessment/re-computation and initiating fresh penalty proceedings after the Tribunal directed re-computation; (iii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable where the addition was sustained on estimate basis.

Issue (i): Whether the later penalty order dated 12.08.2024 is liable to be quashed as a mechanical repeat of an earlier penalty.

Analysis: The facts regarding existence of an earlier penalty order and the worklist status of appeals were examined. The earlier penalty order arose from an assessment order later set aside by the Tribunal; however no live appeal against the earlier penalty was before the appellate authority at the relevant time. The Assessing Officer proceeded on the basis that the earlier penalty had become infructuous after the Tribunal's directions.

Conclusion: This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in passing a fresh assessment/re-computation and initiating fresh penalty proceedings after the Tribunal's direction to re-compute the disallowance.

Analysis: The Tribunal's order restored quantification of bogus purchases to the Assessing Officer for re-computation. The Assessing Officer gave effect to that direction by recomputing the addition and issuing penalty notices based on the recomputed figure. The re-computation and consequent penalty proceedings were therefore consequence of the Tribunal's direction rather than an independently unwarranted fresh assessment.

Conclusion: This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable where the addition was made on estimate basis.

Analysis: Authorities considering levy of penalty where additions rest on estimates were applied. The addition which formed the basis for penalty was found to be computed on an estimate basis. Applying the principle that penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not leviable where additions are sustained purely on estimation/guesswork and there is no clear concealment of particulars, the penalty could not be sustained.

Conclusion: This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) is set aside because the impugned additions were made on estimate basis; other grounds challenging repetition of penalty and the Assessing Officer's action are dismissed. The appeals are therefore partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not leviable where the addition on which penalty is based is sustained purely on estimation or guesswork and there is no clear finding of concealment of particulars of income.

Issues: Whether payments made under Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMCs) for maintenance of equipment are payments for "works" attracting TDS under Section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not "fees for professional or technical services" under Section 194J, and whether the assessee is an assessee in default under Sections 201(1)/201(1A) for deducting TDS under Section 194C at 2% instead of 10% under Section 194J.

Analysis: The statutory definitions distinguish "works" and contracts from "fees for professional or technical services" and Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) limits "fees for technical services" to managerial, technical or consultancy services excluding consideration for construction, assembly or like projects. The payments here were for periodic day-to-day maintenance and repair of installed equipment under annual contracts (AMCs), where service providers perform maintenance work as and when required rather than rendering managerial, technical consultancy or advisory services. The factual character of the transactions aligns with the scope of "work" under Section 194C and falls outside the ambit of "fees for technical services" or "professional services" under Section 194J.

Conclusion: The payments for AMCs qualify as payments for carrying out "work" and attract TDS under Section 194C; they do not constitute fees for professional or technical services under Section 194J. Consequently, the assessee is not an assessee in default under Sections 201(1)/201(1A) and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the rectification jurisdiction under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available to grant relief against an addition of Rs. 1,26,037/- made under Section 69A in a best-judgement assessment for AY 2012-13.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the limited scope of Section 154 which is confined to correcting an obvious or patent mistake apparent from the record and does not permit re-opening of questions of fact or re-evaluation of material which could give rise to two opinions. The assessment was completed under Section 144 on the basis of unexplained bank credits supported by material available to the Assessing Officer and by information obtained under Section 133(6). The Tribunal noted that challenging an addition under Section 69A requires adducing evidence to explain the source of deposits, which involves factual inquiry beyond the remedial scope of Section 154. The Tribunal also observed that the proper remedy for disputing such an addition is an appeal against the assessment order within the statutory time limits, and that rectification cannot be used as a substitute for appeal or review of the merits.

Conclusion: Rectification under Section 154 is not available to set aside the addition of Rs. 1,26,037/- made under Section 69A; the rectification application and the subsequent appeal are dismissed (decision is against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue).