Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notices and cancellation orders were vitiated for want of a specified date and time for personal hearing and for travelling beyond the notices by cancelling registration retrospectively; (ii) Whether non-uploading of the physical verification report on the common portal rendered the proceedings invalid; (iii) Whether the writ petitions were not maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notices and cancellation orders were vitiated for want of a specified date and time for personal hearing and for travelling beyond the notices by cancelling registration retrospectively.

Analysis: Rule 22(1) read with Form GST REG-17 requires the proper officer to state the reasons for proposed cancellation, grant seven working days to reply, and specify the date and time for personal hearing. The notices issued in the present matters granted time to reply but did not specify any hearing date and time. The final cancellation orders also proceeded to cancel registration retrospectively, although the notices did not disclose such a proposal. The proceedings were therefore not in conformity with the prescribed procedure and offended fairness in the decision-making process.

Conclusion: The notices and the cancellation orders were invalid on this ground, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether non-uploading of the physical verification report on the common portal rendered the proceedings invalid.

Analysis: Rule 25 requires the physical verification report, along with photographs and connected documents, to be uploaded on the common portal within fifteen working days of verification. The record showed that the verification was conducted but the report and supporting documents were not uploaded before the impugned final orders were passed. Since the cancellation was founded on that verification, non-compliance with Rule 25 materially affected the legality of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings were vitiated for breach of Rule 25, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petitions were not maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedy.

Analysis: Though an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was available, the petitioners were denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the show-cause notices and to place material before the assessing authority. In such circumstances, the rule of alternative remedy did not bar writ interference, particularly where the foundational proceedings themselves were contrary to the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice. The existence of an appellate remedy could not cure the defect at the first stage.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The impugned show-cause notices and the consequential cancellation orders were quashed, and fresh proceedings were left open to be initiated in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where mandatory notice requirements and the opportunity of personal hearing under the GST cancellation procedure are not complied with, and the foundational verification record is not duly uploaded as required, the proceedings are vitiated and the alternative remedy rule does not preclude writ relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported monitors (M80281FQ AW MVCD-1619 Barco Monitor for MRI) are classifiable as computer monitors under heading 8528 such that IGST at 18% (serial no. 384/383C of Notification No.1/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate)) applies instead of 28% charged under serial no.154; (ii) Whether the orders rejecting amendment applications and sustaining assessment at 28% IGST should be set aside and assessments restored to the proper officer under section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 for consequential determination.

Issue (i): Classification and applicable IGST rate for the imported monitors.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied TARiff classification principles including GIR 1 and HS explanatory notes to distinguish monitors capable of connecting to and designed for use with ADP machines from other monitors; relied on technical criteria (connectors, absence of TV tuner, viewable size, display pitch, ergonomic and connectivity features) and CBIC guidance (Circular No.33/2007) as authoritative field guidance. The Tribunal found the goods were 19 inch LCD monitors, met the ADP-monitor technical specifications, and fell within heading 8528; notification serial entries for IGST are keyed to the heading (8528) and size/technical capability, leading to 18% rate for monitors not exceeding 32 inches or computer monitors per Notification No.1/2017.

Conclusion: The imported monitors are classifiable as computer monitors under heading 8528 and attract IGST at 18% (favouring the assessee).

Issue (ii): Validity of impugned orders rejecting amendment requests and sustaining assessment at 28% and appropriate remedial direction.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the adjudicating authority failed to apply proper classification analysis, erred in treating the notification entry as limited to a specific tariff item (8528 5200) rather than the heading (8528), and did not discharge the burden of proof for re-classification; reliance on established authorities on burden and on CBIC circulars was invoked. Given absence of prejudice to revenue and correctness of declared classification, the Tribunal found the rejection of amendment and revision to 28% to be unsustainable.

Conclusion: The orders rejecting amendment and sustaining assessment at 28% are set aside; the assessments are restored to the proper officer under section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 for consequential determination (outcome favourable to the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeals to the extent of quashing the impugned orders on IGST rate and classification, directing reconsideration by the proper officer consistent with the Tribunal's findings that the monitors qualify as computer monitors attracting IGST at 18%.

Ratio Decidendi: Monitors that satisfy the technical criteria of being capable of directly connecting to and designed for use with ADP machines fall under heading 8528 and, if of display size not exceeding 32 inches, attract IGST at the 18% rate specified in the notifications; reclassification by revenue requires discharge of the burden of proof and cannot substitute a tariff item beyond the notification's heading-based entries.

Issues: Whether the proclamation of sale was barred by limitation under Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the assessment order attained finality only on dismissal of the special leave petition.

Analysis: Rule 68B(1) requires the three-year period to be reckoned from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to the demand becomes conclusive or final. The relevant question was when finality attached to the assessment order. The assessment order had been carried in appeal before the High Court and thereafter challenged before the Supreme Court by special leave. Finality, for the purposes of Rule 68B, meant the point at which the order could no longer be set aside, modified, or revised. Since the Supreme Court could still have interfered with the assessment order, finality was reached only when the special leave petition was dismissed. That dismissal fell in the financial year 2015-16, so the limitation period ran from 31.03.2016 to 31.03.2019. The proclamation of sale issued on 12.06.2018 was therefore within time. The ancillary objection based on the second certificate did not alter this conclusion.

Conclusion: The sale proclamation was not time-barred and the challenge under Rule 68B failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was rejected because the recovery proceedings were held to be within the prescribed limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, an assessment order attains finality only when it is no longer capable of being set aside, modified, or revised, and the limitation period for sale of attached immovable property runs from the end of the financial year in which that finality is reached.

Issues: (i) Whether the Tax Recovery Officer could declare a mortgage created after service of notice under the Second Schedule as void ab initio. (ii) Whether a mortgage created after service of notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule was invalid and ineffective against the revenue, including any claim of bona fide mortgagee protection. (iii) Whether the revenue could proceed with attachment and sale of the immovable property and apply the sale proceeds in accordance with the Second Schedule.

Issue (i): Whether the Tax Recovery Officer could declare a mortgage created after service of notice under the Second Schedule as void ab initio.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguishes between the recovery machinery under the Second Schedule and adjudication of title. Section 281(1) operates only up to service of notice under Rule 2, and Rule 16(2) makes a private transfer void only as against claims enforceable under the attachment. The recovery officer may investigate objections to attachment, but the scheme does not confer power to conclusively pronounce a third-party transfer void ab initio. The earlier principle that a transfer cannot be declared void by the recovery officer continues to apply to the extent the statute does not expressly enlarge that jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The declaration that the mortgage was void ab initio was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether a mortgage created after service of notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule was invalid and ineffective against the revenue, including any claim of bona fide mortgagee protection.

Analysis: Once notice under Rule 2 is served, Rule 16(1) disables the defaulter or his representative in interest from mortgaging or otherwise dealing with the property without permission of the Tax Recovery Officer. The mortgage here was created after service of such notice, and no permission had been obtained. The proviso to Section 281(1), including protection for transfers for adequate consideration and without notice, was inapplicable because the transfer was post-notice. The mortgage therefore could not prevail against claims enforceable under the recovery attachment, although it was not treated as void in an absolute sense.

Conclusion: The mortgage was not protected against the revenue's recovery claims and could not be relied upon to defeat the attachment.

Issue (iii): Whether the revenue could proceed with attachment and sale of the immovable property and apply the sale proceeds in accordance with the Second Schedule.

Analysis: The Second Schedule authorises recovery by attachment and sale after service of notice and lapse of the prescribed period. Rule 51 gives attachment retrospective effect from the date of service of notice, and Rule 16(2) preserves the attachment against private transfers to the extent of enforceable claims. The property therefore remained available for recovery of tax arrears, while any surplus after satisfaction of the certificate was to be dealt with according to the final outcome of the independent dispute between the private parties.

Conclusion: The revenue was entitled to proceed with sale and appropriate the sale proceeds towards the certified dues, with any surplus to be dealt with as directed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was interfered with only to the limited extent of striking down the recovery officer's declaration that the mortgage was void ab initio, while the statutory recovery process against the attached property was otherwise sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: After service of notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule, the defaulter cannot validly encumber the property without permission, but the tax recovery officer has no power to declare the resulting transfer void ab initio; such transfer operates only subject to the claims enforceable under the recovery attachment.

Issues: Whether the Final Assessment Order dated 29/07/2024 passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(13) is barred by limitation under Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and therefore liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the interplay between Sections 144C and 153 of the Income-tax Act and applied principles of harmonious construction and binding precedent. The Tribunal followed the ratio of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd. and coordinate decisions of the Tribunal (including Hyderabad Bench) holding that Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and the outer time limits in Section 153 apply to final assessment orders made pursuant to remand under Section 144C. The Bench rejected the Revenue's request to defer adjudication despite an interim order in a related Supreme Court matter, observing that the Madras High Court decision relied upon by the assessee is not stayed and there is no contrary High Court decision. The Tribunal noted timelines for draft and final orders under the statutory scheme, the effect of the non-obstante clause, and authorities on reasonable time, and concluded that where the final order is passed beyond the outer time limit under Section 153 (as extended under Section 153(4) where applicable), the order is time-barred and liable to be quashed. The Tribunal also preserved parties' rights by granting liberty to revive the appeal on merits if the Supreme Court's final decision in the related matter necessitates modification.

Conclusion: The Final Assessment Order dated 29/07/2024 is barred by limitation under Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and is quashed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the final assessment orders passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(13) (and related provisions) are barred by limitation under Section 153(1) read with Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the interaction between Section 144C (including the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(13)) and the time limits prescribed under Section 153(1) and Section 153(4). It considered the Madras High Court judgment in Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd., decisions of coordinate Benches of the Tribunal (notably Hyderabad Bench), and relevant principles of statutory interpretation including harmonious construction and the effect of interim orders in higher courts. The Tribunal analysed the statutory timeline for draft orders, DRP directions under Section 144C(12), and the final assessment under Section 153, including extensions where a TPO reference exists, and noted that the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(13) does not, in toto, negate the applicability of the outer time limits under Section 153. The bench also considered authorities on reasonable time where no statute prescribes a period and the doctrine that vested rights cannot be defeated by undue delay. The Tribunal followed coordinate decisions which applied the outer time limit under Section 153 to final assessments made after DRP directions and held that a final assessment passed beyond the statutory outer limit is time-barred.

Conclusion: The impugned final assessment orders dated 15/07/2024 (A.Y. 2020-21) and 30/09/2024 (A.Y. 2021-22) passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(13) are barred by limitation under Section 153 read with Section 144C and are quashed. The parties are granted liberty to seek revival of the appeals for adjudication of remaining issues if the Supreme Court's Larger Bench decision on the issue requires modification of this outcome.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with. (ii) Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The cheque transaction, dishonour memos, statutory notice, and reply notice established the issuance of cheques towards partial discharge of liability and their dishonour for insufficiency of funds. The accused admitted the transaction, liability, and the issuance of cheques, and no defence evidence was adduced to dislodge the prosecution case.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Analysis: The complaint contained specific averments that the accused was the Managing Director and was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the relevant time. The accused also admitted his role in the company and his involvement in the transaction, and the record showed that he had issued the cheques. On these facts, the statutory conditions for company liability and vicarious liability were met.

Conclusion: Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was correctly fastened on the accused.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed, and the conviction and sentence, as modified in appeal, were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: To fasten liability on an individual for an offence by a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint must contain specific averments that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, and such liability may be sustained where the evidence also shows active involvement in the cheque transaction.

Issues: (i) Whether addition of Rs.10,00,000 on account of difference in opening cash balance is sustainable; (ii) Whether addition of Rs.6,58,538 treated as unexplained cash credit received from sundry debtors is sustainable; (iii) Whether addition of Rs.2,08,293 made by invoking sections 50C/43CA is sustainable.

Issue (i): Addition of Rs.10,00,000 on account of difference in opening cash balance.

Analysis: The difference in opening cash balance was explained as arising from a clerical/typographical error in the preceding year's return and supported by previous agricultural and business receipts; assessee declared income under presumptive scheme and did not maintain regular books; Revenue produced no material to establish that the amount represented unexplained money.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.10,00,000 is deleted and the conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Addition of Rs.6,58,538 treated as unexplained cash credit from sundry debtors.

Analysis: The amount represented recovery from sundry debtors arising from business transactions and formed part of receipts for computation under presumptive taxation; Assessing Officer did not disprove the explanation with cogent evidence.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.6,58,538 is deleted and the conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Addition of Rs.2,08,293 by applying sections 50C/43CA based on stamp duty valuation.

Analysis: Property sold was held as stock-in-trade and assessee declared income on presumptive basis; addition was based solely on stamp duty valuation without material showing receipt of consideration over stated sale consideration.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.2,08,293 is deleted and the conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) are deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Additions based on unexplained cash or stamp duty valuation are not sustainable without cogent evidence that the assessee received unexplained money or consideration in excess of stated amounts; explanations supported by records and presumptive taxation status, absent contrary material from Revenue, justify deletion of such additions.

Issues: Whether the penalty levied under section 272A(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where the assessee establishes reasonable cause for non-compliance of statutory notices and claims relief under section 273B.

Analysis: The assessee was a non-regular filer whose name appeared in the sale deed as a nominee; the property was owned by her husband who declared the capital gains. Statutory notices were not communicated to the assessee and an ex-parte assessment was framed; delay in filing appeal was condoned and the ex-parte assessment was set aside. Section 273B provides for relief from penalty where reasonable cause for default is established. On the facts-nominee entry, absence of communication of notices, first-time activation of e-filing only after bank request and consequent lack of awareness-the requirements for reasonable cause are met and the statutory exception under section 273B applies; the material does not support sustaining penalty under section 272A(1)(d).

Conclusion: Penalty under section 272A(1)(d) is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the financial debt and default were established so as to justify admission of the Section 7 insolvency application; (ii) Whether the corporate debtor's challenge based on the OTS process, alleged malicious initiation under Section 65, and the later settlement offers warranted interference with the admitted insolvency proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the financial debt and default were established so as to justify admission of the Section 7 insolvency application.

Analysis: The record showed repeated acknowledgments of borrowing, restructuring, recall notices, authentication of default, and multiple settlement proposals by the corporate debtor. The admitted disbursement and continued non-payment demonstrated a subsisting financial debt and default. The adjudicating authority was not required to determine the exact quantum of default for admission once the threshold default was shown and the application was otherwise complete.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (ii): Whether the corporate debtor's challenge based on the OTS process, alleged malicious initiation under Section 65, and the later settlement offers warranted interference with the admitted insolvency proceedings.

Analysis: The OTS proposal remained contingent on approval by all consortium lenders and never matured into a binding settlement. The lenders were entitled to annul the process when unanimous consent was not obtained, and the corporate debtor had no vested right to insist on acceptance of the proposal. The allegations of malicious initiation were rejected because the Section 7 application was founded on debt and default, not on a collateral purpose. The later attempts to settle, including those made after the matter had been reserved and after assignment of debt, did not undo the admitted default or render the proceedings non-maintainable. The appropriate route for any fresh settlement, once the CoC stood constituted, was under Section 12A.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of upholding the impugned orders.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency admission and the rejection of the connected applications were sustained, while liberty was left open to pursue settlement through the statutory withdrawal mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: A contingent OTS that has not received the requisite approvals from all required lenders does not create an enforceable right in favour of the borrower, and once debt and default are established, later settlement attempts do not by themselves defeat admission of a Section 7 proceeding or convert it into a malicious initiation.

Issues: Whether, in light of subsequent developments, the appeal had become academic and the subject properties could be treated as restored to the resolution applicant under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 read with Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Restoration of Property) Rules, 2016.

Analysis: The appeal was rendered academic because of subsequent developments, and the Court declined to decide the larger question of law. Without prejudice to the rights and contentions of either side, the Court directed that the subject properties be treated as restored under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and that possession be handed over to the resolution applicant.

Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of with the direction that the subject properties stand restored to the resolution applicant, while the legal question remained open.

Issues: (i) whether the FIR, the connected criminal proceedings and the challenge to the ECIR could be quashed on the ground that the alleged conduct was covered by special statutes and that the police and enforcement authorities lacked jurisdiction; (ii) whether the order taking cognizance and the materials collected during investigation disclosed any legal infirmity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction; (iii) whether the money-laundering proceedings and provisional attachment action were unsustainable for want of prima facie material.

Issue (i): whether the FIR, the connected criminal proceedings and the challenge to the ECIR could be quashed on the ground that the alleged conduct was covered by special statutes and that the police and enforcement authorities lacked jurisdiction.

Analysis: The writ petitions were tested against the scheme of the special enactments, the allegations in the source FIRs, the information supplied by the enforcement agency and the later criminal investigation. The Court held that the registration of the FIR was not barred merely because the allegations also touched corporate law and securities law issues. It held that the place of registration was not illegal, that the information supplied by the enforcement agency could validly trigger police action, and that distinct allegations founded on a separate conspiracy could proceed independently. The Court also held that the argument of exclusive recourse under special statutes did not justify quashing where the allegations disclosed cognizable offences and the statutory framework did not create an absolute embargo on criminal prosecution under the general penal law.

Conclusion: The challenge to the FIR and the plea of lack of jurisdiction failed.

Issue (ii): whether the order taking cognizance and the materials collected during investigation disclosed any legal infirmity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The Court held that a magistrate is not required to pass a detailed speaking order at the stage of cognizance and that the existence of prima facie material is sufficient. It further held that writ review cannot become a roving inquiry into the probative value of investigation materials, particularly after submission of a charge-sheet and taking of cognizance. The allegations of mala fides, selective reliance on materials and procedural impropriety were found to be unsupported by admitted or proved facts and insufficient to dislodge the prosecution at this stage.

Conclusion: The cognizance order and the criminal proceedings were not vitiated.

Issue (iii): whether the money-laundering proceedings and provisional attachment action were unsustainable for want of prima facie material.

Analysis: The Court held that the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is a special statute with an overriding effect and that money-laundering can be made out where there is prima facie material showing involvement in the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. On the facts, the Court recorded that the investigation yielded substantial material concerning alleged unlawful gain through ESOPs, diversion of funds to the rights issue, attachment of demat accounts and filing of a prosecution complaint. The Court accepted that these materials were sufficient at the threshold to support the enforcement action and to justify continuation of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge to the PMLA proceedings and attachment action failed.

Final Conclusion: The Court found no ground for interference in writ jurisdiction and upheld the continuation of the criminal and enforcement proceedings arising from the impugned allegations.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the allegations, taken at face value, disclose cognizable offences and prima facie involvement in proceeds of crime, writ courts will not quash the proceedings merely because the factual matrix also engages special statutory regimes or because the accused asserts mala fides or procedural irregularity.

Outcome: The special leave petitions were dismissed and the interlocutory applications, if any, stood disposed of.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether a Resolution Applicant (SRA) whose name was not included in the final list of Prospective Resolution Applicants (PRAs) could be permitted to submit and have its Resolution Plan considered by the CoC in contravention of Regulation 36A and Regulation 39 of the CIRP Regulations; (ii) Whether the Consortium of Dharmesh Jain (SRA) fulfilled the net-worth eligibility criteria required for submission of EoI; (iii) Whether the CIRP had expired when the Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC; (iv) Reliefs available to the Appellants in view of the findings on the process.

Issue (i): Whether the SRA whose name was not in the final list of PRAs could be permitted to submit and have its Resolution Plan considered by the CoC in contravention of Regulation 36A and Regulation 39 of the CIRP Regulations.

Analysis: Regulation 36A requires issuance of a provisional list within ten days of the last date for submission of EoI, an opportunity to object within five days, and issuance of a final list after considering objections. Regulation 36A(6) rejects EoIs received after the time specified; Regulation 39(1B) bars consideration of plans from persons not appearing in the final list. While Form-G may permit the CoC to extend timelines, statutory steps for issuing provisional/final lists and inviting objections (sub-regs 1012) must be complied with when late EoIs are accepted after extension. The record showed no publication of an amended provisional list and no opportunity for objections after the Consortiums late EoI, hence non-compliance with Regulation 36A sub-regs 1012.

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent. The Tribunal upholds the Adjudicating Authoritys conclusion that the SRAs Plan could not lawfully be considered because the statutory requirements of Regulation 36A were not complied with.

Issue (ii): Whether the Resolution Applicant fulfilled the net-worth eligibility criteria.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority noted absence of audited financial statements for the immediate preceding year but did not finally hold the Consortium ineligible; records included net-worth certificates and subsequent affidavits. The Authoritys observations recorded that adequate documentary proof at the EoI stage was lacking, but no conclusive finding of ineligibility under Section 29A or the invitation criteria was recorded.

Conclusion: In favour of Appellant. The Tribunal held that the Adjudicating Authority did not record a finding that the Consortium was ineligible to submit the Resolution Plan.

Issue (iii): Whether the CIRP period had expired when the Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC.

Analysis: The CIRP period had been extended by the Adjudicating Authority until 30.09.2024. The Plan approval and related approvals fell within the extended CIRP timeline; any discrepancy in filing dates did not demonstrate breach of the CIRP period on the material before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: In favour of Appellant. The Tribunal held there was no breach of the CIRP period in the resolution process.

Issue (iv): Reliefs whether and what reliefs the Appellants are entitled to given the procedural infirmities identified.

Analysis: Although the Tribunal upheld the Adjudicating Authoritys rejection of the specific Resolution Plan on the ground of non-compliance with Regulation 36A, the projects nature (large real-estate project with numerous homebuyers) and the interest of stakeholders justified relief short of directing liquidation. The Tribunal examined powers to re-commence CIRP and to exclude pendency periods for a fresh timeline.

Conclusion: In favour of Appellant. The Tribunal modified the impugned order by setting aside the direction to initiate liquidation and directed the RP/CoC to issue a fresh Form-G, recommence the CIRP from issuance of Form-G, complete the process within 90 days (extended by exclusion of pendency periods), and, if not completed, permit the RP to file for liquidation.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirmed the Adjudicating Authoritys refusal to approve the impugned Resolution Plan for failure to comply with Regulation 36A, but it set aside the direction to commence liquidation and directed recommencement of the CIRP by issuance of a fresh Form-G with a 90-day timeline to conclude the process; the Resolution Plan approval, if any, is to be filed afresh for adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Inclusion of a late Expression of Interest after extension of timelines is permissible only where the Resolution Professional and Committee of Creditors comply with Regulation 36A sub-regulations 1012 by issuing an amended provisional list, inviting and considering objections, and then publishing a final list; failure to follow these statutory steps invalidates consideration of the late applicants Resolution Plan.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 29,31,364 made by treating bank cash deposits as unexplained income by estimating profit in a money transfer business is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material on record including bank statements showing cash deposits followed by immediate transfers, the stated business model that the account was used for third-party money transfer transactions, and the fact that commission per transaction had been offered to tax. The Tribunal noted that identical modus operandi and commission determination had been accepted in earlier assessments in respect of the person conducting the transfer business. The Tribunal found the commission rate of Rs. 40 per transaction to be reasonable and supported by the transaction pattern evidenced in the bank statements, and observed that the assessee had declared commission income corresponding to the transactions.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 29,31,364 is not warranted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid where the sanction for issuance of the notice (required by section 151 for reopenings beyond three years) was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the competent authority.

Analysis: The appeal concerns assessment year 2018-19 and a notice under section 148 issued on 05.04.2022. Section 151 prescribes that when more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, sanction for issuance of notice under section 148 must be granted by the specified higher authority (Principal Chief Commissioner/Principal Director General/Chief Commissioner/Director General). The sanction in this case was given by the Principal Commissioner, which does not meet the statutory requirement where the three-year threshold is crossed. The Revenue did not dispute the identity of the sanctioning authority.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 148 is vitiated for want of valid sanction under section 151 and the subsequent proceedings are null and void; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made by the Assessing Officer under Section 50C by adopting a higher value from departmental information is sustainable where the Sub-Registrar's Calculation Statement shows a value equal to the registered sale consideration and stamp duty was paid on that registered value.

Analysis: Section 50C permits adoption of the value shown in prescribed authorities' records as full value of consideration for transfer of immovable property. The Assessing Officer relied on departmental information indicating a higher value, but the Sub-Registrar's Calculation Statement correctly recorded the property value as equal to the registered sale consideration. Stamp duty was paid on the registered consideration, and there was a noted typographical error in the departmental information which led to an inflated figure being used. The Sub-Registrar's valuation document and evidence of stamp duty payment demonstrate that the registered sale consideration was not less than the jantri value and accurately reflects the transaction value.

Conclusion: The adoption of the higher departmental figure is not sustainable where the Sub-Registrar's valuation equals the registered sale consideration and stamp duty has been paid on that amount; the addition under Section 50C is therefore unwarranted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: Delay condoned. No interference was called for with the impugned order, and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues: Whether, in respect of GST on the lease premium and the consequential interest for delayed payment, the respondent could lawfully shift the burden of interest on to the petitioners despite not issuing the tax invoice within the prescribed time and despite the statutory scheme placing the obligation to pay tax and interest on the supplier.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 places the obligation to issue a tax invoice on the registered supplier and requires payment of GST within the prescribed return cycle. The Court noted that the respondent issued the demand for GST and interest only much later and had not complied with the invoice requirement within the time contemplated by the Rules. In that setting, the contractual clauses relied upon by the respondent could not override the statutory mechanism. The Court also noted that the Act itself treats supply without invoice as a penal breach and that interest liability attaches to the person who is liable to pay tax but fails to pay it within the prescribed time.

Conclusion: The respondent was liable to pay the GST interest and could not transfer that burden to the petitioners. The recovery of interest from the petitioners was held illegal and unsustainable, and refund was directed.