Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on inputs, input services and capital goods used in construction of immovable property that is subsequently let out and taxed under Renting of Immovable Property Service; (ii) Whether the demand is time-barred by limitation/extended period.

Issue (i): Admissibility of CENVAT credit on inputs, input services and capital goods used in construction of immovable property let out and taxed as Renting of Immovable Property Service.

Analysis: The rules define "input service" by a means-clause covering services used by a provider of taxable service for providing an output service and by an inclusive clause listing services used in relation to setting up premises of a provider of output service. Rule 3 permits CENVAT credit on input services and utilization for payment of service tax on output services. The Tribunal examined prior decisions of Tribunals and High Courts holding that services used for construction of premises used to provide a taxable renting service fall within the definition of input service where received prior to the 2011 exclusion. The 2011 amendment excluded certain construction services prospectively w.e.f. 01.04.2011; services received before that date remain covered. Departmental circulars cannot override statutory provisions.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit is admissible in favour of the appellant for inputs, input services and capital goods used in construction of immovable property let out and taxed as Renting of Immovable Property Service for the period prior to 01.04.2011.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand raised by the department is barred by limitation or requires invocation of extended period.

Analysis: The record shows filing of ST-3 returns and regular audits by the department. No evidence was produced to show suppression or collusion or willful misstatement by the appellant to evade tax. Precedent limits invocation of extended period absent such suppression.

Conclusion: The demand is barred by limitation and the extended period is not invocable; conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed, with consequential reliefs as per law, because the appellant was entitled to CENVAT credit for the relevant pre-1.4.2011 period and the demand is time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Where services are used by a provider of a taxable output service for providing that output, including services used in relation to setting up premises, they qualify as "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and CENVAT credit is admissible for periods prior to the prospective exclusion effective 01.04.2011; departmental circulars cannot override the statutory definition and extended period requires proof of suppression or collusion.

Issues: Whether the services rendered to foreign universities for commission amounted to intermediary services taxable to service tax, or whether they constituted export of service and were therefore not liable to service tax.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the nature of the appellant's activity under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012. The Tribunal noted that the issue was already settled in several prior decisions involving identical or similar activities, where services rendered to overseas educational institutions for commission were held not to fall within the definition of intermediary service under Rule 2(f). The appellant was found to be providing services on its own account to foreign clients, and the activity was treated as export of service rather than an arrangement or facilitation between two persons. In view of the settled position on merits, the Tribunal did not go into the other issues.

Conclusion: The services were not intermediary services and were classifiable as export of service; the service tax demand, interest, and penalty were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A person providing services on its own account to an overseas client does not become an intermediary merely because commission is earned for those services, and such services may constitute export of service rather than taxable intermediary service.

Issues: (i) Whether the adda-fees collected by the concessionaire are taxable as "Business Support Service" under Sections 65(104c) and 65(105)(zzzq) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether the service tax demand in respect of the period October 2006 to September 2011 is time-barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the adda-fees collected by the concessionaire from bus operators constitute a taxable "Business Support Service".

Analysis: The agreement between the concessionaire and the Authority (governed by the Punjab Infrastructure (Development & Regulation) Act, 2002) shows that the concessionaire constructed, financed, operated and was to transfer the terminal; the Authority retained title and the exclusive right to fix adda-fees; the concessionaire was permitted to collect adda-fees in lieu of consideration for construction and development. The statutory definition of "support services of business or commerce" covers outsourced services provided to a business recipient. The facts show no contract or privity between the concessionaire and the bus operators for provision of support services; the concessionaire was not engaged by bus operators to perform outsourced business functions but was permitted to collect fees as consideration from the Authority under a BOT-type concession. The impugned demand was limited to adda-fees and the concession agreement and surrounding scheme indicate the service, if any, was rendered to the Authority and the fees were in lieu of consideration for construction/investment. The Tribunal also considered guidance in Board circulars expanding the scope of business support services but found those do not convert the public infrastructure concession into outsourced business support services to individual bus operators.

Conclusion: The adda-fees are not taxable as "Business Support Service" under the Finance Act, 1994; the service tax demand on adda-fees is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand of service tax for October 2006 to September 2011 (SCN dated 11.04.2012) is barred by limitation.

Analysis: The concessionaire furnished all relevant information to the department on 06.04.2009 and complied with departmental directions thereafter. The statutory limitation period of one year would commence from 06.04.2009 and the department was required to issue notice by 05.04.2010. The SCN was issued on 11.04.2012, beyond the one-year period. The department did not produce evidence of suppression, fraud or wilful mis-statement to invoke extended limitation.

Conclusion: The service tax demand in appeal ST/55340/2013 (period October 2006 to September 2011) is time-barred and therefore not sustainable; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders confirming service tax, interest and penalties on adda-fees under the category of business support services are set aside and all appeals are allowed with consequential relief as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Service tax liability under the business support service category must be determined by reference to the contractual rights and obligations between provider and recipient; where a concessionaire collects user/parking charges under a BOT-type concession from an Authority and there is no privity of contract with individual users, such collections do not constitute outsourced "business support services" to those users, and limitation runs from disclosure of relevant information to the department unless suppression or fraud is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit on fuel used for generation of electricity was admissible when the electricity was transferred to the State Electricity Board grid and equivalent power was received back under a wheeling arrangement. (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit on fuel used for generation of electricity was admissible when the electricity was transferred to the State Electricity Board grid and equivalent power was received back under a wheeling arrangement.

Analysis: The applicable credit provisions required the input to be used in or in relation to manufacture of final products within the factory of production. The arrangement with the electricity board showed that the electricity generated in the captive plant was injected into the grid and the electricity used in the factory was received separately from the grid. On the facts found, the electricity generated was not used within the factory for manufacture, and the transfer to the grid amounted to a transfer for consideration in the nature of sale or exchange. The settled principle applied was that credit is available only to the extent inputs are used for electricity actually consumed in the factory, and not for electricity wheeled out or supplied to the grid.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit was not admissible to the extent of fuel used for electricity transferred to the grid, and the denial of credit on that portion was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The dispute was one of interpretation of the credit scheme, and the record showed the department was aware of the captive power arrangement. The assessee had a bona fide basis for its understanding of the law, and no reliable material established suppression, fraud, wilful misstatement, or collusion with intent to evade duty. In that setting, the extended period could not be invoked and the penal consequences did not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The demand and penalties were set aside only to the extent they rested on the extended period and penal action, while the credit denial on electricity wheeled out to the grid was sustained, resulting in a partial allowance of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit on fuel used to generate electricity is allowable only to the extent the electricity is actually used within the factory of production for manufacture of final products, and not for electricity transferred or wheeled out to the grid; where the dispute is interpretational and departmental knowledge is established, the extended period and penalties are not sustainable absent suppression or fraud.

Issues: Whether interest is payable on the refunded deposit retained by the Department during investigation under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or otherwise, and at what rate and period such interest should be awarded.

Analysis: The deposit in question was not a duty payment or a pre-deposit under Section 35F but an amount deposited during investigation and later ordered refunded on quashing of demands. Section 11BB governs interest on refund of duty under Section 11B and is therefore inapplicable to amounts that are not duty. Section 35FF (as amended) and judicial precedents (including Sandvik Asia Ltd., ITC, and subsequent High Court and Tribunal decisions) establish that where the Department has retained amounts not constituting duty or lawful pre-deposit, interest/compensation for unjustified retention is awardable. Notifications fixing varying statutory interest rates have been considered, and Tribunal authority supports awarding interest at 12% per annum as an appropriate compensatory rate for sums unjustifiably retained from date of deposit until date of refund.

Conclusion: Interest is not payable under Section 11BB for the refunded deposit; instead, the claimant is entitled to interest as compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the refunded amount from the date of deposit until the date of refund, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the show cause notice and consequential demand and penalty issued against the importer for alleged misclassification of imported Natural Rubber Latex are time-barred such that the impugned order must be set aside.

Analysis: The applicable limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the legal effect of the post-clearance audit and self-assessment regime (as introduced by the Finance Act, 2011 and implemented through the Bill of Entry (Electronic Declaration) Regulations, 2011) were examined. The classification framework under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (GIR) was considered only to the extent necessary to assess whether the demand could validly be raised within the limitation period. The Tribunal noted factual timelines of the relevant Bills of Entry, the existence of earlier departmental clearances for similar consignments, the importer's ACP/AEO facilitation status, and the absence of evidence demonstrating wilful misstatement by the importer. Authorities establishing that where a demand is time-barred there is no occasion to decide merits were applied.

Conclusion: The show cause notice and consequent demand and penalty are time-barred. The impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed on the ground of limitation; the appellant is entitled to consequential relief as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: A departmental demand based on post-clearance audit is liable to be set aside if it is issued beyond the statutory limitation period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the revenue fails to discharge the burden of proving wilful misstatement or suppression of facts that would justify extended period invocation.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice dated 31 March 2021 but issued on 1 April 2021, and the consequential assessment, were valid without compliance with the amended reassessment procedure.

Analysis: The e-proceedings record established that the notice was issued on 1 April 2021. Under the amended provisions and the Supreme Court's transitional directions, the notice was required to be treated as a notice under section 148A(b), followed by an order under section 148A(d) and a fresh notice under section 148 within the surviving limitation period. Neither the required treatment nor the order under section 148A(d) followed.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was quashed and the consequential assessment set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice issued on 1 April 2021 under the unamended reassessment provisions must be treated under the transitional directions as a preliminary notice under the amended procedure, followed by the requisite order and fresh notice within the surviving limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court may invoke Article 227 of the Constitution of India to strike off a plaint when Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides a specific remedy; (ii) Whether Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits striking off an entire plaint.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court may invoke Article 227 of the Constitution of India to strike off a plaint when Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides a specific remedy.

Analysis: The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is exceptional and is to be exercised sparingly to keep subordinate courts within jurisdictional bounds, not as an appellate or error-correcting forum. Order VII Rule 11 provides a specific statutory mechanism for rejection of a plaint on enumerated grounds, several of which require factual consideration. Availability of such a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 constitutes a near-total bar to invoking Article 227, absent an absolutely necessary case for supervisory intervention. Disputed questions concerning title, alleged fraud, and the genuineness of documents require adjudication through the ordinary civil process.

Conclusion: Article 227 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to strike off the plaint where recourse under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was available; the issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits striking off an entire plaint.

Analysis: Order VI Rule 16 authorises striking out or amendment of objectionable matter in a pleading where it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, prejudicial to fair trial, or an abuse of process. Its scope is confined to infirm or abusive portions of pleadings and cannot be extended to eliminate the plaint in its entirety. Rejection of a plaint is governed separately by Order VII Rule 11.

Conclusion: Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not authorise striking off an entire plaint; the issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The title dispute and allegations concerning the plaintiff's documents must be addressed through the statutory civil-procedure framework, including any properly instituted application for rejection of the plaint.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides a specific remedy for rejection of a plaint, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to circumvent that remedy; Order VI Rule 16 does not permit striking off the entire plaint.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for AY 2016-17 were valid where the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148, issued after more than three years from the end of the assessment year, were approved by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: Under the substituted reassessment regime, prior sanction by the specified authority is a jurisdictional precondition for an order under section 148A(d) and a reassessment notice under section 148. Where more than three years have elapsed, section 151(ii) requires approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The approval in the present case was granted by the Principal Commissioner, who fell within section 151(i) and was not the competent authority for this stage. The defect was jurisdictional and could not be cured under section 292B.

Conclusion: The order under section 148A(d), the notice under section 148 and all consequential reassessment proceedings were invalid and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty at 200% for under-reporting of income could be sustained without specifying the applicable limb of misreporting under section 270A(9).

Analysis: Penalty proceedings are independent and penal in nature; therefore, the charge must be stated without ambiguity. Penalty for ordinary under-reporting is leviable at 50% under section 270A(7), whereas the enhanced 200% penalty under section 270A(8) applies only where under-reporting results from a specified case of misreporting under section 270A(9). Although the assessment proceedings referred to misreporting and the penalty was computed at 200%, neither the initiation nor the penalty order identified any particular clause of section 270A(9). The failure to specify the statutory limb made the charge vague and the penalty unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty levied under section 270A at 200% was quashed for failure to specify the applicable misreporting clause under section 270A(9).

Issues: (i) whether the deletion of addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of unsecured loans was justified, including the objection based on Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; (ii) whether disallowance of interest expenditure on unsecured loans was sustainable; (iii) whether disallowance of employees' contribution to provident fund under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be restored.

Issue (i): whether the deletion of addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of unsecured loans was justified, including the objection based on Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: The lenders' identity was established through PAN and income-tax records, their creditworthiness was supported by returns and bank statements, and the genuineness of the transactions was supported by banking channels and deduction of tax at source on interest. No adverse material was brought to rebut these factual findings, and the evidences relied upon did not warrant interference on the Rule 46A objection.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was upheld and the issue was decided against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): whether disallowance of interest expenditure on unsecured loans was sustainable.

Analysis: The record did not establish any nexus between the borrowed funds and non-business use, and the assessee's business activity and deployment of funds supported the allowability of the interest claim. The Revenue failed to bring material to displace the finding that the expenditure was incurred for business purposes.

Conclusion: The disallowance of interest was not sustained and the issue was decided against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): whether disallowance of employees' contribution to provident fund under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be restored.

Analysis: Employees' contribution to provident fund is governed by section 36(1)(va) and is allowable only if deposited within the due date prescribed under the relevant welfare law. Payment before the due date for filing the return does not cure the default, and the contrary view of the first appellate authority could not survive in light of the governing rule.

Conclusion: The disallowance was restored and the issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only on the provident fund issue, while the deletions relating to unsecured loans and interest were sustained, resulting in a partial relief to the Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: Once identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of a loan transaction are established, an addition under section 68 cannot be sustained; employees' contribution to provident fund is deductible only when deposited within the statutory due date under the relevant labour law.

Issues: Whether interim bail should be granted to the petitioner in the pending criminal proceedings arising out of the alleged liquor scam, having regard to the stage and complexity of the investigation and the competing claims of liberty and effective investigation.

Analysis: The proceedings involved a large-scale alleged scam, multiple accused persons, several charge-sheets or prosecution complaints already filed, further investigation still pending, and a substantial number of witnesses proposed to be examined. The Court balanced the petitioner's claim to liberty and prolonged custody against the prosecution's need for an uninterrupted and effective investigation, and considered that the investigation was likely to take considerable time. To ensure that the investigation was not impeded while protecting personal liberty, the Court granted interim bail with stringent conditions, including restrictions on travel, residence, appearance, contact with witnesses, and public statements on the allegations.

Conclusion: Interim bail was granted to the petitioner in both matters, subject to the stated conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In complex multi-accused criminal investigations expected to continue for a considerable time, interim bail may be granted by balancing the accused's right to liberty against the prosecution's need for an unhindered investigation, and by imposing conditions sufficient to prevent interference with the process.

Issues: Whether the additions of Rs.50,00,000 treated as unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of unsecured loans are justified and liable to be sustained.

Analysis: The assessee produced documentary evidence to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the loans, satisfying the primary onus under Section 68. The Tribunal examined earlier decisions of the same Bench where identical loans from the same lenders for the same assessment year were tested and additions under Section 68 were deleted. The Tribunal applied consistency with those precedents and found no controverting material on record to rebut the assessee's proof. The Revenue relied on third-party statements alleging the lenders were shell companies, but the Tribunal found that identical allegations had been considered and rejected in earlier similar cases involving the same lenders.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.50,00,000 treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is deleted. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalties for abetment or facilitation of gold smuggling could be imposed on the two Customs officers under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The material established acquaintance with the principal offender, introduction to another officer, and receipt of loans or gifts. However, it did not establish that either officer directed, approved, or knowingly facilitated the clearance of passengers carrying smuggled gold. Neither officer was shown to have performed any act or omission connected with the smuggling, nor was there evidence that they possessed, transported, or dealt with the smuggled gold. Receipt of loans or gifts could warrant action under service-conduct or anti-corruption regimes but did not, by itself, establish liability under the Customs Act. The Revenue produced no material displacing the Commissioner's findings, and the penalties imposed on persons found to have participated in the alleged smuggling had also been set aside in connected proceedings.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were not sustainable against either officer; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the tax order should be pursued through the available appellate remedy before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The Appellate Tribunal had been constituted and its order prescribed filing windows for appeals. The petitioner could invoke that remedy within the applicable window period upon statutory pre-deposit. The challenge to invocation of Section 74 was not adjudicated and was left for determination by the Tribunal.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, leaving the petitioner to avail the appellate remedy before the Tribunal.

Issues: (i) Whether commission receipts could be offered under the presumptive taxation scheme under section 44ADA; (ii) Whether cash received as a gift from the assessee's sister was taxable; (iii) Whether expenditure incurred for earning commission receipts assessed as income from other sources was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether commission receipts could be offered under the presumptive taxation scheme under section 44ADA.

Analysis: Section 44ADA applies only to income from professions specified under section 44AA(1). Commission-earning activity, without proof that it constituted a specified profession, did not qualify for presumptive taxation under that provision.

Conclusion: The commission receipts were not eligible for taxation under section 44ADA, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether cash received as a gift from the assessee's sister was taxable.

Analysis: The sibling relationship was undisputed and was supported by confirmation, PAN details and bank records. The receipt consequently fell within the exclusion for gifts received from a relative under section 56(2)(x).

Conclusion: The gift received from the sister was not taxable and the related addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether expenditure incurred for earning commission receipts assessed as income from other sources was allowable.

Analysis: Commission receipts assessable under section 56 are taxable only as net income after allowing reasonable expenditure incurred in earning them under section 57. As the quantum and evidentiary basis of the claimed expenditure had not been verified, the claim required factual verification.

Conclusion: The computation of taxable commission income was remitted for verification of allowable expenditure, in favour of the assessee to that limited extent.

Final Conclusion: The gift receipt is excluded from taxable income, while the taxable amount of commission receipts must be recomputed after verification of the expenditure claim; presumptive treatment of the commission receipts remains unavailable.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated on an audit objection alleging non-verification of sundry creditors, where cash purchases of raw hides and skins were legally permissible and no objective material established that the disclosed creditors were non-genuine.

Analysis: Section 40A(3) read with Rule 6DD(e)(ii) permits cash payments exceeding the prescribed limit for purchase of raw hides and skins. The assessee's books recorded the names of the sellers or creditors and the relevant mandi details; no objective material was identified to doubt those particulars or the physical existence of the sellers. In the absence of a pre-existing legal requirement to maintain PAN and address details of such sellers, their non-furnishing could not by itself support an adverse inference. An audit objection may at most generate suspicion, but reassessment jurisdiction requires objective material indicating that a specified part of the disclosed credits was non-genuine. Reassessment on such suspicion would amount to a fishing expedition.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation lacked jurisdiction and was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether delay in filing applications for fixation of drawback Brand Rate/Special Brand Rate within the extendable one-year period under Rule 7 of the Customs and Central Excise Drawback Rules, 2017 should be condoned.

Analysis: Rule 7 permits extension beyond the initial three-month period from the let-export order, up to the prescribed maximum period. The exporter had sought extension, paid the stipulated application fees, and explained that delayed receipt of export documents and completion of verification and certification caused the delay. Drawback being a beneficial export-incentive measure, the extension power must be exercised liberally rather than on a narrow technical approach. The applicable Board circular also treats liberal grant of extensions as a trade-facilitation measure.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee; the authority must consider the applications on merits, fix the applicable drawback Brand Rate/Special Brand Rate, and grant consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a drawback Brand Rate application is filed within the statutorily extendable period, the power to condone delay should be exercised liberally, consistently with the beneficial and trade-facilitative character of the drawback scheme.

Outcome: Delay condoned and the Special Leave Petition dismissed; the question of law, if any, is kept open.