Issues: (i) Whether a Resolution Applicant who is an Operational Creditor and the sole member of the Committee of Creditors (holding 100% voting rights) can vote to approve its own resolution plan; (ii) Whether a single-member Committee of Creditors that is also a competing Resolution Applicant can fairly, objectively and independently assess and reject a competing resolution plan, particularly where a judicial direction required fresh consideration.

Issue (i): Whether an Operational Creditor, who is not a Financial Creditor, acting as a Resolution Applicant and sole voting member of the CoC can validly vote to approve its own resolution plan.

Analysis: Section 30(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 contains a proviso that a resolution applicant shall not have a right to vote at the CoC meeting unless such resolution applicant is also a financial creditor. The statutory scheme thus separates the role of a resolution applicant from the role of a voting decision-maker to prevent influence and conflict. In the factual matrix where the sole CoC member was an Operational Creditor who also submitted and approved its own plan, the statutory prohibition in Section 30(5) was breached. Such voting and approval by an Operational Creditor who is not a Financial Creditor directly defeats the purpose of the proviso and creates a material irregularity in the decision-making process.

Conclusion: Issue (i) answered in the negative. Approval of its own resolution plan by an Operational Creditor who is not a Financial Creditor and who held 100% voting rights in the CoC is void-ab-initio and amounts to a material irregularity.

Issue (ii): Whether the single-member CoC that was also a competing Resolution Applicant conducted a fair, objective and independent assessment of the competing resolution plans when the Adjudicating Authority had directed fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority directed the CoC to freshly consider the appellant's plan keeping relevant parameters including total plan value in view. The minutes of the 6th CoC meeting, however, show absence of an evaluation matrix, lack of comparative financial analysis, failure to invite the appellant to the meeting, non-sharing of relevant material (including PUFE information), and predetermined rejection based on internal discussion. The stark disparity in plan values (appellant's plan being significantly higher) heightened the obligation on the CoC and RP to undertake a structured, transparent comparative evaluation. The single-member CoC's rejection without meaningful evaluation, and the RP's failure to ensure compliance with Regulation 39 and the AA direction, constitute procedural infirmity, denial of a meaningful opportunity, and violation of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) answered against the CoC and RP. The decision-making process was vitiated by material irregularity, conflict of interest and denial of natural justice; the CoC's approval cannot be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders approving the resolution plan of the sole CoC member and rejecting the appellant's plan are set aside due to material irregularity and violation of Section 30(5) and principles of natural justice; the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process cannot be continued within the present framework and the Corporate Debtor is ordered to be liquidated.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 30(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits a resolution applicant who is not a financial creditor from voting at the CoC meeting; where a sole CoC member who is an operational creditor votes to approve its own plan and the process lacks a structured, transparent comparative evaluation and compliance with judicial directions, the approval is void-ab-initio and constitutes a material irregularity justifying judicial intervention including setting aside the approval.

Issues: (i) whether the section 7 application was within limitation and whether the settlement agreement amounted to acknowledgment of liability; (ii) whether the respondent fell within the expression financial service provider so as to bar section 7 proceedings; (iii) whether the loan claim stood subsumed in the settlement arrangement or otherwise failed to establish debt and default for admission under the Code.

Issue (i): whether the section 7 application was within limitation and whether the settlement agreement amounted to acknowledgment of liability.

Analysis: The period of three years was computed from the recall notice dated 24 June 2016, and the petition filed in June 2019 was treated as within time. The settlement agreement dated 1 July 2017 also contained an acknowledgment of the outstanding liability, which supported the plea that limitation stood saved. The reasoning proceeded on the basis that acknowledgment under the Limitation Act operated to preserve the claim.

Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected, and the debt was treated as being within time.

Issue (ii): whether the respondent fell within the expression financial service provider so as to bar section 7 proceedings.

Analysis: The respondent was found to have been an NBFC and a financial service provider at the time of the underlying transactions. On that footing, proceedings under section 7 were held to be impermissible against it. The characterization of the respondent at the relevant point of time was treated as decisive for maintainability.

Conclusion: The respondent was held to be a financial service provider, and section 7 proceedings were held not maintainable against it.

Issue (iii): whether the loan claim stood subsumed in the settlement arrangement or otherwise failed to establish debt and default for admission under the Code.

Analysis: The loan transaction, the assignment, the recall notice, and the settlement agreement were viewed together as a complicated and intertwined commercial arrangement. The settlement was treated as an all-encompassing arrangement connected with wider disputes and recoveries, rather than a clean standalone case of debt and default. The pledge and other contractual rights were also held not to alter the result in favour of admission.

Conclusion: Debt and default were not treated as clearly established for admission under section 7.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the insolvency petition was found not maintainable against the respondent and, independently, the materials did not warrant admission of the section 7 petition on the facts recorded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the corporate debtor is found to be a financial service provider at the relevant time, a section 7 petition is not maintainable against it, and a settlement embedded in a complex transaction will not justify admission unless debt and default are clearly and independently established.

Issues: Whether a provisional attachment order passed under Section 83(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 ceases to have effect after the expiry of one year under Section 83(2) and, if so, whether bank accounts provisionally attached must be de-frozen and made operable.

Analysis: Section 83(1) authorises provisional attachment of property including bank accounts; Section 83(2) provides that every such provisional attachment shall cease to have effect after the expiry of one year from the date of the order under sub section (1). The Court relied on the statutory text and the Supreme Court decision in Kesari Nandan Mobile, which held that where the statute does not provide for extension, renewal or re issuance of a provisional attachment after efflux of the one year period, no extension is permissible. The petitioners had shown that more than one year had elapsed since the provisional attachment dated 3rd January, 2025, and that requests to the Commissioner and banks to de freeze accounts had not been acted upon. The Court observed that once the statutory one year period has expired, the provisional attachment ceases to have effect and neither the tax authority nor the bank may continue the freezing of property or bank accounts based on that order.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment effected by the order dated 3rd January, 2025 has ceased to have effect by efflux of time under Section 83(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; accordingly the bank accounts so attached shall be de frozen and made operable and neither the Commissioner nor the banks can continue the freezing on the basis of that expired provisional attachment. The writ petitions are partly allowed to this extent in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the ex-parte demand/DRC-07 order dated 03.08.2024 can be quashed or set aside and whether the petitioner is entitled to a hearing and reconsideration of the impugned order provided the impugned amount is deposited.

Analysis: The petition challenges the show cause notice dated 31.05.2024 and the ex-parte demand/DRC-07 order dated 03.08.2024 on grounds including absence of opportunity of personal hearing, limitation, and subsequent closure of liability. A maintainability objection based on availability of alternate remedy was noted. The petitioner undertook to deposit the entire amount stated in the impugned order within four weeks. In view of this undertaking, the respondent was directed to grant a personal hearing to the petitioner (with written notes of argument and reply) and thereafter to pass a reasoned order within four weeks of that hearing. Protective directions were given that, if the subsequent order is adverse to the petitioner, the deposited amount shall not be apportioned by the respondent for a period of two weeks from service of the order on the petitioner. The court expressly did not decide merits of the tax demand and left open the petitioner's right to prefer an appeal against any adverse order.

Conclusion: Petition allowed in terms of prayer (B): petitioner to deposit the entire impugned amount within four weeks; respondent to provide personal hearing on 30th March, 2026 and pass a reasoned order within four weeks thereafter; if the order is adverse, the amount shall not be apportioned for two weeks from service of the order; petitioner remains free to prefer appeal.

Issues: Whether the petitioners accused under Sections 132(1)(b) and 132(1)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are entitled to regular bail.

Analysis: The petitions relate to allegations of wrongful availment of ineligible input tax credit through fake invoices and non-receipt of goods, with an asserted tax evasion of Rs. 23.12 crores. Considered factors include the documentary nature of the prosecution case, that parts of investigation are complete, the offences are triable by a Magistrate and carry a maximum sentence of five years, absence of confessional statements or direct evidence of the petitioners' involvement, period of custody already undergone, and precedent authorities allowing bail in similar circumstances. Conditions against influencing witnesses and furnishing bail/surety bonds are proposed.

Conclusion: Bail granted to the petitioners; they are to be admitted to regular bail subject to furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate/Illaqa Magistrate and subject to conditions preventing threat or influence of prosecution witnesses.

Issues: Whether the orders rejecting amendment/denying restoration and cancelling the petitioner's GST registration (including the orders dated 31.01.2024 and 28.03.2025) should be set aside and the petitioner's GST registration restored with effect from 12/13 July 2017, permitting a fresh decision after hearing.

Analysis: The petitioner's GST registration was originally granted on 12 July 2017 and later amended. Following an intimation of change of principal place of business and subsequent departmental inquiries, the amendment was rejected and proceedings resulted in cancellation. Documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner (including an affidavit and electricity bill) was subjected to field verification; the verification report records that the property owner confirmed the authenticity of the documents and that the petitioner had vacated the premises on 31.05.2023. The verification also included comparison of tax liabilities and ITC, and correspondence shows the petitioner deposited dues except for an amount attributable to inability to file returns after cancellation. In view of the verification supporting the petitioner's claim and the recorded assurances regarding deposit of outstanding tax once the registration is activated, the factual basis for denial of the amendment/restoration was undermined. Procedural fairness requires an opportunity of hearing and fresh consideration of the petitioner's request for restoration in light of the verified documents and submissions.

Conclusion: The orders dated 31.01.2024 and 28.03.2025 are set aside. The petitioner is permitted to appear before the authority and the authority is directed to decide the petitioner's application for restoration of GST registration effective from 12/13 July 2017 after granting hearing, expeditiously and in any case within three months from the date of this order. The petition is partly allowed.

Issues: Whether an order passed under Section 92CA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, without supplying copies of the agreements relied upon by the authority, is vitiated for failure to provide the assessee an opportunity to defend and thereby breaches principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

Analysis: The issue concerns whether denial of copies of relied-upon agreements impairs the assessee's ability to file a meaningful reply on transfer pricing adjustments. Consideration includes the relevance of the nature and terms of agreements to comparability and pricing, the requirement that relied documents be made available so the assessee can identify parties, contractual clauses and transactional specifics, and the possibility of redaction to protect confidentiality. The timelines for filing replies and passing final orders were assessed in light of the need to supply documents and permit effective response within expanded time limits.

Conclusion: The order passed under Section 92CA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, without supplying copies of the relied-upon agreements is set aside. The authority is directed to supply the relied-upon agreements (with permitted redactions) and to allow specified time for filing a reply and for passing a fresh order, thereby vindicating the assessee's right to disclosure and to a fair opportunity to be heard.

Issues: Whether aluminium layered oil coolers, used in automotive vehicles for cooling engine oil, are classifiable under Heading 8419.50.92 as plate type heat exchange units or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles.

Analysis: The product was found to be a plate-type heat exchanger consisting of brazed aluminium plates with alternating flow channels through which engine oil and coolant pass, enabling indirect heat transfer and cooling. Its essential character and principal function were held to be heat exchange, not propulsion, transmission, steering, braking, or other motor-vehicle-specific functions. Heading 8419.50.92 specifically covers heat exchange units of plate type, and the Explanatory Notes to Heading 8419 describe units in which hot and cold fluids traverse separated paths so that one is cooled and the other heated. Heading 8708 was treated as a residual entry for motor-vehicle parts and accessories, but Note 2(e) to Section XVII excludes machines or apparatus of Headings 84.01 to 84.79, other than radiators, from the scope of parts and accessories. Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation and, alternatively, Rule 3(a), supported classification in the more specific heading.

Conclusion: The goods were held classifiable under Heading 8419.50.92 and excluded from Heading 8708.

Final Conclusion: The ruling confirms that a vehicle-specific use does not displace classification where the goods are specifically and more precisely covered by a Chapter 84 heading and are excluded from Section XVII by the relevant note.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are specifically described by a Heading in Chapter 84 and fall within the exclusion in Section XVII, they cannot be classified under the residual motor-vehicle parts heading merely because they are designed for use in motor vehicles.

Issues: (i) Whether the section 7 application was barred by limitation or was saved by acknowledgment of debt in the corporate debtor's balance sheets and acknowledgment letters. (ii) Whether non-classification of borrowings in the balance sheets in terms of the ICAI guidance note invalidated the acknowledgment for limitation purposes.

Issue (i): Whether the section 7 application was barred by limitation or was saved by acknowledgment of debt in the corporate debtor's balance sheets and acknowledgment letters.

Analysis: The limitation dispute turned on the date of default and subsequent acknowledgments. The record showed that the corporate debtor had acknowledged the liability in its balance sheets for the relevant years and also by an acknowledgment letter dated 31.12.2021 signed by the suspended directors. The exclusion of time ordered in the suo motu limitation proceedings was also taken into account. On that basis, the filing of the section 7 application was held to be within limitation.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent; the application was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether non-classification of borrowings in the balance sheets in terms of the ICAI guidance note invalidated the acknowledgment for limitation purposes.

Analysis: The objection based on the accounting classification of borrowings was rejected. The absence of the suggested classification did not negate the admission of liability reflected in the balance sheets. The tribunal held that the accounting format could not override the substantive acknowledgment of debt, and the reliance placed on the cited accounting guidance did not assist the appellant.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent; the acknowledgments remained valid for limitation purposes.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order was found free from error, and the appeal failed on both limitation and acknowledgment grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: An acknowledgment of financial debt in balance sheets and written acknowledgment letters can extend limitation for a section 7 insolvency application, and defects in accounting classification do not nullify such acknowledgment where liability is otherwise admitted.

Issues: Whether the approved resolution plan extinguished the rights of dissenting financial creditors against personal guarantors and third-party securities, and whether the observations restricting release of guarantor properties and continued recovery/attachment were sustainable.

Analysis: The resolution plan expressly provided that all encumbrances, security interests, liens and attachments over the assets of erstwhile promoters, directors and guarantors, whether charged or not charged, would stand irrevocably released, and that claims and related enforcement would stand settled and extinguished. The plan had already been upheld in earlier proceedings, and the challenge to that approval had failed before the Supreme Court. In that backdrop, the continued reliance on attachments under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 for recovery of dues already dealt with in the CIRP was inconsistent with the binding effect of the approved plan. The observations that only mortgaged properties or properties specifically identified in the plan could be released were contrary to the width of the plan language and to the finality attached to the earlier approval.

Conclusion: The observations in paragraphs 55 to 57 were unsustainable and were set aside; the approved resolution plan was held to release the covered assets and to bar further recovery action against the guarantors and promoters in respect of the resolved debt.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent of deleting the impugned restrictive observations, while leaving the remainder of the order intact, and the respondents were bound to act in accordance with the approved resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved resolution plan that expressly extinguishes encumbrances, security interests and attachments over promoters' and guarantors' assets is binding on dissenting financial creditors, and recovery proceedings inconsistent with that plan cannot be continued in respect of the resolved debt.

Issues: (i) Whether rights claimed under the collaboration-cum-redevelopment agreement and the assignment deed had crystallised into an enforceable monetary claim against the corporate debtor. (ii) Whether the letter dated 31.03.2021 constituted an enforceable corporate guarantee and acknowledged an admissible claim. (iii) Whether the resolution professional and the adjudicating authority were justified in refusing to update the information memorandum and in rejecting the claim.

Issue (i): Whether rights claimed under the collaboration-cum-redevelopment agreement and the assignment deed had crystallised into an enforceable monetary claim against the corporate debtor.

Analysis: The agreement made the assignee's rights contingent upon removal of the encumbrance over the subject property and return of the title deeds. Since the encumbrance was admittedly not removed and the redevelopment never materialised, no vested or crystallised right arose in favour of the assignor or its assignee. The assignment deed could transfer only such rights as the assignor actually possessed, and it did not create an independent claim for the underlying debt.

Conclusion: The claim based on the collaboration-cum-redevelopment agreement and the assignment deed was not enforceable.

Issue (ii): Whether the letter dated 31.03.2021 constituted an enforceable corporate guarantee and acknowledged an admissible claim.

Analysis: The letter was treated as a unilateral communication and not as a complete guarantee instrument binding on all necessary parties. It was neither duly stamped nor notarised, and it did not establish a concluded and enforceable guarantee within the meaning of contract law. In the absence of mutual assent and proper supporting material, the document could not sustain the claimed financial liability.

Conclusion: The letter did not amount to an enforceable corporate guarantee or a valid basis for admission of the claim.

Issue (iii): Whether the resolution professional and the adjudicating authority were justified in refusing to update the information memorandum and in rejecting the claim.

Analysis: The resolution professional was empowered to verify claims and was entitled to take into account the absence of crystallised rights, the unresolved encumbrance, the lack of supporting proof of debt, and the late assertion of contingent rights over the property. On those facts, there was no legal basis to direct alteration of the information memorandum or to interfere with the rejection of the claim.

Conclusion: The rejection of the claim and the refusal to update the information memorandum were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the appellant did not establish any crystallised and enforceable right or debt against the corporate debtor, and the impugned order required no interference.

Ratio Decidendi: A contingent contractual entitlement that remains dependent on an unfulfilled condition precedent does not mature into an enforceable insolvency claim, and an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those possessed by the assignor.

Issues: Whether the Summary of the Show Cause Notice in Form GST DRC-01 and the attached statement/determination can substitute for a Show Cause Notice issued under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; whether attachments and orders lacking authentication of the Proper Officer and without providing opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) are valid.

Analysis: Section 73(1) requires that a Show Cause Notice be issued when tax is not paid/short paid/erroneously refunded or input tax wrongly availed/utilised (for reasons other than fraud or willful misstatement). Section 73(3) provides for the statement of determination of tax and Section 73(9) for passing the order after considering representations. Rule 142(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires issuance of an electronic summary in FORM GST DRC-01 in addition to the notice under Section 73. Rule 26(3) prescribes authentication of notices, certificates and orders through digital signature or e-signature. Section 75(4) mandates opportunity of hearing when requested in writing or when an adverse decision is contemplated. The summary form and an attached statement of determination do not contain the particulars and mandate of a Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) and therefore cannot substitute for issuance of a proper Show Cause Notice. Authentication by the Proper Officer is required and absence of authenticated signature renders the notice/statement/order ineffective. Where the statutory right to hearing exists and is invoked in the prescribed form, an adverse order cannot be passed without affording hearing.

Conclusion: The Summary in FORM GST DRC-01 and the attached statement/determination do not substitute for the Show Cause Notice required under Section 73(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Notices, statements and orders in proceedings under Section 73 must be authenticated in the manner required and an opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) must be afforded; failure to comply renders the impugned order invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer/AO, TDS failed to apply the Explanation to section 191 and the proviso to section 201 by not examining whether the payees had paid tax directly, and whether the matter should be remanded to the AO for such examination.

Issue (i): Whether the AO/TDS proceeded to treat the assessee as an "assessee in default" under section 201 without ascertaining direct payment of tax by the payees as required by the Explanation to section 191 and without the requisite certificate under the first proviso to section 201.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the Explanation to section 191 (direct payment) and the first proviso to section 201 which together impose on the deductor the duty to consider whether the payee has furnished a return and paid tax and, where applicable, whether a certificate in the prescribed form has been furnished. The record showed no finding that information existed about direct payment by the payees and no certificate in the prescribed form was furnished by the deductor. In these circumstances the Tribunal found that the jurisdictional and substantive prerequisites specified in the Explanation to section 191 and the proviso to section 201 were not fulfilled by the AO/TDS prior to holding the assessee to be in default.

Conclusion: The additional legal ground is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine and adjudicate afresh whether the relevant payees had paid tax directly (and related compliance with the proviso to section 201), in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether proceedings under Section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained independently of the scrutiny assessment and DRP proceedings under Section 143(3) and Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (ii) whether the service charges paid to the Singapore entity were fees for technical services requiring deduction of tax at source under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Article 12(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA.

Issue (i): whether proceedings under Section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained independently of the scrutiny assessment and DRP proceedings under Section 143(3) and Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Proceedings under assessment and TDS collection operate in different statutory spheres. The scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) concerns computation of total income, while Section 201 addresses failure to deduct or deposit tax at source. The absence of a disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) in the assessment order did not, by itself, bar action under Section 201. The DRP also confined itself to transfer pricing objections and did not return any finding on the TDS issue. On that footing, the existence of earlier assessment or DRP proceedings did not oust the jurisdiction of the TDS authority.

Conclusion: the objection to jurisdiction on the ground of prior assessment and DRP proceedings was rejected, and the TDS authority was held competent to act under Section 201.

Issue (ii): whether the service charges paid to the Singapore entity were fees for technical services requiring deduction of tax at source under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Article 12(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA.

Analysis: To fall within Article 12(4), the services had to be managerial, technical or consultancy in nature and, in relevant cases, had to satisfy the make available condition. The petitioner had furnished Form 15CA and Form 15CB and had explained the nature of services and the agreement terms, including the contention that no technical knowledge, skill or know-how was made available so as to enable independent use by the recipient. The impugned order proceeded mainly on the alleged inadequacy of invoice descriptions and did not examine the make available requirement or the treaty position with sufficient depth. It also failed to properly address the earlier treatment of similar services and the material placed before it.

Conclusion: the payments were not validly brought to tax as fees for technical services for the purpose of withholding tax, and the order treating the petitioner as an assessee in default could not stand.

Final Conclusion: the writ petition succeeded and the TDS demand order was quashed, with the Court holding that the impugned finding of default under Section 201 could not be sustained on the merits.

Ratio Decidendi: where treaty protection applies, a payment is not taxable as fees for technical services unless the statutory and treaty conditions, including the make available requirement where applicable, are satisfied on a proper examination of the underlying services and evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the Netherlands-resident assessee constituted a Permanent Establishment (fixed place PE or dependent agent PE) in India such that its commission income is taxable in India under Article 5 and Article 7 of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty; (ii) Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were validly initiated.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee had a Permanent Establishment in India and whether commission income received from Indian accommodations was attributable to such PE and taxable in India.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the treaty test for fixed place PE (identification of a fixed place, availability of that place to the non-resident, and carrying on core business activities through that place) and the revenue burden to prove existence of PE. The material on record did not show any place of business, employees, personnel, equipment, or premises at the disposal of the assessee in India; the digital platform was hosted outside India; transactions were principal-to-principal between accommodations and bookers; and no dependent agents in India were established by evidence. The provisions and judicial standards for attribution and PE were applied to the facts. The Tribunal noted that SEP provisions were not operable for the relevant year and that treaty protections remained applicable.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the Revenue failed to prove existence of a fixed place PE or dependent agent PE in India and that the commission income was not attributable to any PE in India. The finding that the assessee constituted a PE is rejected in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/148 (and related notices under Sections 148A/149/151) were validly initiated.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the recorded reasons for reopening and the linkage between the information relied upon (withholding details) and the formation of belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The assessing officer did not demonstrate a sufficient connection or lead independent evidence to establish that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Relevant legal standards governing initiation of reassessment proceedings were applied to the facts.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the reassessment proceedings were not sustainable to the extent they produced the impugned additions, and the assessment order based on those proceedings is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed and the assessment order dated 15.01.2025 (pursuant to DRP directions) is set aside as the Revenue failed to establish a Permanent Establishment in India or validly attribute the commission income to India; consequential grounds were left open as academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Revenue seeks to tax business profits of a treaty resident, it must establish, on evidence, the existence of a PE under the relevant treaty and a clear attribution of profits to that PE; absent such proof, reassessment and taxation under the treaty are not sustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs.1,83,50,000/- made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged non-genuine accommodation entries is sustainable; (ii) Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 are valid in the absence of independent application of mind and where the assessment under section 143(3) was completed more than four years earlier without failure to disclose all material facts.

Issue (i): Whether addition of Rs.1,83,50,000/- under section 69A (non-genuine accommodation entries) is sustainable.

Analysis: The question requires examination of whether the assessee was found to be the owner or in possession of money or other valuable articles not recorded in books as contemplated by section 69A. The decision under consideration applied judicial authority holding that invocation of section 69A requires ownership/possession and cannot be based solely on investigative reports or statements without establishing possession or ownership. The assessing authority acted on information from the investigation wing and statements rather than independent factual finding of ownership/possession; the appellate authority examined the law and facts and deleted the addition while confirming a commission income limited to the commission element.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.1,83,50,000/- under section 69A is deleted; relief is in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148 are valid given the earlier completed assessment under section 143(3) and absence of independent application of mind and failure to demonstrate failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

Analysis: The validity of reopening beyond four years depends on satisfaction of the proviso to section 147, namely that income has escaped assessment by reason of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The reasons recorded relied on the investigation wing's report without demonstrating independent application of mind by the assessing officer linking tangible material to formation of reason to believe. Precedents establish that reopening based on a mechanical adoption of investigation report or without independent consideration is impermissible. The record shows the original assessment under section 143(3) and no material establishing that the assessee failed to disclose relevant facts; accordingly the reassessment lacks the requisite foundation.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 are quashed; relief is in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge by the Revenue is dismissed and the assessee's cross-objection is allowed; the net effect is deletion of the addition under section 69A and quashing of the reassessment initiated under sections 147/148.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 69A can be invoked only where the assessee is found to be owner or in possession of unexplained money or valuables not recorded in books; reopening under section 147 beyond four years requires demonstrable failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts and an assessing officer's independent application of mind to tangible material forming the reason to believe.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 21.07.2022 for assessment year 2015-16 is time-barred and consequently whether the reassessment proceedings and consequent reassessment are void ab initio.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined applicability of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) and the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal on the computation of surviving limitation for issuance of reassessment notices. Applying the legal framework set out in Rajeev Bansal, the period between issuance of the deemed show-cause notice under the old regime and the receipt of the assessee's response is to be excluded and the assessing officer must complete the mandated steps within the surviving time limit. For AY 2015-16 the regular limitation under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA did not extend the validity of notices issued under the old law between 1.4.2021 and 30.6.2021, and the surviving time limit for issuance of a fresh notice expired before 21.07.2022. The Tribunal relied on the chronology of notices, replies and orders in the record and respectfully followed the Supreme Court's computation and the reasoning in Rajeev Bansal and related High Court authority to hold that the notice dated 21.07.2022 fell outside the surviving limitation.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 148 on 21.07.2022 is time-barred; the notice is quashed and the consequent reassessment is quashed. The assessee's challenge is allowed and the appeal is allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded during investigation can be admitted as evidence without following the procedure for admissibility; (ii) Whether burden under the statutory provision for seized goods shifts to the claimant in a town-seizure where gold lacks foreign marking and requisite purity; (iii) Whether seizure under the provision empowering seizure was supported by reasonable belief that goods were smuggled; (iv) Whether confiscation and penalties imposed could be sustained given findings on admissibility and burden of proof.

Issue (i): Admissibility of statements recorded during inquiry without following the statutory procedure.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires that statements recorded before investigating officers acquire relevancy in proceedings only after the person making the statement is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms an opinion, for reasons recorded, that the statement should be admitted in the interests of justice; otherwise such statements are not relevant. Precedents applying parallel provisions in excise and customs underscore the mandatory nature of this two-step procedure and the need to afford opportunity for cross-examination once a statement is admitted.

Conclusion: Statements recorded during investigation were not admissible evidence because the mandatory procedure for examination and admission in adjudication proceedings was not complied with; reliance on those statements is impermissible (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (ii): Application of the statutory burden-shifting provision in a town-seizure where gold lacks foreign marking and requisite purity.

Analysis: The provision that casts the burden on the person from whose possession goods are seized applies where seizure is made under a reasonable belief of smuggling. For town seizures where goods lack foreign marking and do not meet the typical indicia of foreign-origin articles, established authority holds that the burden remains on the revenue to demonstrate reasonable belief of foreign origin; production of invoices after seizure can be permissible to discharge ownership or legitimate purchase.

Conclusion: The burden to prove the seized gold was smuggled did not fall on the claimant in the circumstances of a town seizure without foreign marking and with lower purity; invoices produced subsequently could be relied upon (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iii): Legality of seizure under the provision authorising seizure based on reasonable belief.

Analysis: Seizure requires a reasonable belief, based on material or indicia, that goods are liable to confiscation as smuggled. Where goods lack foreign markings and no independent material establishes foreign origin or recent unlawful importation, authorities cannot rest seizure on mere speculation or absence of immediate documentary cover; precedents require objective bases for reasonable belief.

Conclusion: The seizure was not supported by reasonable belief of foreign origin and thus was not lawful (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iv): Validity of confiscation and penalties imposed in light of inadmissibility of statements, burden allocation, and seizure validity.

Analysis: Confiscation under the statutory heads and imposition of penalties depend on admissible evidence and a lawful seizure. Where statements relied upon were inadmissible, the burden did not shift to the claimant in a town-seizure lacking foreign indicia, and the seizure itself lacked reasonable belief, there was no lawful basis to sustain confiscation or to impose penal consequences; penalties premised on alleged fabrication or complicity also could not be sustained absent admissible proof.

Conclusion: Confiscation and penalties set aside (in favour of the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The cumulative effect of the conclusions is that the impugned confiscation and penalties are unsustainable because material relied upon was inadmissible, the statutory burden did not shift in the circumstances of a town seizure lacking foreign indicia, and the seizure lacked reasonable belief; accordingly the appeal succeeds and the enforcement measures are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded during investigation are admissible in adjudication proceedings only after the witness is examined before the adjudicating authority and the authority records a reasoned opinion admitting the statement in the interests of justice; in town seizures where goods lack foreign marking and requisite purity, the revenue must demonstrate reasonable belief of foreign origin before casting the burden on the claimant, and absent such admissible evidence and reasonable belief confiscation and penalties cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by the Financial Creditor by filing a Section 7 petition was fraudulent, malicious or a collusive proceeding and whether the application under Section 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 seeking recall of the admission order should be allowed.

Analysis: The legal framework comprises Section 7 (initiation and admission of a Section 7 petition on proof of debt and default) and Section 65 (power to reject or recall admission where petition is found to be fraudulent, malicious or collusive) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The operative facts include an earlier Section 7 petition resolved by a Settlement Agreement dated 13.04.2022, subsequent dishonour of cheques and a fresh Section 7 petition admitted on 15.12.2023. The applicant filed I.A. under Section 65 after eight months of admission, alleging collusion and malafide initiation, pointing to overlap of individuals connected with the Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor and to a person who issued a loan recall notice also verifying the CD's reply. The material placed on record included the Settlement Agreement, board resolution and power of attorney authorizing representation, balance sheets acknowledging liability and evidence of dishonoured cheques. The requisite strict standard of proof under Section 65 requires clear material establishing that the petition was instituted fraudulently, maliciously or in collusion; allegations alone without supporting decisive evidence do not meet that threshold. The record shows admission of the second Section 7 petition was founded on proved debt and default arising after the Settlement Agreement and dishonour of payment, and the board resolution and other documents undermined the contention that representation by the same individual rendered the initiation collusive or malicious.

Conclusion: The issue is answered against the Appellants; the applicants failed to satisfy the strict standard of proof required under Section 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Section 65 application is rejected and the appeal is dismissed (in favour of the Respondent).

Issues: (i) Whether the adjudicating authority was vitiated in approving the resolution plan (I.A. No.159/2020) and in rejecting the applicant's I.A. No.717/2025 seeking directions against the Resolution Professional and protections regarding the lease, such as to warrant interference by this Tribunal.

Analysis: The appeal challenges the approval of the resolution plan on grounds including alleged non-disclosure/withholding of pleadings by the Resolution Professional, denial of inspection, unilateral alteration of the plan, failure to file Form-H and uncertainty regarding the status of the corporate debtor's lease granted by GIDC. The adjudicating authority and this Tribunal's earlier order set aside GIDC's termination of the lease and revived I.A. No.159/2020; the CoC had approved the plan with a clear voting majority and the plan complied with Section 30(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The adjudicating authority recorded that the SRA was aware of the lease and had conducted due diligence; safeguards required under the information memorandum and plan implementation (including no-dues obligations regarding GIDC) fall on the RP and CoC. Repeated litigation accounted for delay and does not provide a ground to permit the SRA to resile from a plan duly approved by the CoC. Alleged procedural irregularities by the RP (inspection denial, non-sharing of pleadings, failure to file Form-H) were considered by the adjudicating authority and found insufficient to upset plan approval; the reliefs sought in I.A. No.717/2025 (including directions to IBBI and undertaking from GIDC) were not shown to be necessary to protect the implementability of the plan given the revival of the lease and the adjudicating authority's findings.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority's approval of I.A. No.159/2020 and rejection of I.A. No.717/2025 do not warrant interference; the appeal is dismissed and the decision is in favour of the Respondent.