Issues: (i) Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal by reversing the first appellate court's factual findings; (ii) Whether the notarised photocopy of the power of attorney was admissible and sufficient to establish authority to alienate the properties.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal by reversing the first appellate court's factual findings.

Analysis: Section 100 confines second-appellate jurisdiction to substantial questions of law and ordinarily preserves findings of fact. Interference remains permissible where findings rest on inadmissible material, ignore material evidence, misconstrue documents, or are vitiated by perversity. Reliance by the first appellate court on an unproved photocopy to infer authority to alienate constituted reliance on no legally admissible evidence, raising a question of law.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference was within the permissible scope of second-appellate jurisdiction. The issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the notarised photocopy of the power of attorney was admissible and sufficient to establish authority to alienate the properties.

Analysis: Documentary facts must ordinarily be proved by primary evidence. Secondary evidence is admissible only after establishing the existence and execution of the original, a legally recognised reason for its non-production, and the authenticity of the copy. The photocopy was produced without the required factual foundation or compliance with the procedure governing secondary evidence. Statutory presumptions concerning authentication could not be invoked before the document was lawfully admitted and proved.

Conclusion: The photocopy was no evidence of authority to sell, and the alleged power of attorney could not validate the conveyances. The issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Final Conclusion: The alleged authority to alienate having remained unproved, the conveyances executed on its basis did not bind the plaintiff.

Ratio Decidendi: A photocopy of a document cannot establish its contents or attract presumptions of due execution unless the statutory conditions for admission and proof of secondary evidence are first satisfied.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail.

Analysis: Investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed. The applicant had remained in custody since October 2024. The role attributed to the applicant was substantially similar to that of a co-accused subsequently granted bail. The relevant bail considerations, including the prima facie case, availability for trial, risk of absconding, and possibility of witness tampering, supported release subject to safeguards.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to regular bail, subject to conditions securing attendance at trial and preventing interference with the proceedings.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order was sustainable where the order under section 148A(d) and consequential notice under section 148 were approved by an authority lower than that required after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: Under the reassessment regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, prior sanction for an order under section 148A(d) and a notice under section 148 is jurisdictional and must be granted by the authority specified in section 151 according to the elapsed period. For assessment year 2016-17, the three-year period, read with the statutory COVID-19 relaxation, expired on 30 June 2021. The approval on 27 July 2022 was consequently required from the higher authority prescribed by section 151(ii), rather than from the Principal Commissioner. The subsequent proviso relied upon by the Revenue was introduced with effect from 1 April 2023 and did not govern the impugned order and notice issued on 29 July 2022.

Conclusion: The sanction was not obtained from the competent specified authority under section 151(ii); the order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148, and consequential reassessment were invalid and were quashed. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether jurisdiction under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly assumed on the basis of the satisfaction note recorded in respect of the seized material.

Analysis: The record showed that the satisfaction note did not specify, with clarity, which seized entry belonged to the assessee or to which assessment year it related. The note was also prepared in a consolidated form and was not confined to a clear, year-specific satisfaction based solely on the seized material handed over by the searched person's Assessing Officer. In these circumstances, the jurisdictional prerequisite for proceedings under section 153C was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C was invalid, and the consequential assessment proceedings and additions were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For valid initiation under section 153C, the satisfaction note must be specific, year-wise, and must clearly connect the seized material with the assessee; a defective or consolidated satisfaction note vitiates the resulting assessment.

Issues: Whether leave encashment paid to employees originally from the Central Government service but absorbed in BSNL on retirement was exempt under Section 10(10AA)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether tax could be deducted at source under Section 192 on the footing that Section 10(10AA)(ii) applied.

Analysis: The employees had initially served in the Department of Telecommunications and were later absorbed in BSNL. The Court read Rule 37A of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 as a special framework governing such absorption, particularly the deeming provision treating them as having retired from Government service and the provisions ensuring pensionary benefits for BSNL absorbees in the same manner as Central Government servants. On that basis, the Court held that their retirement had to be treated as retirement from Central Government service for the purpose of Section 10(10AA). The Court also held that general executive instructions could not override the statutory scheme and that the two enactments had to be harmoniously construed so that one did not defeat the benefits conferred by the other.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to exemption under Section 10(10AA)(i), and the deduction of tax on leave encashment by invoking Section 10(10AA)(ii) was not justified.

Final Conclusion: The impugned communication was quashed and the writ petition was allowed, leaving the petitioners free to claim the consequential tax benefit in their returns.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special pension rule deems absorbed Government servants in a PSU to have retired from Government service and preserves Government-equivalent pensionary treatment, leave encashment on retirement must be assessed under the Central Government exemption rather than the general residuary provision.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice issued under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can consolidate multiple financial years or tax periods for the purpose of proposing demand and recovery.

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats tax liability with reference to the relevant tax period and links demand and recovery to the due date for furnishing the annual return for that period. The limitation prescribed for passing orders under Sections 73 and 74 operates year-wise, and a single notice covering different financial years would aggregate distinct tax periods with separate statutory timelines. The Court followed earlier Bombay High Court decisions holding that there is no scope for consolidating various financial years or tax periods in a notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The clubbing of multiple financial years or tax periods in the impugned notice was impermissible, and the notice and consequential order were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent of invalidating the consolidated proceedings under Section 74, while leaving the respondents free to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 must conform to the year-wise tax period structure and limitation scheme of the Act and cannot validly consolidate distinct financial years or tax periods into one proceeding.

Issues: Whether the Foreign Tax Credit could be denied in processing under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, solely because Form 67 was filed after the due date prescribed under section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The return of income and Form 67 were both filed on the same date, and the record supported the claim for Foreign Tax Credit. The delay relied upon by the lower authority was treated as insufficient to deny the substantive entitlement to the credit. The adjustment made at the intimation stage was held to be unjustified in the facts of the case, and the matter was considered covered by prior tribunal decisions cited before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The denial of Foreign Tax Credit was not sustained, and the assessee was held entitled to verification and grant of credit after proper examination of Form 67.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, whose GST registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns and whose portal-based revocation remedy was time-barred, should be permitted to submit the revocation request in physical form and have it considered by the competent authority.

Analysis: The cancellation arose from non-filing of returns for six consecutive months. In view of the time-bar under the portal mechanism, the Court directed that if the petitioner approached the competent authority within one week with an application for revocation in physical form, the authority should entertain it and decide the same in accordance with law within three weeks thereafter.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to receive and decide a physical application for revocation within the stipulated time.

Outcome: The writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to pursue the remedy before the adjudicating authority.

Issues: Whether the writ petitions were maintainable in view of the statutory appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the expiry of the prescribed limitation period.

Analysis: The impugned order was amenable to an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under the statutory scheme. The petitioners did not invoke that remedy within the normal period or the extended period of limitation, and no compelling circumstance was shown to justify bypassing the appellate forum. The Court applied the settled rule that writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not to be exercised where an efficacious alternate remedy exists, and the recognised exceptions to that rule were not made out on the facts.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were not maintainable and were liable to be rejected.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST assessment orders could be interfered with and the matters remitted for fresh consideration, and whether conditional pre-deposit could be directed in respect of the disputed demand including the issue of tax on seigniorage fees under reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The writ petitions challenged assessment orders passed under Section 74 of the GST enactments for alleged short payment of tax and non-payment of tax on seigniorage fees under reverse charge mechanism. The order did not finally decide the taxability dispute on merits. Instead, it adopted a conditional remand course, requiring partial cash pre-deposit within a stipulated time, filing of replies to the show cause notices, and production of supporting documents. It also directed that the bank attachment would stand vacated on compliance.

Outcome: The assessment matters were sent back to the respondent for fresh adjudication subject to pre-deposit and compliance with procedural directions, and interim bank attachment relief was granted conditionally.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's appeal challenging allowance of depreciation on held-to-maturity securities raised any substantial question of law.

Analysis: The questions raised were already covered by earlier decisions of the same Court, including decisions holding the issue in favour of the assessee. In view of the binding precedent, the Court found no basis to re-open the issue merely because the matter was stated to be pending before the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal was liable to be dismissed, and the result was in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the order discharging the accused from prosecution for the offence under Section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be set aside in view of the common finding that the accused was not shown to be in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs.

Analysis: The impugned discharge order rested on a common factual finding applicable to the accused persons that there was no material showing participation in the day-to-day management of the company. That finding had already been interfered with in respect of the Managing Director in connected proceedings. In these circumstances, the same reasoning could not be allowed to stand against the present accused, while preserving the accused's opportunity before the trial court to establish the absence of material linking him to the company's day-to-day affairs.

Conclusion: The discharge order was set aside as against the accused, and the revision was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution against the accused was restored for reconsideration on the question of his role in the company's management, and the challenged discharge did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A discharge founded on the absence of material showing that a director was in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs cannot be sustained where the common basis for that finding has been set aside and the issue requires fresh examination.

Issues: Whether the appeal rejection on limitation was sustainable when the summary of the original order was communicated later and the statutory procedural requirements for uploading the order summary were not shown to have been complied with.

Analysis: The dispute turned on when limitation could properly be computed for the assessee's appeal. The writ court relied on the procedural scheme under the GST rules, including the requirement that the order summary be uploaded electronically and treated as the notice for recovery, and on the earlier view that such compliance is material to preserve appellate remedies. In the circumstances, the later communication of the summary and the plea that the appeal was filed within the relevant period warranted reconsideration of the limitation issue on merits rather than a mechanical rejection.

Conclusion: The limitation-based rejection was set aside and the appeal matter was remitted for fresh consideration on merits and in accordance with law without reference to limitation.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to avail the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 and obtain issuance of Form 4 notwithstanding that the tax payment was made after summons had been issued and the dispute had already been subjected to enquiry or investigation.

Analysis: Relief under the Scheme was governed by the eligibility and exclusion provisions in Sections 124 and 125 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2019. Section 125(1)(f) excluded a person making a voluntary disclosure after being subjected to enquiry or investigation or audit, and Section 124 contemplated relief only in accordance with the quantified tax dues and the statutory deductions. Since summons had been issued before payment was made, the claim fell within the statutory bar. The Court also noted that the mere filing of an application or issuance of a form under the Scheme could not override the statutory ineligibility created by Section 125(1)(f).

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the Scheme or to a direction for issuance of Form 4, and the challenge to the demand and consequential order failed.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the assessee had made an erroneous but bona fide claim for double taxation relief and had disclosed the relevant income in the return.

Analysis: The claim for treaty relief was found to be legally untenable, but the record did not show concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The disallowance arose from a pure question of law and interpretation, based on a plausible understanding of the treaty position before the amendment to Section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not attracted merely because a claim is disallowed; the statutory preconditions of concealment or inaccuracy must be established. The facts did not justify treating the assessee's claim as inflated, deliberate, or false.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not exigible, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide but erroneous legal claim, made on disclosed facts, does not by itself constitute concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars so as to attract penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether 99% VAT retention/remission granted under the State industrial policy was includable in the assessable value of the excisable goods cleared by the appellant.

Analysis: The appellant's VAT retention was treated as a capital subsidy/incentive flowing from the State industrial policy and the remission scheme, and not as an amount retained as part of the sale price or as an additional consideration for the goods. The Tribunal followed its earlier decisions holding that such State-granted incentive/remission does not form part of the assessable value for levy of central excise duty. On that basis, the demand based on inclusion of the retained VAT could not survive.

Conclusion: The VAT remission/retention was not includable in the assessable value, and the duty demand was unsustainable. The appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the demand order was liable to be quashed and the matter remanded for fresh consideration because the authority did not consider the petitioner's explanation regarding delayed movement of goods.

Analysis: The petitioner's reply specifically explained that the e-way bills had been generated on time, but the vehicle could not move on the scheduled date due to a technical fault and became operative only on the next day. The impugned order did not advert to this explanation or the specific grounds raised in the reply. A decision affecting the petitioner's liability had to be made after considering the explanation and by passing a reasoned order. Since that exercise was not undertaken, the order could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the authority to pass a fresh, reasoned and speaking order after considering the petitioner's reply and granting an opportunity of hearing if required.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory order affecting tax liability must consider the assessee's explanation and record reasons; failure to do so vitiates the order and justifies remand for fresh decision.

Issues: Whether the common adjudication order confirming service tax demands after an inordinate delay of about nine years from the show cause notices was sustainable under Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The show cause notices were issued in 2010 and 2011, but the common order was passed only in 2019. Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires adjudication within six months in normal cases and within one year where the extended period applies, where it is possible to do so. The provision reflects a legislative mandate for expeditious disposal and does not permit dormant proceedings to be revived after an unexplained and excessive lapse of time. The Department could not justify keeping the matters in the call book and awaiting the outcome of other proceedings, because each show cause notice is an independent proceeding and nothing prevented timely adjudication. The prolonged inaction resulted in arbitrariness and prejudice to the assessee.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order was time-barred and unsustainable, and the writ petitions were allowed by setting it aside. The merits of whether fabrication falls within the taxable entry were left open.

Ratio Decidendi: Even where the statutory time limit under Section 73(4B) is treated as directory, service tax adjudication cannot be deferred for an inordinate and unexplained period, and a belated order passed after years of departmental inaction is liable to be struck down as arbitrary and contrary to the legislative scheme of prompt determination.

Issues: Whether the activity of laying and repair of electric cables and allied works undertaken for an electricity distribution utility is exempt from service tax as part of transmission and distribution of electricity, and whether the work is covered by the exemption for naturally bundled services and subcontractor services.

Analysis: The activity was found to have a direct and close nexus with transmission and distribution of electricity. Applying the negative list under Section 66D(k) of the Finance Act, 1994 and the principle of bundled services under Section 66F(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, the works performed for the utility were treated as part of the single exempt service that gave the bundle its essential character. The Tribunal also followed the view that exemption under Serial No. 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 extends to subcontractor services when they form part of exempt works contract services.

Conclusion: The activity was not liable to service tax and the demand could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the entire demand was set aside, with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where works undertaken for an electricity distribution utility are naturally bundled with and essential to transmission and distribution of electricity, they assume the character of the exempt main service and do not attract service tax.