Issues: Whether the benefit of the enhanced 10% tolerance band in relation to stamp duty valuation applies retrospectively so as to restrict the addition made under section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the difference between the declared consideration and the stamp duty value is below 10%.

Analysis: The addition arose from the difference between the purchase consideration and the stamp duty valuation of immovable property. The Tribunal followed its earlier co-ordinate bench decisions holding that the amendment introducing the tolerance band is curative in nature and relates back to the date when the anti-avoidance provision was inserted. Since the difference in the present case was 9.91%, it fell within the permissible tolerance limit. The same principle was held applicable to section 56(2)(vii)(b), with the result that the deeming addition based on stamp duty value could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The retrospective benefit of the 10% tolerance band was applied, and the addition sustained by the first appellate authority was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative amendment introducing or enlarging a tolerance band for minor variations between declared consideration and stamp duty valuation applies retrospectively where it removes unintended hardship in an anti-avoidance provision.

Issues: (i) whether tax liability of a deceased assessee can be recovered from the legal representative under Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) whether the assessment order passed after the assessee's death without notice, hearing, and reasons could stand in view of Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): whether tax liability of a deceased assessee can be recovered from the legal representative under Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 93 specifically creates liability in the hands of the legal representative where the assessee dies, including where the business has been discontinued, and permits recovery out of the estate of the deceased to the extent the estate can meet the charge.

Conclusion: The liability, if assessed in accordance with law, is recoverable from the estate of the deceased through the legal representative; the petitioner is not immune from such liability.

Issue (ii): whether the assessment order passed after the assessee's death without notice, hearing, and reasons could stand in view of Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Where adverse tax liability is proposed, an opportunity of hearing must be afforded, and the order must set out relevant facts and the basis of decision. The legal heir was not independently noticed or heard before the order was passed after the assessee's death, and the order did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a reasoned determination.

Conclusion: The assessment order was unsustainable and liable to be quashed for violation of the mandatory hearing and speaking-order requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the impugned assessment was set aside, and the respondents were left free to proceed afresh in accordance with law against the estate of the deceased after giving due opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax liability of a deceased assessee may be fastened on the legal representative under Section 93, but any assessment against the legal representative must comply with the mandatory requirements of prior hearing and a reasoned order under Section 75.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of alleged bogus purchases under section 69C could be sustained where the assessee produced purchase invoices, sales invoices, bank statements and ledger entries, and the Assessing Officer relied only on investigation material without independent enquiry or cross-examination.

Analysis: The assessee had furnished detailed documentary material supporting the purchases and corresponding sales, and the payments were shown through banking channels. The books of account and book results were not shown to be defective. The Assessing Officer relied on the investigation report and statements of third parties, but no corroborative independent enquiry was made and no effective opportunity of cross-examination was granted. In such circumstances, the material relied upon was insufficient to displace the documentary evidence produced by the assessee or to sustain the entire addition as unexplained expenditure.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was , and the Revenue's challenge failed. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether tax was deductible under section 194LBC on Excess Interest Spread paid by a securitisation trust to the originator.

Analysis: Section 194LBC applies only where income is payable to an investor in respect of that investor's investment in the securitisation trust. The originator had not subscribed to pass-through certificates or otherwise invested in the trust, and had maintained its minimum retention requirement through cash collateral. Excess Interest Spread was the residual surplus under the transaction waterfall and did not arise from an investment in the trust. Both statutory conditions for deduction at source were therefore absent.

Conclusion: The payment of Excess Interest Spread to the originator was not subject to tax deduction at source under section 194LBC; the assessee was not an assessee in default, and the demand under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) was liable to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax deduction under section 194LBC arises only where payment is made to an investor in respect of its investment in a securitisation trust; a residual payment to an originator without such investment does not attract the provision.

Issues: (i) Whether gas compressors manufactured for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems were classifiable under Heading 8414 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles; (ii) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments could be sustained on the ground of suppression of facts and wilful misstatement, and consequentially whether the quantification had to proceed under Section 73.

Issue (i): Whether gas compressors manufactured for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems were classifiable under Heading 8414 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles.

Analysis: The classification exercise was held to depend on the tariff scheme under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 read with the GST rate notification, including the relevant Section Notes and the General Rules for Interpretation. On a conjoint reading of Section Note 2, Section Note 2(e) and Section Note 3 to Section XVII, the goods were treated as parts intended solely for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems and not as standalone gas compressors under Heading 8414 for GST rate purposes. The specific heading under Chapter 87 was preferred over the more general Chapter 84 entry, and the Department's view that Heading 8708 applied was accepted.

Conclusion: The classification under Heading 8708 was upheld and the challenge to the rival classification under Heading 8414 failed.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments could be sustained on the ground of suppression of facts and wilful misstatement, and consequentially whether the quantification had to proceed under Section 73.

Analysis: The Court found that the assessees' classification had been consistently adopted over time and had been accepted by the Department, indicating a bona fide classification dispute rather than concealment or deliberate suppression. In such circumstances, invocation of the extended period under Section 74 and the associated penal consequence was not justified. The Court therefore set aside the proceedings to that extent and directed the matter to be reworked on the basis of the proper classification with quantification under the normal provision.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74 was held unsustainable and the matter was remitted for quantification under Section 73.

Final Conclusion: The Department's classification stand was sustained, but the extended-period and suppression-based proceedings were not. The matter was sent back only for fresh computation of tax and penalty under the normal limitation regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a product is specifically designed and used only as a component of motor vehicles, tariff classification must follow the more specific heading applicable to that vehicle part, and an extended limitation/penalty provision cannot be invoked absent wilful suppression or intent to evade tax in a bona fide classification dispute.

Issues: (i) Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. (ii) Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (iii) Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Issue (i): Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.

Analysis: Section 24(1)(a) applies where acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act had commenced but no award had been made before commencement of the 2013 Act. In such cases, the acquisition continues, but the award-making stage is governed by the 2013 Act, save that rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are not retrospectively imported into proceedings initiated under the earlier Act. The provision is a savings clause designed to extend the beneficial regime of the 2013 Act to pending matters at the stage of compensation determination.

Conclusion: The proceedings were correctly treated as governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, and the awards had to be made under the 2013 Act, apart from rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 74 prescribes a limitation period for appeals to the High Court, and its proviso only permits a further period within which the delayed appeal may still be entertained. The 2013 Act does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, and Section 103 states that the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force. Read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the absence of express exclusion means that Section 5 remains available. The statutory scheme does not justify reading an implied exclusion into Section 74.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.

Issue (iii): Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Analysis: Since Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied, and the matters involved appeals against awards under the 2013 Act, the delay applications were liable to be considered on the liberal standard of sufficient cause. The Court found no reason to remit the matters for further delay adjudication and preferred to avoid prolonging the litigation.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the first appeals was condoned and the applications were allowed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned High Court orders were set aside to the extent they had rejected condonation, and the first appeals were permitted to proceed on merits under the 2013 Act regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribing a limitation period does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 remains applicable by virtue of Section 29(2); and for pending land acquisition proceedings culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) requires application of the 2013 Act at the award stage.

Issues: Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 36(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 are unconstitutional or ultra vires, or whether they must be read down so as not to deny input tax credit to a bona fide recipient who has complied with the other conditions for availing credit.

Analysis: Input tax credit is part of the GST scheme designed to avoid cascading of tax. The provision under challenge made entitlement to credit depend on the supplier having actually paid the tax to the Government, even though the recipient has no practical mechanism to verify or control the supplier's compliance. The Court held that this places an onerous and impossible burden on a bona fide purchaser, and that the statute failed to distinguish between honest purchasing dealers and defaulting or collusive transactions. Following the line of authority that a bona fide recipient cannot be penalised for the supplier's default, the Court held that the provision need not be struck down if it is confined by interpretation to non-bona fide, collusive, or fraudulent transactions. Rule 36(4) was treated consistently with that approach.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) and Rule 36(4) were upheld in validity but read down so that denial of input tax credit is confined to transactions that are not bona fide or are collusive or fraudulent, and not to a bona fide recipient who otherwise satisfies the statutory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax credit condition that makes a bona fide recipient's entitlement depend on the supplier's act of remittance, despite the recipient having no effective control over that act, must be read down to avoid unconstitutional arbitrariness and to preserve the credit mechanism in genuine transactions.

Issues: Whether medicines and consumables supplied by a hospital pharmacy to in-patients during the course of diagnosis and treatment form part of a composite supply of healthcare services and are exempt under the relevant GST exemption entry.

Analysis: Health care services rendered by a clinical establishment are exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). Inpatient services include the complete gamut of hospital services provided under the direction of medical doctors till discharge, and the classification notes specifically encompass medical, pharmaceutical, nursing, laboratory and other allied services. Medicines and consumables supplied to in-patients are naturally bundled with the principal healthcare service and are supplied in conjunction with it in the ordinary course of business. Under section 2(30), such a bundle is a composite supply, and under section 8(a) it takes the tax character of the principal supply.

Conclusion: The supply of medicines and consumables to in-patients by the hospital pharmacy is part of a composite supply of healthcare services and is exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read with section 8(a) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Where medicines and consumables are supplied to in-patients as an integral and naturally bundled part of hospital treatment, the supply is a composite supply whose tax treatment follows the exempt principal supply of healthcare services.

Issues: Whether software expenses of Rs. 28,24,19,000/- incurred by the assessee for annual maintenance, database support and licence renewal are revenue in nature and deductible under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or are capital expenditure entitling the Assessing Officer to treat them as capital with depreciation.

Analysis: The expenditure comprises annual maintenance charges, fees for database support and licence renewal and has been characterized in the assessee's books as recurring period costs. The payments were for subscription/usage for fixed periods and did not transfer ownership or create any proprietary software asset or intellectual property in favour of the assessee. No cogent material was placed on record to demonstrate creation of a capital asset or enduring benefit beyond the annual period. Prior decisions of coordinate benches and some High Courts treating similar recurring software/subscription costs as revenue expenditure were applied to the facts.

Conclusion: The software expenses are revenue in nature, constitute period/recurring costs, and are deductible under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the addition made by the Assessing Officer is deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether remuneration paid to a working partner is allowable under Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite an inadvertent incorrect reference to old limits in the partnership deed; (ii) Whether commission income shown in Form 26AS but not received in the year and accounted on cash basis is taxable for Assessment Year 2013-14.

Issue (i): Allowability of partner's remuneration where the partnership deed contains an inadvertent incorrect tabulation of limits but expressly adopts the definition of "book profit" as per Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The partnership deed authorises payment of remuneration and explicitly refers to the definition of "book profit" as per Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or statutory modification thereof. The dispute concerns quantification of remuneration determined by the firm and an inadvertent clerical error in the deed's tabulated limits. The limiting formula under Section 40(b) governs allowability; quantification is for the firm to decide and remuneration actually offered to tax by the partner indicates receipt and taxation in his hands. No loss to revenue arises from allowing the remuneration within the correct limits prescribed by Section 40(b).

Conclusion: The remuneration quantified and claimed by the assessee is allowable under Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the addition of Rs. 31,30,490 is deleted. Conclusion: in favour of assessee.

Issue (ii): Taxability of commission income reflected in Form 26AS but not received in the relevant year where the assessee follows a consistent cash basis accounting policy and offers such amounts to tax only on receipt.

Analysis: The assessee consistently follows a cash basis accounting policy, discloses it in notes to accounts, and did not receive the commission in the year under consideration. Documentary evidence establishes that the commission and corresponding TDS were offered to tax and TDS credit claimed in the subsequent assessment year. Recognition on cash basis defers taxation until receipt; Form 26AS entry alone does not alter the accounting/tax treatment where the assessee's policy and records show non-receipt in the year.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 3,77,617 on account of commission income is not tenable and is deleted. Conclusion: in favour of assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both contested additions are deleted and the appeal is allowed, resulting in deletion of the disallowance under Section 40(b) and the commission income addition; the assessee succeeds on the decided issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a partnership deed authorises payment of remuneration and expressly adopts the definition of book profit under Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an inadvertent clerical error in the deed's tabulated limits does not defeat allowability if the remuneration, as quantified by the firm, falls within the correct statutory limits; similarly, consistent cash basis accounting defers taxation of commission income until actual receipt despite an entry in Form 26AS.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of purchases amounting to Rs. 9,00,63,954/- held to be unexplained expenditure and added as income under Section 69C read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified when the assessee had filed documents and evidences during assessment and appellate proceedings.

Analysis: The appeal examines whether the authorities below rightly concluded that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness and creditworthiness of purchases. Relevant statutory provisions include Section 69C and Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning unexplained expenditure and deemed income. The record shows extensive documentary material was filed by the assessee during assessment proceedings and before the appellate authority, including purchase invoices, confirmations, creditors ledgers, annual accounts, tax audit reports, bank statements, e-way bills, freight bills and e-proceedings acknowledgements, as indexed in the paper book. The authorities below proceeded on the finding that only confirmations were furnished and that balance sheets, bank statements and transportation evidence were not provided; the appellate record demonstrates these findings to be incorrect. The material filed remained unverified by the revenue despite being on record, and the appellate order failed to apply principles of fair hearing and verification, infringing audi alteram partem and resulting in a mechanical and callous disposal of the issue.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 9,00,63,954/- as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not justified; the addition is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of expenditure of Rs. 36,15,769/- under the legal regime governing expenditure relating to exempt income (Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962) is sustainable where the assessee made a suo-motu limited disallowance and contended that investments were from interest-free own funds.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the Assessing Officer recorded a reasoned dissatisfaction with the assessee's suo-motu computation as a condition precedent to apply the prescribed method under Rule 8D. The Tribunal applied the settled legal tests requiring a discernible nexus between the accounts examined and the conclusion of dissatisfaction, as articulated by higher courts. It found that the AO had identified that the assessee's suo-motu disallowance omitted common overheads (rent, utilities, senior management time, etc.) despite large investment balances, and had recorded reasons grounded in the financial statements. The Tribunal also analysed the scope of Rule 8D and noted that once a valid dissatisfaction is recorded, the AO must compute disallowance by the prescribed method; the character of funding (own funds versus borrowed funds) was not decisive where the AO limited computation to administrative/indirect expenses under Rule 8D(2)(ii). The Tribunal further considered and distinguished coordinate orders relied upon by the assessee as factually different and not creating a general bar to invoking Rule 8D when indirect costs are unaccounted for. The Tribunal agreed with the appellate authority that the disallowance principleually stood but directed recomputation strictly using the monthly average of investments furnished by the assessee.

Conclusion: The Tribunal holds that the Assessing Officer validly recorded the requisite dissatisfaction and properly invoked Rule 8D; the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D is sustained, subject to recomputation using the monthly average of investments as directed by the CIT(A). The appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Assessing Officer, after examination of accounts, records a reasoned dissatisfaction that the assessee's suo-motu apportionment omits common overheads, the prescribed method under Rule 8D must be invoked and applied (using monthly average of investments) to determine the disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether an assessment order passed confirming proposals in a show cause notice uploaded on the GST portal without providing an opportunity of personal hearing and without exploring alternate modes of service is valid; and whether the impugned order should be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration when part recovery of the disputed tax has already been effected.

Analysis: The show cause notice was served by uploading on the GST online portal but the petitioner did not receive or respond to the notice and was not afforded a personal hearing before the impugned order was passed. Sending notices by upload on the portal is a recognised mode of service; however, where there is no response from the taxpayer, the tax officer must apply mind and explore other modes of service prescribed under Section 169(1) of the GST law (for example by RPAD) to ensure effective service and to secure the opportunity of personal hearing. Failure to do so renders any ex parte confirmation in the assessment order susceptible to challenge. The petitioner has already suffered recovery of a portion of the disputed tax, and in light of the absence of an effective opportunity to be heard, a remand for fresh consideration is appropriate to enable filing of objections and to secure a personal hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order passed without effective service and without a personal hearing is set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner is permitted to file reply/objections within three weeks of receipt of the order; on filing, the authority shall issue a clear 14 days notice fixing a date for personal hearing and thereafter decide the matter on merits in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service by electronic portal alone does not elicit a response, the assessing officer must explore alternate prescribed modes of service and afford a personal hearing; failure to ensure effective service and opportunity to be heard renders an ex parte assessment order liable to be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether the delay of 69 days in filing the appeal against the assessment order should be condoned and the impugned rejection order set aside subject to conditions.

Analysis: The assessment order was dated 23.08.2024 and the appeal was filed on 28.02.2025 with a delay of 69 days beyond the condonnable period. The petitioner attributed the delay to the pendency of a rectification application and offered to pay an additional 10% of the disputed tax amount over and above the statutory pre-deposit. Having examined the factual chronology and the remedial mechanism available to an appellant under the statutory appellate regime, the circumstances relied upon (pendency of rectification application) are found to be a plausible ground for extending condonation. The petitioner's offer to make an additional payment as a term for condoning the delay is a recognised equitable condition to secure the public revenue while permitting adjudication on merits. Accordingly, subject to the agreed payment, procedural relief by setting aside the rejection and permitting the appeal to be admitted is directed, with the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merits after affording opportunity to the appellant.

Conclusion: The delay of 69 days is condoned; the appeal rejection order dated 09.04.2025 is set aside subject to payment of an additional 10% of the disputed tax amount (over and above statutory pre-deposit). Upon such payment the appellate authority is directed to admit the appeal on record and decide it on merits after providing sufficient opportunity to the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition under section 50C based on an original stamp duty valuation which was subsequently revised by the stamp valuation authority is sustainable; (ii) Whether exemption under section 54F is maintainable where the assessee entered into an agreement for an under-construction flat prior to the one-year pre-transfer period but received possession within two years after transfer and whether the proviso regarding ownership of other residential houses is attracted; (iii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be sustained when the quantum additions forming its basis are deleted and the controversy is one of interpretation and bona fide disclosure.

Issue (i): Whether the addition under section 50C based on the original stamp duty valuation was sustainable.

Analysis: The original stamp duty valuation was revised by the competent stamp valuation authority by a Supplementary/Clarification Deed which excluded an approach road wrongly included earlier and reduced the stamp duty value. The revised valuation was lower than the declared consideration. A deeming provision that substitutes declared consideration with stamp duty value operates only where the stamp duty value represents a legally valid and factually correct market value. A valuation which has been rectified by the stamp authority for a fundamental factual error loses its evidentiary and statutory relevance for invoking the deeming fiction.

Conclusion: The addition under section 50C is deleted; decision in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 54F though the agreement for the new house predates one year before transfer, and whether the proviso barring exemption because of ownership of another residential house applies.

Analysis: For under-construction properties purchased from builders, the relevant consideration is the substance of the transaction - completion, substantial payment, and receipt of possession - rather than the mere date of the initial agreement. The assessee made staged payments over years, took possession within two years of transfer of the original asset, and the investment was restricted to the extent of capital gains. The statutory proviso requires excluding the new asset from the count of residential houses; excluding the new asset, the assessee owned only one other residential house on the date of transfer.

Conclusion: The disallowance of exemption under section 54F is deleted and the exemption is allowed; decision in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be sustained.

Analysis: The penalty was levied solely on the basis of the quantum additions which have been deleted. Additionally, the dispute involved legal and interpretational questions supported by documentary evidence and precedent, with full disclosure by the assessee. Where the foundational quantum additions are deleted and the controversy is not one warranting penal consequences, penalty cannot survive.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(c) is deleted; decision in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed in part on quantum and in entirety on penalty, resulting in deletion of the section 50C addition, allowance of the section 54F exemption, and deletion of the penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A deeming provision substituting declared consideration with stamp duty value cannot be applied where the stamp valuation is shown to be factually erroneous and has been revised by the competent stamp authority; for under-construction purchases from builders, the date for qualifying reinvestment is determined by substantial completion and possession within the statutory period rather than by the initial agreement date, and the new asset is excluded when applying the proviso on ownership for section 54F.

Issues: Whether the statutory pre-deposit mandated by Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 as a condition precedent for entertaining an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) can be relaxed or permitted to be paid in installments so as to enable the appellant to have its appeal entertained.

Analysis: The Court examined the mandatory nature of the pre-deposit requirement under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 and recognised that the right of appeal is subject to statutory conditions. The Court also recognised that where immediate compliance would render the right of appeal illusory because of genuine financial constraints, the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction may strike a balance by permitting substantial compliance through a structured payment plan while safeguarding revenue interests. Applying these principles to the appellant's proposal filed during hearing, the Court considered the need to enable the statutory remedy to be pursued without wholly nullifying the pre-deposit mandate and framed an instalment schedule which permits the CESTAT to admit and proceed with the appeal upon initial payment while preserving the requirement of full deposit before final disposal.

Conclusion: The Court allowed the appellant relief by setting aside the impugned order and directing that CESTAT shall entertain the appeal upon deposit of Rs.2.00 Crore by the next listed date, followed by Rs.3.00 Crore within three months and the remaining Rs.5.00 Crore within a further three months; CESTAT may proceed pending full payment but shall pronounce final order only after deposit of the entire Rs.10.00 Crore. The decision is in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether the delay of 847 days in filing the sales tax revision petition should be condoned.

Analysis: The affidavit filed in support of condonation did not explain a substantial part of the delay. The chronology showed long unexplained gaps, including a period of more than one year after receipt of the impugned order and another long interregnum after the alleged change of Law Officers. Routine movement of files was found to be no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay, and the reasons disclosed were held to be insufficient even on a minimal scrutiny.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the application for condonation was rejected.

Issues: Whether business auxiliary services rendered by the assessee to an overseas group entity qualify as export of services under the Export of Services Rules, 2005 and therefore are not taxable under Section 65(19) sub-clause (iv) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The services comprised facilitation/commission for overseas suppliers who contracted directly with Indian customers, with consideration received in convertible foreign exchange. Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 and Circular No. 111/5/2009 recognise the location of the service receiver as the relevant criterion for export of services. The question was authoritatively addressed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Service Tax-III v. Vodafone India Limited (2025), which affirmed that where the receiver of the service is located outside India, the activity falls within export of services and is not taxable even if the eventual use or performance has connection with India; the decision in A.T.E. Enterprises was similarly treated as covered by the Supreme Court's disposal. Applying these principles to the facts where the overseas group entity was the contractual recipient and payer, the services meet the export of services criteria under the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the respondent (assessee): the business auxiliary services rendered to the overseas entity qualify as export of services and are not exigible to service tax under Section 65(19) sub-clause (iv) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the receiver of services is located outside India, the activity qualifies as export of services under Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005, and such services are not taxable under Section 65(19) sub-clause (iv) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: (i) Whether the batch of review petitions under Section 47 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 satisfy limited grounds for review (mistake apparent on face of record, discovery of new evidence or any other sufficient reason) so as to set aside the Tribunal's earlier order; (ii) Whether the declaration made under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (certified by the Principal Commissioner and tax paid) was nullified by the Assessing Authority such that the certificate can be treated as void; (iii) Whether the statement of Yogendra Raj Singhvi, including his subsequent retraction, constituted admissible and corroborative evidence to establish deposit/rotation of cash and thereby a benami transaction.

Issue (i): Whether the review petitions disclose grounds sufficient for review under the limited jurisdiction applicable to review applications.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled tests for review (mistake apparent on the face of the record; discovery of new and important evidence; any other sufficient reason analogous to these grounds) as explained in the Supreme Court authority. The petitioners did not demonstrate a manifest error on the face of the record, nor did they produce new evidence that was previously unavailable despite due diligence. The Tribunal examined the factual basis relied upon by the review applicants and found no foundational factual error needing correction.

Conclusion: Review dismissed; no ground for review is made out.

Issue (ii): Whether the Assessing Authority validly nullified the certificate issued under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 thereby rendering the declaration void and affecting the Tribunal's prior decision.

Analysis: The Tribunal required the review applicants to identify any scheme provision empowering the Assessing Authority to nullify a certificate issued under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016. No such provision was shown. The valuation was certified by a registered valuer and not credibly impeached. The Assessing Authority's order purportedly treating the declaration as forged lacked evidence of hearing and did not set out sufficient grounds; thus it suffered from procedural infirmity and could not be relied upon to overturn the certified declaration for purposes of establishing benami transactions.

Conclusion: The contention that the declaration/certificate is void is rejected; no basis shown to treat the declaration as null and void.

Issue (iii): Whether the statement of Yogendra Raj Singhvi, despite retraction, furnished the necessary corroborative evidence of cash deposits/rotation to sustain a finding of benami transaction and provisional attachment.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the allegation of cash deposits and rotation required foundational proof such as bank statements. The review applicants relied principally on the recorded statement of Yogendra Raj Singhvi which was promptly retracted. The respondents had not produced independent corroborative financial records (bank statements or equivalent) establishing deposit of cash by the noticees. The retracted statement, without corroboration, was insufficient to discharge the onus of proof required to sustain provisional attachment or a benami finding.

Conclusion: The statement, being retracted and uncorroborated, does not support a case for benami transaction or warrant review.

Final Conclusion: The review applications do not disclose any manifest error, new material fact, or other sufficient reason warranting interference with the Tribunal's earlier order; accordingly all review petitions are dismissed and the Tribunal's prior decision stands.

Ratio Decidendi: Review under Section 47 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 is permissible only on limited grounds-mistake apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important evidence previously unavailable with due diligence, or other reasons analogous thereto-and absent such grounds (including absence of corroborative foundational evidence for alleged cash deposits), review must be denied.

Issues: (i) Whether delay of 298 days in filing appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals)/NFAC should be condoned; (ii) Whether gratuity of Rs.7,19,063 is exempt from tax under section 10(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Whether commuted pension of Rs.15,25,689 is exempt from tax under section 10(10A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iv) Whether addition of Rs.3,84,000 made as unexplained money under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 298 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals)/NFAC should be condoned.

Analysis: Affidavit evidence establishes relocation, non-receipt of notices at earlier address, limited digital literacy, and reliance on a tax consultant; precedent principles favour preferring substantial justice over technical disallowance of appeals where sufficient cause exists; the period and reasons were evaluated in context and compared with authorities allowing condonation for longer delays.

Conclusion: Delay of 298 days is condoned and the appeal is admitted for adjudication on merits in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether gratuity of Rs.7,19,063 is exempt under section 10(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Salary certificate (Form 16) from the employer confirms receipt and nature of the amount as death-cum-retirement gratuity; no additional documentary requirement was shown to be necessary to establish exemption; the disallowance by the assessing authority rested on absence of reply rather than on any substantive dispute regarding entitlement to statutory exemption.

Conclusion: Rs.7,19,063 is exempt under section 10(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the addition against salary is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether commuted pension of Rs.15,25,689 is exempt under section 10(10A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Employer-issued salary documentation supports the characterisation of the receipt as commuted pension; the assessing authority's addition was founded on non-production of documents despite the Form 16 confirmation; no basis was shown for treating the amount as taxable salary rather than exempt commuted pension.

Conclusion: Rs.15,25,689 is exempt under section 10(10A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the corresponding addition is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the addition of Rs.3,84,000 as unexplained money under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable.

Analysis: Declared income and accepted pension/retirement receipts provide a legitimate and sufficient source for the time deposit; interest from the deposit was declared; the addition was based on conjecture without evidence disproving the declared source; no books or assets indicating undisclosed wealth were shown.

Conclusion: Addition of Rs.3,84,000 under section 69A is deleted and the addition is disallowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on merits after condoning delay; exemptions under section 10(10) and section 10(10A) are upheld and the addition under section 69A is deleted, resulting in a decision favourable to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: When statutory exemptions are supported by employer-issued salary certification and the assessee's declared income adequately accounts for an investment, additions as unexplained income under section 69A cannot be sustained on conjecture; condonation of delay is warranted where sufficient cause is shown and substantial justice requires merit adjudication.