Issues: (i) Whether service of notices solely by making them available on the GST common portal is valid when the petitioner's GST registration stood cancelled; (ii) Whether the impugned order violates the statutory mandate under Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not granting an opportunity of personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether portal-only service is valid after cancellation of GST registration.

Analysis: Section 169 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes multiple permissible modes of service including direct tender, registered post/courier, email, availability on the common portal and, where other modes are impracticable, affixation or publication. Where the petitioner's registration was cancelled, reliance solely on portal-based service imposes a duty to monitor the portal on a non-registered person and may fail to communicate the notice effectively. Prior authority dealing with identical facts was considered and applied.

Conclusion: Portal-only service is not a valid mode of service where the petitioner's registration had been cancelled; service was not effected in accordance with Section 169 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order violated the requirement of Section 75(4) to grant an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) embodies the principle of audi alteram partem and requires that an opportunity of hearing be granted where a request is received in writing or an adverse decision is contemplated. Fiscal adjudications must comply with principles of natural justice and failure to afford a hearing renders proceedings vulnerable. The absence of personal hearing in the circumstances was examined in light of settled principles.

Conclusion: The impugned order violates Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not providing the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order is quashed; the petitioner is permitted to file a reply to the show-cause notice and the Department may issue a fresh notice and adjudicate afresh, ensuring effective service and providing personal hearing in terms of Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Where registration has been cancelled, service solely by making notices available on the GST common portal does not satisfy the service requirements of Section 169 and an adjudicatory order affecting rights must be preceded by an opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) to comply with audi alteram partem and natural justice.

Issues: Whether the ex parte best judgment assessment order dated 24.03.2025 passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income tax Act, 1961, can be set aside on the ground that the Interim Resolution Professional (appointed under Section 16 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016) and the company's management were bona fide prevented from placing material before the Assessing Officer during the stay/seizure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under Section 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and whether the assessee is entitled to a fresh notice and opportunity to be heard.

Analysis: The record shows appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional and subsequent stay that effectively halted the CIRP, resulting in the IRP being de jure in charge but lacking effective access to facts, transactions and documents, while the management lacked legal authority to represent the company. The additions made by the Assessing Officer relate to the cost of acquisition of property which was not placed before the Assessing Officer. Given the inability of the IRP and management to present factual and legal pleas before assessment, and the practical obstacles to obtaining effective relief on appeal (including payment conditions that would be onerous for a company emerging from insolvency), the appellate remedy would be illusory. In these circumstances, the impugned ex parte best judgment assessment requires setting aside and remanding for issuance of a fresh/comprehensive notice with an adequate period to respond; on receipt of the reply and documents the Assessing Officer should pass a fresh order in accordance with law and, if expedient, afford an audience to the authorised representative.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 24.03.2025 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed; the Assessing Officer shall issue a fresh/comprehensive notice (if any additions are proposed), allow at least thirty days to respond and furnish documents, and thereafter pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to a fresh opportunity to be heard.

Issues: (i) Whether the funds sold by the assessee are equity-oriented funds and liable to tax as long-term capital gains under Section 112A or taxable as short-term capital gains; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer's acceptance of declared Annual Letting Value (ALV) for various properties was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue requiring revision under Section 263; (iii) Whether non-initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271C for alleged failure to deduct TDS under Section 194C renders the assessment order erroneous and subject to revision under Section 263.

Issue (i): Whether the funds sold are equity-oriented funds and liable to tax under Section 112A as long-term capital gains.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the fund details, including ISIN codes and fund statements submitted with the assessment record, and noted that the Assessing Officer had considered these details during scrutiny and formed an opinion that they were equity-oriented. The revisional order did not indicate materials or reasoning by which the Authority for Revision could legitimately conclude the funds were not equity-oriented; the revisional exercise under Section 263 requires material basis for concluding an assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on this issue and found the funds to be equity-oriented for the purposes of taxation under Section 112A.

Issue (ii): Whether the ALV declared and accepted by the Assessing Officer for various properties was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Analysis: For each property, the Tribunal reviewed materials on record (declarations, earlier years' acceptance, municipal/authority assessment where applicable, use of property for professional/commercial purposes, and evidence of sale or construction status). The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had before him material and explanations and had formed an opinion accepting the declared ALV or the commercial/residential use. The revisional order failed to set out a reasoned basis or specific contrary material to justify treating the assessment as erroneous and prejudicial; generalized references to market yields or an AI overview were insufficient to displace the Assessing Officer's considered view.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee and quashed the revisional directions on ALV for the properties addressed.

Issue (iii): Whether the Commissioner could, under Section 263, set aside the assessment for non-initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271C for alleged failure to deduct tax under Section 194C.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied established precedent that initiation of penalty proceedings is a matter of satisfaction of the Assessing Officer and that the Commissioner cannot, by invoking Section 263, set aside an assessment solely to direct initiation of penalty where no material justifying such revision is recorded in the revisional order.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee and held that the revisional direction to initiate penalty proceedings was not sustainable under Section 263.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the revisional order lacked requisite material and reasoned findings to sustain revision under Section 263 on the issues of fund classification, ALV of properties, and initiation of penalty proceedings; accordingly, the revision order was quashed and the appeal allowed, subject only to verification of the purchase/cost of acquisition of one fund item as directed.

Ratio Decidendi: A revisional order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid only where the Commissioner records material and reasons showing that the subordinate authority's order is prima facie erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue; absent such material and reasoned findings, the revisional power cannot be exercised to substitute an alternate view or to direct fresh investigation.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to consideration for Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) benefits despite filing manual/non-EDI bills of export and inability to submit e-BRC details through the DGFT e-Com portal.

Analysis: The Court examined prior decisions of coordinate and other High Courts which have held that where exports are validly effected on the strength of bills of export, procedural requirements such as e-EDI registration or issuance of e-BRCs cannot be used to deny statutory benefits under schemes like MEIS. The Court noted directions in earlier Division Bench decisions permitting manual transmission or correction of bills and mandating processing of MEIS claims where entitlement exists. Applying those precedents and the principle of maintaining parity in treatment, the Court found that the petitioner's inability to complete the online application due to non-issuance of e-BRCs (attributable to manual bills) should not result in summary rejection of the claim.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to have its MEIS claim considered on merits and the petitioner shall be permitted to submit manual application and supporting documents; the respondents shall not reject the claim solely on the ground of non-submission through the online process and shall consider the claim in accordance with extant policy. The minutes dated 09.06.2020 are set aside and the petition is disposed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where exports are validly effected on the strength of bills of export, procedural or electronic compliance requirements (such as e-EDI registration or e-BRC issuance) cannot be invoked to deny entitlement to benefits under MEIS; administrative authorities must consider such claims on merits and permit manual submissions or corrections to ensure parity of treatment.

Issues: Whether the attachment of an ancestral property as "equivalent value" under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible where the actual tainted property cannot be traced and the property was not purchased by the accused from proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The adjudicatory framework permits provisional attachment of property believed to be proceeds of crime. The definition of "proceeds of crime" in Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 encompasses not only property derived from criminal activity but also the value of such property and property equivalent in value when the tainted property is taken or held outside the country. Where the investigating authority is unable to locate the actual tainted property, the statute allows attachment of untainted property equivalent in value. There is no statutory exemption for ancestral or inherited property; prior acquisition does not automatically preclude attachment as equivalent value if evidence supports that the attached property represents the value equivalent of proceeds of crime. The impugned findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority that the property represented value equivalent to proceeds of crime were considered on the material placed on record, and the appellate forum applied the statutory scheme to uphold the attachment.

Conclusion: The attachment of the subject ancestral property as equivalent value under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible; the appeal is dismissed in favour of the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where actual tainted property cannot be traced, Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 authorises attachment of property equivalent in value, and ancestral or prior acquisition of property does not by itself prevent such attachment.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest on delayed refund of excise duty deposited under protest and, if so, from which date and at what rate.

Analysis: The petitioner deposited excise duty under protest and obtained favourable orders on appeal. Multiple letters seeking refund were sent to the respondent, and the respondent eventually directed formal applications and processed the refund only after pursuing appellate remedies. Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (w.e.f. 26.05.1995) prescribes entitlement to interest on refunds and provides the framework for rate and commencement; for pending refund applications interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of introduction of the Finance Bill, 1995. The record shows the petitioner sought refund prior to 26.05.1995 and continued to press for refund thereafter; the respondent did not contest receipt of earlier refund requests and delayed sanction until 29.12.2000.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to interest on the refunded excise duty at the rate notified by the Government and prevailing for the relevant period, commencing after the expiry of three months from 26.05.1995. The petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017 is vitiated for non-compliance with the requirement of personal hearing under Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017 and consequent violation of the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The petition record shows a show cause notice dated 23.07.2024 fixing personal hearing on 23.12.2024, non-appearance by the petitioner on that date, and an original order under Section 74 dated 20.01.2025 passed without giving a fresh notice specifying date, time and venue for hearing on 20.01.2025. The decision follows the precedent of the Coordinate Bench in Shubham Steel Traders v. State of U.P., which addresses the requirement of granting an opportunity of personal hearing in similar circumstances. The analysis focuses on compliance with the statutory hearing requirements in Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017 and the application of principles of natural justice where no fresh hearing opportunity was afforded before passing the impugned order under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017 is quashed for failure to afford the petitioner a personal hearing in compliance with Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017; authorities are directed to grant fresh opportunity of hearing and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, resultantly disposal is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, under Section 83(7) of the Finance Act, 2010, provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (including Section 11A relating to recovery) could be made applicable to assessment and recovery of Clean Environment Cess by notification, and whether the impugned Notification No. 2/2010 is intra vires.

Analysis: Section 83(7) of the Finance Act, 2010 authorises the Central Government to declare applicability of specified provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to matters relating to cess. The text of Section 83(7) employs the legislative device of incorporation by reference, enabling direct extension of an existing statutory regime. Established authorities and lexical meaning support a broad understanding of the term "levy" to encompass assessment, computation and collection processes. Section 84 confers a separate rule-making power to prescribe detailed procedures, but the existence of that power does not preclude use of Section 83(7)'s incorporation device. The legislative scheme-read as a whole-permits the Central Government either to frame detailed rules under Section 84 or to adopt, by notification under Section 83(7), the existing Central Excise provisions for assessment and recovery of the cess. Given that "levy" includes assessment and collection, extending Central Excise provisions by notification for recovery of Clean Environment Cess falls within the scope of Section 83(7).

Conclusion: The impugned Notification No. 2/2010-Clean Energy Cess, dated 22-6-2010, insofar as it makes applicable provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (including Section 11A) to assessment and recovery of Clean Environment Cess, is intra vires the Finance Act, 2010; the writ petition is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Authority under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 has power to remit the matter back to the adjudicating authority.

Analysis: The Court examined sub-clause (11) of Section 107 which prescribes that the Appellate Authority shall, after such further inquiry as may be necessary, pass such order as it thinks just and proper, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against but shall not refer the case back to the adjudicating authority that passed the said decision or order. The Court compared the impugned appellate orders which, after recording findings favourable to the petitioner on export conditions, proceeded to remit the matters to the adjudicating authority to re-determine place of supply. Reliance was placed on the Court's earlier decision in Anand & Anand (Law Firm) and on Kronos Solutions India (P.) Ltd. v. UOI where identical statutory prohibition on remand was held to preclude remitting the matter, and the appellate authority was directed to decide appeals on merits. The respondents conceded there is no provision for remand by the Appellate Authority and did not dispute the effect of Section 107(11).

Conclusion: The later part of the appellate orders dated 30.04.2024 (Leading), 28.06.2024 (connected C-1), 31.05.2024 (connected C2) and 31.05.2024 (connected C3) insofar as they remit the matters to the adjudicating authority are set aside; the Joint Commissioner, CGST (Appeals), Noida is directed to decide the appeals in accordance with law within two months.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation could be sustained where the adjudication order and notice to show cause were not properly served on the petitioner but only uploaded on the authority's portal.

Analysis: It is not in dispute that the notice to show cause and the adjudication order were not served upon the petitioner by any mode except by uploading them on the portal under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab. Where a party is not duly served and therefore lacks knowledge of the adjudication order, the period of limitation for filing an appeal does not commence. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of delay without addressing the failure of service and the consequent absence of knowledge. The petitioner approached the appellate authority immediately upon obtaining knowledge of the adjudication order. Given these facts, the technical delay is capable of being condoned and the appellate authority should have considered service and knowledge before dismissing the appeal on limitation grounds.

Conclusion: The appellate order dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay is set aside; the delay is condoned and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for fresh consideration on merits. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 without fixing or granting any fresh personal hearing and without compliance with Section 75(4) (and Section 75(6)) is in violation of the principle of natural justice and therefore liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The impugned order was passed after an earlier show cause notice which fixed a hearing date; the petitioner did not attend that earlier date and no fresh notice was served fixing a definite date, time and venue for hearing before passing the order on 20.01.2025. The provisions of Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require opportunity of hearing and compliance with principles of natural justice in adjudication under the GST framework. The matter is governed by the Coordinate Bench decision in Shubham Steel Traders v. State of U.P., which holds that passing an order without affording a fresh, definite hearing opportunity where none was served violates natural justice. Applying that principle and the statutory requirement of a hearing opportunity, the original order under Section 74, having been passed without fixing or granting a fresh personal hearing, is procedurally flawed.

Conclusion: The order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is quashed and set aside; the authorities are directed to grant another opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter pass an order in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether officers are competent under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to issue a single composite show cause notice and pass a consolidated adjudication order covering multiple financial/assessment years.

Analysis: The statutory scheme governing initiation and limitation under Section 74 requires the determination year-wise because the limitation for adjudication is pegged to the due date for furnishing the annual return of the specific financial year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised relates. Consolidated notices covering multiple years can curtail the period available to an assessee to adduce evidence and defend years whose limitation period would otherwise expire later, and can multiply the assessed liability and appellate pre-deposit burden contrary to the year-specific language of subsections (9) and (10) of Section 74. Prior decisions holding composite notices unsustainable explained that consolidated adjudication is permissible only where a statute provides a common initiation and completion period; comparable provisions in other Acts (for example Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944) demonstrate that year-agnostic consolidation is statute-specific. Orders dismissing Special Leave Petitions in limine do not operate as precedents on the merits and therefore do not preclude application of the Division Bench reasoning that consolidated notices cause prejudice and exceed officer powers under the CGST scheme.

Conclusion: Composite show cause notices and consolidated adjudication orders for multiple financial/assessment years issued under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are unsustainable; the impugned composite notices and orders are quashed, with liberty to issue separate notices for each relevant assessment year and complete proceedings in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether late fee leviable under Section 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be imposed by processing TDS returns under Section 200A(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for defaults occurring prior to 01.06.2015, and (ii) Whether the matter should be remitted for recomputation of late fee limited to the period from 01.06.2015 until filing of the TDS return.

Analysis: Relevant enactments include Section 234E (late fee) introduced with effect from 01.07.2012 and the summary processing mechanism under Section 200A introduced earlier, with clause (c) of Section 200A(1) (authorising levy by processing) inserted effective 01.06.2015. Coordinate tribunal and High Court decisions reflect two views: one treating levy by processing prior to 01.06.2015 as ultra vires, and another treating Section 234E as a self-contained substantive liability independent of Section 200A(1)(c). A series of coordinate-bench tribunal precedents hold that the amendment authorising levy by processing is prospective and therefore late fee under Section 234E can be imposed by processing only from 01.06.2015. Where appeals involved pre-01.06.2015 processing, those precedents direct recalculation limiting levy to the period from 01.06.2015. In one appeal the first appellate authority dismissed on delay; principles favouring condonation of delay in the interests of substantial justice permit consideration on merits and application of the concluded position on prospective application of Section 200A(1)(c).

Conclusion: (i) The levy of late fee under Section 234E by summary processing under Section 200A(1)(c) is not applicable retrospectively and is to be applied only from 01.06.2015 onward; (ii) Appeals where returns were processed before 01.06.2015 are to be relieved of fees attributable to the period prior to 01.06.2015 and matters remitted for recomputation of late fee limited to the period from 01.06.2015 until the date of filing of the relevant TDS return. The result is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) under Section 69A of the Income tax Act, 1961 is vitiated where the dispute relates to a loan and the proper charging section is Section 68; (ii) Whether the cash deposits of Rs.11,61,000 were satisfactorily explained by the assessee and the sustained addition of Rs.6,61,000 is liable to be deleted.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made under Section 69A of the Income tax Act, 1961 is sustainable when the transaction is a loan and the correct provision is Section 68 of the Income tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the nature of the transaction (loan) and the statutory scope of Section 69A (unexplained money, bullion, jewellery or valuable article) vis a vis Section 68 (unexplained cash credit). The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer applied Section 69A instead of considering Section 68 and that such misapplication amounted to non application of mind. The Tribunal relied on precedents holding that additions made under an incorrect charging section are vitiated and directed that appeal effect be given to this finding.

Conclusion: The addition sustained under Section 69A is not sustainable; the matter is vitiated by application of an incorrect charging section and the ground is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee satisfactorily explained the cash deposits aggregating to Rs.11,61,000 and whether the partial addition of Rs.6,61,000 sustained by the CIT(A) should be deleted.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed the cash sources presented (opening cash balance, rental income, interest income and agricultural receipts) showing cumulative cash available. The Tribunal found that both the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) sustained the addition based on surmise, without independent inquiry or cogent contrary evidence, and that the CIT(A)'s reasoning did not comply with the requirements of Section 250(4) and (6) of the Income tax Act, 1961. On this factual and legal appraisal the Tribunal set aside the impugned addition and directed the Assessing Officer to give effect to the order.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.6,61,000 is deleted and Ground No.2 is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on the substantive issues decided: the addition made under an incorrect charging section is vitiated and the cash deposits were satisfactorily explained, resulting in deletion of the impugned additions and direction for appeal effect.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition made under an incorrect charging section vitiates the assessment where the nature of the transaction requires application of a different provision, and unexplained cash additions cannot be sustained in the absence of cogent contrary evidence and proper compliance with the appellate recording requirements of the Income tax Act, 1961.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the accompanying interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The special leave petition was dismissed and the pending application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether a notice under Section 148 issued on the basis of audit objections can validly reopen a completed assessment where the Assessing Officer had the relevant information and documents at the time of the original assessment; (ii) Whether the notice dated 31.03.2023 under Section 148 is barred by limitation under Section 149(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether a notice under Section 148 issued on the basis of audit objections can validly reopen a completed assessment where the Assessing Officer had the relevant information and documents at the time of the original assessment.

Analysis: The inquiry focuses on whether audit objections constitute fresh "information" permitting reassessment when the Assessing Officer already had the material and had put specific queries during the original scrutiny under Section 143(3). The procedural scheme in Section 148 and Section 148A requires the Assessing Officer to apply mind to the information and consider the assessee's reply before issuing a notice. Where all relevant facts and documents were available to the Assessing Officer during the original assessment and were considered in that process, treating subsequent audit objections as a basis to reopen amounts to reassessment by way of review rather than discovery of new information.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. Reopening the assessment on the same material already available to the Assessing Officer amounts to a change of opinion and is not a valid basis for issuing notice under Section 148.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice dated 31.03.2023 under Section 148 is barred by limitation under Section 149(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The period for issuing notice is governed by Section 149(1) as in force prior to the Finance Act, 2021, which restricts reopening beyond four years unless conditions in clause (b) or (c) are satisfied. Where the assessee had filed return and disclosed material facts and no ground of failure to disclose existed, the extended period is not attracted. The notice in question was issued beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The notice dated 31.03.2023 and proceedings pursuant thereto are time-barred under Section 149(1) as in force for the relevant period.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 dated 31.03.2023 are set aside and the reassessment proceedings initiated thereunder are quashed; the reopening was both impermissible as a review based on the same material and barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: An audit objection does not constitute valid "information" to reopen a completed assessment under Section 148 where the Assessing Officer had, and had considered, the relevant documents and material during the original assessment; reopening in such circumstances amounts to impermissible change of opinion, and a notice issued beyond the four-year limitation (where no failure to disclose material facts is shown) is time-barred under Section 149(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had statutory authority under the amended proviso to Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside an assessment framed under Section 143(3) and remand it to the Assessing Officer; (ii) Whether the reassessment initiated under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid where identical additions relating to the same receipts were earlier assessed in another assessment year; (iii) Whether the sanction/approval granted under Section 151(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuance of notice under Section 148 was valid where the sanctioning authority acted mechanically without independent application of mind.

Issue (i): Whether the amended proviso to Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 empowered the CIT(A) to set aside and remand an assessment framed under Section 143(3) (as opposed to assessments framed under Section 144).

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the scope of the Finance Act, 2024 amendment to Section 251(1)(a) and relevant judicial precedent, noting that the expanded power to set aside and remit is confined by the proviso to assessments made as best judgment assessments under Section 144. The assessment in the present case was framed under Section 143(3) and not Section 144; therefore the proviso's remedial power did not apply.

Conclusion: The CIT(A) lacked statutory authority under Section 251(1)(a) to set aside and remand an assessment framed under Section 143(3). The CIT(A) order insofar as it set aside and remanded the assessment is quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether reopening of assessment under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the same share capital/share premium receipts had already been assessed in Assessment Year 2009-10.

Analysis: The Tribunal found on the record that identical additions concerning the same receipts had already been made in AY 2009-10 by an earlier assessment order dated 31.03.2015. The reassessment for AY 2008-09 duplicated those additions. The reasons recorded for reopening did not demonstrate that any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for AY 2008-09, and the foundational requirement for invoking Section 147 was therefore absent.

Conclusion: The reopening under Section 147 and the reassessment order for AY 2008-09 are invalid and are quashed.

Issue (iii): Whether the sanction/approval under Section 151(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuing notice under Section 148 was valid where the sanction was granted mechanically based on identical reasons as another assessment year.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that Section 151(2) requires an independent application of mind by the sanctioning authority as a mandatory safeguard against arbitrary reopenings. In this case the sanction was granted without independent examination because it relied on the same transactions already forming the basis for reopening another assessment year, demonstrating non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The sanction/approval under Section 151(2) is vitiated for want of independent application of mind and is quashed.

Final Conclusion: The combined effect of the findings is that the CIT(A)'s power to set aside the assessment under the amended proviso to Section 251(1)(a) did not extend to assessments framed under Section 143(3), the reassessment under Section 147/148 was unsustainable because it duplicated amounts already assessed in another year, and the sanction under Section 151(2) was granted mechanically; accordingly the CIT(A) order is quashed to the extent it set aside and remanded the assessment, the reassessment is quashed, and the sanction is quashed, resulting in the assessee's appeal being partly allowed and the Revenue's appeal being allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: The proviso to Section 251(1)(a) (as amended by the Finance Act, 2024) confers power to set aside and remit only in relation to assessments framed under Section 144; reopening under Section 147 is unsustainable where reasons do not show that income chargeable to tax escaped assessment and where identical receipts have already been assessed in another assessment year; sanction under Section 151(2) is invalid if granted without independent application of mind.

Issues: Whether the denial of exemption under section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and treating long term capital gains as unexplained income under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of sale of shares of M/s HPC Biosciences Ltd. was justified.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined documentary evidence including purchase invoices, allotment/bonus advice, share certificates, demat statement, contract notes, bank entries and proof of payment, and noted sale through a recognised stock exchange with payment of Securities Transaction Tax. The authorities below had relied on investigation reports and third party statements not supplied to, and not tested by cross examination of, the assessee. The Tribunal followed a coordinate bench decision which held that where transactions are executed through recognised exchanges with dematerialised trades, STT payment, and supporting documents, and where adverse statements were not furnished for cross examination, the onus on the revenue to establish sham transactions was not discharged on preponderance of probabilities.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 287 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the net profit rate estimated by the Assessing Officer at 18% on gross receipts is reasonable or should be revised, including applicability of presumptive taxation.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 287 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The affidavit filed by the assessee sets out personal circumstances, lack of awareness regarding tax obligations for the body of individuals, confusion between PANs, illiteracy regarding electronic communication and a family medical emergency. Reliance is placed on established authority permitting condonation where a reasonable cause is shown.

Conclusion: Delay of 287 days is condoned and the appeal is admitted for adjudication in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Assessing Officer's estimate of net profit at 18% on gross receipts is sustainable or should be revised under presumptive taxation principles.

Analysis: The assessee did not file a return nor participate in assessment proceedings and did not furnish particulars to substantiate actual income. Given the absence of material, principles of presumptive taxation are considered appropriate to determine a reasonable net profit rate. Applying section 44AD principles, a lower presumptive rate is applied to arrive at a fair estimation of income.

Conclusion: The net profit is estimated at 8% of gross receipts instead of 18%; income computed accordingly and addition of Rs. 16,68,000 is deleted. The finding of the lower appellate authority is set aside and the assessee's grounds are partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by condoning the delay and revising the estimated net profit rate under presumptive taxation, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee shows reasonable cause for delay, condonation is justified; where no particulars are furnished and the assessee has not participated, income may be estimated on presumptive taxation principles and a reasonable net profit rate may be applied by the Tribunal.