Issues: (i) Whether the interest charged on the foreign-currency loan advanced to the associated enterprise was at arm's length; (ii) Whether the arm's length fee for the standby letter of credit was correctly restricted to 0.5%; (iii) Whether weighted deduction for expenditure incurred on an approved in-house research and development facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR.

Issue (i): Whether the interest charged on the foreign-currency loan advanced to the associated enterprise was at arm's length.

Analysis: The loan was benchmarked under the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method at LIBOR plus 340 basis points, whereas interest was charged at LIBOR plus 350 basis points. The associated enterprise had independently obtained a Hong Kong bank loan at LIBOR plus 275 basis points. The foreign lending rate and the external comparable supported the rate charged by the assessee; the domestic cost-of-funds approach did not provide a comparable uncontrolled price for the international loan transaction.

Conclusion: The interest charged was at arm's length and no transfer-pricing adjustment was warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the arm's length fee for the standby letter of credit was correctly restricted to 0.5%.

Analysis: The standby letter of credit issued for the associated enterprise's external borrowing constituted an international transaction requiring arm's length benchmarking. The adopted judicial benchmark for corporate guarantee fee was 0.5%, and no material justified the higher rate of 1.62% determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer.

Conclusion: The arm's length standby letter of credit fee was correctly restricted to 0.5%, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether weighted deduction for expenditure incurred on an approved in-house research and development facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR.

Analysis: Approval by DSIR under Section 35(2AB) related to the in-house research and development facility. The deduction for eligible expenditure incurred on that approved facility was not dependent upon, or restricted by, the amount reported or quantified by DSIR in Form 3CL.

Conclusion: The weighted deduction could not be restricted to the expenditure quantified by DSIR, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions of the loan-interest adjustment and research-and-development disallowance, and the restriction of the standby letter of credit fee to 0.5%, remain operative.

Issues: Whether the statutory housing board was eligible for exemption under section 11 where it charged consideration for residential units, plots and allied housing activities.

Analysis: The statutory housing functions of providing accommodation, particularly for lower-income and weaker sections, fall within advancement of an object of general public utility. Under the proviso to section 2(15), as interpreted in relation to statutory boards and authorities, charging consideration does not by itself establish trade, commerce or business. Consideration that merely covers cost, administrative expenses and a nominal mark-up, including an amount needed for reasonable growth, is not commercial in character. The determinative inquiry is whether the charges are substantially or significantly above cost and driven by a profit motive; section 11(4A) operates consistently with this inquiry for incidental business activity.

Conclusion: Eligibility for exemption under section 11 depends upon verification of whether the consideration charged for residential units and plots exceeded cost plus a nominal mark-up. The Assessing Officer must undertake that verification and allow exemption if no profit element is found.

Issues: Whether a notice for scrutiny assessment under Section 143(2) must disclose the reasons for selecting the assessee's case for scrutiny or specify whether scrutiny is limited or complete.

Analysis: The circulars governing selection and nature of scrutiny operate as inter-departmental instructions for identifying cases to be scrutinised. The initial notice under Section 143(2) serves to intimate selection for scrutiny; the Assessing Officer is required during assessment proceedings to seek particular information and documents through a specific notice. An assessee has no right to demand reasons for selection unless arbitrariness or vendetta in such selection is demonstrated.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 143(2) need not disclose the reasons for scrutiny selection or state the nature of scrutiny; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the tender condition requiring availability of an office in the State and in the consignee district or specified districts during the last three years, as reflected in GST registration, was arbitrary and violative of the right to carry on trade and business.

Analysis: The condition was examined against the object of public procurement and the requirement that tender eligibility criteria bear a rational nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. The Court held that GST registration is valid across India and cannot be used to insist on multiple district-specific registrations or to confine participation to bidders having a local establishment in the tender district. The Court further held that procurement objectives can be met by assessing financial capacity, technical competence, and past performance, without creating an artificial barrier based on place of business. The restrictive condition was therefore found to be unreasonable and inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity in public tenders.

Conclusion: The tender condition was held to be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and was quashed in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The tender authority was directed to delete the impugned eligibility condition and proceed with the tender after extending the relevant dates.

Ratio Decidendi: A tender eligibility clause that creates an artificial local-barrier and lacks a rational nexus with the object of procurement is liable to be struck down as arbitrary and infringing the right to carry on trade and business.

Issues: (i) Whether the Joint Commissioner had jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice and pass the order imposing penalty under the GST enactments in the light of Circular No. 254/11/2025-GST dated 27.10.2025.

Analysis: The proceedings were initiated and culminated in the order by the same proper officer. The Court noted that the officer was already competent to initiate proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and that, by the time the order-in-original was passed, the circular relied upon had come into force. The challenge was also weakened because the notice was acted upon, no jurisdictional objection was taken before the authority, and Section 160 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 protects proceedings from invalidation merely on account of defect or omission when they are otherwise in substance and effect in conformity with the statute.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional objection was rejected and the impugned penalty order was held to be valid.

Issues: Whether, in a writ petition challenging cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns and non-payment of tax, directions could be issued permitting revocation, payment of tax dues, filing of draft returns, and restoration of registration.

Analysis: The proceeding was disposed of by issuing structured directions to enable the petitioner to seek revocation of cancellation. The petitioner was required to file an application for revocation, submit draft returns, and deposit all tax dues by the stipulated date. The registering authority was directed to receive the tax payment before considering revocation, decide the application within 15 days, and, if revocation was accepted, restore the registration with consequential filing of returns. Manual filing was also permitted if online filing caused difficulty.

Conclusion: The petitioner obtained conditional relief enabling revocation of cancellation and possible restoration of GST registration, subject to compliance with the directed requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with directions facilitating consideration of revocation and restoration of registration on compliance with tax and filing obligations.

Ratio Decidendi: Where registration has been cancelled for non-compliance, the Court may, in an appropriate case, direct consideration of revocation subject to payment of dues and filing of returns.

Issues: Whether the assessees were liable to pay an amount equal to 6% of the value of electricity generated and sold to the electricity distribution company under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 when common inputs and input services were used for manufacture of excisable goods and generation of electricity.

Analysis: The controversy was treated as covered by an earlier adjudication on an identical issue, which had held that electricity generated from bagasse and sold outside could not be subjected to the 6% payment under Rule 6(3). The same statutory framework applied to the present period, and the earlier decision had attained finality. In those circumstances, a different view could not be adopted for the same issue.

Conclusion: The assessees were not liable to pay 6% of the value of the electricity sold, and the demand under Rule 6(3) could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed in favour of the assessees.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an identical issue under the same statutory regime has already been conclusively decided in favour of the assessee and has attained finality, the liability under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 cannot be reimposed on the same footing.

Issues: Whether service tax paid on commission agent services used for sale of goods qualifies as an input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, so as to entitle the assessee to CENVAT credit.

Analysis: The inclusive part of the definition of input service expressly covers sales promotion. The Tribunal noted the CBEC clarification stating that credit is admissible on services of sale of dutiable goods on commission basis, and also relied on the consistent view taken in the assessee's own subsequent period and other Tribunal decisions allowing credit on commission paid to agents who effect sales. On this basis, the Tribunal held that commission paid for sale of goods falls within the scope of input service.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit on commission agent services was unsustainable and the assessee was entitled to the credit.

Issues: Whether the summons issued under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 called for interference in writ jurisdiction on the grounds of harassment, arbitrariness, and non-compliance with the administrative circular.

Analysis: Section 70 empowers the proper officer to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary in an inquiry. A director is not automatically insulated from inquiry merely because the company has acted through another representative, and the investigating authority is entitled to assess whether the director's attendance is necessary. In writ review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interference is warranted only where the summons is shown to be without jurisdiction, issued for an oblique purpose, or otherwise amounts to abuse of power or harassment. The administrative circular relied upon is intended to guide the exercise of statutory power and reflects the requirement of administrative fairness, but it does not curtail the statutory power itself. Any judicial interference would depend on demonstrable arbitrariness in the exercise of that power.

Conclusion: No final adjudication was made on the validity of the summons, and the matter was kept pending with the interim protection continuing.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 61,50,000 as income from undisclosed sources on account of cash deposits in the assessee's bank account was justified.

Analysis: The assessee explained that the cash deposits were sourced from advance cash received on sale of ancestral agricultural land. The registered sale deed recorded receipt of cash of Rs. 1.18 crores, and the statement recorded during assessment corroborated the transaction. The record also showed cash withdrawals and available cash balance sufficient to explain the impugned deposit. In these circumstances, the cash receipt from sale of agricultural land constituted an available source of funds, and the addition treating the deposit as unexplained could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee establishes a credible source for cash deposits through contemporaneous documentary evidence and corroborated statements, an addition for unexplained income cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the addition made by estimating gross profit at 35% on an alleged cash receipt of Rs. 5,00,000 (based on seized diary and digital data) was justified, or whether the assessee's explanation supported by bank statements and the diary decoding negates the addition.

Analysis: The seized diary entries and digital data were examined alongside the assessee's bank statements and the decoding of symbols in the seized diary (alphabetic markers denoting cheque or cash). The entry for Rs. 5,00,000 appearing in the diary was shown by the diary's own notation to be a cheque entry (not cash). The assessee produced complete bank statements which did not show receipt of the Rs. 5,00,000. The diary also contained a separate ledger reference indicating a different business name for that entry. In view of these documentary trails, the asserted cash receipt was plausibly explained either as a cheque not actually received or as pertaining to a different concern, undermining the basis for treating the amount as unexplained cash business receipt and for estimating gross profit thereon.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,75,000 made by applying a 35% gross profit estimate on the alleged Rs. 5,00,000 cash receipt is deleted; the assessee's explanation supported by bank statements and diary decoding is accepted and the addition is not sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a seized entry is shown by the seized material itself to denote a cheque (not cash) and the assessee produces bank statements disproving receipt of the amount, the entry cannot be treated as an unexplained cash receipt for making an estimated addition; documentary contradiction of the basis for estimation negates the addition.

Issues: Whether the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioner is arbitrary or unjustified and liable to be quashed, and if so, on what conditions the LOC should be set aside.

Analysis: The Court examined the law governing LOCs as articulated in Vineet Gupta v. Union of India and other precedents which treat LOCs as a coercive executive measure impinging on the fundamental right to travel under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The factors considered include absence of a criminal FIR, absence of demonstrable necessity or proximate likelihood of absconding, cooperation of the subject with investigations, family and other ties to the country, and the need for necessity, proportionality, fairness, and due process before continuation of an LOC. On facts, there is no FIR against the petitioner; the petitioner holds tax residence abroad but has extensive family ties in India; the petitioner has previously been permitted to travel by the Court on multiple occasions and has travelled; the original complaint was withdrawn by the complainant; and the petitioner has undertaken to cooperate and appear as required. Balancing the State's interest and the petitioner's fundamental rights, and applying the principles of necessity and proportionality, the Court concluded that continuation of the LOC was not justified but that conditional relief was appropriate to safeguard any legitimate investigative requirement. The Court therefore set aside the LOC while reserving the respondents' right to reopen or reissue protective measures if circumstances so warrant, and imposed conditions requiring an affidavit undertaking cooperation, production of documents, furnishing of travel itinerary and contact details, advance notice for appearances, and a mechanism for the Investigating Officer or Court to direct restraint or reissue an LOC if reservations remain.

Conclusion: The Look Out Circular issued against the petitioner is quashed and set aside subject to conditions requiring the petitioner to cooperate with investigations and comply with procedural requirements; liberty is reserved to the respondents to reopen or reissue an LOC if justified.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to Cenvat credit of Rs. 3,99,183/- on input services received from a job worker where the service provider had paid service tax (although the service was placed in the negative list) and such payment was accepted by the supplier's jurisdictional authority.

Analysis: The appeal examines whether denial of Cenvat credit to the recipient can be sustained when the supplier had paid service tax which was neither disputed nor refunded by the supplier's jurisdictional authority, and when the services received were used as input services in manufacture. Applicable provisions include the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 concerning taxable services and the negative list. The Tribunal applied settled precedents holding that where the supplier has discharged tax obligations and the supplier's jurisdictional authority has accepted that payment, the recipient cannot be deprived of credit on the ground of re-classification or non-taxability by a different territorial assessing officer. The analysis focuses on (a) the nature of services received as input services for manufacture, (b) the effect of tax payment by the supplier and its acceptance by the supplier's jurisdiction, and (c) limits on reassessment by the recipient's jurisdictional officer concerning the supplier's tax liability.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit of Rs. 3,99,183/- is set aside and the appellant is entitled to the Cenvat credit with consequential relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the services provided by the appellant are correctly classifiable as "Works Contract Service" or as "Site Formation and Clearance, Excavation, Earthmoving and Demolition Services"; (ii) Whether post 01.07.2012 the activity falls under Section 66B(54) read with Section 66E(h) or is taxable under the composite/partial reverse charge scheme (Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9), and whether the demand raised by invoking extended period is sustainable.

Issue (i): Classification of the appellant's services as works contract service vis-a -vis site formation and excavation services.

Analysis: The contracts incorporate supply of services together with supply of materials in execution of composite contracts, including civil construction, erection, commissioning, installation, fabrication and incidental activities. The execution particulars and work orders show integrated activities involving both materials and services supplied as part of the same contractual obligation. The composite nature of performance and the concomitant payment structure were considered in relation to the statutory classification provisions cited by the parties.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Applicability of post-01.07.2012 charging provisions (Section 66B(54) read with Section 66E(h)) and Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9; validity of extended period demand.

Analysis: For the period after 01.07.2012 the services, as characterised above, do not fall within the exclusion invoked under the cited provisions and the appellant has paid service tax under the composite/partial reverse charge mechanism as reflected in Sl.No.9 of Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. The demand based on reclassification and invocation of extended period is examined in light of the contractual composite nature and the tax treatment adopted by the appellant.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand and adjudication are set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs, as the services are rightly treated as works contract service and the post-2012 tax treatment under Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9 is applicable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where contracts are composite involving supply of materials together with service in execution of a single integrated obligation, the correct classification is works contract service and not a pure site formation/excavation service; such classification governs the applicable service tax treatment including application of Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 can be imposed on a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the term "person" in Rule 26(1) can extend to an artificial juristic entity such as a company for imposing penalty. The Tribunal relied on earlier decisions of the Tribunal and Larger Benches which hold that penal consequences under Rule 26 (including Rule 26(2)) are directed at natural persons who possess the requisite knowledge and conduct, and that a company as an artificial entity does not itself have a mind to form the requisite knowledge; therefore, to punish culpable individuals the corporate veil must be lifted. The Tribunal noted consistent precedents (including Rashmi Metaliks Limited and other cited decisions) concluding that penalties under Rule 26 are not imposable on an artificial entity in the absence of specific statutory provision making the company itself liable.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 cannot be imposed on the respondent company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013; the impugned order upholding the dropping of penalty is therefore upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the order rejecting the appeal as time-barred under Section 107(4) of the W.B.G.S.T. Act could be quashed and the delay condoned on the ground that the timeline is directory and the petitioner had furnished sufficient explanation for delay.

Analysis: The issue arises under Section 107(4) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act concerning time limits for filing an appeal and the scope for condoning delay. The petitioner's delay in filing the appeal was examined on the record and the petitioner furnished reasons (paragraph-6) explaining the non-filing within the statutory period. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision holding that the timeline under Section 107(4) is directory. The petitioner was found to have made out a prima facie case and was not grossly negligent in delay. The respondent did not press objection to the legal position regarding the directory nature of the provision. Based on these findings, the impugned order rejecting the appeal as time-barred was quashed and the appeal was directed to be heard on merits treating it as filed within time, with a peremptory timeframe for disposal and restraint on coercive action pending disposal.

Conclusion: The rejection order dated 29.08.2022 is quashed and set aside; the appeal shall be treated as filed within time and the respondent is directed to fix a hearing date and decide the appeal on merits, thereby ruling in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether the petitioner has a remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 against the order dated 9th February, 2026 of the Assistant Commissioner and whether the writ petition should be entertained or disposed of in light of the availability of that remedy.

Analysis: The Court examined the Division Bench judgment dated 14th March, 2023 in CUSTA 22 of 2022 which granted the petitioner liberty to apply to the concerned Customs authority for payment of the value of seized perishable goods and left the matter of payment to be processed in accordance with law. Pursuant to that liberty, the petitioner applied and the Assistant Commissioner passed an order on 9th February, 2026 permitting release of Rs.1,45,61,332/-. The Court observed that the Assistant Commissioner's order is an order passed by the concerned authority in exercise of statutory powers and that the statute provides an appellate remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. Given the availability of that specific statutory appeal remedy to challenge the Assistant Commissioner's order and to claim interest, the writ petition is not the appropriate forum to bypass the statutory appellate process.

Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by recording that the petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 against the order dated 9th February, 2026 and to claim interest before the Appellate Authority; the writ petition is not entertained further.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging an order passed under Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, filed after substantial delay and without availing the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Act, is maintainable before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provides an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which prescribes a 90-day period for filing an appeal; invocation of writ jurisdiction in lieu of the statutory remedy is permissible only if the writ is filed within a reasonable period. Delay in approaching the High Court, unexplained or attributable to the petitioner's own inaction, and failure to demonstrate when the petitioner became aware of the impugned order are relevant factors. Where a petitioner by his own fault disables himself from availing the prescribed statutory remedy, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 may not be exercised. The facts show the petitioner waited after receipt of the order and did not pursue the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed time; no satisfactory explanation for the delay or for not monitoring communication of the order has been furnished.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; the outcome is in favour of the revenue.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the petitioner's request for condonation of delay in filing two TMA applications was liable to be set aside for want of reasons and for failure to consider the petitioner's claim of parity with similarly situated applicants.

Analysis: The petitioner sought condonation for delay in submitting online applications for Transportation and Marketing Assistance under Chapter 7A of the Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020. The competent committee rejected the request, and the review committee maintained the rejection. The reasons recorded in both decisions were found to be inadequate, as they did not meaningfully engage with the petitioner's specific grievance, including the contention that similarly placed entities had been granted relief. Administrative orders affecting rights and benefits must contain reasons within the order itself, and such reasons cannot be supplied later. The absence of a reasoned consideration of the relevant submissions and the claim of parity rendered the decision vulnerable.

Conclusion: The rejection was not sustained. The matter was remitted to the review committee for reconsideration and for passing a well-reasoned order in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent of securing a fresh, reasoned reconsideration of the petitioner's claim by the review committee.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative decisions affecting civil benefits must disclose the reasons for the conclusion reached, and failure to deal with the relevant submissions and parity claims warrants reconsideration.

Issues: Whether the assessee-society was entitled to continue to hold registration granted under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (and consequentially the application for registration under section 12A) or whether the Commissioner (Exemptions) was justified in cancelling that registration by invoking the fifteenth proviso to section 10(23C) on the ground of occurrence of one or more "specified violations" as defined in Explanation 2 to the said proviso.

Analysis: The fifteenth proviso to section 10(23C) read with Explanation 2 prescribes the circumstances and the definition of "specified violation" which may justify cancellation of approval/registration, including application of income for non objects, business income not incidental or without separate books, activities not genuine or not in accordance with conditions of approval, non compliance with other laws, or incomplete/false information in the application. The assessing record and show cause proceedings disclosed that the Department's risk management system flagged large cash/fee receipts, certain payments (including an advance for purchase of land), and other expenses. The assessee produced detailed bank and fee records, explanations for the advance to J.J. Construction Co. (a bona fide land purchase agreement leading to litigation and suit for specific performance), supporting documents for various small and routine expenditures, and evidence showing fee collection through banks and multiple wings. The findings relied on by the Commissioner (Exemptions) involved factual discrepancies, minor recording irregularities in bank entries, non registration of the land agreement, and questioned necessity of certain expenditures. Those matters either fell within issues the Assessing Officer should probe in scrutiny assessments or were not shown to amount to any of the "specified violations" in Explanation 2. The Commissioner did not establish that income was applied otherwise than for the objects, or that activities were not genuine, or that payments benefitted a specified person within section 13(3). The non registration of the agreement did not, by itself, demonstrate siphoning or that the transaction was with a related person; the assessee had initiated appropriate civil proceedings including conversion to specific performance and provided supporting material. Minor discrepancies in bills or bank record aggregation were explained and, given the scale of operations (multiple branches and thousands of students, and aggregate receipts exceeding Rs.20 crore), did not justify cancellation under the proviso. The Commissioner's conclusions were therefore based on suspicions and isolated inconsistencies rather than a satisfaction that a "specified violation" had occurred as required by the proviso and Explanation 2.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration under section 10(23C)(vi) and the refusal to grant registration under section 12A were set aside. The registration under section 10(23C)(vi) is restored and the dependent application under section 12A is remitted to the Commissioner (Exemptions) for fresh adjudication in accordance with the findings recorded in the restored appeal.