Issues: Whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that is left unsigned and blank is violative of Section 282A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and, if so, whether such unsigned notice invalidates the reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The statutory text of Section 282A(1) requires that a notice or other document issued by an income-tax authority shall be signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form in accordance with prescribed procedure. Section 282A(2) contains a deeming provision for authentication where the name and office of a designated authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon, but does not relieve compliance with the mandatory signing requirement of Clause (1). Authorities holding that an unsigned notice cannot be treated as a mere clerical irregularity and that defects in signature are not curable for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction to proceed with reassessment have been applied. Where a notice under Section 148 is unsigned and blank in the signature/seal fields, the issuing authority lacks the valid authenticated instrument required by Section 282A(1), and consequently no valid jurisdiction to complete reassessment under Sections 147/143(3) can be exercised.

Conclusion: The unsigned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is violative of Section 282A(1) and is held invalid, arbitrary and void ab initio; the reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/143(3) therefore lack jurisdiction and are quashed. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment orders passed without considering cancellation of registered sale deeds and reversal of payments are sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment proceeded without verification of documents showing cancellation of registered sale deeds and reversal of transaction consideration which were produced before the Court for the first time. Relevant legal framework includes reassessment procedure under Section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and judicial precedent addressing when transactions are found to be terminable or cancelled and whether income truly accrued. The cited precedent holds that if transactions are cancelled and accounting reflects the reversal, income may not have truly accrued and reassessment based on hypothetical accrual is impermissible. The respondent admitted non-possession of those documents during the 148A proceedings and sought remand for verification.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders are quashed and set aside; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment or reassessment cannot be sustained where the assessing authority failed to consider documentary evidence showing cancellation of transactions and reversal of consideration such that income did not truly accrue.

Issues: (i) Whether the Transfer Pricing Officer's and Assessing Officer's upward adjustments disallowing the royalty payments (determining ALP at NIL) were legally sustainable, and whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the adjustment; (ii) Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was correct in allowing deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of participation in the Andhra Pradesh Micro Irrigation Project.

Issue (i): Whether the addition on account of royalty payments determined at NIL by the TPO/AO was sustainable in law and whether aggregation under TNMM and deletion by CIT(A) was correct.

Analysis: The dispute concerns benchmarking of royalty paid to an associated enterprise. Statutory methods under section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 require the TPO to apply a prescribed transfer pricing method to determine ALP. The appellate authority examined the TPO's order and found no application of any prescribed methodology, noted that the assessee had maintained transfer pricing documentation and applied CUP/TNMM approaches, and relied on coordinate Bench decisions of the Tribunal and higher court judgments which treated the royalty as within the scope of aggregated benchmarking with manufacturing transactions or otherwise supported the assessee's benchmarking. The appellate authority also relied on the proviso to section 92C(2) concerning permissible variation and compared operating margins of the assessee with comparables. The Tribunal, following preceding coordinate Bench decisions and absence of any contrary higher forum reversal, applied those precedents and found the TPO/AO's ALP determination at NIL to be ad hoc and unsustainable.

Conclusion: The determination of ALP of royalty at NIL by the TPO/AO is not sustainable; the deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is upheld. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was rightly allowed deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for amounts relating to APMIP despite a typographical name discrepancy in the agreement.

Analysis: The appellate authority examined documentary evidence including the executed agreement, work orders, invoices, payment advices, performance certificates, Form 10CCB and TDS records. The sole basis of AO's disallowance was a name discrepancy on the agreement's first page, alleged to indicate contracting on behalf of the holding company and characterization as a works contract. The appellate analysis applied the legal test of dominant intention for classification of contracts and found that the assessee independently executed supply, installation and commissioning obligations and accounted income and expenditure in its books. No contrary material was placed on record by Revenue.

Conclusion: The deduction claimed under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is correctly allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue - relating to disallowance of royalty payments (transfer pricing adjustment) and denial of deduction under section 80IA(4) - are without merit; the Tribunal dismisses the Revenue's appeals and upholds the CIT(A)'s deletions and allowance, following applicable transfer pricing methodology requirements and relevant coordinate Bench and higher court precedents.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a Transfer Pricing Officer determines arm's length price, he must apply one of the prescribed methods under section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; an ad hoc determination without applying statutory methods or rejecting the taxpayer's documented benchmarking is legally unsustainable, and documented evidence establishing the assessee as the contracting party satisfies eligibility for deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor and whether its claim is a secured financial debt; (iii) Whether the covenant to pay in the Mortgage Deed creates an enforceable guarantee and whether the Mortgage Deed is an English mortgage.

Issue (i): Whether direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The statutory definition of financial debt requires disbursement against consideration for the time value of money, but it does not expressly stipulate that disbursement must be made directly to the Corporate Debtor. A transaction may still answer the description of financial debt where funds are disbursed for the benefit of the Corporate Debtor or the transaction otherwise has the commercial effect of borrowing. The existence of direct disbursement is relevant, but not indispensable in every case.

Conclusion: Direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is not a sine qua non for financial debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor and whether its claim is a secured financial debt.

Analysis: The Mortgage Deed contained an express covenant to pay and also provided for recovery of any deficiency from the Mortgagor. The Corporate Debtor had undertaken liability under the security documents, and the arrangement was treated as having the commercial effect of borrowing. On that basis, the debt was held to fall within the scope of financial debt, and the Appellant was held to be more than a mere other secured creditor. The claim was therefore considered to be a secured financial debt.

Conclusion: The Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor in respect of the mortgage-based claim and its claim is a secured financial debt.

Issue (iii): Whether the covenant to pay in the Mortgage Deed creates an enforceable guarantee and whether the Mortgage Deed is an English mortgage.

Analysis: The covenant to pay, read with the deficiency liability and the enforcement structure in the deed, was treated as creating a liability akin to a contract of guarantee. The deed also expressly stated that the mortgage would be by way of a legal mortgage in English form, satisfying the essential attributes of an English mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The covenant to pay operates as an enforceable undertaking and the Mortgage Deed qualifies as an English mortgage.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A mortgage document that contains an express covenant to pay and deficiency liability may constitute financial debt and support classification as a secured financial creditor, even where the disbursement was not made directly to the Corporate Debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether disbursement of debt to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Code; (ii) Whether the Appellant qualifies as a financial creditor under Section 5(7) read with Section 5(8) of the Code and whether its claim was a secured financial debt; (iii) Whether the covenant to pay in the mortgage deeds created an enforceable guarantee or merely secured the mortgage; (iv) Whether the covenant to pay undertaken by the Corporate Debtor in respect of debt disbursed to a third party amounted to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (v) Whether the liability of the Corporate Debtor under the covenant to pay was limited only to the extent of the mortgage provided by it.

Issue (i): Whether disbursement of debt to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Code.

Analysis: Financial debt under the Code requires disbursement against consideration for the time value of money, but the text of Section 5(8) does not insist that the disbursement must be made directly to the corporate debtor. The nature of the transaction, the existence of a liability, and the commercial effect of borrowing remain material. A payment routed to a third party can still satisfy the requirement where it is made for the benefit of the corporate debtor and forms part of the relevant financial arrangement.

Conclusion: Direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor was held not to be a sine qua non for financial debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellant qualifies as a financial creditor under Section 5(7) read with Section 5(8) of the Code and whether its claim was a secured financial debt.

Analysis: The Debenture Trust Deed, the supplemental mortgage deeds, and the associated security documents were read together as one composite transaction. The Corporate Debtor, though not the original borrower, executed the mortgage deeds and undertook obligations in relation to the secured obligations arising from the debentures. The Court treated the covenant to pay and the joint and several liability of the security providers as bringing the Appellant within the definition of a financial creditor, and not merely an other secured creditor.

Conclusion: The Appellant was held to be a financial creditor and its claim was held to be a secured financial debt.

Issue (iii): Whether the covenant to pay in the mortgage deeds created an enforceable guarantee or merely secured the mortgage.

Analysis: The covenant to pay was not read as a bare security clause confined to the mortgaged property. The Court read Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the mortgage deeds jointly and held that the Corporate Debtor undertook to discharge the secured obligations and not merely to permit enforcement against the mortgaged assets. The covenant was treated as creating personal liability and an enforceable assurance akin to a guarantee.

Conclusion: The covenant to pay was held to create an enforceable guarantee and not merely a security interest over the mortgaged property.

Issue (iv): Whether the covenant to pay undertaken by the Corporate Debtor in respect of debt disbursed to a third party amounted to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Applying the ingredients of Section 126, the Court found an existing debt, a creditor, a principal debtor, and a surety-like undertaking by the Corporate Debtor to discharge the liability in case of default. The composite documentation showed that the Corporate Debtor stepped into the shoes of the obligors for the secured obligations and that the arrangement was functionally equivalent to a guarantee.

Conclusion: The covenant was held to amount to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Issue (v): Whether the liability of the Corporate Debtor under the covenant to pay was limited only to the extent of the mortgage provided by it.

Analysis: The Court rejected the contention that liability was confined to the value or enforcement of the mortgaged assets. The covenant to pay, read with the deed as a whole, imposed an obligation to ensure discharge of the secured obligations and not merely a property-linked liability. Clause 2.2 was held not to whittle down the broader undertaking contained in Clause 2.1.

Conclusion: The liability of the Corporate Debtor was held not to be limited only to the mortgaged property.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to succeed on merits, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor executes mortgage or security documents containing an express covenant to pay the secured obligations, the arrangement may constitute a contract of guarantee and financial debt under the Code even if the disbursement was made to a third party rather than directly to the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether the period from 12.06.2024 to 21.11.2025 should be excluded from the CIRP timelines by allowing IA No.410 of 2026 challenging the Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the exclusion application.

Analysis: The dispute concerns an insolvency proceeding of a real estate corporate debtor with multiple projects where project-wise segregation affected the ability to proceed with the CIRP and to issue Form G. The Resolution Professional relied on CoC resolutions and events relating to negotiation and settlement for the CHD Vann project, and on the fact that the project was segregated by order dated 21.11.2025. The Adjudicating Authority rejected exclusion because hearings had occurred and orders were pronounced on 21.11.2025; however, the record shows substantive impediments arising from ongoing project-specific negotiations and the need to await segregation and related instructions before issuing Form G. The appellate court found these facts sufficient to constitute causes beyond the control of the Resolution Professional that prevented timely progress of the CIRP and justified exclusion of the specified period.

Conclusion: IA No.410 of 2026 is allowed and the period from 12.06.2024 to 21.11.2025 is excluded from the CIRP timelines, setting aside the Adjudicating Authority's order dated 20.02.2026; appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether a pre-existing dispute regarding the existence and veracity of the claimed debt was raised by the corporate debtor prior to the issue of the demand notice so as to render the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 inadmissible.

Analysis: The petition under Section 9 was founded on four invoices and related correspondence. The corporate debtor, prior to receipt of the demand notice, communicated detailed objections disputing the existence of the claimed debt and sought substantiation of the alleged services, identities of customers, proof of delivery and related particulars. The invoices lacked particulars such as customer identities, specifications or delivery proof and no contemporaneous contract was placed on record. The legal standard from Mobilox Innovation Pvt. Ltd. requires only a plausible contention requiring investigation and not satisfaction of merits; subsequent Supreme Court decisions reinforce that a non-spurious pre-existing dispute raised before the demand notice bars admission of a Section 9 petition. Applying that standard to the materials on record yields a genuine dispute that is neither illusory nor patently feeble.

Conclusion: The existence of a pre-existing dispute prior to the demand notice renders the Section 9 application inadmissible and the appeal challenging the NCLT order rejecting the Section 9 petition is dismissed in favour of the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor raises a genuine dispute about the existence or veracity of the claimed debt prior to issuance of the demand notice, and the dispute is not patently feeble or spurious, the adjudicating authority must reject an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Department could adjust/set-off an outstanding demand for assessment year 2011-12 against tax deducted at source deposited from auction proceeds (claimed as refund by the liquidator) without having filed a claim in the liquidation proceedings.

Analysis: Regulation 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 permits mutual credits and set-off where mutual dealings exist and claims are adjudicated in the liquidation process. Sections 36 and 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 treat refunds as part of the liquidation estate and prescribe realisation and distribution in accordance with the Code. Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 gives the Code overriding effect over inconsistent provisions of other laws, subject to the limited exception under Section 178(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the present case the Income Tax Department had not filed any claim in the liquidation proceedings; the amount was deposited by the successful auction purchaser as TDS and the liquidator filed an income-tax return claiming refund. Absent a claim filed by the Department and adjudication in the liquidation process, adjustment of the refund against an earlier demand was not permissible under the Code and Regulations; the proper course for the Department to seek set-off was to present a claim in the liquidation process and seek relief under the insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority correctly directed refund of the TDS amount to the liquidator; adjustment by the Income Tax Department against the outstanding demand for A.Y. 2011-12 without filing a claim in the liquidation proceedings was not permissible. The appeal is dismissed and the order allowing the liquidator's application is upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether the defaults arising from invoice-based supply transactions fell within the suspension period under section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether the issuance and subsequent dishonour of cheques shifted the date of default and established a running account so as to take the case outside the pre-25.03.2020 default period.

Issue (i): Whether the defaults arising from invoice-based supply transactions fell within the suspension period under section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The operational debt arose from invoices issued between 20.04.2019 and 19.09.2019, each carrying a stipulation that payment would become due within 30 days. On that basis, the liability became due and payable on or before 19.10.2019. Section 10A bars initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process only for defaults arising on or after 25.03.2020. Since the defaults in question had already occurred before that date, the suspension under section 10A was held inapplicable. The existence of debt was also not disputed.

Conclusion: The defaults did not fall within the section 10A suspension period and the objection based on section 10A failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the issuance and subsequent dishonour of cheques shifted the date of default and established a running account so as to take the case outside the pre-25.03.2020 default period.

Analysis: The dishonour of cheques issued towards outstanding liability did not alter the original due dates of the invoices. The liability had already matured before 25.03.2020, and the dishonour did not defer the date of default. No material was shown to establish a settlement between the parties, and the asserted running account did not change the fact that the invoice amounts had become due within the earlier period. The application under section 9 was therefore founded on the pre-25.03.2020 default and not on the cheque dishonour as an independent trigger.

Conclusion: The cheque dishonour did not shift the date of default and the running account contention was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to be without merit because the insolvency application was based on defaults that had occurred before the statutory suspension period, leaving the admission of the section 9 proceeding undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of section 10A, the relevant date is the date when the operational debt first became due and payable; subsequent dishonour of cheques issued towards the same liability does not postpone that date or bring an earlier default within the suspension window.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge a show cause notice issued under Section 74 and Section 74A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The petition challenges the validity of a show cause notice issued under Sections 74 and 74A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court examined the pleadings and noted that the petitioner himself pleaded that he was the supplier. The Court relied on the established principle that writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not available to decide the merits of revenue demands raised by way of a show cause notice, as reflected in binding precedents. The Court observed that the other grounds raised by the petitioner could not be adjudicated in a writ petition which is directed only against the show cause notice. The petitioner was, however, permitted procedural relief to file a reply to the notice and have his contentions considered by the competent authority without prejudice.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the show cause notice is dismissed; liberty granted to the petitioner to file a reply within 15 days, and the competent authority to consider the reply without being influenced by the Court's observations or the respondent's reply. In favour of Respondent.

Issues: Whether the Competent Authority validly issued a tax withholding certificate at the rate of 4% under Section 197 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for AY 2026-27, and if not, what relief should be granted to the petitioner.

Analysis: The Competent Authority issued the certificate without recording reasons or addressing the nature of the transactions and the petitioner's reliance on relevant authorities; the transactions prima facie appear not to be exigible to tax and the petitioner may still be subject to assessment proceedings where tax liability can be determined and refund claimed if appropriate. Considering the large portion of the assessment year elapsed and substantial amounts already withheld, a reduction in the withholding rate would address the Revenue's concern of possible future scrutiny while providing interim relief to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The issued certificate at 4% is not sustained; a tax withholding certificate requiring deduction of tax at 2% is to be issued for AY 2026-27.

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was legally justified in adjourning the petitioner's appeal sine die after reserving order, solely because a separate appeal (ITA No.30/2025) had been admitted and questions of law framed, without staying the effect of its order.

Analysis: The petition challenges the Tribunal's decision to adjourn the appeal sine die after the matter had been heard and the order reserved. Relevant procedural prescription includes Rule 34(5)(c) of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, which contemplates a time-bound delivery of judgment (sixty days, extendable by thirty days). The issue of admission of a separate appeal and framing of substantial questions of law does not, without an order staying the operation of the Tribunal's order, automatically justify indefinite adjournment where the reserved judgment remains operative. Directory character of procedural time-limits does not permit a bench to render the appellant's grievance ineffective by adjourning sine die once the appeal has been heard and the stay application refused; the Tribunal had the duty to either decide the appeal or take steps to protect the assessee's interest if it considered delay necessary.

Conclusion: The adjournment of the appeal sine die is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal in accordance with law within the specified time frame. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for non-compliance with notices under Sections 143(2) and 142(1) should be sustained or deleted.

Analysis: The assessee, an educational institution claiming exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, did not respond to notices issued under Sections 143(2) and 142(1) due to heavy admission work and failure to verify emails. The assessment was subsequently completed by the assessing officer after accepting the return filed under Section 148, resulting in a nil tax computation. Section 271(1)(b) confers a discretionary power on the assessing officer to impose penalty for failure to comply with notice; case law of coordinate benches was considered where penalties were deleted when assessment proceeded on merits (i.e., not under Section 144) and no escapement of income was found. The Tribunal found the explanation of genuine oversight credible, the assessment showed no escapement of income, and the statutory provision uses permissive language ('may') enabling discretion against imposing penalty in such circumstances.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessing officer accepts the return and computes nil tax showing no escapement of income, and the assessee offers a bona fide, credible reason for non-compliance, the discretionary power under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits deletion of the penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty order dated 30.12.2025 could be validly based on the Warehouse (Custody and Handling of Goods) Regulations, 2016 instead of the Special Warehouse (Custody and Handling of Goods) Regulations, 2016 applicable to a license under section 58A of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the penalty order is sustainable in view of delay in initiation of proceedings, non-supply of the audit report which formed the basis of the show-cause notice, and lack of justification for fixation of the quantum of penalty.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent could invoke Warehouse Regulations, 2016 instead of Special Warehouse Regulations, 2016 in proceedings against a licensee under section 58A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The petitioner held a Special Warehouse licence under section 58A of the Customs Act, 1962. The Special Warehouse Regulations were issued by Notification No. 69/2016-Customs (N.T.) dated 14.05.2016 under the statutory powers relevant to section 58A. The impugned show-cause notice and order expressly proceed under specific regulation numbers of the Warehouse Regulations, 2016 that do not correspond to the Special Warehouse Regulations applicable to the petitioner. Even if there are similar or pari materia provisions in both regulation sets, initiation and adjudication under regulations that do not apply to the statutory category of licence held by the petitioner entails an error in law.

Conclusion: The proceedings and penalty premised on the Warehouse Regulations, 2016 instead of the Special Warehouse Regulations, 2016 are not legally sustainable and must be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty order is sustainable given the five-year delay after surrender of licence, the non-supply of the audit report relied upon for issuance of the show-cause notice, and absence of clarification for the quantum of penalty.

Analysis: The audit report dated 16.12.2022, which prompted the show-cause notice dated 01.02.2024, was not supplied to the petitioner despite being requested, depriving the petitioner of the material necessary to make effective representation. The impugned proceedings were initiated almost five years after acceptance of licence surrender, and no satisfactory explanation or contemporaneous verification was shown to justify the delay. Further, the respondent did not clarify how the specific penalty amounts were fixed. Under these circumstances, continuation and completion of penalty proceedings, and imposition of the specified penalty amount, involved procedural infirmities.

Conclusion: The penalty order is vitiated by procedural unfairness arising from non-supply of the foundational audit report, inordinate delay, and lack of justification for the penalty quantum; the order must be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 30.12.2025 imposing penalty is quashed and set aside; the remedy of remand is declined due to the inordinate delay and procedural defects.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, accused under Sections 132(1)(a), 132(1)(c) read with Section 132(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is entitled to regular bail while the matter is at the pre-charge stage and triable by a Magistrate.

Analysis: The petitioner is alleged to have availed wrongful input tax credit by producing bogus invoices. The matter remains at the pre-charge stage and is triable by a Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner has undergone actual custody exceeding five months. The Court relied on comparative judicial pronouncements addressing bail where the accused had undergone significant custody, where the prosecution case was documentary in nature and triable by a Magistrate, and noting the maximum punishment under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act. The respondent did not dispute the custodial period or the pre-charge status. The Court balanced the custodial period, nature of allegations, stage of the proceedings and relevant precedents in exercising discretion to grant bail.

Conclusion: The petition for regular bail is allowed and the petitioner is admitted to regular bail subject to furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate/Illaqa Magistrate and subject to conditions prohibiting threat or influencing of prosecution witnesses.

Issues: (i) Whether the Special Leave Petitions SLP(C) Nos. 13375/2019 and 7579/2020 should be permitted to be withdrawn and disposed of as withdrawn; (ii) Whether delay in filing SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 should be condoned and whether the Special Leave Petitions including SLP(C) No. 237/2023 merit interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner(s) may withdraw SLP(C) Nos. 13375/2019 and 7579/2020 and have those petitions dismissed as withdrawn.

Analysis: The petitioners sought leave to withdraw the specified Special Leave Petitions on the ground that the High Court had not addressed a first prayer in the writ petitions; the request to withdraw was processed and the Court recorded disposal of those petitions on the basis of withdrawal.

Conclusion: The Special Leave Petitions SLP(C) Nos. 13375/2019 and 7579/2020 are dismissed as withdrawn.

Issue (ii): Whether delay in filing SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 should be condoned and whether the impugned order/judgment should be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 and SLP(C) No. 237/2023.

Analysis: Delay in filing SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 was considered and condoned. The petitions were examined under the discretionary appellate jurisdiction and the Court found no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order/judgment, resulting in dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions.

Conclusion: Delay in filing SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 is condoned; the Special Leave Petitions (including SLP(C) Diary No. 28636/2020 and SLP(C) No. 237/2023) stand dismissed for lack of grounds for interference.

Final Conclusion: The matters are finally disposed of by dismissal: the first group of SLPs are dismissed as withdrawn and the remaining SLPs are dismissed after condonation of delay where applicable, with no interference granted under the Court's discretionary jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether an institution established under the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 is a specified person liable to deduct tax at source under section 51 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Notification No. 50/2018-Central Tax dated 13.09.2018. (ii) Whether the threshold of Rs. 2,50,000 for deduction of tax at source is to be determined on the value of supply under each contract, excluding GST, regardless of the number of invoices issued.

Issue (i): Whether an institution established under the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 is a specified person liable to deduct tax at source under section 51 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Notification No. 50/2018-Central Tax dated 13.09.2018.

Analysis: The notification was read in the light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of materially similar language and the Authority held that the disjunctive wording of the notification could not exclude institutions set up by an Act of Parliament from the ambit of the prescribed category. It further examined the statutory framework of the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 and found substantial governmental control through the Visitor's powers, governmental oversight, rule-making authority, accountability requirements, appointment and removal controls, audit and reporting obligations, and the Central Government's regulatory role. On that basis, the Authority concluded that the applicant fell within the notified category for purposes of tax deduction at source.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the threshold of Rs. 2,50,000 for deduction of tax at source is to be determined on the value of supply under each contract, excluding GST, regardless of the number of invoices issued.

Analysis: The Authority held that the contractual arrangement, and not the number of invoices, governs the threshold. Where supplies are made under a single contract, the aggregate value of supply under that contract, excluding GST, is relevant. Where there are separate contracts, each contract is to be tested independently. In continuous or recurrent supply situations forming part of the original contract, the threshold applies to the contract as a whole.

Conclusion: The threshold is to be determined contract-wise and not invoice-wise, with GST excluded from the computation.

Final Conclusion: The ruling confirms liability to deduct tax at source under the notified category and clarifies that the monetary threshold operates by reference to the contract value rather than individual invoices.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory language uses disjunctive wording and the surrounding legal framework shows substantive governmental control, the entity may fall within the notified category for tax deduction at source, and the threshold for deduction is computed on the value of the contract and not on individual invoices.

Issues: Whether the sales tax collected and retained by an industrial undertaking under a state capital investment incentive policy (allowing retention of sales tax up to the amount of capital investment) constitutes a capital receipt or a revenue receipt for the purposes of income-tax assessment for the assessment year 2007-08.

Analysis: Prior decisions of a High Court addressed an identical exemption scheme and concluded that sales tax collected and retained under the policy is a capital receipt. Those High Court decisions were not sustained by successful challenge in the Supreme Court, as the appeals filed by Revenue were dismissed. The scheme allowed retention of sales tax equal to capital investment for a fixed period and the facts and legal questions in the present appeals materially correspond to those earlier decisions. On that basis, the applicable legal framework and consistent precedent support classification of the retained sales tax as capital receipt rather than taxable revenue receipt.

Conclusion: The issue is answered against Revenue and in favour of the assessee: the sales tax collected and retained under the capital investment incentive policy is a capital receipt and not includible as taxable revenue for the assessment year in question.

Ratio Decidendi: Sales tax amounts retained under a state capital investment incentive policy, to the extent permitted as retention equal to capital investment, constitute capital receipts and are not taxable as revenue receipts where the scheme and facts are materially identical to earlier authoritative decisions which have withstood challenge.

Issues: Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (DCIT) was competent to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 147 by issuing notice under Section 148 in 2025 in respect of the same bank-deposit transactions which had already been investigated and finally adjudicated by the Income Tax Officer (ITO) in assessment order dated 30.03.2023 for Assessment Year 2019-20.

Analysis: The Court examined the record and found the self-same cash-deposit transactions with Canara Bank (total Rs. 4,42,47,290/-) had been subject-matter of proceedings before the ITO, who on verification of audited accounts, bank statements and returns filed under PAN-2 had concluded assessment for the relevant year and assessed total income at nil. The DCIT's subsequent Order under Section 148A(3) and notice under Section 148 relied on the same material and sought reassessment without any showing that the ITO's order had been varied, reversed or that fresh and distinct material existed. The Court applied settled principles that reassessment proceedings cannot be a mere re-examination or review of a concluded assessment on a mere change of opinion; the initiation of reassessment requires independent tangible material giving rise to 'reasons to believe' and completed assessments attain finality and cannot be reopened for the same subject-matter, as doing so would amount to vexation twice for the same cause and risk double taxation. The Court further found no dispute on facts and held that alternative statutory remedies did not oust the High Court's jurisdiction to grant relief in this factual matrix.

Conclusion: The Order dated 24.06.2025 under Section 148A(3), Notice dated 30.06.2025 under Section 148 and intimation dated 25.07.2025 under Section 144B issued by the DCIT insofar as they seek reassessment of the same transactions already finally adjudicated by the ITO are quashed and set aside; the writ petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether charges collected by an electricity distribution utility for related and ancillary activities connected with transmission and distribution of electricity, including wheeling charges, meter rent, supervision charges, cross-subsidy charges, late payment surcharge and similar receipts, are taxable to service tax. (ii) Whether the demand for the extended period of limitation and the consequential penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether charges collected by an electricity distribution utility for related and ancillary activities connected with transmission and distribution of electricity, including wheeling charges, meter rent, supervision charges, cross-subsidy charges, late payment surcharge and similar receipts, are taxable to service tax.

Analysis: The related receipts arose from the utility's statutory function of transmitting and distributing electricity under the Electricity Act, 2003 and the applicable tariff framework. The reasoning followed the settled principle that services which are naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business must be treated as the single service giving the bundle its essential character. Transmission and distribution of electricity was treated as the principal service, and the ancillary receipts were held to be part of that composite activity. The interpretation adopted in the earlier binding decisions was relied upon to hold that such related services do not lose their exempt character merely because they are separately identified in accounts or billed under different heads.

Conclusion: The ancillary and related receipts were not exigible to service tax and the demand on merits failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand for the extended period of limitation and the consequential penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The demand was founded on an allegation of wilful suppression and misstatement, but the records showed that the receipts were reflected in the books of account and the dispute turned on classification and taxability of the receipts. In the absence of cogent evidence establishing deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax, invocation of the extended period was not justified. Once the demand itself failed on merits, the penalties also could not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation and the penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service tax demand, interest and penalties were set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Ancillary receipts that are naturally bundled with exempt transmission and distribution of electricity assume the character of the principal exempt service and are not separately taxable; in the absence of deliberate suppression, the extended limitation cannot be invoked.