Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under section 148 was invalid for want of sanction from the correct specified authority under section 151. (ii) Whether the section 263 revisionary order could survive when the reassessment proceedings were void for lack of valid jurisdictional sanction.

Issue (i): Whether the notice issued under section 148 was invalid for want of sanction from the correct specified authority under section 151.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. For such cases, section 151(ii) required approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner, and not from the Principal Commissioner. The limitation provisions in section 149 could not be used to dilute the separate sanction requirement under section 151. The proviso inserted in section 151 by the Finance Act, 2023 was held to be prospective and could not validate a prior notice issued on approval from the wrong authority.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid in law for want of sanction from the correct specified authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the section 263 revisionary order could survive when the reassessment proceedings were void for lack of valid jurisdictional sanction.

Analysis: Once the reassessment initiation itself was found to be without jurisdiction, the foundation for the revisionary exercise ceased to exist. A revision under section 263 cannot independently stand where the underlying reassessment proceeding is legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The section 263 order could not survive and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded because the reassessment notice was held invalid for want of proper approval, and the revisionary order based on that defective proceeding was annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is initiated beyond three years, approval must be obtained from the authority specified in section 151(ii), and a revisionary order cannot survive if the underlying reassessment proceeding is void for want of such jurisdictional sanction.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner could invoke revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 when the reassessment order was already the subject matter of a pending appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Analysis: Explanation 1(c) to section 263(1) extends the revisionary power to matters not considered and decided in appeal, but it also makes clear that where the very order is under appeal, the Commissioner cannot revise issues that form part of the appellate subject matter. As the assessee's appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was pending on the same issue concerning the sale of shares and the reassessment order, the prerequisite for valid invocation of section 263 was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 was invalid and the revision order was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded because the revisionary order could not stand once the same issue was already carried in appeal before the appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under section 263 is barred to the extent the very matter is the subject of a pending appeal and has not been finally kept outside the appellate adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping benefit on the basis of surplus funds available from earlier assessment years so as to delete the additions for unexplained income and investment in vehicle for the later year. (ii) Whether the capital gains addition for the later year required modification and whether deduction under section 54 was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping benefit on the basis of surplus funds available from earlier assessment years so as to delete the additions for unexplained income and investment in vehicle for the later year.

Analysis: The available fund position, as worked out from the bank accounts and accepted receipts, showed surplus funds in the earlier year sufficient to cover the disputed additions in the later year. The surplus of the earlier year, together with the remaining balance from the next year, was more than enough to absorb both the addition for unexplained income and the investment in the vehicle.

Conclusion: The additions for unexplained income and investment in the vehicle were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the capital gains addition for the later year required modification and whether deduction under section 54 was allowable.

Analysis: The capital gains had been computed by the assessee himself at a lower figure than that mentioned in the order, and the higher figure was found to be inadvertent. The claim for deduction under section 54 was not substantiated on record and therefore could not be granted.

Conclusion: The capital gains addition was restricted to the amount computed by the assessee, and the claim for deduction under section 54 was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the extent of deletion of the telescoped additions and correction of the capital gains figure, with the remaining relief denied.

Ratio Decidendi: Where proved surplus funds from earlier years are sufficient to explain later investments or additions, telescoping relief must be allowed, but a statutory deduction cannot be granted without substantiation.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings and the consequent additions could be sustained when the reopening and assessment were based on third-party material that was not confronted to the assessee.

Analysis: The reassessment was founded on data allegedly recovered from another group and used to infer suppression of sales in the assessee's business. The assessee sought the underlying material, statements and related records relied upon for reopening and assessment, but those materials were not furnished or confronted. The basis of the addition therefore remained untested by the assessee, resulting in breach of natural justice. Following the earlier order in the assessee's own case on identical facts, the reassessment proceedings were held to be vitiated for non-confrontation of the material relied upon by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were quashed and the additions were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 262 days in filing the appeals deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the registration granted under section 12AB treating the assessee as a religious trust, and the consequential rejection of approval under section 80G(5), were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 262 days in filing the appeals deserved condonation.

Analysis: The delay was explained by the assessee's late discovery, through audit and management transition, that the registration had been granted treating it as a religious trust, which also affected eligibility for approval under section 80G(5). The explanation was accepted as showing sufficient cause, and the appeals were admitted.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the registration granted under section 12AB treating the assessee as a religious trust, and the consequential rejection of approval under section 80G(5), were sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee was found to be running educational institutions and had long been treated as a charitable institution. The record contained no material or reasoned finding showing that its objects or activities were in nature or confined to a particular community. The order also did not disclose any confrontation of adverse material or a speaking basis for classifying the assessee as a religious trust. In these circumstances, the classification and the consequential refusal of approval under section 80G(5) could not be sustained without reconsideration of the relevant material and a hearing to the assessee.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for fresh examination and a speaking order, with reconsideration of both registration and approval issues.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, and the impugned matters were restored for fresh adjudication after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: A trust cannot be classified as religious for registration and approval purposes without recorded material, confrontation of adverse material, and a reasoned speaking order based on its objects and activities.

Issues: Whether the refusal to condone a delay of 1460 days in filing the revision application under section 264 could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The revision application was filed far beyond the statutory period under section 264(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the explanation offered for the delay was found to be vague. The assessee continued to comply with statutory obligations during the relevant period, including filing returns and completing audit requirements, which supported the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause preventing timely filing. The decision not to condone delay was therefore treated as a plausible view, warranting no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The observations on merits were directed to be ignored and not treated as precedent.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone delay was upheld and the writ petition failed.

Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be sustained where the alleged debt arose from a partnership firm, the firm was not impleaded or served with statutory notice, and the accused was proceeded against in his personal capacity.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires that criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 arises only where the cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The architecture of Section 141, read with its explanation, treats a firm as a principal legal person whose liability must be prosecuted by arraigning the firm; liability of persons in charge is derivative. The evidence on record shows the complainant's transaction and alleged liability were with the partnership firm, and the firm was neither served with the demand notice nor impleaded as an accused. The presumption under the provision corresponding to Section 139 is rebuttable; an admission in the complainant's testimony that the transaction was with the firm raises a probable defence on the existence of personal liability of the accused. Successive presentations and notices were noted on the record but the primary issue is the absence of the firm before the forum and absence of material proving a subsisting personal liability of the accused. The penal nature of the offence mandates strict adherence to statutory conditions and proof of personal liability on the balance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The conviction cannot be sustained; the revisional application is allowed and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the alleged liability arises from a partnership firm and the firm is not impleaded or served with the statutory demand, prosecution and conviction of an individual partner in his personal capacity for cheque dishonour is unsustainable absent proof that the cheque was issued to discharge a legally enforceable personal debt of that individual.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147/notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid; (ii) Whether the element of profit in undisclosed 'on-money' receipts should be estimated at 16% (as held by CIT(A)) or at a different rate; (iii) Whether ICDS-III applies and whether the unaccounted profit must be taxed in the year of receipt of on-money or in the year of execution of sale deed; (iv) Whether the assessee is entitled to telescoping benefit against additions for alleged unaccounted cash loans (addition under section 69A read with section 115BBE).

Issue (i): Validity of reassessment initiated under section 147 by issuing notice under section 148.

Analysis: The assessing officer reopened assessments after search operations and relied on incriminating seized material, seized digital data and third party statements; approval under section 151 was obtained; amendments to section 148 providing deemed satisfaction for three years prior to search (post 01.04.2021) were applicable; the reassessment covered both searched party and third parties under the new scheme of search assessments.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings and notice under section 148 are valid and the ground challenging the reopening is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Appropriate rate for estimating profit element embedded in 'on-money' receipts.

Analysis: Authorities and precedents were examined including jurisdictional High Court and Tribunal decisions holding that only the profit element, not entire on money, is taxable; assessing officer had estimated 35%, CIT(A) reduced to 16% without adducing comparable basis; assessee's audited average profit was 7%; the Tribunal reasoned estimation must be based on facts, past results and comparable cases and adopted a rate nearer to truth taking into account expenditure funded from on money and business nature.

Conclusion: The Tribunal reduces the estimated profit on on money to 10% and directs the assessing officer to compute additions accordingly; appeals of the assessee are partly allowed on this issue and revenue appeals in respect of sustaining higher estimates are dismissed.

Issue (iii): Applicability of ICDS-III and year of taxation for unaccounted profit on on money (year of receipt vs year of execution of sale deed).

Analysis: ICDS-III (Income Computation and Disclosure Standard III) applies to contractors using percentage of completion method; the assessee is a contractee (developer employing contractors) and has consistently followed project completion / percentage of completion recognition, and judicial precedents including Supreme Court and jurisdictional High Court support recognition of income on execution/registration of sale deed when risk and rewards transfer; hence ICDS-III not applicable to contractee and unaccounted profit should be taxed in year of sale deed execution.

Conclusion: ICDS-III does not apply to the assessee; unaccounted profit on on money is taxable in the year of execution/registration of sale deed; revenue grounds seeking taxation in year of receipt are dismissed.

Issue (iv): Entitlement to telescoping benefit against addition of Rs. 97,30,000 made for alleged cash loans (section 69A r.w.s.115BBE).

Analysis: The assessing officer made addition for alleged cash loans based on seized loose papers; CIT(A) found confirmed unaccounted profit (even after re estimation) exceeded the alleged cash advances and applied telescoping principle by setting off estimated confirmed unaccounted profit against the alleged loans; relevant precedent supports telescoping where additions relate to same source and confirmed/unaccounted profit covers the impugned advances.

Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds deletion by CIT(A) and dismisses the revenue's ground; telescoping benefit is allowed in favour of the assessee on the facts.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the validity of reopening under section 147/148, allows the assessee's appeals partly by directing estimation of profit on on money at 10% and holding that unaccounted profit is taxable on execution of sale deeds, allows telescoping against alleged cash loans, and dismisses all cross appeals by the revenue; overall the decision is partly in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where undisclosed 'on money' receipts are established from seized material, only the profit element (not entire receipts) may be estimated for taxation; such estimation must be factually grounded and approximately nearer to truth, and where a taxpayer is a contractee (not a contractor) ICDS III does not apply and unaccounted profit is taxable in the year of execution/registration of sale deed when significant risks and rewards transfer.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest on the refund amount of Rs. 62,01,371/- for the period during which the refund remained unpaid.

Analysis: Section 20 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 governs refund, approval, and interest on refundable amounts. A refund found due on assessment or pursuant to appellate proceedings attracts the statutory interest consequence where payment is not made within the prescribed period. The earlier Division Bench view in the same statutory setting held that the approval mechanism under the refund rules cannot be used to defeat the statutory period for payment without interest, and that interest follows when the refund is released beyond that period. In the present case, the refund was held due by the assessing authority and was ultimately released only on 28.08.2019, whereas the application for refund had been made on 22.04.2016.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to interest on the refund amount at the prescribed rate for the period from 22.04.2016 till 28.08.2019.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order dated 30.05.2023 rejecting the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for condonation of delay in filing the return for assessment year 2018-19 should be entertained despite the delay and laches in filing the writ petition.

Analysis: The petition challenges an order under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 rejecting condonation of delay in filing the return. The Court examined whether the petitioner has furnished any reasonable explanation for the long delay in approaching the High Court since the impugned order dated 30.05.2023 and considered settled principles on delay and laches in invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court applied the established tests that (i) there is no fixed limitation for filing a writ petition but the petitioner must approach the court within a reasonable time depending on the nature of rights and liabilities; (ii) delay and laches are relevant discretionary factors that may disentitle a litigant from extraordinary relief; and (iii) the cause for delay must be examined to determine whether it constitutes sufficient cause. Reliance was placed on precedent establishing that unreasonable delay ordinarily disentitles a party to the extraordinary remedy and that the discretion under Article 226 must be exercised with care and caution, taking into account the absence of any acceptable explanation for delay.

Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed for delay and laches; relief denied and challenge to the order under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is refused (result adverse to the petitioner and in favour of the revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner, having demonstrated a semblance of acting on behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, should be permitted to approach the proper officer with supporting documents and be granted a post-decisional hearing against the order dated 21 January 2025; (ii) Whether the impugned order dated 21 January 2025 and garnishee proceedings based thereon should be kept in abeyance/stayed pending the adjudicating authority's reconsideration.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be allowed to file a representation with the proper officer with supporting documents and be granted a post-decisional hearing.

Analysis: The petitioner produced a letter dated 7 March 2019 and a possession certificate in court which, while not part of the adjudicating record, indicate a prima facie case that the petitioner may have collected parking charges on behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. The adjudicating order criticized the absence of an agreement on record. Given the petitioner's assertion and the existence of documents not previously placed before the adjudicating authority, procedural fairness requires an opportunity to present such documents and obtain a hearing before final adverse consequence is enforced.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted liberty to approach the proper officer within two weeks with all supporting documents and is entitled to a post-decisional hearing; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned adjudicating order and garnishee proceedings should be kept in abeyance or stayed pending reconsideration.

Analysis: To preserve the petitioner's rights while the proper officer reconsiders the claim on the basis of fresh documents and submissions, the adjudicating order is directed to remain in abeyance for a limited period and garnishee proceedings are stayed. The adjudicating authority retains the discretion to affirm its earlier conclusion if the documents and submissions are found unacceptable in law or fact; conversely, if the authority finds no liability, it must refrain from enforcing the impugned order. Time limits for filing representation and for the authority to decide are prescribed.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 21 January 2025 shall remain in abeyance for four weeks and garnishee proceedings shall remain stayed for eight weeks; this conclusion is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicating authority must reconsider the petitioner's claim on the basis of documents to be filed within the specified period and grant a post-decisional hearing; enforcement measures are temporarily suspended to enable such reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer demonstrates a prima facie case and possesses documents not placed before the adjudicating authority, fairness requires permitting a representation with supporting documents and granting a post-decisional hearing, and temporarily staying enforcement pending timely reconsideration by the proper officer.

Issues: Whether the erstwhile resolution professional was entitled to calculate liquidator fee in the first or second bucket, and whether the amount already withdrawn in excess of the fee admissible under the liquidation regulations had to be refunded.

Analysis: The relevant fee under Regulation 4(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 depends on the period within which realisation of assets takes place. The exclusion claimed for the additional period relating to the resumption of auctions on medical grounds was not accepted, as the record showed that the effective realisation occurred after more than one year. The fee computation made on the third-bucket basis was therefore upheld, and the earlier withdrawal by the appellant was found to exceed the amount legally payable, with liability to refund the excess along with GST.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to higher fee computation on the basis claimed, and the direction to refund the excess amount was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the determination of liquidator fee on the third-bucket basis was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the liquidation fee framework, the applicable fee bucket is determined by the actual period of realisation, and a claimed exclusion of time will not be accepted unless it is properly established and justified on record.

Issues: Whether the assessing authority adjusted refunds in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Office Memorandum and whether the petitioner is entitled to refund of amounts adjusted beyond 20% of the disputed demand and restraint on recovery pending disposal of appeals.

Analysis: The Court examined the assessing authority's communications calling for deposit of 20% of the disputed demand and the Office Memorandum F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC dated 29.02.2016 as amended by Office Memorandum F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC dated 31.07.2017 which prescribes payment/adjustment up to 20% of disputed demand as condition for stay where appeals are pending. The Court compared the quantified demands, the 20% threshold for each assessment year, and the refunds adjusted by the revenue, finding that the adjustments made exceeded the 20% limit shown in the petition's table for the assessment years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20. The Court held that where applications for stay are pending and refunds are adjusted, the mandate of the Office Memorandum permits adjustment only up to the prescribed 20% in cases under paragraph 4(A), and therefore adjustments beyond that ceiling cannot stand.

Conclusion: The petition is allowed; respondent No.1 is directed to refund amounts adjusted in excess of 20% of the disputed demand for assessment years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, and respondents are restrained from recovering any portion of the demands for those years pending finalisation of the appeals.

Issues: Whether the Competent Authority erred in issuing a tax withholding certificate at the rate of 10% under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2026-27 and whether a certificate at a lower rate should be issued.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order and found that the Competent Authority failed to record any sustainable or prima-facie reasons concerning the nature of the petitioner's transactions or to deal with the petitioner's contentions and judgments relied upon. The Court noted competing contentions: the petitioner asserted that the transactions do not attract royalty or fees for technical services under the India-Ireland tax treaty and relied on precedent, while the Revenue emphasised that the nature of transactions was not yet examined and that withholding certificates are not final and refunds may follow on assessment. Balancing the Revenue's interest in safeguarding potential tax liabilities and the petitioner's hardship from substantial tax deduction where transactions prima facie appear non-taxable, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to grant interim relief by directing issuance of a lower rate withholding certificate for the specified assessment year, while preserving the Revenue's right to examine and assess the transactions in due course.

Conclusion: The petition is partly allowed; the respondent is directed to issue a tax withholding certificate requiring deduction of tax at 2% for Assessment Year 2026-27 (financial year 2025-26) within 10 days; the direction applies only to the certificate issued pursuant to the petitioner's application for AY 2026-27 and the Competent Authority shall consider subsequent years in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the immovable properties and proceeds realised from sale of part of the lands are benami properties within the meaning of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; (ii) Whether the Amending Act, 2016 applies where the transfer pre-dates the amendment but the property is held by the alleged benamidar subsequent to the amendment; (iii) Whether the appellants fall within the fiduciary exception under sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the immovable properties and proceeds realised from sale of part of the lands are benami properties under the PBPT Act, 1988.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined admissions of lack of financial capacity by the ostensible holder, custody and non-possession of original title deeds by the ostensible holder, the conduct of the alleged beneficial owner in executing agreements to sell and receiving sale proceeds, bank records showing absence of consideration paid by the ostensible holder, and the treatment of sale proceeds derived from benami land as derived from the benami property. The Tribunal also considered the statutory definition of "benami property" under section 2(8) and the elements in section 2(9) requiring that the property be transferred to or held by a person while consideration is provided by another and that the property be held for the immediate or future benefit of the person providing consideration.

Conclusion: The immovable properties and the sale proceeds realised from a portion of the said lands are benami properties; this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Amending Act, 2016 is applicable when transfer occurred prior to amendment but the property is held by the alleged benamidar after the amendment.

Analysis: The Tribunal relied on the amended definition and prior Tribunal reasoning that the definition of benami transaction covers both transfer and holding; where a property is held by the ostensible holder subsequent to the Amending Act 2016, the amended provisions apply provided other conditions of the definition are satisfied. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court's earlier decision relied upon by the appellants has been recalled and that jurisprudence and statutory text support applying the Amending Act to property held post-amendment.

Conclusion: The Amending Act, 2016 applies where the property, though transferred earlier, is held by the alleged benamidar subsequent to the amendment; this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants are protected by the fiduciary exception in sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act, 1988.

Analysis: The Tribunal interpreted sub-clause (ii) as inclusive but held that a fiduciary relationship requires exclusive trust and absence of personal benefit by the fiduciary. The factual matrix showed that the alleged fiduciary exercised dominion and control, retained title deeds, orchestrated transfers, and personally received sale proceeds, indicating an adverse financial interest inconsistent with fiduciary obligations and not within the recognized or notified categories under the clause.

Conclusion: The appellants do not fall within the fiduciary exception under sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A); this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal finds the impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority confirming the provisional attachment and holding the properties to be benami correct on the facts and law, and there is no merit in the appellants' grounds; the appeals are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a property transferred prior to the Amending Act, 2016 is nonetheless held by the alleged ostensible holder after the amendment, the amended definition of benami transaction applies; further, proceeds derived from sale of benami property are themselves benami property, and a claimed fiduciary relationship is negated where the purported fiduciary derives personal benefit and exercises dominion and control inconsistent with exclusive trust.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be relegated to the alternate remedy despite a jurisdictional challenge to the reassessment notice, and whether interim protection should be granted pending final disposal.

Analysis: The challenge raised two jurisdictional objections to the notice under section 148: first, that the notice was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer when, according to the petitioner, only the Faceless Assessing Officer could issue it; and second, that the notice granted only 30 days to file the return though the amended provision was said to require a minimum period of three months. In such circumstances, the existence of an appellate remedy was not treated as a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court found that arguable jurisdictional questions were raised and that the writ petition was therefore fit to be entertained.

Conclusion: The Court declined to relegate the petitioner to the alternate remedy and granted interim protection against the reassessment order, demand notice, and penalty show-cause notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition raising arguable jurisdictional defects in reassessment proceedings may be entertained notwithstanding the availability of an alternate statutory remedy.

Issues: Whether the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 30.07.2022 and the consequential assessment and related orders are time-barred under the limitation calculus (surviving period) as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal, having regard to the 30-day window granted in Ashish Agarwal for providing reasons/material.

Analysis: The controlling authorities establish a two-step timeline: (i) Ashish Agarwal granted a one-time 30-day period from 04.05.2022 for the Revenue to furnish information/material, and (ii) Rajeev Bansal prescribes computation of the surviving period by adding the period allowed to the Department and the period allowed to the assessee to reply (four weeks plus two weeks). Any notice issued by the Department beyond the one-time 30-day window under Ashish Agarwal cannot be used to extend or reset the surviving period. A fresh notice dated 26.07.2022 issued after the Ashish Agarwal window cannot lawfully extend limitation; reliance on the fourth proviso to Section 148A to claim an additional seven days is inconsistent with the Rajeev Bansal mechanism which defines the surviving period without such further extension.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 dated 30.07.2022 and the consequential orders, including the assessment order dated 29.01.2026, are time-barred and are quashed. The writ petition is allowed insofar as it seeks quashing of the said notice, the order under Section 148A(d), the second notice dated 26.07.2022, the order disposing objections dated 13.01.2026, the assessment order dated 29.01.2026 and consequential demand and penalty notices.

Issues: Whether the assessment order dated 9th June 2021 and the notice of demand dated 9th June 2021 could be sustained where, despite a draft assessment order having been made, no notice was served on the assessee to show cause as required by Section 144B(1)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 144B(1) provides the faceless assessment procedure and, in particular, requires the assessment unit to prepare a draft assessment order (Section 144B(1)(xiv)) and the National Faceless Assessment Centre to examine that draft and, if any variation prejudicial to the assessee is proposed, to provide an opportunity to the assessee by serving a notice calling upon the assessee to show cause (Section 144B(1)(xvi)). The statutory scheme mandates that only after serving such notice and considering any response can a final assessment be passed. In the present matter the Revenue accepts that although a draft assessment order was prepared, no show-cause notice was communicated to the assessee and no opportunity to reply was afforded prior to passing the final assessment and issuing the demand notice. This absence of the mandated procedural step constitutes a breach of the specific statutory procedure set out in Section 144B(1)(xvi).

Conclusion: The assessment order dated 9th June 2021 and the notice of demand dated 9th June 2021 are quashed and set aside for failure to comply with the mandatory show-cause requirement under Section 144B(1)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The writ petition is allowed in these terms.

Issues: (i) Whether addition of Rs. 12,25,00,000/- under section 68 in respect of share capital subscribed by a foreign investor could be sustained; (ii) Whether disallowance of Rs. 4,30,91,544/- under section 40A(2)(b) in respect of payments to a related party could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the addition under section 68 in respect of share subscription by a foreign holding/investment company is sustainable.

Analysis: The material shows subscription through banking channels supported by FIRC and regulatory filings, and audited financial statements of the investor disclosing the investment as an asset. For an investment/holding company, balance sheet and cash flow disclosures are more probative of capacity than operating profit. The revenue/assessing authorities did not produce affirmative material disproving identity, genuineness or source after production of audited accounts and reconciliatory documents; alleged non-authentication of certain annexures and the investor's negligible operating income were relied upon without correlating to the audited disclosures and regulatory reporting.

Conclusion: Addition under section 68 of Rs. 12,25,00,000/- is deleted and the explanation furnished by the assessee is accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) for payments to a related party is sustainable.

Analysis: The apparent discrepancy arose from comparing Form 26AS receipts of the service provider with only revenue expenses in the assessee's profit and loss account without accounting for capitalised invoices. The assessee produced audited related-party schedules and a detailed reconciliation demonstrating capitalisation of significant invoices and adjustments for provisions and taxes, reducing the residual difference to a nominal amount. Section 40A(2)(b) requires formation of an opinion based on objective material such as fair market value benchmarking or demonstrable excess; a mere unexplained mismatch, once reconciled by documentary disclosures, does not justify disallowance.

Conclusion: Disallowance of Rs. 4,30,91,544/- under section 40A(2)(b) is deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed in respect of both issues, resulting in deletion of the addition under section 68 and deletion of the disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) as recorded above.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee explains a cash credit by establishing identity, genuineness and source through audited balance sheet and cash flow disclosures and regulated banking/regulatory evidence, the addition under section 68 cannot be sustained in absence of affirmative rebutting material; similarly, disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) requires objective material demonstrating excess after accounting for capitalisation and reconciliatory adjustments, and cannot rest on an unreconciled mismatch.

Outcome: The advance ruling application was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly.