Issues: Whether the sales tax subsidy/exemption granted under the State Industrial Policy is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the subsidy was granted to promote capital investment (capital nature) or was an operational/recurring assistance post commencement of production (revenue nature). The Court applied the purpose test as articulated by the Supreme Court in Ponni Sugars and reiterated in Chaphalkar Brothers, holding that the time or manner of grant is immaterial and the larger object (promotion of capital investment) is decisive. The factual matrix showed retention of sales tax collected by the assessee for ten years, with a ceiling linked to fixed capital investment (300% of fixed capital investment) and differential benefit based on location within the State, indicating that the subsidy was granted in consideration of capital investment. The Income Tax Department conceded before the Tribunal (ITAT) in light of the Supreme Court rulings that such subsidy is capital in nature, and no challenge to that concession was pressed by Revenue.

Conclusion: The sales tax subsidy/exemption under the State Industrial Policy is a capital receipt; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee and the assessee's appeal is allowed.

Issues: Whether, where business income is declared and accepted under section 44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and turnover is recorded at the stamp duty value, a separate addition of the differential amount can be made under section 43CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 44AD operates as a complete deeming code for computing business profits on the basis of turnover or gross receipts by prescribing a percentage of turnover as taxable income. Section 43CA is also a deeming provision which substitutes stamp duty value for the stated consideration for the limited purpose of computing business income from transfer of land or building held as stock-in-trade. When both deeming provisions are in play, they must be harmonised to give effect to each without producing duplication. If section 44AD applies and the turnover/gross receipts base already reflects the stamp duty value (as recorded in the assessment), section 43CA's effect is limited to determining the appropriate turnover for application of the presumptive rate under section 44AD. Making a separate addition of the stamp duty differential, in addition to applying the presumptive percentage on the adopted turnover, results in an impermissible hybrid computation and double counting unless section 44AD is first displaced and normal computation is undertaken.

Conclusion: The separate addition of the differential amount under section 43CA is not sustainable where turnover for section 44AD has been recorded at the stamp duty value and the presumptive computation under section 44AD has been accepted; the addition is deleted and the appeal is partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Clause 19.13 of the Conditions of Contract constituted a valid arbitration agreement and survived termination of the underlying contract notwithstanding approval of the resolution plan; (ii) whether the Court under Section 11(6-A) was confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement or could examine the effect of the resolution plan and the Clean Slate doctrine; (iii) whether approval of the resolution plan extinguished the Petitioner's claims against the Respondent or left intact independent civil remedies capable of being referred to arbitration.

Issue (i): Whether Clause 19.13 of the Conditions of Contract constituted a valid arbitration agreement and survived termination of the underlying contract notwithstanding approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: The clause required disputes arising out of or touching the works contract to be referred to arbitration by a sole arbitrator, was contained in a written contract, and clearly satisfied the ingredients of an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The arbitration clause was treated as distinct from the underlying commercial contract. Applying the doctrine of separability, the termination of the contract did not, by itself, extinguish the arbitration agreement. The approval of the resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was held not to expressly extinguish the arbitration clause itself.

Conclusion: Clause 19.13 was a valid arbitration agreement and, prima facie, continued to subsist despite termination of the contract and approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court under Section 11(6-A) was confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement or could examine the effect of the resolution plan and the Clean Slate doctrine.

Analysis: The scope of Section 11(6-A) was held to be narrow and limited to prima facie scrutiny of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The Court treated questions arising from the resolution plan, the Clean Slate doctrine, and the effect of insolvency on the claims as matters involving contested facts and legal consequences beyond the limited referral inquiry. Those matters were held to fall within the domain of the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.

Conclusion: The Court was confined to a prima facie Section 11 inquiry and could not finally decide the insolvency-based objections at the referral stage.

Issue (iii): Whether approval of the resolution plan extinguished the Petitioner's claims against the Respondent or left intact independent civil remedies capable of being referred to arbitration.

Analysis: The Clean Slate doctrine was understood to operate principally against stale claims against the corporate debtor and not to extinguish, as a matter of law at the referral stage, the corporate debtor's independent remedies against third parties. The Court relied on the distinction between claims against the corporate debtor and claims by the corporate debtor against counterparties. Questions of accord and satisfaction, waiver, estoppel, and extinction by operation of law were treated as disputed matters requiring arbitral determination. The claims were therefore regarded, prima facie, as live disputes falling within the arbitration clause.

Conclusion: The Petitioner's claims were not held to be extinguished at the Section 11 stage, and the disputes were treated as arbitrable.

Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed and an arbitrator was appointed, with all substantive objections arising from insolvency, resolution-plan approval, and the Clean Slate doctrine left open for decision by the arbitral tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: At the Section 11 stage, the Court's inquiry is limited to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement, and insolvency-based objections affecting the merits or survival of claims ordinarily fall for determination by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 unless the arbitration agreement itself is shown not to exist.

Issues: Whether Sections 69 and 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are constitutionally invalid (arbitrary, unreasonable and ultra vires the Constitution of India) and whether proceedings under those provisions can be quashed.

Analysis: The writ petition challenges the vires of Section 69 and Section 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on grounds of arbitrariness and want of legislative competence. The Court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India (2025) governs the question of vires raised in this petition and renders the challenge unsustainable. The petitioner conceded that the Supreme Court decision covers the vires aspect but sought liberty to pursue other available remedies concerning other prayers in the petition. The Court therefore confined its decision to the vires challenge in the light of the binding precedent.

Conclusion: The challenge to the vires of Section 69 and Section 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is negated and the prayer to quash proceedings under those provisions is rejected. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to pursue other remedies in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether Sections 69 and 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are ultravires the Constitution of India and liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The challenge to the vires of Sections 69 and 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was considered in light of binding authority of the Supreme Court in Radhika Agarwal vs. Union of India and others, 2025. The Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision forecloses the present vires challenge and controls the adjudication of constitutional competence and reasonableness of the impugned provisions. The petitioner acknowledged that the issue is covered by the mentioned Supreme Court precedent but sought liberty to pursue other remedies in respect of remaining prayers; the Court granted such liberty while declining to disturb the precedent-driven conclusion on vires.

Conclusion: The challenge to the vires of Sections 69 and 132 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is rejected and the prayer for quashing those provisions is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the letters dated 14th February 2018, 26th April 2018, 25th September 2018 and 24th December 2018 and the show-cause notice dated 14th May 2019, insofar as they seek to recover Service Tax/IGST from the importer on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism in CIF contracts, are liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The Court applied the legal framework governing levy and rulemaking under the Finance Act, 1994 and the IGST Act, 2017 together with the structure of reverse charge mechanism. It examined the scope of taxing power as confined to service providers and service recipients, the limits of rulemaking under Section 94 of the Finance Act, and the interaction between levy provisions and the valuation/collection machinery. The Court relied on precedents holding that in CIF contracts the service of sea transportation is received by the foreign exporter (seller) and that importers have no privity of contract with the overseas shipping line nor make payment of ocean freight; thus the impugned rules and notifications that seek to shift liability to importers amount to attempting to tax a third party beyond the statutory charging and rulemaking powers. The Court further applied the principle that a separate levy on service elements of a composite supply (where the importer is already liable for IGST on the composite import) is inconsistent with the composite supply doctrine under the GST framework. The Court considered prior decisions (including Sanathan Textiles, Sal Steel, Chennai & Ennore Ports, and Union of India v. Mohit Minerals) and concluded that the impugned executive notifications and consequential demands lack legislative authority, and that any amounts paid may be claimed by refund subject to law and unjust enrichment principles.

Conclusion: The letters dated 14th February 2018, 26th April 2018, 25th September 2018 and 24th December 2018 and the show-cause notice dated 14th May 2019 are quashed and set aside; the petitioner is entitled to seek refund, if any, by filing a refund application to be decided in accordance with law including principles of unjust enrichment.

Issues: Whether a reference made at the instance of the applicant could be withdrawn, and whether the Court could decline to answer the referred questions when the applicant stated that it was no longer interested in pursuing the reference.

Analysis: A reference under Section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 is ordinarily required to be answered, but the Court held that the party at whose instance the reference was made has no absolute right to withdraw it once made. At the same time, where that party states that it does not wish to pursue the reference and the other side is also not interested in having the questions answered, the Court is not obliged to decide the reference on merits and may decline to answer the questions, keeping them open for decision in an appropriate case.

Conclusion: The reference could not be withdrawn as of right, but the Court declined to answer the referred questions and disposed of the matter.

Ratio Decidendi: A party cannot unilaterally withdraw a reference once made by the Tribunal, but the Court may decline to answer the referred questions where the party at whose instance the reference was made no longer wishes to pursue it and no hearing on merits is effectively required.

Issues: Whether the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 (w.e.f. 08.10.2024) without a saving clause renders proceedings and recovery orders issued under that rule without any legal basis and therefore liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The Court examined the legal effect of the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, including whether proceedings founded solely on that rule survive after its omission in the absence of a saving clause. The Court considered the relationship of Rule 96(10) to Section 16 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and constitutional challenges raised under Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The Court also reviewed prior decisions of the High Court on identical questions and noted that where an impugned order is founded exclusively on a statutory rule which is subsequently omitted without a saving provision, the statutory basis for such order ceases to exist.

Conclusion: The omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 (w.e.f. 08.10.2024) without a saving clause removes the legal foundation for proceedings and recovery orders issued solely under that rule; accordingly, the impugned recovery orders dated 21.12.2023 are set aside. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 in Form GST DRC-07 is invalid on the ground that the petitioner's detailed reply in Form GST DRC-06 was not considered and that the summary in Form GST DRC-01 cannot substitute for a detailed show cause notice.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order and found that the petitioner had submitted a detailed reply which was considered by the authority, and that the demand in Form GST DRC-01 was based on an intimation in Form GST DRC-01A attached to the show cause proceedings. The Court distinguished the decision in Shambu Prasad (Gauhati) as not applicable on the facts, noting that the present proceedings involved a detailed reply and a meritorious adjudication. The Court also observed that the petitioner approached the Court within the period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the respective GST enactments and addressed the question of limitation by granting liberty to file an appeal.

Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed; the impugned order stands upheld and the petitioner is not entitled to relief in this Court. The petitioner is granted liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority within thirty days and the Appellate Authority is directed to entertain and dispose of the appeal on merits notwithstanding limitation.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dated 17 March 2025, passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing because notices of hearing returned undelivered, was in violation of principles of natural justice and requires interference/remand.

Analysis: Section 153 of the Customs Act, 1962 provides multiple modes for service of notices and contains a deeming provision that a notice sent by post is deemed served at the expiry of the normal transit period only if the contrary is not proved. Returned postal articles with endorsements indicating non-delivery constitute proof of contrary facts. Where returned notices are on file, reliance on deemed service is not permissible without attempting alternative modes of service provided under the statute. An appellate order made without ensuring effective service by available alternative methods, when postal service has failed, results in denial of the opportunity of hearing. Email service is an available and expected additional mode where an email address is on record and may be resorted to along with other prescribed modes.

Conclusion: The appellate order dated 17 March 2025 is set aside for violation of principles of natural justice and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for fresh consideration with direction to afford the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing and to effect service by appropriate alternative modes expeditiously.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Tribunal/NCLT has jurisdiction to extend the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) period beyond the moratorium/outer limit prescribed under Section 101 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and whether the impugned orders rejecting applications for extension of PIRP should be set aside.

Analysis: Relevant statutory and regulatory provisions include Section 101 (moratorium) and Sections 112-115 (report and order on repayment plan) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and Regulation 19 of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Regulations, 2019, which prescribes the timeline for filing an approved repayment plan. Section 101 prescribes that the moratorium ceases on expiry of 180 days from admission or on the date an order is passed under Section 114, whichever is earlier; this fixes the outer limit of the moratorium but does not expressly prescribe automatic termination of the PIRP or preclude the adjudicating authority from exercising its statutory discretion in relation to continuation or extension of the resolution process. Precedents of this Tribunal and the ratio in Supreme Court decisions on analogous provisions (concerning mandatory timelines) establish that where timelines in the Code or regulations are procedural or directory and where substantive justice and stakeholders' interests warrant, the adjudicating authority/Tribunal may in appropriate cases permit extension of the resolution process (while distinguishing that extension of the resolution process does not equate to extension of the moratorium beyond the statutory outer limit of 180 days).

Conclusion: Issue (i) decided in favour of the appellant. The appeals are allowed, the impugned common order dated 28.01.2026 is set aside and the applications for extension of the PIRP are allowed; the PIRP period is extended until 15.03.2026 for procedural completion and submission of the report on the repayment plan.

Issues: (i) Whether the blocking of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger for the tax period 01.10.2025 to 31.12.2025 under Rule 86A of the GST Rules is maintainable; (ii) Whether an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner is competent to block input tax credit under Rule 86A.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned blocking of input tax credit under Rule 86A for the specified tax period is valid.

Analysis: Evidence of an inspection and recorded statements on 04.12.2025 indicated that the credit was claimed on potentially blocked invoices, and the blocking action was taken on 05.12.2025. Prior decisions addressed identical factual and legal circumstances, confirming that blocking under Rule 86A is permissible where the material justifies such action and a show cause notice proceedings are in existence.

Conclusion: The blocking of input tax credit for the specified tax period is valid and the challenge to the blocking is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Whether the action to block credit by an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner is beyond jurisdiction under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Prior judicial decisions construed Rule 86A to permit blocking where a subordinate officer acts with the authorisation of a senior officer; issuance of Form GST DRC 01 and internal authorisation satisfy the requirement that the blocking be effected with senior approval. The internal hierarchical permission and the status of the State Tax Officer as proper officer for issuance of show cause notice were treated as validating the impugned action.

Conclusion: The objection based on competence of the officer is rejected; the blocking carried out by the officer below Assistant Commissioner is not invalidated where senior authorisation or proper internal delegation exists.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the blocking of input tax credit is dismissed; the petitioner is granted liberty to make a representation and, if submitted, the concerned officer shall consider it and pass appropriate orders after hearing within thirty days.

Ratio Decidendi: Where material gathered from inspection and recorded statements indicates ineligibility or potential fraud in claimed input tax credit and a show cause notice is in existence, blocking of credit under Rule 86A is permissible; such blocking by a subordinate officer is valid if effected with senior authorisation or within the internal delegation of powers.

Issues: (i) Whether consultancy and project management services provided by the applicant to Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for construction of Danapith Fire Station, staff quarters and multi level parking qualify as "pure services" relating to functions entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W and are exempt under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, as amended.

Analysis: The exemption in Sl. No. 3 requires (a) the supply to be a pure service (excluding works contract or composite supplies involving supply of goods), (b) the recipient to be Central/State/Union territory/local authority, and (c) the service to be by way of any activity in relation to a function entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G or to a Municipality under Article 243W. The supply agreement dated 13.11.2019 shows scope limited to architectural and structural drawings, detailed estimates, tender documents, consultancy for MEP/firefighting/electrification, supervision, certification of bills and related advisory and project management services, with no transfer of property in goods; accordingly it is not a works contract or composite supply involving goods and falls within the concept of pure services. The recipient is Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, which is a local authority under Section 2(69)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The twelfth schedule to Article 243W includes fire services (clause (7)) and public amenities including parking lots (clause (17)). The staff quarters in this contract are provided for accommodation of fire personnel and are located within the fire station premises; historical and regulatory material (Standing Fire Advisory Committee recommendations and auditing observations) indicate provision of living accommodation on fire station premises is integral to fire services, supporting treatment of the staff quarters as part of the municipal function of fire services. Applying these legal tests to the facts, all three conditions of Sl. No. 3 are satisfied for the services in question.

Conclusion: The consultancy and project management services supplied by the applicant to Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for the Proposed Construction of Danapith Fire Station and Staff Quarters & Multi Level Parking are exempt from GST under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, as amended.

Issues: Whether the respondent should be directed to consider and dispose of the petitioner's application under Section 161 of the GST enactments seeking rectification of the impugned assessment order.

Analysis: The Court recorded that the petitioner filed an application under Section 161 for rectification which remained undecided. The respondent's counsel stated that the application would be considered and disposed of on merits. The petitioner had also filed substantive replies to the show cause proceedings regarding input tax credit, but the Court did not undertake adjudication of the tax demand. Instead, the Court confined itself to ensuring the statutory rectification remedy is adjudicated promptly by the administrative authority.

Conclusion: The respondent is directed to consider and dispose of the petitioner's rectification application under Section 161 on merits within 30 days. The writ petition is disposed of with the above direction.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 15(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is valid when it treats post-contractual or subsequently computed trade discounts as affecting transaction value; (ii) Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is maintainable in the facts raised; (iii) Whether interim protection in the form of stay of recovery should be granted to the petitioner and on what terms.

Issue (i): Validity of Section 15(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in relation to trade discounts computed after formation of the underlying contract.

Analysis: Reliance is placed on precedent holding that trade discounts arising from pre-existing agreements but computed later do not alter the supplier's liability on transaction value; legislative treatment contrary to that principle has been questioned and requires closer scrutiny on merits.

Conclusion: Prima facie doubt is raised on the validity of Section 15(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as applied to subsequently computed trade discounts; the issue requires detailed adjudication.

Issue (ii): Objection to invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The challenge to initiation of proceedings under the penal provision has been advanced as a substantive objection to be examined on merits, and the petition presents sufficient material to warrant deeper scrutiny of the grounds for invoking Section 74.

Conclusion: A prima facie case is made out that invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 may be open to challenge; the question is to be decided on a full hearing.

Issue (iii): Entitlement to interim protection from recovery during pendency of the writ petition.

Analysis: Having found prima facie merit on the challenges to the statutory provisions and the invocation of penal proceedings, and having noted partial deposit/recovery already effected, interim relief in the form of restraint on recovery subject to a deposit condition is appropriate to preserve the petitioner's position until final disposal.

Conclusion: Interim protection is granted to the petitioner; subject to deposit of 10% of the disputed tax (including amounts already deposited or recovered), no further recoveries shall be made during the pendency of the writ petition.

Final Conclusion: The petition raises substantial questions of law concerning the application of transaction value rules and the invocation of penal provisions under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and interim relief has been issued to preserve the subject matter pending adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount of INR 465 crore could be taxed in the assessee's hands as business income, fees for technical services, or under the India-UAE DTAA on the basis of alleged consultancy services rendered through a permanent establishment or fixed base in India; (ii) Whether the investments made by the assessee's foreign group companies in Indian companies could be taxed in the assessee's hands as unexplained income.

Issue (i): Whether the amount of INR 465 crore could be taxed in the assessee's hands as business income, fees for technical services, or under the India-UAE DTAA on the basis of alleged consultancy services rendered through a permanent establishment or fixed base in India.

Analysis: The addition rested on the assumption that the assessee rendered consultancy services from premises in India and that the foreign companies were mere conduits. The earlier year's decision in the assessee's own case had already held that there was no direct or indirect evidence that the services were rendered from India, that mere presence at a business premises did not establish disposal or use of that premises as a permanent establishment, and that the Revenue failed to establish a business connection in India. It was also held that consultancy and liaison services did not fall within Article 14 as independent personal services and that the absence of a fixed base or stay exceeding the treaty threshold defeated that alternative basis of taxability. The same factual position continued in the year under appeal, and no material change in facts or law was shown.

Conclusion: The amount of INR 465 crore was not taxable in the assessee's hands as business income, fees for technical services, or under the treaty on the basis alleged by the Revenue, and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the investments made by the assessee's foreign group companies in Indian companies could be taxed in the assessee's hands as unexplained income.

Analysis: The investments were made by separate foreign corporate entities and not by the assessee in his individual capacity. A shareholder and the company are distinct legal persons, and the Revenue did not bring reliable material to show that the assessee himself made the investments or that unaccounted funds of Indian origin were routed through him. In the absence of factual inquiry establishing diversion of the companies' funds or grounds to disregard corporate personality, the investments could not be attributed to the assessee.

Conclusion: The investment addition in the assessee's hands was not sustainable, and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The protective additions and related grounds raised by the Revenue fail, and the assessee's case succeeds on both the principal taxability issue and the investment issue.

Ratio Decidendi: Taxation of consultancy receipts in the hands of a non-resident individual requires proof of a taxable nexus in India, such as an established permanent establishment, fixed base, or business connection, and investments made by separate foreign companies cannot be attributed to a shareholder absent material to pierce the corporate veil.

Issues: (i) Whether addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs.2,30,00,000/- on account of sale proceeds of unlisted equity shares should be sustained or deleted; (ii) Whether the direction by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to the Assessing Officer to make an addition equal to 5% of total sales consideration as embedded profit is sustainable; (iii) Whether addition of Rs.31,00,000/- under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged non-genuine commodity trading profit in illiquid stock options is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs.2,30,00,000/- under Section 68 in respect of sale of unlisted equity shares is maintainable.

Analysis: The transactions involved sale of investments held by amalgamating companies; investments and prior acceptances by revenue in earlier assessment years were on record; purchasers furnished confirmations, ITRs, audited accounts and banking trail; no independent defect in documents was demonstrated by the Assessing Officer; co-ordinate bench decisions and High Court confirmation in materially similar cases applied the principle that once investments were accepted in earlier scrutiny assessments and sale proceeds are supported by evidence, additions under Section 68 cannot be sustained; statements recorded during search were retracted and lacked corroborative material.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.2,30,00,000/- under Section 68 is deleted and the Revenue's appeal on this issue is dismissed (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether the CIT(A)'s direction to make an addition equal to 5% of total sales consideration as presumed profit is sustainable.

Analysis: The direction imposing a 5% deemed profit lacked a substantive basis in the appellate order; the Assessing Officer was not directed to apply or compute such a percentage based on evidentiary findings; co-ordinate bench authority did not support an unsubstantiated presumptive addition where the factual matrix was similar and evidence supported genuineness of transactions.

Conclusion: The CIT(A)'s direction to add 5% of sales consideration is set aside and the assessee's cross-objection is allowed (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether the addition of Rs.31,00,000/- as non-genuine commodity trading profit in illiquid stock options is maintainable under Section 68.

Analysis: Profit of Rs.31,00,000/- was credited and offered to tax by the assessee with contract notes and exchange records; AO relied on SEBI/investigation reports without pointing to defects in the assessee's documents or producing independent contradictory evidence; legal authorities restrict making additions solely on retracted search statements without corroboration.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.31,00,000/- is deleted and the assessee's ground is allowed (in favour of the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the assessee's appeal and cross-objection are allowed; the Assessing Officer is directed to delete the impugned additions and to act in accordance with the findings recorded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where investments were accepted in earlier scrutiny assessments and sale proceeds are supported by documentary evidence and banking trail, and where statements recorded during search are retracted without corroborative material, additions under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the Company Petition under Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 was maintainable and whether the NCLT was justified in admitting the petition and directing issuance of public notice under Rule 87 of the NCLT Rules, 2016.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined Section 245(1) and (4) of the Companies Act, 2013 and the relevant NCLT Rules (including Rule 84(3)(ii)(b), Rule 85 and Rule 87) to determine threshold eligibility and prima facie satisfaction. The Tribunal considered whether Section 245 is confined to continuing acts or also covers past/concluded transactions, the scope of reliefs under Section 245(1)(g) and (h) (including claims for damages or compensation against the company, its directors or third parties), and whether applicants acted in good faith and could pursue the cause of action in their own right. The Tribunal reviewed factual allegations of concealment, undervaluation and related party transactions with reference to Regulation 23 of the SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015, and noted market regulator (SEBI) and enforcement (ED) inquiries as relevant prima facie material. The Tribunal also applied the statutory definition of good faith (Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897) and considered whether joinder of all class members would be impracticable and whether representative petitioners would adequately protect class interests.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that Section 245(1) permits class actions for acts prejudicial to the company and its members, including past and concluded transactions where damages or restitution are sought; that reliefs under Section 245(1)(g) and (h) can extend to third parties and past acts; that the petition met the statutory threshold (2% / 4.99% shareholding) and prima facie satisfaction; and that the NCLT did not err in admitting the petition and directing issuance of public notice. The appeal against the admission and notice direction was dismissed.

Issues: (i) whether Clause (d) of the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the West Bengal Excise (Change in Management) Rules, 2009 was constitutionally valid insofar as it denied exemption in the usual course of business to private limited companies while granting a similar benefit to public limited companies; (ii) whether the 2020 amendment defining "change in management" was clarificatory and retrospective; and (iii) whether the provision should be read up rather than struck down.

Issue (i): whether Clause (d) of the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the West Bengal Excise (Change in Management) Rules, 2009 was constitutionally valid insofar as it denied exemption in the usual course of business to private limited companies while granting a similar benefit to public limited companies.

Analysis: The exemption structure in the 2009 Rules was examined as a whole. The charging and regulatory provisions treated changes in management of private and public limited companies on broadly similar terms, and the distinction introduced in the exemption clause alone created an intra-class classification among limited companies. The distinction was held to have no intelligible differentia or rational nexus with the object of the Rules, particularly because changes in the usual course of business are involuntary and outside managerial control. The Court held that the State's latitude in liquor regulation does not permit arbitrary discrimination within the same class.

Conclusion: The exclusion of private limited companies from the usual-course-of-business exemption was unconstitutional and unsustainable.

Issue (ii): whether the 2020 amendment defining "change in management" was clarificatory and retrospective.

Analysis: The amendment introduced a new definition by substitution and was stated to operate with immediate effect. Since the earlier Rules contained no definition of the expression, the amendment could not be treated as merely clarificatory. The Court therefore rejected the contention that it operated retrospectively.

Conclusion: The 2020 amendment was not retrospective and did not govern the controversy as a clarificatory measure.

Issue (iii): whether the provision should be read up rather than struck down.

Analysis: The Court held that constitutional avoidance required the provision to be preserved by reading it up so that it aligned with the parallel exemption given to public limited companies. Striking it down in full would have removed even the benefit already intended for private limited companies in cases of death of directors and would defeat the scheme of the Rules. The proper construction was therefore to retain the provision with the words necessary to include change in management in the usual course of business.

Conclusion: Clause (d) was to be read up to include change in management in the usual course of business, and not struck down in entirety.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in substance, the impugned judgment was modified only to the extent of substituting reading up for invalidation, and the setting aside of the demand and related directions was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: A subordinate fiscal rule that discriminates within the same class of regulated entities without intelligible differentia or rational nexus to the object of the rule offends Article 14 and must be construed to preserve validity if the scheme permits such construction.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint and cognizance were barred by limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether non-compliance with Section 202 of the Code vitiated the summoning process when the complaint was made by a public servant. (iii) Whether the High Court could quash the prosecution for alleged deficiency in pleading the role of company directors under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint and cognizance were barred by limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The limitation period for the offence punishable under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was three years. The Court held that, on the facts, the relevant starting point was the date on which the identity of the accused became known during the investigation, not the initial complaint by the private informant. The complaint before the court was filed within three years from that point, and the delay was therefore within the permissible period.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and the finding was in favour of the Appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with Section 202 of the Code vitiated the summoning process when the complaint was made by a public servant.

Analysis: The Court read Sections 200 and 202 of the Code harmoniously and treated a complaint by a public servant acting in discharge of official duty on a different footing. Reliance was placed on the earlier view that the object of an inquiry under Section 202 is to prevent unnecessary harassment, but that the statutory setting does not justify quashing where the complaint is by a public servant and the case is otherwise supported by official action. The Court rejected the distinction sought to be drawn on facts and held that the mandatory inquiry point did not justify interference in the present case.

Conclusion: The challenge based on Section 202 failed and was decided in favour of the Appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court could quash the prosecution for alleged deficiency in pleading the role of company directors under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Analysis: The Court held that questions whether the directors were in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company's business were matters of fact that should ordinarily be tested at trial. The High Court's conclusion that the complaint was insufficient on that aspect was found to be premature.

Conclusion: The quashing on the ground of Section 34 was unsustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the Appellants.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution was restored in the appeals where the quashing order was set aside, while the separate accused appeal was dismissed. The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the present appeals and would not prejudice the trial on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution initiated by a public servant under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the limitation period may commence when the identity of the accused is ascertained during investigation, and the requirement of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code does not warrant quashing where the complaint is by a public servant acting in discharge of official duty and the challenge is otherwise premature.