Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority rightly admitted the Section 7 petition by finding existence of financial debt and default and whether the admission should be interfered with on account of alleged viability of the corporate debtor; (ii) Whether the second Section 7 petition was barred by res judicata by reason of dismissal of the earlier petition; (iii) Whether the impugned admission violated the RBI Prudential Framework dated 07.06.2019 by not giving opportunity to submit a resolution plan or restructure debt; (iv) Whether the conduct of the financial creditor in purportedly stalling support and causing default justifies interference with admission.

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority lawfully admitted the Section 7 petition on the basis of established financial debt and default and whether the viability argument displaces the limited scope of enquiry at admission.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the pleaded debt, acknowledgements of liability, audited accounts, and records of default, and applied the governing precedents interpreting the limited scope of inquiry at the admission stage. The Tribunal analysed the relevance of the Vidarbha line of authority vis-a -vis Innoventive and subsequent clarifications, and considered recent Supreme Court guidance emphasising that once debt and default are established the Adjudicating Authority has constrained discretion at admission. The appellant failed to produce contemporaneous, concrete financial evidence showing unconditional or unencumbered realizable assets sufficient to discharge secured creditors such that Vidarbha would apply.

Conclusion: The admission under Section 7 was correct; debt and default were established and the viability arguments do not warrant interference. This conclusion is against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the second Section 7 petition was barred by res judicata because a prior Section 7 petition was dismissed.

Analysis: The Tribunal distinguished the earlier dismissal as having been occasioned by the quashing of the RBI circular relied upon in that petition, not a decision on merits of the claim; the subsequent petition was filed on the basis of the revised RBI framework and therefore raised a fresh foundation for proceedings. The legal principle of res judicata was applied only where prior dismissal operates on merits and grants finality to the same cause of action.

Conclusion: Res judicata does not bar the second Section 7 petition. This conclusion is against the Appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned admission violated the RBI Prudential Framework dated 07.06.2019 by not providing opportunity to submit a resolution plan or restructure debt under the framework.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed the content and discretionary language of the RBI framework, noted that the corporate debtor had not submitted a resolution plan under the 07.06.2019 framework, and found that the framework affords commercial lenders flexibility including initiation of insolvency or recovery. The Tribunal also considered that the forensic-audit driven fraud classification and pending investigations affected eligibility and opportunity to invoke the framework.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the RBI Prudential Framework; no interference is warranted. This conclusion is against the Appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether alleged misconduct by the financial creditor in freezing facilities, adjusting receipts, or otherwise causing insolvency justifies setting aside the admission.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined consortium minutes and records, finding that adjustments and recall measures were inter-lender matters and that the appellant did not establish, by concrete evidence, that the financial creditor's conduct legally precluded initiation of CIRP. The Tribunal also noted admissions of debt and relevant documentary evidence indicating default.

Conclusion: Allegations of misconduct do not justify interference with admission. This conclusion is against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: All substantive grounds advanced to set aside the admission of CIRP were considered and rejected; the appeal is devoid of merit and is dismissed, leaving the CIRP and ensuing commercial process to proceed under the statutory scheme and the decisions of the committee of creditors.

Ratio Decidendi: At the Section 7 admission stage the Adjudicating Authority's primary enquiry is limited to whether a financial debt exists and whether default has occurred; absent clear, contemporaneous, and convincing evidence demonstrating that the corporate debtor's viability or other exceptional facts should displace that limited enquiry, admission should not be set aside on grounds of commercial viability, res judicata arising from a dismissal for reasons unrelated to merits, or alleged lender conduct where debt and default are established.

Issues: Whether remuneration received by an IPL player from franchisees for playing matches and for promotional activities can be taxed as "business support service" under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994, and whether the CBEC instruction dated 26 July, 2010 can be relied upon to tax composite fees if segregation is not possible.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined precedent including the Calcutta High Court decision in Sourav Ganguly and Tribunal authorities holding that IPL players engaged under franchise contracts are not rendering business support services as independent contractors for the franchisees but perform as professional players subject to franchise control. The Tribunal considered the legal scope of Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994 and the limits of administrative instructions, noting that a board instruction or circular cannot expand statutory taxing provisions or create a tax liability where the statute does not provide it. The reasoning applied prior decisions which held that fees for playing matches fall outside taxable services and that the CBEC instruction of 26 July, 2010 cannot lawfully subject a composite fee to service tax when the statute does not contemplate such a levy.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the remuneration received by the player from the IPL franchisee could not be taxed under "business support service" and that the CBEC instruction dated 26 July, 2010 cannot be used to create a tax liability on composite fees. The appeal is therefore allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned High Court order could disturb the benefit already conferred on the appellants by the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court and affect their career prospects. (ii) Whether persons who were not parties to the earlier proceedings could pursue an independent remedy against a judgment or order that allegedly prejudiced their rights.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned High Court order could disturb the benefit already conferred on the appellants by the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court and affect their career prospects.

Analysis: The earlier decision had already granted the appellants relief and their promotions had been implemented. Once that position had attained finality, the High Court could not, in substance, reopen or undermine the consequence of the Supreme Court's earlier order in proceedings to which the appellants were not parties. The impugned observations, insofar as they could prejudice the appellants, were therefore not to operate against them in view of the special facts noticed.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the appellants, and the impugned order was not to affect their career prospects.

Issue (ii): Whether persons who were not parties to the earlier proceedings could pursue an independent remedy against a judgment or order that allegedly prejudiced their rights.

Analysis: The governing principle is that a decision may sometimes have broader consequences beyond the immediate parties, but a non-party who is aggrieved is not remediless. The available course is to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law, including the remedies recognised for persons affected by a judgment but not impleaded in the earlier proceedings.

Conclusion: The issue was answered by holding that the intervenors and the petitioner in the connected matter were at liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy before the appropriate forum.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed to the extent of protecting the appellants from prejudice under the impugned order, while the connected matters were left to be pursued through independent remedies in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A judgment affecting service rights cannot be allowed to prejudice non-parties without affording them the remedy recognised by law, and an earlier final order in favour of parties cannot be indirectly unsettled in later proceedings so as to impair their accrued benefits.

Issues: Whether the order permitting shifting of the registered office from West Bengal to Maharashtra was contrary to the second proviso to Rule 30(9) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 because appeals against the approved resolution plan were pending.

Analysis: Rule 30(9) permits shifting of the registered office where the management has been taken over under a resolution plan approved under section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, so long as no appeal against the resolution plan is pending in any Court or Tribunal and no inquiry, inspection or investigation is pending or initiated after approval. The record showed that the appellate tribunal had clarified that the pending appeal did not by itself stay the approved resolution plan and had further directed that the application for shifting could be considered by the statutory authority in accordance with law. The Court also noted that mere filing of an appeal does not automatically stay the underlying order or preclude statutory compliance, and that no prejudice was shown to the petitioners from the change of registered office.

Conclusion: The impugned order was held not to violate the second proviso to Rule 30(9), and the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the impugned order detaining goods and vehicle should be stayed temporarily and whether directions should be issued for (a) sale of the perishable goods by public auction with deposit to be kept pending appeal, and (b) conditional release of the vehicle on payment and bond, while permitting the petitioner to prefer a statutory appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerning detention and confiscation of goods in transit (including Sections 68 and 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017), the rules governing documents carried in transit (including Rule 138A(1)(a) and (b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017), and the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court noted precedents dealing with perishable consignments and interim relief (including Division Bench directions permitting deposit, auction and participation by the owner). Balancing the need to protect perishable goods from deterioration and the departmental interest in preserving fiscal rights, the Court extended time for filing the statutory appeal, granted a limited stay of the impugned order for 30 days, directed that the goods be sold by public auction with proceeds to be preserved pending the appellate outcome, and ordered conditional release of the vehicle on payment and furnishing of a bond, all subject to the outcome of the statutory appeal.

Conclusion: The petitioner is permitted to prefer a statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 within 30 days (limitation extended 30 days); the impugned order is stayed for 30 days; the respondents are directed to sell the perishable goods by public auction and retain proceeds pending appeal; and the vehicle shall be released on payment of Rs. 50,000 and furnishing a bond for Rs. 1,50,000, all subject to the appellate outcome.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can validly consolidate or club multiple financial years/tax periods (including where fraudulent availment of input tax credit is alleged).

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme of the CGST Act, 2017 treating tax liability as tied to defined tax periods (monthly or annual returns) and noted the separate year-wise limitation framework established by Sections 73(10) and 74(10). The Court considered prior Division Bench decisions of this Court (Milroc Good Earth Developers and Rite Water Solutions) which held that the Act prescribes year-wise assessment and recovery and does not permit aggregation of different financial years with distinct due dates and limitation periods into a single consolidated show cause notice. The Court rejected the submission that allegations of fraudulent availment of input tax credit create an exception permitting consolidation, observing that Section 74 does not differentiate so as to allow clubbing of periods; rather, fraud affects the applicable limitation period but does not collapse separate tax periods into one proceeding. The Court also distinguished the contrary view of another High Court by noting that the Supreme Court's dismissal of a challenge to that view was in limine and did not decide the merits, and that subsequent binding decisions of this Court must be followed by the authorities below.

Conclusion: The show cause notice dated 06/06/2025 and the order dated 31/10/2025 insofar as they purport to consolidate multiple financial years under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are quashed and set aside. The respondents are permitted to re-issue notices strictly in terms of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 if otherwise permissible by law.

Issues: Whether the authority under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 could cancel a firm's registration certificate by invoking Section 64 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and whether the impugned cancellation orders were valid where fraud was alleged.

Analysis: The scheme of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 distinguishes between registration, recording of alterations, and rectification of mistakes. Section 64 empowers only correction of entries so that the register conforms to the documents filed; it does not confer a power to adjudicate disputed questions of fact or to cancel a registration certificate. The Delhi Partnership (Registration of Firms) Rules, 1972 permit protest, examination of documents, and inquiries in aid of the Registrar's duties, but they do not create a power of de-registration. The registration certificate under the Act was treated as an acknowledgment of the statutory statement and not as an order capable of being rescinded under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court further held that the impugned cancellation was passed by an authority who was not the Registrar contemplated by Section 57 and that, in any event, the registration on the facts disclosed was not shown to have been obtained by fraud in a manner justifying cancellation.

Conclusion: The Registrar had no power to cancel the registration certificate under Section 64 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, with or without aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the cancellation orders were invalid; the petition succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of an express statutory power, a Registrar under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 may rectify entries to conform to filed documents, but cannot cancel a firm's registration certificate or decide disputed inter se factual issues by resorting to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Issues: (i) Whether a show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can validly consolidate or club alleged tax defaults across multiple financial years/tax periods.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerning tax periods, return filing and limitation for assessment and recovery, including the treatment of each financial year as a separate tax period (Section 2(106); Sections 39, 44, 37, 50) and the separate operation of time limits for issuance of assessment/orders under Sections 73(10) and 74(10). The Court considered and followed prior Division Bench decisions which held that the statute prescribes year-wise limitation and assessment structure and does not permit aggregation of different tax periods into a single consolidated show cause notice. The Court rejected the proposition that alleged fraudulent availment of input tax credit permits clubbing of multiple years into one show cause notice, noting that fraud-related cases remain subject to the same year-wise limitation framework under Section 74 and related provisions. The Court also addressed conflicting authority and explained that subsequent decisions of this Court on the point bind the authorities below unless set aside by a competent court.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that issuance of a consolidated show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covering multiple financial years/tax periods is not permissible; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee. The impugned consolidated show cause notice dated 26/06/2025 is quashed and set aside. The respondents remain at liberty to issue notices strictly in accordance with Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and applicable limitation rules.

Issues: (i) Whether a show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can consolidate or club multiple financial years/tax periods into a single notice, including in cases alleging fraudulent availment of input tax credit.

Analysis: Section 74(1) and the limitation provisions in Sections 74(10) and 73(10) operate with reference to specific tax periods tied to the filing of returns for each financial year; tax period is defined under Section 2(106) and the statutory scheme contemplates year-wise assessment and recovery linked to annual returns. The separate time limits for demand and recovery run year by year, and provisions governing returns and assessment (including Sections 39, 44, 37 and provisions addressing payment and interest such as Section 50) reflect an annual/periodic structure. Consolidating different financial years in a single show cause notice would aggregate distinct tax periods with different due dates and limitation timelines, affecting the statutory time bar and the assessee's ability to respond period by period. The allegation of fraudulent availment of input tax credit does not, by itself, create a statutory exception permitting clubbing of separate tax periods into one consolidated notice where Section 74's year-wise limitation scheme applies.

Conclusion: Issue (i): Clubbing multiple financial years/tax periods into a single show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is not permissible; even where fraudulent availment of input tax credit is alleged, notices must comply with the year-wise period and limitation framework. The result is in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: Whether the certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2026-27 prescribing deduction of tax at 10% could be sustained, or whether a nil rate certificate should be issued to the petitioner.

Analysis: The factual matrix for AY 2026-27 was found to be identical to preceding assessment years for which the respondents had issued nil rate certificates after considering the material on record. The record includes a prior appellate approach attributing 15% of total revenue to the Indian permanent establishment and the Supreme Court order dated 19.04.2023 upholding that attribution and holding it absorbed by remuneration to Indian distributors. The impugned certificate dated 22.07.2025 at 10% was issued before the demand notice dated 11.11.2025 and therefore could not be justified on the basis of a subsequently created demand. In light of the settled position on attribution and absorption by distributor remuneration, and absence of any change in the business model or facts, the continued practice of issuing nil rate certificates applies to the AY 2026-27. The competent authority is directed to issue a nil rate certificate and given procedural directions for future applications, subject to the authority recording a contrary finding on existence of taxable PE after notice to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The impugned certificate prescribing 10% deduction is quashed and the respondents are directed to issue a certificate for nil deduction under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for AY 2026-27; directions provided for issuance of nil rate certificates for subsequent years and for procedure where a contrary PE finding is to be recorded.

Issues: (i) Whether mere generation of surplus by an educational institution results in cancellation of registration under Section 12AA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the interpretation of Section 10(23C) in M/s. New Noble Educational Society applies so as to justify cancellation under Section 12AA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether mere generation of surplus by an educational institution results in cancellation of registration under Section 12AA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 12AA(3) permits cancellation only when the registering authority is satisfied that the activities of the trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with its objects. The record contains no finding that the respondent-Trust conducted activities inconsistent with its objects; instead, the surplus was invested in educational infrastructure and used for educational purposes. Supreme Court authority establishes that surplus generated in the course of providing education does not, per se, disqualify an institution.

Conclusion: Issue (i) answered in favour of the assessee; mere generation of surplus while providing education does not justify cancellation under Section 12AA(3).

Issue (ii): Whether the interpretation of Section 10(23C) in M/s. New Noble Educational Society applies so as to justify cancellation under Section 12AA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The scope and purpose of Section 10(23C) and Section 12AA differ; Section 10(23C) deals with exemption conditions while Section 12AA concerns registration and its cancellation. The principles in M/s. New Noble Educational Society that surplus per se does not disqualify an educational institution are applicable in limited respect, but the detailed interpretative rules of Section 10(23C) cannot be read across to alter the mandatory satisfaction required under Section 12AA(3).

Conclusion: Issue (ii) answered in favour of the assessee to the limited extent that the principle that surplus per se is not disqualifying applies; otherwise the interpretation of Section 10(23C) does not displace the requirements of Section 12AA(3).

Final Conclusion: The cancellation of registration under Section 12AA(3) was unsustainable for lack of any finding that activities were not genuine or were outside the objects; the appeal is dismissed and the Tribunal's order setting aside the cancellation is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Cancellation under Section 12AA(3) requires a recorded satisfaction that activities are not genuine or not in accordance with objects; surplus generated in the course of providing education, and applied to educational objects, is not by itself a ground for cancellation.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice and reopening of assessment under section 148/147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid and justified; (ii) Whether the addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating sale consideration of shares as unexplained credit should be sustained for lack of evidence of genuineness.

Issue (i): Validity and justification of reopening of assessment under section 148/147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated on information indicating trading in a penny scrip and inquiries were made into the sharp price rise and alleged accommodation entry practice; the assessment order was passed under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 after notice under section 148. The Tribunal examined the materials relied upon by the assessing officer including investigation inputs and regulatory findings, and considered whether the recorded reasons and supporting material met the statutory threshold for reopening and reassessment.

Conclusion: The reopening of assessment and issuance of notice under section 148/147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is upheld as valid and justified.

Issue (ii): Sustenance of addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating sale proceeds as unexplained credit for lack of evidence of genuineness.

Analysis: The assessee failed to appear before the Tribunal and did not furnish corroborative documents such as preferential allotment records, supporting contract notes beyond broker entries, demat records proving entitlement, or other evidence to establish the genuineness of the share transactions. The assessing officer and first appellate authority relied on investigation statements, company financials not supporting price movement, and a regulatory order indicating irregular trading. The Tribunal considered whether the assessee discharged the evidentiary burden to refute the addition under the unexplained credit provision and found absence of substantive documentary proof.

Conclusion: The addition made under section 68 is sustained; the finding is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: On the issues decided, the Tribunal affirmed the reassessment proceedings and the addition under the unexplained credit provision, resulting in dismissal of the assessee's appeals; the lower authorities' orders are upheld for lack of corroborative evidence and on the basis of materials relied upon for reopening.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is initiated on credible investigative and regulatory material and the assessee fails to produce corroborative evidence to establish the genuineness of transactions, the reopening under section 148/147 and an addition under section 68 may be validly sustained.

Issues: Whether the Court should entertain a writ petition challenging a preventive detention order at the pre-execution stage when the proposed detenue is absconding and has evaded the process of law.

Analysis: The power of judicial review under Article 226 extends to preventive detention orders even before execution, but the jurisdiction is exercised subject to well-settled self-imposed restraints. Pre-execution interference is confined to exceptional situations such as lack of authority, wrong person, wrong purpose, or vague and extraneous grounds. Where the proposed detenue has been avoiding service, has not surrendered, and proceedings under the COFEPOSA Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure have been initiated in consequence, the Court may decline to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction. A mere lapse of time or reliance on the quashing of a co-accused's detention order does not by itself justify interference in favour of a person who is still absconding.

Conclusion: The pre-execution challenge was not entertained and the writ petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A pre-execution challenge to a preventive detention order may be refused where the proposed detenue is absconding and has evaded the process of law, because the Court will ordinarily not exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in aid of a lawbreaker.

Issues: Whether the appellant could enforce the foreign arbitral award and corrective award against the 2nd respondent, though it was not a signatory to the charterparty or a party to the arbitration, on the basis that it had issued a cheque as security for the liability of the 1st respondent.

Analysis: The dispute arose from demurrage payable under the charterparty and the deferred payment arrangements between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent was not part of the underlying charterparty or the arbitral proceedings, but it had voluntarily stepped in and issued a cheque for the precise amount claimed in the arbitration as security for the disputed demurrage. The Court treated this act as a conscious undertaking to secure satisfaction of any award passed on that claim. Since the cheque was issued with full knowledge of the dispute, the arbitration, and the possibility of enforcement failure against the 1st respondent, the 2nd respondent could not later deny liability by invoking absence of signature or non-participation in the arbitration. The Court also found that the group-company relationship and prior conduct supported the conclusion that refusal to permit enforcement would aid deception and frustrate the award.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to enforce the foreign arbitral award and corrective award against the 2nd respondent jointly and severally with the 1st respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: A person who, with knowledge of the underlying arbitration claim, voluntarily issues security specifically for satisfaction of any award on that claim may be proceeded against in enforcement, even if not a signatory to the main contract or a party to the arbitration.

Issues: Whether assignment/transfer of leasehold rights (95 year lease) by the lessee for consideration amounts to a supply of services attracting GST under the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and related notifications.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 7(1) and Schedule II (Clause 2(b)) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which deal with scope of supply and land/building transactions. The respondents treated the assignment as a taxable miscellaneous service under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 and issued notice under Section 75 read with Section 73(5) of the Maharashtra Act, 2017. The Court analysed the nature of the transaction: the petitioner held a long-term (95 year) lease with transferable rights under the lease deed, and the transaction extinguished the petitioner's rights and transferred benefits arising out of immovable property to the assignee. The Court considered and followed the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court which held that assignment/sale/transfer of leasehold rights of industrial plot allotted by a State industrial development corporation constitutes transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property and is not a supply of services for levy under Section 9, and noted the relevance of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 granting nil rate for certain one-time upfront amounts for long-term leases by State industrial development corporations. The Court observed that the essential element of supply - being in the course or furtherance of the petitioner's business - was absent because the transaction related exclusively to transfer of immovable property benefits and had no nexus with the petitioner's business operations. The Court rejected classification of the assignment as 'other miscellaneous services' under the rate notification.

Conclusion: The assignment/transfer of the petitioner's leasehold rights is a transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property and does not constitute a supply of services attracting GST; the impugned order dated 30/12/2025 is quashed and set aside, and the writ petition is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the order dated 03.07.2024 cancelling the petitioner's GST registration under Section 29(2)(d) was vitiated for want of reasons and application of mind; (ii) Whether the appellate order dated 22.08.2025 dismissing the appeal as time-barred could sustain where the original order was passed without affording opportunity of hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the cancellation order dated 03.07.2024 is invalid for lack of reasons and absence of application of mind.

Analysis: The impugned cancellation order contains no reasons explaining the basis for taking the harsh step of cancelling registration. The authorities relied on precedents establishing that quasi judicial or administrative orders affecting fundamental rights and statutory entitlements must disclose reasons and reflect application of mind. An order devoid of reasons does not satisfy the requirement of reasoned decision-making and fails the test of equality before law.

Conclusion: The cancellation order dated 03.07.2024 is set aside as it is without application of mind and lacks reasons; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate order dated 22.08.2025 dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation is sustainable in view of the defect in the original order and denial of hearing.

Analysis: The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on limitation grounds. However, because the original order was passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and was ex parte, the appellate dismissal cannot sustain in isolation; the court followed coordinate decisions holding that where the original order is vitiated by absence of reasons and denial of hearing, the appellate disposal that does not adjudicate merits is consequential and may be quashed to enable fresh consideration after hearing.

Conclusion: The appellate order dated 22.08.2025 is quashed; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both the impugned cancellation order and the appellate order are quashed and set aside, and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration after affording the petitioner an opportunity to file reply and be heard.

Ratio Decidendi: A quasi judicial administrative order affecting statutory registration must record reasons and demonstrate application of mind; absence of reasons and denial of opportunity of hearing render such an order unsustainable and justify quashing and remand for fresh decision after hearing.

Issues: Whether the bail applications filed by the accused under Sections 132(1)(b), 132(1)(c) and 132(1)(i) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in Case No.1057/2025 should be granted.

Analysis: The Court examined the nature and magnitude of the alleged offences, the role attributed to the applicants in the alleged scheme of creation and circulation of fictitious input tax credit, the amounts involved as reflected in the complaint and investigation, and relevant precedents addressing bail in economic offences. The Court applied the principle that economic offences involving large-scale fraud on the public exchequer and deep-rooted conspiracies constitute a class apart for bail purposes and warrant a different approach. The Court noted authorities emphasising seriousness of economic offences, potential threat to the financial system, and the need to guard against tampering with evidence and absconding, and found those authorities applicable to the facts of the present matter. The Court also considered submissions regarding conclusion of investigation and comparative sentences in other cases but concluded that, on the facts and roles attributed, the applicants' case did not satisfy the exigencies for grant of bail.

Conclusion: Bail applications are rejected; the applicants' prayer for bail is refused and the applications are dismissed against the applicants.

Issues: (i) Whether the products manufactured as non-alcoholic beverages, iced tea preparations, syrups and beverage concentrates, and extracts, essences and concentrates of tea were correctly classifiable under the claimed HSN entries and corresponding tariff headings. (ii) Whether the said products fell under Schedule I or Schedule III of the amended GST rate notifications. (iii) What GST rate applied to each category of goods under GST 2.0.

Issue (i): Whether the products manufactured as non-alcoholic beverages, iced tea preparations, syrups and beverage concentrates, and extracts, essences and concentrates of tea were correctly classifiable under the claimed HSN entries and corresponding tariff headings.

Analysis: The product descriptions, ingredients, and preparation processes showed that the non-alcoholic beverage products did not contain fruit pulp or fruit juice and were therefore not classifiable as fruit-juice based drinks. They fell under heading 2202, with tariff item 22029990 for other non-alcoholic beverages. The iced tea preparations and extracts, essences and concentrates of tea were found to fall under heading 2101, specifically sub-heading 210120. The syrups and beverage concentrates were found to fall under sub-heading 210690 and more specifically tariff item 21069019.

Conclusion: The claimed HSN classifications were not fully correct. The correct classification for non-alcoholic beverages was 22029990, for iced tea preparation and tea extracts was 210120, and for syrups and beverage concentrates was 21069019.

Issue (ii): Whether the said products fell under Schedule I or Schedule III of the amended GST rate notifications.

Analysis: The non-alcoholic beverage products were held to fall under Schedule III because they were other non-alcoholic beverages not covered by the Schedule I exclusions. Iced tea preparation and extracts, essences and concentrates of tea were held to fall under Schedule I as goods covered by tariff item 210120. Syrups and beverage concentrates were also held to fall under Schedule I as goods covered by tariff item 21069019.

Conclusion: Non-alcoholic beverages fall under Schedule III, while iced tea preparation, tea extracts, syrups and beverage concentrates fall under Schedule I.

Issue (iii): What GST rate applied to each category of goods under GST 2.0.

Analysis: The rate schedules applied 20% CGST plus 20% SGST to other non-alcoholic beverages under Schedule III. Goods falling under Schedule I attracted 2.5% CGST plus 2.5% SGST. Applying those entries, the non-alcoholic beverage products were taxable at 40% in aggregate, while iced tea preparations, tea extracts, and syrups and beverage concentrates were taxable at 5% in aggregate.

Conclusion: Non-alcoholic beverages were taxable at 20% CGST plus 20% SGST, and iced tea preparation, tea extracts, syrups and beverage concentrates were taxable at 2.5% CGST plus 2.5% SGST.

Final Conclusion: The ruling settled the tariff classification and GST slab applicable to each product category, with non-alcoholic beverages placed in the higher Schedule III slab and the iced tea and concentrate products placed in Schedule I at the concessional rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification under the GST rate schedules depends on the actual composition, product description, and tariff heading fit of the goods, and goods not covered by a specific Schedule I entry remain classifiable as other non-alcoholic beverages under Schedule III.

Issues: Whether security services provided to the Food Corporation of India qualify as pure services supplied to a Government Entity in relation to functions entrusted under Article 243G or Article 243W of the Constitution and are exempt from GST under entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: Security services rendered for guarding depots and offices were treated as pure services because no supply of goods or works contract element was involved. The Food Corporation of India was held to be a Government Entity, not a Governmental Authority, since its functions were tied to procurement, storage, movement and distribution of foodgrains for the public distribution system. The entry relied upon, however, exempts pure services only when supplied to the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority, and the post-amendment text does not extend that exemption to a Government Entity. Although the activity was linked to the public distribution system under Article 243G, the recipient did not fall within the specified class of recipients for the exemption.

Conclusion: The security services were pure services, but the exemption under entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) was not available because the recipient was a Government Entity and not one of the specified authorities.

Final Conclusion: The ruling answers the exemption question against the applicant and confirms taxability of the services under the notification framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Exemption under entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) applies only when the recipient is the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority, and not merely because the recipient is a Government Entity performing functions linked to Article 243G or Article 243W.