Issues: (i) Whether call centre services provided by the respondent to British Airways UK qualify as "export of services" under Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 thereby entitling the respondent to rebate under Rule 5 and Notification No.11/2005-ST dated 19.04.2005 for the relevant period.

Analysis: The issue requires examination of the two conditions in Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005: (a) that the service is provided from India and used outside India, and (b) that payment is received in convertible foreign exchange. The phrase "used outside India" has been interpreted by departmental circulars dated 24.02.2009 and 13.05.2011 to mean effective use and enjoyment of the service outside India. Previous Tribunal decisions addressing similar call centre services and the interpretation of place of use, including Paul Merchants Ltd., Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd., Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt. Ltd., and the Larger Bench decision in Arcelor Mittal Stainless (I) Pvt. Ltd., uphold that the recipient of service is the person at whose instance and expense the service is provided and that effective use and enjoyment by an overseas recipient satisfies the "used outside India" condition. The agreement between the parties shows services were provided to and paid by British Airways UK and had direct impact on BA UK operations; payment was in convertible foreign exchange. The Tribunal in earlier orders on adjacent periods and the absence of challenge or stay of those decisions support consistency of conclusion for the present period.

Conclusion: The call centre services provided by the respondent to British Airways UK qualify as export of services under Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 and the respondent is entitled to the rebate under Rule 5 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 read with Notification No.11/2005-ST dated 19.04.2005. The Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the impugned order is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the discount offered by the appellant on demo vehicles sold to dealers is includible in the assessable value under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the valuation rules.

Analysis: The issue concerns valuation for excise purposes where demo vehicles are offered to dealers at a discounted price. The legal framework includes Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 and the Board circular F. No. 6/40/2002-CX.1 dated 01.04.2003 which clarify that at the time of removal there is no distinction between demo and normal vehicles for valuation. Prior decisions of the Tribunal in Ford India Pvt. Ltd. and Hyundai Motor India Ltd., affirmed by later orders, held that discounts for demo cars are not permissible deductions from transaction value where demo cars are not shown to be a separate class for valuation purposes and comparable price of normal cars must be adopted. The appellate bench applied those precedents and found them squarely applicable to the present facts, noting that the Revenue had relied on established authority and the Supreme Court had disposed of related civil appeals, leaving the issue settled.

Conclusion: The discount on demo vehicles is includible in the assessable value; the appeals are dismissed and the valuation determinations in favour of Revenue are upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh containing at least 5% fruit juice is classifiable under Tariff Item No. 2202 90 20 rather than 2202 10 20; (ii) Whether cenvat credit is allowable on services for disposal of waste and on services for conducting air-pollution survey around the factory; (iii) Whether demands, extended period invocation and penalties survive if classification and credit demands fail.

Issue (i): Classification of Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh containing at least 5% fruit juice under Tariff Item No. 2202 90 20 or under Tariff Item No. 2202 10 20.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied both the common parlance test and the relevant regulatory definitions indicating that products with fruit juice content not less than 5% satisfy the definition of fruit juice based drinks and therefore fall within Tariff Item No. 2202 90 20; the decision follows the larger bench precedent that examined Regulation-based definitions and total soluble solids thresholds in determining classification.

Conclusion: Classification in favour of the assessee; Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh containing at least 5% fruit juice is classifiable under Tariff Item No. 2202 90 20.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to cenvat credit on services for disposal of industrial waste and on services for conducting air-pollution survey.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied Rule 2(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and relevant authority precedent holding that services procured to comply with environmental or pollution control directions are input services used directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture; the air-pollution survey conducted to maintain product quality and to comply with principals' requirements was held to be integrally connected to manufacture and thus within the scope of input services.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit allowable to the assessee on services for disposal of waste and on the air-pollution survey; credit demands in favour of Revenue not sustained.

Issue (iii): Validity of extended period invocation, quantification errors and imposition of penalties where classification and credit demands fail.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that extended period invocation and penalty depend on the survival of substantive duty or proof of suppression/mens rea; where classification and credit demands are rejected on merits and issues are interpretational or based on audit without culpable suppression, extended period and penalty are not sustainable.

Conclusion: Extended period invocation and penalties do not survive in favour of the Revenue; no penalties or extended-period recoveries sustained.

Final Conclusion: The substantive demands for duty and denial of cenvat credit were decided in favour of the assessee on classification and credit issues, resulting in allowance of the appeals and setting aside of the impugned orders; ancillary demands and penalties consequential on those demands were also negated.

Ratio Decidendi: A product containing not less than 5% fruit juice falls within Tariff Item No. 2202 90 20 as a fruit juice based drink, and services procured to comply with environmental or pollution control requirements or to maintain product quality are input services within the meaning of Rule 2(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Issues: (i) Whether, during the relevant period, an Input Service Distributor was required to distribute Cenvat credit only proportionately on turnover basis under Rule 7 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. (ii) Whether the credit distributed by the Input Service Distributor could be disallowed at the recipient unit's end when the distribution at the Input Service Distributor's end was not questioned.

Issue (i): Whether, during the relevant period, an Input Service Distributor was required to distribute Cenvat credit only proportionately on turnover basis under Rule 7 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: For the period from May 2013 to October 2015, Rule 7 used the expression that the Input Service Distributor "may" distribute credit and the conditions then prescribed were discretionary. The later amendment with effect from 01.04.2016 replaced that position with a mandatory regime using "shall". The appellant also produced Chartered Accountant certificates showing distribution on turnover basis, and the same method had been accepted in the appellant's own cases for earlier and later periods, which had attained finality.

Conclusion: The credit distribution was valid for the relevant period and the demand based on alleged non-proportional distribution was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the credit distributed by the Input Service Distributor could be disallowed at the recipient unit's end when the distribution at the Input Service Distributor's end was not questioned.

Analysis: The show cause notice and the impugned order did not dispute the admissibility of the credit at the Input Service Distributor's end or the eligibility of the input services themselves. The settled principle applied was that the correctness of distribution is to be examined at the Input Service Distributor's end and not by disallowing credit at the recipient's end. On that basis, the attempt to deny credit at the appellant's end could not survive.

Conclusion: The disallowance of credit at the recipient unit's end was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand, interest, and penalty were set aside and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: For the relevant period, distribution of input service credit by an Input Service Distributor under Rule 7 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was discretionary, and credit cannot be denied at the recipient's end where the distribution at the Input Service Distributor's end is not under challenge.

Issues: (i) Whether the university's surplus disqualified it from exemption as an institution existing solely for educational purposes; (ii) whether the university was substantially financed by the Government for exemption purposes; (iii) whether additional evidence was properly admitted without a remand report.

Issue (i): Whether the university's surplus disqualified it from exemption as an institution existing solely for educational purposes.

Analysis: Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires an educational institution to exist solely for educational purposes and not for profit. Its objects and use of income are relevant; a surplus alone does not establish a profit motive.

Conclusion: The surplus did not disqualify the university from exemption. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the university was substantially financed by the Government for exemption purposes.

Analysis: Substantial government financing is assessed by reference to annual grants and other government support, including capital grants and grants in kind such as land and infrastructure. The assessment had relied on recurring grants and a 75% benchmark under the Comptroller and Auditor-General legislation; the university was subject to audit by state-appointed auditors. The valuation-based calculation included government-provided land and infrastructure.

Conclusion: The university was substantially financed by the Government and qualified for exemption. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether additional evidence was properly admitted without a remand report.

Analysis: Under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the appellate authority sought a remand report from the assessing officer and issued multiple reminders, providing an opportunity to respond. No report was submitted, and the Revenue did not substantiate any impropriety in admission of the evidence.

Conclusion: Admission of the additional evidence was upheld. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The educational exemption and reliance on the additional evidence remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In determining substantial government financing for an educational exemption, government-provided land and infrastructure and capital support must be considered alongside annual grants.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice issued more than three years after the end of the relevant assessment year was valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner.

Analysis: Section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, or, where applicable, the Chief Commissioner or Director General where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Sanction by the prescribed specified authority is a jurisdictional precondition for issuance of a notice under section 148. As the notice and order under section 148A(d) were issued beyond the three-year period for assessment year 2017-18, approval by the Principal Commissioner did not satisfy section 151(ii).

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential assessment order were void ab initio for want of approval from the prescribed specified authority, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether tax on dividend paid to the Singapore shareholder was chargeable at the domestic rate or at the beneficial rate under the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: Article 10 of the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was applied in preference to the domestic rate under Section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The beneficial treaty rate governed withholding on the impugned dividend remittance.

Conclusion: Tax on the dividend paid to the Singapore shareholder is chargeable at 10%, in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The application for condonation of an inordinate delay of 1381 days was dismissed, and the special leave petition stood dismissed.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking directions regarding alleged violation of CITES-related permissions and regulatory action against the concerned respondents disclosed any ground for interference under Article 32.

Analysis: The reliefs sought were founded on alleged non-compliance with CITES documentation and sought production of records, constitution of an independent committee, regulatory proceedings under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and interim restraint on further imports. The subject matter had already been examined by a Special Investigation Team constituted by the Court, whose report had been accepted and had recorded no violation of domestic or international law. The relied-upon CITES Secretariat document also recorded that there was no evidence of import without requisite CITES documentation or import permits, and no evidence of commercial purpose. The Court further held that an import made under valid permission cannot later be treated as prohibited merely because objections are subsequently raised, and noted that unsettling the custody and environment of lawfully imported living animals may itself amount to cruelty.

Conclusion: No ground for the requested directions was made out, and the petition was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The challenge failed on merits because the alleged CITES violation was not substantiated and the prior lawful import could not be retrospectively invalidated on the basis of later objections.

Ratio Decidendi: An import carried out under valid permission cannot be treated as prohibited retrospectively merely because objections are raised later, especially where the competent inquiry has found no violation of law.

Issues: Whether the condition requiring the petitioner to furnish a security bond equal to the tax and penalty claim in the bail order deserved modification or withdrawal.

Analysis: The application sought deletion of the bail condition imposed in the earlier order. The Court held that the impugned condition required only furnishing of a security bond and did not require advance deposit of money or a bank guarantee. It further held that the Supreme Court decisions relied upon concerned materially different bail conditions and were therefore inapplicable. The Court also noted that the same condition had already been challenged before the Supreme Court, making it inappropriate for the High Court to examine the same issue again. A further modification of the earlier order was treated as an impermissible review.

Conclusion: No ground for modification was made out and the application was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The bail condition remained undisturbed, and the request to alter the earlier order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A bail condition requiring a security bond may not be modified where the challenge would effectively amount to review of the earlier order or where the same issue is already pending before the Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether the impugned order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal suffered from any error of law or fact warranting interference in appeal.

Analysis: The appeal was considered on the basis of the factual and legal matrix placed before the Court. The Court recorded that, on such consideration, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had not committed any error of law or fact.

Conclusion: No interference was called for and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the impugned order cancelling the GST registration and the subsequent endorsement were liable to be quashed and whether restoration of registration could be directed subject to compliance with filing of returns and payment of tax arrears.

Analysis: The writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking interference with the cancellation order and the consequential endorsement. The Court accepted the prayer for interference and set aside both the impugned order and endorsement. It further directed that if the petitioner files the GST returns and pays the up-to-date tax within the stipulated period, the respondents shall reinstate the GST registration within the time fixed by the Court.

Conclusion: The cancellation order and consequential endorsement were quashed, and restoration of GST registration was directed on compliance with the specified conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In writ jurisdiction, a GST cancellation order and consequential endorsement can be quashed, with restoration of registration directed, where the Court finds the matter fit for such relief subject to compliance with filing returns and payment of tax dues.

Issues: (i) whether the provisional assessment adopted by the customs authorities was in accordance with law; (ii) whether roasted areca nuts were correctly classified under Chapter 8 instead of Chapter 20; (iii) whether the valuation adopted by the customs authorities could displace the declared transaction value; and (iv) whether the show cause notice and consequential confiscation proceedings were liable to interference.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional assessment adopted by the customs authorities was in accordance with law.

Analysis: The bill of entry had been filed and the import was treated as final at the time of import, but the department later altered it to provisional. The statutory scheme required self-assessment, verification, and where necessary re-assessment, and any provisional assessment had to be carried out and finalised within the framework and timelines prescribed by the Customs Act and the applicable provisional assessment regulations. The department did not follow the prescribed procedure, and the later communication could not be used to cure the defect. The Court also held that the provisional assessment process was not lawfully undertaken.

Conclusion: The provisional assessment was held to be contrary to law and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether roasted areca nuts were correctly classified under Chapter 8 instead of Chapter 20.

Analysis: The Court found the imported goods to be roasted areca nuts on the basis of the laboratory reports obtained from the designated testing laboratory, which recorded a moisture content consistent with roasted goods. Applying the tariff structure, the HSN notes, and the settled principle that a specific entry prevails over a general one, the Court held that roasting is distinct from drying and that roasted areca nuts fall under the chapter covering otherwise prepared or preserved nuts, not the entry for fresh or dried areca nuts. The Court also relied on the earlier reasoning that common parlance cannot override a specific tariff classification.

Conclusion: The goods were held to be classifiable under Chapter 20 and not Chapter 8, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the valuation adopted by the customs authorities could displace the declared transaction value.

Analysis: The relevant date for rate and tariff valuation was the date of presentation of the bill of entry. The subsequent import-policy notifications could not govern an import that had already been presented earlier. On valuation, the Court held that the declared transaction value could be displaced only if the proper officer had reasonable doubt supported by reasons and followed the procedure under the valuation rules. No such lawful rejection of the declared value had been made, and the department could not replace transaction value by an ad hoc valuation tied to a different classification.

Conclusion: The valuation adopted by the customs authorities was held to be contrary to law and the declared transaction value was accepted, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether the show cause notice and consequential confiscation proceedings were liable to interference.

Analysis: The show cause notice was issued while the assessment process was still unresolved and before lawful finalisation of the assessment. The Court held that proceedings under the recovery provision could not properly commence before completion of the assessment and that confiscation could not be pursued on the basis adopted by the department when the goods were not shown to be prohibited. In the circumstances, the show cause notice and all downstream proceedings were unsustainable.

Conclusion: The show cause notice and consequential confiscation proceedings were quashed, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded on all material issues, the department's seizure, communication, and show cause notice were set aside, and release of the goods was directed on the basis of the petitioner's classification and valuation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the tariff contains a specific entry for roasted goods, that specific entry prevails over a general entry for fresh or dried goods, and customs valuation cannot be displaced unless the proper officer lawfully records reasonable doubt and follows the prescribed statutory procedure before rejecting the declared transaction value.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty for acceptance of cash loans was sustainable despite the assessee's claim of reasonable cause arising from an emergency; (ii) Whether penalty for repayment of loans in cash was sustainable on the same facts.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for acceptance of cash loans was sustainable despite the assessee's claim of reasonable cause arising from an emergency.

Analysis: Section 269SS restricts acceptance of specified loans or deposits in cash, while Section 273B excludes penalty where reasonable cause is established. The cash was obtained to meet an immediate emergency concerning funds required for the assessee's overseas immigration-related arrangements. The lenders' identity, creditworthiness and the genuineness of the transactions were accepted, and no material showed that the cash represented unaccounted income or a device for tax evasion. The explanation remained uncontroverted. Reasonable cause warrants a liberal and pragmatic assessment; an unforeseen and bona fide emergency requiring immediate funds can satisfy that standard. A mere technical breach, without contumacious conduct, deliberate disregard of law or intent to evade tax, does not justify penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for repayment of loans in cash was sustainable on the same facts.

Analysis: The repayment in cash arose from the same genuine and emergency-driven loan transactions. The accepted bona fide explanation and reasonable cause equally applied to the cash repayment.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reasonable cause established through genuine emergency transactions protects the assessee from penalties for both acceptance and repayment of the cash loans.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide and substantiated emergency involving genuine cash loan transactions, unconnected with unaccounted income or tax evasion, constitutes reasonable cause under Section 273B and precludes penalties for a technical breach of cash-loan restrictions.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 received by banking channel as advance against sale of property, later adjusted in a subsequent sale transaction, could be taxed as income from other sources on the footing of forfeiture; and (ii) whether the cash amount of Rs. 5,00,000 could be sustained as unexplained money under section 69A.

Issue (i): Whether the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 received by banking channel as advance against sale of property, later adjusted in a subsequent sale transaction, could be taxed as income from other sources on the footing of forfeiture.

Analysis: The amount received through banking channel was found to have been adjusted against the later agreement with another purchaser. On those facts, the advance was not forfeited. Since forfeiture is the basis for bringing such amount to tax under the relevant provision, the premise for addition failed.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the cash amount of Rs. 5,00,000 could be sustained as unexplained money under section 69A.

Analysis: The assessee's explanation that the cash amount had been returned to the purchaser was rejected by the lower authorities without any enquiry or cogent supporting material. In the absence of such enquiry or evidence, the addition could not be sustained merely on disbelief of the explanation.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxable additions made on account of the alleged forfeited advance and unexplained cash receipt were removed, resulting in complete relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an advance sale consideration is shown to have been adjusted in a later transaction, forfeiture cannot be presumed for taxing it as income from other sources, and an addition for unexplained money cannot be sustained without enquiry or cogent evidence rebutting the assessee's explanation.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail in the criminal complaint under Section 132(1)(b),(c),(f) and (i) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 on the basis of parity with a co-accused who has already been granted regular bail.

Analysis: The petition challenges the order denying bail by the trial court and relies on parity with co-accused Sanket Mittal who was granted regular bail by this Court. The petitioner was arrested on 06.05.2025 and has remained in custody for approximately ten months. The State accepts that the petitioner is at par with the co-accused for the purposes of bail. The Court refrains from examining the merits of the allegations, noting that such issues are for trial and appreciation of evidence. Considering the parity with the co-accused, absence of other criminal antecedents, the period of incarceration already undergone, and the likely duration of trial, the petitioner's entitlement to bail on similar terms as the co-accused was found to be made out.

Conclusion: The petition is allowed and the petitioner is to be released on regular bail upon furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate within seven days; failure to furnish bonds within seven days will result in the further custody period after one week not being counted in this case.

Issues: (i) whether working capital adjustment was required to be granted while benchmarking the international transaction of software development services; (ii) whether, after accepting the combined benchmarking approach for the logistics segment under TNMM, separate transfer pricing adjustments could still be made for royalty and Global Accounts Manager charges; (iii) whether deduction under section 80G could be denied merely because the donation formed part of CSR expenditure; (iv) whether the claim for TDS/TCS credit required verification and consequent relief; and (v) whether the disallowance under section 43B required restoration for fresh consideration.

Issue (i): whether working capital adjustment was required to be granted while benchmarking the international transaction of software development services.

Analysis: The DRP had directed the transfer pricing authorities to make working capital adjustment after the assessee furnished reliable segment-wise data. The assessee had claimed to have filed the relevant material before the authorities, including in rectification proceedings. The order giving effect proceeded on the footing that no such data had been furnished. In these circumstances, the adjustment issue required reconsideration on the basis of the record already supplied by the assessee.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the AO/TPO to grant working capital adjustment after considering the material furnished by the assessee, and the ground was allowed for statistical purposes.

Issue (ii): whether, after accepting the combined benchmarking approach for the logistics segment under TNMM, separate transfer pricing adjustments could still be made for royalty and Global Accounts Manager charges.

Analysis: The operating cost for the logistics segment had already included royalty and GAM charges while the segment was benchmarked under TNMM. Once the combined approach was accepted, the same elements could not again be isolated and benchmarked separately under a different method. The Tribunal relied on the principle that adoption of one most appropriate method requires consistency in applying that method to the transaction set as a whole, and separate adjustments for embedded costs would distort the ALP exercise.

Conclusion: Separate ALP adjustments for royalty and GAM charges were held to be impermissible once the combined approach had been accepted.

Issue (iii): whether deduction under section 80G could be denied merely because the donation formed part of CSR expenditure.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the disallowance framework for CSR expenditure under section 37(1) operates in the computation of business income, whereas deduction under section 80G operates at the stage of computing total income under Chapter VI-A. A donation otherwise eligible under section 80G does not lose its character for that purpose merely because it is also part of CSR spending. Denial of the deduction in such a situation would amount to double disallowance, which is not contemplated by the Act.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80G was allowed.

Issue (iv): whether the claim for TDS/TCS credit required verification and consequent relief.

Analysis: The issue turned on verification of the tax deducted or collected vis-a-vis the income on which such credit was claimed. Since the factual correlation had to be checked by the assessing authority, the matter was remitted for examination in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The AO was directed to verify the TDS/TCS claim and decide the matter afresh.

Issue (v): whether the disallowance under section 43B required restoration for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The adjustment had been made in processing without proper confrontation to the assessee. In the interests of justice, the matter required a fresh opportunity and reconsideration by the AO after hearing the assessee.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication and the ground was allowed for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The assessment was interfered with only to the extent indicated above, with the working capital adjustment and TDS/TCS and section 43B matters sent back for reconsideration, the royalty and GAM standalone transfer pricing adjustments deleted in principle, and the section 80G claim sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a composite transfer pricing method is accepted for a segment and the disputed items are already embedded in the operating cost base, separate ALP adjustments for those embedded items are not permissible; likewise, a CSR-linked donation does not lose eligibility for deduction under section 80G merely because it is also CSR expenditure.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal against the assessment order was liable to be condoned and the appeal directed to be heard on merits.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed limitation under Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The delay was attributed to circumstances beyond the petitioner's control arising from the sudden demise of the proprietor, and the Court found that refusal to entertain the appeal would cause grave prejudice. Following earlier Coordinate Bench decisions taking the same view, the Court held that the circumstances disclosed sufficient cause for condonation.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned and the Appellate Authority was directed to entertain the appeal and decide it on merits.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent of restoring the petitioner's appellate remedy and enabling consideration of the dispute on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in filing a statutory appeal is shown to have occurred due to bona fide circumstances beyond the appellant's control, the delay may be condoned so that the appeal is decided on merits.

Issues: Whether the common approval granted by the Principal Commissioner for 111 reassessment cases satisfied the requirement of independent application of mind under section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the notice under section 148 and the consequential reassessment were valid.

Analysis: The approval was granted in a consolidated manner for multiple cases without case-specific satisfaction. The Tribunal followed the jurisdictional High Court's view that sanction for reopening is not a ritualistic formality and must reflect independent consideration of the material relating to each assessee. A common omnibus approval, without any indication of individual examination, was held to be mechanical and contrary to the statutory safeguard built into section 151. Since the reopening was founded on that invalid approval, the notice issued under section 148 could not survive and the reassessment proceedings were vitiated.

Conclusion: The approval under section 151 was invalid, the notice under section 148 was without jurisdiction, and the reassessment was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer of the assessee's case under section 127 was valid for coordinated investigation. (ii) Whether the notice issued under section 153A was valid and whether the reassessment proceedings had become time-barred.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer of the assessee's case under section 127 was valid for coordinated investigation.

Analysis: Section 127 permits transfer of a case after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing and recording reasons. The transfer was made on the ground of coordinated investigation after notice and consideration of the circumstances, including the group-wide centralisation of connected cases and the assessee's own earlier request for transfer to the same jurisdiction. The administrative order was not shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or vitiated by non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The transfer under section 127 was valid and this issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice issued under section 153A was valid and whether the reassessment proceedings had become time-barred.

Analysis: Section 153A applies where a search is initiated under section 132, but the record did not disclose any factual search against the assessee supported by incriminating material. The notices reflected inconsistent search dates, the premises were found closed, and the proceedings were treated as initiated merely on the basis of the warrant without the necessary factual foundation. Even otherwise, the Department did not complete the assessment by resorting to section 144 within the permissible period, and the proceedings had elapsed by limitation.

Conclusion: The notice under section 153A was illegal and the reassessment proceedings were time-barred, so this issue was decided in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the transfer failed, but the challenge to the search-related reassessment succeeded, resulting in the writ petition being allowed and the impugned reassessment proceedings coming to an end.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer under section 127 is sustainable when supported by recorded administrative reasons and coordinated investigation, but a section 153A proceeding cannot be sustained without a valid search foundation and relevant incriminating material, and it cannot survive once the statutory time for assessment expires.