Issues: Whether the writ petitioner should be permitted to pursue an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 and whether interim coercive action against the petitioner should be restrained pending disposal of such appeal.

Analysis: The appellate remedy under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 is available to the petitioner to challenge the Order-in-Original and the Order-in-Appeal. The appellate forum has jurisdiction to consider condonation of any delay that occurred in filing the appeal. The petitioner has placed on record medical evidence prima facie indicating that non-appearance before the Commissioner (Appeals) was due to serious ill-health. In view of these circumstances and for ends of justice, an opportunity to file and have the appeal considered by the Appellate Tribunal is appropriate. Considering the balance of convenience and the nature of relief sought, interim restraint on coercive measures is warranted until the Appellate Tribunal disposes of the appeal.

Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed directing the petitioner to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 within six weeks and granting interim protection by restraining coercive action until the appeal is disposed. This disposition is in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether service tax is leviable on supply of electricity to tenants by the appellant; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked for demands detected during departmental audit for the period October 2015 to June 2017.

Issue (i): Whether service tax is leviable on supply of electricity to tenants by the appellant.

Analysis: Electricity is chargeable under chapter heading 2716 of the Central Excise Tariff and thus constitutes goods. The definition of service excludes transfer of title in goods. Tribunal precedents (including Division Bench decision in M/s Shipra Estate Ltd & Jai Krishan Estates Developers Pvt Ltd and ICC Reality (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs CCE) hold that amounts charged for electricity supplied to tenants amount to sale of goods and not a taxable service. In the present case electricity was supplied through sub meters and charged on the basis of units consumed.

Conclusion: Service tax is not leviable on the supply of electricity to tenants; the demand and penalty on this count are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked for demands detected during departmental audit.

Analysis: The appellant filed ST-3 returns regularly and operated under self-assessment. Extended limitation may be invoked only upon proof of one of the statutory exceptions such as fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade. Tribunal precedent in G. D. Goenka Pvt. Ltd. and authorities interpreting Section 72 hold that the responsibility to scrutinise returns and make best judgment assessments rests with the officer; mere detection during audit does not by itself establish the statutory ingredients for invoking extended limitation. No evidence of fraud, collusion or wilful suppression with intent is recorded in the case before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation cannot be invoked; demands and penalties based on extended limitation are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs; demands and penalties confirmed by the lower authorities are set aside to the extent found unsustainable, resulting in an overall decision favourable to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Supply of electricity charged on the basis of units consumed through sub meters is the sale of goods (not a taxable service), and extended limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 cannot be invoked in the absence of evidence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade.

Issues: (i) Whether Modvat credit on GP sheets could be denied on the allegation that the inputs were not used in the manufacture of the final products and were clandestinely diverted. (ii) Whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether Modvat credit on GP sheets could be denied on the allegation that the inputs were not used in the manufacture of the final products and were clandestinely diverted.

Analysis: The dispute arose out of the same investigation that had already been examined in earlier connected matters. The evidentiary basis relied upon by the Revenue only showed that GP sheets were purchased and that, in the ordinary course, OE parts are generally manufactured from HR/CR sheets. That circumstance by itself was insufficient to establish that the appellants had not used GP sheets or that the goods had been cleared clandestinely. The Revenue did not produce concrete evidence identifying buyers of the alleged diverted GP sheets or proving procurement of HR/CR sheets from another source. In the absence of such proof, the allegation remained unsubstantiated and the denial of credit could not stand.

Conclusion: The denial of Modvat credit was not justified and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The credit was reflected in statutory records, invoices were filed with the department, and the relevant returns were regularly submitted and assessed. The material facts were therefore within the knowledge of the department. In such circumstances, suppression or misstatement with intent to evade duty was not established, and the extended period could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the three appeals were allowed with consequential relief as permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand based on alleged clandestine diversion of inputs cannot be sustained without concrete evidence of such diversion, and the extended period of limitation is unavailable where the relevant transactions were disclosed in statutory records and were within departmental knowledge.

Issues: (i) Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the alleged demand of bribe on behalf of the assessing officer were proved. (ii) Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the inspector were proved so as to sustain conviction under the anti-corruption law.

Issue (i): Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the alleged demand of bribe on behalf of the assessing officer were proved.

Analysis: The evidence did not establish any meeting of minds between the two public servants. There was no reliable proof that the assessing officer demanded any bribe, and no convincing material showed that the inspector made the demand in the presence of the assessing officer. The prosecution case, so far as it linked the assessing officer to a conspiracy, remained unsupported by proof of direct demand or participation.

Conclusion: The charge of criminal conspiracy was not proved and the assessing officer's acquittal stood confirmed.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the inspector were proved so as to sustain conviction under the anti-corruption law.

Analysis: The complainant's testimony as to the demand made by the inspector on the relevant date was supported by the trap laying officer and substantial parts of the independent witnesses' evidence. The pre-trap formalities, recovery of the marked notes from the inspector, and the positive sodium carbonate test on his hands and clothing corroborated acceptance. The absence of reliable evidence against the assessing officer did not dilute the separate case against the inspector, and the recoveries and conduct of the inspector provided sufficient proof of the offence.

Conclusion: The inspector's conviction for the offence of accepting illegal gratification was restored, while the conspiracy charge remained unproved.

Final Conclusion: The judgment preserves the acquittal of the assessing officer, but reinstates the inspector's conviction for corrupt acceptance of gratification, with a reduced sentence.

Ratio Decidendi: A public servant can be convicted for acceptance of illegal gratification on independent proof of demand, acceptance, recovery, and corroborative trap evidence even when the alleged conspiracy with another accused is not established.

Issues: (i) Whether the reduction of share capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the procedure followed (notice, disclosure and independence of valuer) were vitiated by procedural infirmity or bias; (ii) Whether the valuation method applied, specifically the use of Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM), and the price fixed for minority shareholders was unreasonable or perverse, warranting interference by this Court.

Issue (i): Whether the procedure followed for reduction of share capital, including the notice, retention of valuation and fairness reports at the registered office, and the appointment of a valuer allegedly related to the internal auditor, amounted to procedural infirmity or bias invalidating the scheme.

Analysis: The Court examined statutory requirements under Section 66 and related provisions, the contents of the notice, availability of valuation and fairness reports at the registered office, participation and voting by identified shareholders, the NCLT/NCLAT scrutiny and findings, and the evidence regarding connections between the valuer and the internal auditor. The Court noted that Section 66 does not mandate a valuation report, that the company had nonetheless obtained a valuation and a fairness report, that the reports were available for inspection and some shareholders inspected them, and that the NCLT and NCLAT examined objections and issued concurrent findings. On the question of valuer independence, the Court applied the legal standard that bias must be demonstrably real and found no real danger of bias, noting independent affirmation of the valuation by unrelated agencies and compliance with accounting certification requirements.

Conclusion: Against the appellants. The Court held that there was no procedural infirmity or demonstrable bias that vitiated the reduction of share capital or justified interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the valuation and the application of DLOM in fixing the exit price were unreasonable or perverse so as to warrant judicial interference under Section 423 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The Court considered statutory scheme, applicable accounting and valuation standards (including Ind AS 113 and ICAI valuation guidance), precedent on DLOM (including foreign decisions and scholarly commentary), the factual matrix of BTL (delisted, sole business being investment in a listed subsidiary, history of rights issue and prior offers), and the NCLT/NCLAT findings. The Court observed that valuation is context sensitive, that Ind AS treats fair value as market-based and permits consideration of marketability, and that ICAI standards recognise DLOM as an adjustment requiring consideration of asset characteristics. The Court applied established tests for interference: whether the scheme is unfair or inequitable, whether the valuation is egregiously wrong or perverse, and whether there is demonstrable prejudice. Having regard to prior offers, the rights issue, independent confirmations, and the NCLT/NCLAT scrutiny, the Court found the valuation rationale plausible and not so unreasonable as to offend judicial conscience.

Conclusion: Against the appellants. The Court held that the application of DLOM and the resultant price were not perverse or egregiously unreasonable and did not justify setting aside the reduction.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the NCLT and the NCLAT that the reduction of share capital and the valuation methodology did not suffer from procedural invalidity or such perversity as to warrant interference under Section 423 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 permits reduction of share capital without a mandatory valuation report, the Court will not interfere with a statutory reduction confirmed by the Tribunal unless the valuation or process is demonstrably unfair, perverse, or vitiated by real and present bias; adjustments for lack of marketability may be applied consistent with applicable accounting and valuation standards and judicial interference is limited to cases of egregious unreasonableness or perversity.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 can be sustained against the appellants who contended they had no prior knowledge of seized foreign-marked gold and whether the penalty amount requires modification.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the factual matrix including the appellants' initial statements, the investigation records regarding the purported intermediary 'Rajesh Bhai' and the mobile number furnished, the absence of corroborative evidence to support the appellants' account, and their unilateral consent (no objection) to seizure. The Tribunal applied the statutory test under Section 112(b) which requires that the person 'knows or has reason to believe' the goods are liable to confiscation under Section 111. The Tribunal found significant lacunae and inconsistencies in the appellants' version, the failure of inquiries to verify the existence or whereabouts of the alleged intermediary or other corroborative details, and the circumstances permitting an inference of prior knowledge from conduct and attendant facts. While the authorities had already ordered absolute confiscation under Sections 111(b) and 111(d), the Tribunal considered proportionality and the appellants' incarceration and ongoing prosecution in deciding appropriate monetary punishment.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the requirement of 'reason to believe' under Section 112(b) is satisfied on the record and affirmed imposition of penalty but reduced the amounts to Rs.3,00,000 on Shri Vishal Kumar Trivedi and Rs.2,00,000 on Shri Kundan Kumar Vyas.

Issues: (i) Whether PEWAP can be regarded as the appellant's client and whether the appellant rendered any taxable service to PEWAP under Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) as defined in Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether reimbursement of shared advertisement expenses by PEWAP constitutes taxable consideration under BAS where the appellant paid vendors and recovered amounts without any margin; (iii) Whether the advertisement costs recovered from PEWAP qualify as export of service under Rule 3(2) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

Issue (i): Whether PEWAP is the appellant's client and whether the appellant rendered any taxable service to PEWAP under Business Auxiliary Service.

Analysis: The Agreement identifies distinct legal entities and records a shared project budget for advertising and promotion. The arrangement provides that the appellant would pay third-party vendors and submit proof of performance to PEWAP, which would remit its share under a budgeted cost sharing mechanism. No contractual obligation in the Agreement requires the appellant to provide promotional services to PEWAP in return for payment as a service provider to a client. The legal framework for levy under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 requires a provider-recipient relationship and rendition of a taxable service for consideration. In the absence of such relationship and consideration, the charging provision is not attracted.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee - PEWAP is not the appellant's client for the purposes of BAS and the appellant did not render a taxable service to PEWAP.

Issue (ii): Whether reimbursement of shared advertisement expenses by PEWAP constitutes taxable consideration under BAS where amounts were recovered without any margin.

Analysis: The amounts received by the appellant represented PEWAP's share of expenses incurred from third-party vendors under a cost sharing arrangement and were supported by claim documents and vendor invoices. There was no element of profit or mark-up and no evidence that the appellant received consideration as a service provider for promotion of goods belonging to PEWAP. Section 67 and the charging provisions require that consideration reflect the amount charged for a taxable service; mere reimbursement of jointly incurred expenses without margin does not constitute taxable consideration. Coordinate authority and Supreme Court precedent distinguishing pure cost sharing or reimbursement from consideration for taxable services were applied.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee - reimbursements of the shared advertisement expenses, without margin and where no service provider-recipient relationship exists, do not constitute taxable consideration under BAS.

Issue (iii): Whether the advertisement costs recovered from PEWAP qualify as export of service under Rule 3(2) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

Analysis: Rule 3(2) requires delivery and use of the service outside India and receipt of payment in convertible foreign exchange. The Tribunal found on the facts that no taxable service was rendered by the appellant; the amounts were reimbursements under a cost sharing arrangement and not payment for services delivered or used outside India. Given the finding that no taxable service was rendered and no consideration was received as payment for such service, the export rules do not need to be applied to negate a tax liability.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee - the recovered amounts do not qualify as export of service for the purpose of avoiding service tax because there is no taxable service or consideration to which Rule 3(2) would apply.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming demands and penalties is set aside because, on the admitted contract and factual matrix, the receipts from PEWAP were reimbursements under a cost sharing arrangement and there was no provider-recipient relationship or taxable consideration; consequential reliefs follow as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where payments received under a documented cost sharing arrangement represent mere reimbursement of jointly incurred third party vendor expenses and there is no provider-recipient relationship or element of consideration/margin, such receipts do not constitute a taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated where the capital-gain issue had already been examined and accepted in the original scrutiny assessment.

Analysis: The original assessment under Section 143(3) had followed specific enquiries and disclosures concerning the sale of shares, computation of capital gains, and the claim under Section 54F. The material relied upon in the order under Section 148A(d) was thus already on record and had been considered in the completed assessment. Reassessment under Sections 147 and 148 cannot be founded on a mere change of opinion, since the power to reassess does not include a power to review a concluded assessment.

Conclusion: The reopening was impermissible as it was based solely on a change of opinion; the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 were quashed.

Issues: Whether the normal limitation period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 applies to a demand for interest on delayed service-tax payment under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Interest under Section 75 is ancillary to the principal service-tax liability and is not an independent levy. Where Section 75 does not prescribe a separate limitation period, the power to demand interest must be exercised within a reasonable period, applying the limitation framework governing the principal demand under Section 73. The extended period of limitation may apply only where the requisite allegations of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression are present. Regular filing of ST-3 returns was undisputed, and the notice contained no allegation warranting invocation of the extended period. For the last period involved, June 2017, the applicable normal period of thirty months expired in December 2019; the notice issued on 24 June 2020 was therefore beyond limitation.

Conclusion: The demand for interest was time-barred and unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the technical disqualification of bidders scoring below the prescribed qualifying marks warranted judicial interference before completion of the tender process; (ii) Whether unsuccessful technical bidders were entitled to immediate disclosure of criterion-wise marks, reasons for disqualification, and comparative marks of other bidders.

Issue (i): Whether the technical disqualification of bidders scoring below the prescribed qualifying marks warranted judicial interference before completion of the tender process.

Analysis: Judicial review in tender matters is confined to testing the legality of the decision-making process for arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or procedural impropriety; it does not extend to reassessing comparative technical merit. The petitioners did not allege mala fides or establish arbitrariness in the technical evaluation. Their challenge depended upon comparison with shortlisted bidders when successful bidders had not yet been identified and, save for one tender, financial bids had not been opened. The challenge to the technical disqualifications was therefore premature. The need for timely commencement of consular, passport and visa services for the Indian diaspora outweighed the petitioners' commercial interest in halting the ongoing tender processes.

Conclusion: The technical disqualifications did not warrant judicial interference at the ongoing tender stage, against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether unsuccessful technical bidders were entitled to immediate disclosure of criterion-wise marks, reasons for disqualification, and comparative marks of other bidders.

Analysis: Rule 173(iv) of the General Financial Rules, 2017 and the tender condition requiring communication of reasons for technical disqualification obligated the respondents to provide reasons to unsuccessful bidders. A pre-bid response could not override or amend the substantive tender terms. However, the tender terms did not prescribe the timing of disclosure. Immediate disclosure of detailed marks and reasons, before conclusion of the tender process, was declined because it could disrupt and delay procurement of essential public services. Comparative marks and benchmarks of other bidders were also not required to be disclosed at that stage, particularly where no successful bidder had been selected and commercial confidentiality was involved. The respondents' undertaking to furnish the petitioners' detailed marks and reasons after completion of the tender process was recorded.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to reasons and detailed breakup of their own marks only after completion of the tender processes, and were not entitled to immediate comparative disclosure, against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The tender evaluations remain insulated from premature merits review, while the respondents must provide the unsuccessful bidders with their reasons for disqualification and detailed scores upon completion of the respective tender processes, leaving statutory remedies thereafter available.

Ratio Decidendi: In tender matters, a contractual and procurement-law obligation to disclose reasons for technical disqualification does not require immediate disclosure during an ongoing procurement where no arbitrariness or mala fides is established and deferred disclosure is necessary to protect overriding public interest in timely completion of the tender.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilized cenvat credit under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 could be denied on the ground that the disputed input services lacked nexus with the output services, and whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the refund without cogent reasons.

Analysis: The refund was rejected on the premise that certain services such as rent a cab, insurance, air travel, supply of tangible goods, event management, outdoor catering and parking charges were not used for providing output services. The order was found to be unsupported by reasons and did not explain the basis for holding the services ineligible. The Tribunal noted that no objection had been raised to the credit when taken, and that refund eligibility could not be denied after credit had been permitted unless the statutory basis and the absence of nexus were properly established. On the facts, and in the absence of material showing personal use or employee consumption in respect of the contested services, the appellant's explanation of business use was accepted.

Conclusion: The denial of refund was unsustainable. The appellant was entitled to the refund of the disputed cenvat credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondents' claims could be admitted and their membership in the committee of creditors sustained on the basis that they were allottees and financial creditors in a class under the insolvency framework. (ii) Whether the appellants could invoke the real estate regulatory definition of promoter to exclude the respondents from allottee status. (iii) Whether the respondents' claims were liable to be rejected because they were struck off companies, speculative investors, or because their claims did not appear in the corporate debtor's financial statements.

Issue (i): Whether the respondents' claims could be admitted and their membership in the committee of creditors sustained on the basis that they were allottees and financial creditors in a class under the insolvency framework.

Analysis: The agreements and payment documents were held to be sufficient to establish the existence of debt due to creditors in a class. The making of payments for acquisition of units was treated as having the character of commercial borrowing, bringing the unit purchasers within Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and enabling them to lodge claims under Section 3(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The admission of their claims by the resolution professional was therefore found to be justified.

Conclusion: The respondents were rightly treated as allottees and financial creditors in a class, and their inclusion in the committee of creditors was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants could invoke the real estate regulatory definition of promoter to exclude the respondents from allottee status.

Analysis: The insolvency framework was held to incorporate only the limited RERA-based definitions expressly adopted in the explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It was held that the definition of promoter from the real estate statute could not be imported to displace the statutory treatment of an allottee under the insolvency law. The substance of the transaction, and not the mere recital or nomenclature in the agreements, governed the issue.

Conclusion: The promoter-based objection was rejected and the respondents' allottee status was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the respondents' claims were liable to be rejected because they were struck off companies, speculative investors, or because their claims did not appear in the corporate debtor's financial statements.

Analysis: It was held that a struck-off company is not barred from asserting claims in insolvency proceedings, and reliance on Sections 248 and 250 of the Companies Act, 2013 did not defeat the respondents' claims. The plea of speculative investment was also rejected because the law does not deny claim participation to an allottee merely because the investment may be commercial or multiple units were booked. Non-reflection of the claims in the balance sheet was found not to be a conclusive ground for rejection in view of Regulation 8A of the Insolvency Resolution Process Regulations, 2016.

Conclusion: The objections based on struck-off status, speculative investment, and balance-sheet mismatch were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed to establish any legal infirmity in the impugned order, and the exclusion of the respondents from the committee of creditors was not warranted.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a case involving alleged organised crime under MCOCA.

Analysis: The application was considered in the context of alleged membership of an organised crime syndicate, the seriousness of the underlying offences, the applicant's criminal antecedents, and the stringent bail standard under Section 21(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The period of custody was noted, but it was held that, in the facts of the case, the gravity of the allegations and the applicant's conduct in breaching bail conditions outweighed the plea for release.

Conclusion: The applicant was not entitled to bail and the application was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a case involving allegations of conspiracy, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, and whether the material on record disclosed a case for release on bail.

Analysis: The record disclosed that a search was conducted by CGST officials, followed by allegations of demand of bribe, a trap operation, recovery of Rs. 70 lakhs, and a controlled WhatsApp conversation between the applicant and a co-accused in which the receipt of the amount and conversion into gold were discussed. The Court treated the conversation and surrounding circumstances as sufficient at the bail stage to connect the applicant with the alleged offence. The applicant's status as a woman, pregnancy, and the filing of charge-sheet were not found sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the and the incriminating material.

Conclusion: Bail was declined and the application was dismissed. The applicant was, however, afforded a direction for expeditious conclusion of the trial.

Issues: (i) Whether Acropetal Technologies Ltd. was rightly excluded from the final set of comparables on account of low employee cost, functional dissimilarity, inorganic growth, and related operational differences; (ii) Whether e4e Healthcare Business Services Pvt. Ltd. was rightly included in the final set of comparables for benchmarking the assessee's international transactions.

Issue (i): Whether Acropetal Technologies Ltd. was rightly excluded from the final set of comparables on account of low employee cost, functional dissimilarity, inorganic growth, and related operational differences.

Analysis: The assessee was a business support service provider with a low-risk profile and no ownership of intangibles, while Acropetal showed a materially lower employee cost ratio, relied on outsourced/onsite development, undertook research and development, and followed an inorganic acquisition-driven growth model. These features made it functionally different from the assessee. The exclusion was also consistent with earlier comparable findings in the assessee's own case and other coordinate bench decisions.

Conclusion: Acropetal Technologies Ltd. was rightly excluded as a comparable, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether e4e Healthcare Business Services Pvt. Ltd. was rightly included in the final set of comparables for benchmarking the assessee's international transactions.

Analysis: e4e Healthcare Business Services Pvt. Ltd. was found to be engaged in healthcare outsourcing and support services broadly similar to the assessee's business support services. It had also been accepted as a comparable in earlier transfer pricing proceedings in the assessee's own case, and no material distinction warranted its exclusion on the facts found.

Conclusion: e4e Healthcare Business Services Pvt. Ltd. was rightly included as a comparable, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was sustained only to the extent upheld by the first appellate authority on the comparables issue, while the assessee obtained relief on the inclusion and exclusion disputes; the limitation ground was not adjudicated and was left open.

Ratio Decidendi: A comparable must be excluded or included only if its functional profile, risk, asset base, and operating model are sufficiently similar to the tested party for a reliable transfer pricing comparison under the TNMM.

Issues: (i) whether the Revenue's appeal was maintainable in view of the CBDT low tax effect circulars, and (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to claim correction of depreciation and additional depreciation before the appellate authority despite not filing a revised return.

Issue (i): whether the Revenue's appeal was maintainable in view of the CBDT low tax effect circulars

Analysis: The disputed tax effect was found to be below the monetary threshold prescribed by the applicable CBDT circulars. The Revenue's computation based on the full depreciation figure was rejected on facts, and the actual amount in dispute was held to be substantially lower. The case did not fall within any recognised exception to the tax effect limit.

Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was not maintainable and was dismissed for low tax effect.

Issue (ii): whether the assessee was entitled to claim correction of depreciation and additional depreciation before the appellate authority despite not filing a revised return

Analysis: The depreciation short-claim was treated as a correction of an inadvertent computational error in the return, and the claim for additional depreciation was supported by the record before the appellate authority. The bar against entertaining fresh claims by the Assessing Officer did not curtail the appellate authority's power to admit and allow such claims where the material necessary for adjudication was already on record.

Conclusion: The assessee's claim for corrected depreciation and additional depreciation was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal failed on the preliminary ground of low tax effect, while the assessee succeeded on the merits of the depreciation claims before the appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A fresh or corrected tax claim not made in the return may be entertained by the appellate authority if it is supported by the record, and a Revenue appeal below the prescribed CBDT tax effect threshold is not maintainable absent an applicable exception.

Issues: (i) Whether unadjudicated additional grounds concerning alleged accommodation entries and investment written off required restoration to the first appellate authority; (ii) Whether an upfront airport-operation concession fee was depreciable as an intangible asset; (iii) Whether retrenchment compensation paid to the Airports Authority of India was fully deductible as revenue expenditure; (iv) Whether passenger development fee was a non-taxable capital receipt; (v) Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be made despite absence of exempt income; (vi) Whether gains from temporary investment of idle project funds were adjustable against capital work-in-progress; (vii) Whether Passenger Service Fee-Security Component constituted the assessee's taxable income; (viii) Whether airport operational infrastructure qualified as plant and machinery for depreciation.

Issue (i): Whether unadjudicated additional grounds concerning alleged accommodation entries and investment written off required restoration to the first appellate authority.

Analysis: The additional grounds were specifically raised before the first appellate authority, but its order contained no findings on them. Section 250(6) requires a speaking appellate order stating the points for determination, decisions and reasons. Non-adjudication of grounds violates that statutory obligation and principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The unadjudicated additional grounds were restored to the first appellate authority for decision on merits after granting opportunity of hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an upfront airport-operation concession fee was depreciable as an intangible asset.

Analysis: The concession arrangement conferred exclusive commercial rights to operate, maintain, develop and collect charges from the airport. The fee did not acquire tangible assets but acquired a licence-like business or commercial right falling within the intangible-asset category.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the upfront concession fee was allowable under section 32(1)(ii), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether retrenchment compensation paid to the Airports Authority of India was fully deductible as revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The payment arose from a contractual obligation under the airport-development agreement and was made to the Airports Authority of India for its employees, rather than under a voluntary retirement scheme of the assessee's own employees. It substituted recurring salary and employee-benefit expenditure and retained revenue character.

Conclusion: The payment was allowable as revenue expenditure and section 35DDA was inapplicable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether passenger development fee was a non-taxable capital receipt.

Analysis: The development fee was statutorily collected and earmarked solely for modernisation and development of airport infrastructure. Its character was that of a levy for specified capital purposes rather than consideration for services or business revenue.

Conclusion: The development fee was a capital receipt and not taxable as revenue income, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be made despite absence of exempt income.

Analysis: No exempt income was earned during the relevant year; the gains from debt mutual funds had been offered to tax or adjusted against project cost. In the absence of exempt income, the foundational condition for disallowance under section 14A was absent.

Conclusion: No disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether gains from temporary investment of idle project funds were adjustable against capital work-in-progress.

Analysis: The borrowed funds were specifically raised for airport development and temporarily invested pending project utilisation. The financing arrangements restricted their deployment and required investment income to be credited to the project account, establishing an inextricable nexus with the implementation of the project.

Conclusion: The short-term capital gains from temporary investment of project funds were adjustable against project cost and not separately taxable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether Passenger Service Fee-Security Component constituted the assessee's taxable income.

Analysis: The security component was collected in a fiduciary capacity, deposited in an escrow account and earmarked exclusively for airport-security expenditure. The assessee had neither beneficial ownership nor discretion over its use; any surplus or deficit was governed by the prescribed regulatory arrangement.

Conclusion: Passenger Service Fee-Security Component did not constitute taxable income of the assessee, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether airport operational infrastructure qualified as plant and machinery for depreciation.

Analysis: Runways, taxiways, aprons, parking bays and allied infrastructure were specially designed and indispensable operational tools for aircraft landing, movement and airport functioning. Applying the functional test, they could not be treated merely as ordinary civil structures or buildings.

Conclusion: The airport operational infrastructure qualified as plant and machinery for the applicable depreciation, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's substantive tax positions on all the Revenue's challenged additions and disallowances were sustained, while the omitted additional grounds require fresh adjudication by the first appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A receipt or expenditure must be characterised according to its real legal and commercial nature: contractual payments substituting recurring business costs are revenue expenditure, project-linked funds and receipts must follow their earmarked capital purpose, and amounts collected without beneficial ownership do not accrue as taxable income.

Issues: (i) Whether freight and allied expenditure could be wholly disallowed merely because vendors did not respond to notices under Section 133(6) despite primary supporting evidence and accepted turnover; (ii) Whether disallowance under Section 40A(3) could be made by aggregating annual cash payments rather than examining payments per person per day; (iii) Whether expenditure could be disallowed on the basis of an undisclosed third-party statement without furnishing it and affording cross-examination.

Issue (i): Whether freight and allied expenditure could be wholly disallowed merely because vendors did not respond to notices under Section 133(6) despite primary supporting evidence and accepted turnover.

Analysis: The assessee had produced vendor particulars, PAN, bank details, invoices, lorry receipts, consignment notes and banking-payment evidence. Non-response or return of notices, without positive material showing sham transactions or receipt of payments back by the assessee, was insufficient for wholesale disallowance. Once the assessee discharged its primary onus, further enquiry, including verification through the vendors' jurisdictional authorities where necessary, was required. The additional documentary material also required examination.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for fresh verification; the Assessing Officer must examine the supporting evidence, conduct lawful enquiries and provide adequate hearing. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under Section 40A(3) could be made by aggregating annual cash payments rather than examining payments per person per day.

Analysis: The statutory threshold is to be tested with reference to payments made to a person on a single day, not annual aggregate payments. The assessee's assertion that no daily payment to a transporter exceeded the prescribed limit required factual verification from the daily payment details.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for limited verification, and no disallowance may be made if no payment exceeds the prescribed daily limit per person. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether expenditure could be disallowed on the basis of an undisclosed third-party statement without furnishing it and affording cross-examination.

Analysis: A third-party statement relied upon against an assessee must be confronted to it, and an effective opportunity to cross-examine the maker must be afforded. The vendor confirmations, invoices, consignment notes and other material produced by the assessee also required proper verification.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for fresh examination; any third-party material proposed to be relied upon must be supplied and cross-examination granted if sought. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed expenditure claims require fresh determination after verification of documentary evidence and adherence to procedural fairness; consequential interest is to be recomputed as necessary.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee provides primary evidence supporting expenditure, adverse conclusions based solely on unverified third-party non-response or undisclosed third-party material cannot be sustained without independent enquiry and a fair opportunity of rebuttal.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to re-export the seized imported goods, and if so, on what conditions.

Analysis: The goods had remained under seizure for more than a year, samples had already been drawn, and the Court found that no useful purpose would be served by their continued retention. Without entering into the merits of the allegations regarding misclassification or undervaluation, the Court accepted that re-export could be permitted in the facts of the case. The parties also agreed on protective conditions to secure the revenue pending adjudication.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to re-export the goods, subject to execution of a bond for the total differential duty payable and furnishing of a bank guarantee equivalent to 5% of the redetermined value, with re-export to be allowed within 12 days of compliance.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by granting permission for re-export of the seized goods, with revenue-protective conditions imposed pending adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized goods have remained in custody for a prolonged period and continued retention serves no useful purpose, re-export may be permitted subject to adequate security for the revenue pending adjudication.

Issues: Whether the impugned customs order could be sustained when the respondents failed to demonstrate that a show cause notice had been issued and served on the petitioner.

Analysis: The challenge was confined to the absence of a show cause notice. The respondents stated that a notice dated 16.08.2021 had been issued, but were unable to produce proof of service or point out any acknowledgment of receipt. The impugned order also did not refer to that notice and instead only reflected the consultative memo. In such circumstances, the requirement of prior notice under the Customs Act was not shown to have been complied with.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside. The petitioner was permitted to treat the impugned order as a show cause notice and file objections within four weeks, whereafter the respondents were required to decide the matter in accordance with law after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded on the ground of absence of demonstrated show cause notice, and the matter was reopened for fresh consideration after notice and hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: An adverse customs order cannot be sustained where prior issuance and service of the statutory show cause notice are not established, and the affected party must be given a reasonable opportunity to respond before fresh adjudication.