Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal against the adjudication order should be condoned by treating the time spent in pursuing rectification proceedings as bona fide prosecution of an alternative remedy, and whether the appeal should be reheard on merits.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the ordinary period prescribed under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Act, 2017, but the record showed that the petitioner had first pursued rectification proceedings, which were rejected only later. The filing of the appeal was found to be within four months from the rejection of the rectification request. The time spent in the rectification proceedings was accepted as having been spent under a bona fide belief before a wrong forum, and no prejudice was shown to defeat consideration on merits.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the order rejecting the appeal was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be taken on record and decided afresh on merits.

Issues: Whether the endorsements insisting on continuance of the bank guarantee could be sustained after the petitioners had obtained release of the goods and conveyance, had succeeded before the first appellate authority, and had shown a consistent track record of GST compliance.

Analysis: The bank guarantee had been furnished only to secure the value of the goods and conveyance pending adjudication. Although the revenue's concern to protect its interest until finality of the proceedings was acknowledged, the petitioners placed material showing regular registration, timely filing of returns, and substantial tax payments over several years. On the facts presented, the record indicated bona fides and a genuine compliance history, so the petitioners' past conduct itself sufficiently secured the revenue's interest in the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Conclusion: The endorsements were unsustainable and were set aside. The bank guarantees were directed to be returned, and the petition was disposed of in favour of the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a bank guarantee was furnished only as security for release of detained goods and the taxpayer's consistent compliance record prima facie secured the revenue's interest, continuance of the guarantee could not be insisted upon in the peculiar facts of the case.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned additions warranted deletion on the basis of the police inquiry indicating misuse of the assessee's PAN, or required verification by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The assessment record for the earlier year showed that similar transactions were not attributed to the assessee after the police inquiry reportedly found that the PAN had been used by a namesake resident of Nagpur. The material placed before the Tribunal did not include the inquiry report itself for the year under consideration. In these circumstances, the factual position needed verification from the Assessing Officer, and if the inquiry report contained facts relevant to the year under consideration, the additions could not survive.

Conclusion: The issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification, with a direction to delete the impugned additions if the inquiry report supported the assessee's case.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of remand on the disputed additions, while the remaining grounds were not adjudicated as they had become academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a prior factual inquiry suggests PAN misuse by a third party, but the underlying inquiry material is not on record for the relevant year, the dispute on additions must be verified afresh and the additions are liable to be deleted if the inquiry supports the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether a cheque initially issued as security could form the basis of prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when liability had crystallized by the date of presentation; (ii) whether the complaint could proceed against the managing director and the director on the basis of the averments made under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): whether a cheque initially issued as security could form the basis of prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when liability had crystallized by the date of presentation

Analysis: A cheque issued as security is not immune from Section 138 proceedings if, on the date of presentation, the underlying liability has become legally recoverable. The governing test is the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability at the time of presentation, not the label attached to the cheque at the time of issuance. A signed blank cheque, once voluntarily handed over, also attracts the statutory presumptions under the Act, and the drawer must rebut them at trial. On the record, the correspondence relied upon indicated acknowledgment of outstanding dues and proposals for repayment, which prima facie supported the existence of a subsisting liability when the cheque was presented.

Conclusion: The defence that the cheque was only a security instrument did not justify quashing and was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the complaint could proceed against the managing director and the director on the basis of the averments made under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Analysis: For prosecution of directors under Section 141, the complaint must contain averments showing that the persons sought to be made liable were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. The complaint here specifically stated that both officers were actively involved in the day-to-day business operations and financial affairs of the company and linked the cheque transaction to their working relationship. The managing director was also the signatory of the cheque, making his liability direct at the threshold stage. In these circumstances, the allegations were sufficient to permit trial and the issues raised by the petitioners involved disputed facts unsuitable for quashing.

Conclusion: The complaint was maintainable against both officers and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The petition disclosed no ground for exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction to terminate the cheque dishonour proceedings, and the criminal complaint was allowed to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A security cheque can attract Section 138 if a legally enforceable debt exists on the date of presentation, and directors can be proceeded against under Section 141 where the complaint contains specific averments of responsibility for the company's business.

Issues: (i) Whether proportionate IPO expenses borne by the company and apportioned to a selling shareholder who participated in Offer For Sale (OFS) as part of an IPO are deductible under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether portfolio management service (PMS) expenses deducted at source and reflected in net sale proceeds are deductible against capital gains.

Issue (i): Whether proportionate IPO expenses apportioned to the selling shareholder are allowable as "expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer" under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the shareholder demonstrably bore a proportionate share of IPO expenses, the nexus between those expenses and the sale of shares via OFS, documentary evidence of net proceeds credited after apportionment, and precedent where coordinate benches allowed similar claims. The Tribunal contrasted this with DRP findings that IPO expenses are capital in nature in the hands of the company and that passing on the deduction is a colourable device, and evaluated factual matrix including proportion of fresh issue versus OFS, consent to bear expenses, prospectus disclosures, escrow/net receipts, and acceptance of similar claims in other assessments.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. Proportionate IPO expenses shown to be netted off from sale proceeds and demonstrably connected to the transfer are allowable under Section 48 and the AO is directed to verify and allow such expenses where found in order.

Issue (ii): Whether PMS expenses deducted under the PMS arrangement and reflected in net proceeds are allowable against capital gains.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that part of the PMS expenses had been allowed for short-term capital gains and that the remaining PMS expenses claimed against long-term capital gains were similarly incurred in connection with sale/transfer of shares and no show-cause was issued prior to disallowance. On parity of reasoning with the allowed portion, the Tribunal considered the PMS expenses to have sufficient nexus with the transfers.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The AO is directed to allow the claimed PMS expenses where supported by record.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes by permitting deduction of proportionate IPO expenses and the claimed PMS expenses to the extent verifiable in the assessment record; remaining grounds are rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Expenditure that is incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer of shares is deductible under Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and this principle applies where the company initially incurs IPO expenses but the selling shareholder has demonstrably borne a proportionate share reflected in net proceeds and supported by documentary evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether confirmation of penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the appellate authority while the appeal against the quantum of assessment remains pending is permissible or amounts to premature adjudication violative of natural justice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme contemplates determination of under-reporting or misreporting of income as a prerequisite to levy of penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Penalty operates as an additional tax and thus presupposes a prior determination of the basic tax liability. Where an appeal against quantum of assessment remains pending and the question of taxable income is not finally adjudicated, confirmation of penalty without resolving the quantum appeal amounts to adjudication of additional tax in advance of determination of the foundational tax liability. Penal proceedings attract the safeguards of natural justice and require clear determination of default before imposition of penalty. The appellate authority exercising co-terminus jurisdiction over quantum and penalty should decide the quantum issue first and then consider penalty in light of that determination; confirming penalty while keeping the quantum appeal pending results in premature penalty adjudication.

Conclusion: Confirmation of penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 while the appeal against the assessment (quantum) remains pending is not permissible; the penalty adjudication is set aside and remitted for fresh consideration after disposal of the quantum appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the action of the Static Surveillance Team (SST) in detaining/seizing the consignments and handing them over to the Income Tax Department was justified; (ii) Whether initiation of proceedings under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against Amit Sharma upon a prima facie belief that the consignment belonged to him was justified; (iii) Whether Arihant Jewelers was entitled to the return of the jewellery claimed by it.

Issue (i): Whether the SST's seizure/detention and handing over of consignments to the Income Tax Department complied with the applicable Standard Operating Procedure during operation of the Model Code of Conduct.

Analysis: The SOP in force during the Model Code of Conduct required specified steps for seizure, detention and release. The record shows the SOP was not followed, requisite satisfaction about misuse for electoral influence was absent and documents produced established the consignments were in transit with a courier and not liable to seizure. The seizure was reported to Revenue and requisitioned instead of being dealt with under the SOP for release to the person from whom they were seized.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against Amit Sharma were justified where he was an employee/custodian and had not claimed ownership of the consignments.

Analysis: The material shows Amit Sharma was an employee of the courier and custodian of consignments; ownership was vested with consignors/consignees as per documents on record. Initiating assessment proceedings under Section 148 against an employee/custodian in the absence of materials to show ownership or undisclosed income was arbitrary in the circumstances and unsupported by the record.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Arihant Jewelers was entitled to release of the jewellery claimed by it in writ proceedings.

Analysis: The SOP required returning seized articles to the person from whom they were seized upon production of requisite documents. The High Court, while deciding issues (i) and (ii), had recorded that seizure was from the courier's employee and that the courier was the proper custodian; the claim of a third party to ownership raises contestable factual and statutory questions appropriately determinable under the statutory remedy (Section 132B) rather than by addressing ownership in writ proceedings. The record showed limited claim in respect of one consignment among many and no dispute by the courier that the goods were its custody items; thus the writ was not the appropriate forum to adjudicate ownership.

Conclusion: Against the assessee (Arihant Jewelers' writ dismissed as not maintainable).

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed by modifying the High Court order: Writ Petition Nos.15169 of 2024 and 6850 of 2024 are allowed and the seized articles are to be released to Sequel Logistics Pvt. Ltd. within three weeks; Writ Petition No.6810 of 2024 is dismissed as not maintainable; the question of ultimate ownership is left open for determination by appropriate forum under statutory procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-compliance with the applicable Standard Operating Procedure during the Model Code of Conduct vitiates seizure and requires release of seized consignments to the person from whom they were seized; disputes on ownership of seized goods must be adjudicated through the statutory remedy under Section 132B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 rather than by writ adjudication of ownership.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.21,99,000 under section 69B on account of alleged on-money paid for purchase of a shop, based solely on third-party seized material and the statement of a third party without providing the assessee the adverse material or an opportunity to cross-examine, is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer and found that the addition was founded on seized documents from a third party (the builder) and on the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of one Shri Kulin Shantilal Vora. The assessee consistently denied any cash payment and repeatedly requested production of the specific evidence and an opportunity to cross-examine the person whose statement was relied upon. The authorities below did not confront the assessee with the adverse seized material nor permit cross-examination, treating the third-party statement as a general admission applicable to multiple buyers. The Tribunal held that third-party information of this nature, without corroboration and without affording the assessee the opportunity to test the veracity of the statement by cross-examination, can at best raise suspicion and does not discharge the revenue's onus to prove the payment. Reliance was placed on settled principles that the burden to establish taxability lies on the revenue and that denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness whose statement forms the basis of an adverse finding breaches principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Addition of Rs.21,99,000 under section 69B is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the challenge to the order refusing production of original or authenticated documents survived after the complainant placed those documents on record; (ii) Whether the accused was entitled to inspect the documents and raise objections as to mode of proof, admissibility, and authentication at the appropriate stage of trial.

Issue (i): Whether the challenge to the order refusing production of original or authenticated documents survived after the complainant placed those documents on record.

Analysis: The grievance that only photocopies of foreign documents had been supplied was met by the subsequent filing of original or authenticated documents before the trial court. Once those documents were taken on record, the basis of the challenge to the earlier order ceased to exist. Questions relating to the evidentiary worth of the material, including compliance with the requirements governing foreign public documents, were held to be matters for determination when evidence is led.

Conclusion: The challenge to the earlier order no longer survived.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused was entitled to inspect the documents and raise objections as to mode of proof, admissibility, and authentication at the appropriate stage of trial.

Analysis: The right of an accused to access the material relied upon by the prosecution was recognised as part of a fair trial. Once the documents formed part of the court record, the accused could inspect them in accordance with the applicable court rules. The accused was also left free to object to their genuineness, admissibility, and mode of proof during the recording of evidence, without those objections warranting rejection of the complaint at the threshold.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to inspect the documents and to raise all legal objections at the trial stage.

Final Conclusion: The petitions were disposed of because the original grievance had become redundant, while preserving the accused's right to inspection and to challenge the documents in evidence at the proper stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the documents sought to be produced are subsequently placed on record, a challenge founded solely on their earlier non-production becomes infructuous, and objections to admissibility or authentication must ordinarily be decided at the stage of evidence rather than at the threshold.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to production and inspection of the original foreign documents relied upon by the prosecution during cross-examination of the complainant, in light of the requirements for proof of foreign public documents and the right to effective cross-examination.

Analysis: The foreign documents were received by the department through official inter-governmental channels, which lent them a strong presumption of genuineness, but did not dispense with the statutory requirements governing proof of foreign public documents. Section 78(6) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 contemplates proof by original or certified copy with appropriate certification, and Section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 recognizes notarial acts of Indian diplomatic officers abroad. Since the documents formed the foundation of the prosecution case, denial of access to the originals could prejudice the defence and impair effective cross-examination. The request was limited to inspection of documents already relied upon and did not justify refusal merely on the ground that it might delay the trial.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to production and inspection of the originals of the relied-upon foreign documents during cross-examination.

Issues: (i) Whether additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) for alleged suppression of sale receipts (Rs. 810.75 lakhs for specific seized instances and extrapolated Rs. 350.16 lakhs for remaining units) are sustainable; (ii) Whether addition of Rs. 232.00 lakhs as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 is sustainable; (iii) Whether approval under Section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind.

Issue (i): Sustainability of additions for suppressed sales including specific seized instances and extrapolated sales based on market portal rates.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined seized welcome letters, digital loose sheets, whatsapp materials and buyer statements and found no signed, dated or corroborative documents proving receipt of excess consideration by the assessee. The solitary buyer statement relied upon by the Department (Santokh Singh) supported the assessee's case that welcome letters overstated consideration and were used as marketing/negotiation tools. Extrapolation for remaining units was held to be based on unauthenticated market portal rates and speculative assumptions without seized material, independent evidence, buyer examination, rejection of books under Section 145(3), comparable sale deeds, or valuation cell reference. The Tribunal applied the principle that additions in search cases must be founded on cogent, corroborative material and not on conjecture or mechanical application of market rates.

Conclusion: Issue (i) decided in favour of the assessee; additions of Rs. 810.75 lakhs and Rs. 350.16 lakhs are deleted.

Issue (ii): Legality of addition of Rs. 232.00 lakhs as unexplained cash credit under Section 68.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the assessee produced documents establishing identity and ledger/ bank evidence for the lenders, including PAN/Aadhaar, account copies, ledger extracts, ITRs and financial statements for certain lenders; loans were routed through banking channels and several loans were repaid. The proviso to Section 68 applicable to companies (Finance Act, 2012) and the additional onus introduced by Finance Act, 2022 were held not to apply to AY 2019-20. Once the assessee discharged primary onus by documentary evidence, the onus shifted to the Assessing Officer to rebut with cogent material; no independent enquiries or concrete material were brought on record to dislodge the furnished evidence.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) decided in favour of the assessee; addition of Rs. 232.00 lakhs under Section 68 is deleted.

Issue (iii): Whether approval under Section 153D given by Range Head (Addl. CIT) was mechanical.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed timeline and supervisory practice in search and seizure assessments, noting the Range Head's role and CBDT guidance; it concluded that the Range Head had perused assessment records and applied mind before accord of approval and that the approval was administrative and not adjudicatory.

Conclusion: Issue (iii) decided against the assessee; the plea of mechanical approval under Section 153D is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's corresponding grounds and deleted the impugned additions for suppression of sales and unexplained cash credits, while dismissing the contention of mechanical approval under Section 153D; accordingly the assessee's appeal is partly allowed and the revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Additions in search cases must be based on cogent, corroborative evidence; extrapolation using unauthenticated market portal rates without seized material or independent corroboration is impermissible, and once an assessee discharges primary onus under Section 68 by producing identity and bank/ledger documents, the Assessing Officer must produce concrete evidence to rebut the genuineness and creditworthiness of creditors.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of service tax was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked. (ii) Whether any substantial question of law arose for consideration in the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of service tax was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked.

Analysis: The demand related to short payment of service tax on telephone services for the relevant period, and the authorities found that the appellant had not produced complete records for postpaid SIM sales, bill collection, and prepaid SIM sales. On the facts recorded, the short payment was detected during departmental audit, and the record did not support the plea that the case was outside the extended period. The limitation objection was therefore examined on the basis of the concurrent factual findings recorded by the authorities below.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was held applicable and the limitation challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether any substantial question of law arose for consideration in the appeal.

Analysis: The Court noted that the demand had been concurrently upheld by the lower authorities and that the controversy turned on factual findings regarding liability and limitation. In the absence of any substantial question of law, the appeal was not fit for interference under the appellate jurisdiction invoked.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law was found to arise.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on the threshold as well as on the merits recorded by the authorities below, and the departmental demand was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the authorities have recorded concurrent factual findings supporting tax demand and invocation of the extended limitation period, and no substantial question of law arises, the appellate court will not interfere.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in rejecting the assessee's books of account and estimating business income at 12% of turnover in respect of futures and options trading for AY 2018-19.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment record, the audited books and trading statements submitted before the authorities, and the assessment officer's basis for rejecting books and applying a 12% turnover estimation. The Ld. CIT(A) found that the books were audited and that in the case of trading in shares and derivatives, detailed trading statements exist which provide particulars of income and expenditure; accordingly the fixed 12% estimation was held to be arbitrary. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not place material on record to justify rejection of the books or to demonstrate why a flat percentage estimation was appropriate for derivative trading, where turnover-based percentage estimates cannot be applied without a reasonable factual basis.

Conclusion: The Tribunal confirms the Ld. CIT(A)'s finding and deletes the Assessing Officer's estimation; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether denial of refund of cenvat credit relating to various input services received by the appellant was correct; (ii) Whether the Appellate Authority erred in holding that the formula adopted by the refund sanctioning authority for computing eligible refund was correct.

Issue (i): Whether the input services disallowed by the authorities were ineligible for cenvat credit/refund under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (definition of "input service" during the relevant period) included "activities relating to business" and therefore had a wide ambit. The appellant, a registered STPI exporter operating as a BPO/ITES, produced export documentation, input invoices and a statutory auditor/chartered accountant certificate supporting the taking and availment of the credits. The adjudicating orders rejecting certain input services lacked reasoned findings establishing absence of nexus between the input services and the exported output services. The departmental finding that invoices were not submitted was not supported by any deficiency memo and the chartered accountant certificate was not controverted on record. Tribunal and higher judicial precedents accept eligibility where records establish use of input services for providing output services.

Conclusion: Issue (i) is decided in favour of the assessee. The disallowance of the contested input services under Rule 2(l) is unsustainable and set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the formula applied by the refund sanctioning authority for computing eligible refund (Maximum refund = Total CENVAT credit taken on input services x export turnover / total turnover) was correctly applied by excluding SEZ turnover from export turnover while including it in total turnover.

Analysis: Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14.03.2006 and its Appendix prescribe that refund is specific to the registered premise from which output services are exported and require application of the proportional formula with reference to that registered premise. The STPI and SEZ facilities constitute different registered premises. The appellant asserted and produced a letter stating maintenance of separate unit-wise accounts for STPI and SEZ facilities. Where separate accounts are maintained for different registered premises, the export turnover and total turnover in the formula must be confined to the registered premise in respect of which refund is claimed. A differential treatment of SEZ exports by excluding them from export turnover while including them in total turnover for the same premise is not consistent with the Appendix conditions and the registered-premises principle.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) is decided in favour of the assessee. For refund claims relating to the STPI registered premise, export turnover and total turnover for the formula under the Notification shall be confined to the STPI unit's turnover; the formula as applied by the authorities is to be revised accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate orders are set aside to the extent they disallowed the refund claims; the appeals are allowed and the matter is remanded to the original authority to redetermine the quantum of refund for the STPI registered premise in accordance with Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14.03.2006, and to sanction the eligible refund with interest within the directed time frame.

Ratio Decidendi: For refund of unutilised input service credit under Rule 5 and the Appendix to Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14.03.2006, (a) the definition of input service under Rule 2(l) (relevant period) includes activities relating to business and credits are allowable where records show use for exported output service, and (b) the export turnover and total turnover in the proportional refund formula must be determined with reference to the specific registered premises claiming the refund; where unit-wise accounts are maintained, turnover of other registered premises (such as SEZ) is to be excluded when computing refund for the STPI premise.

Issues: (i) Whether an object of a charitable society to invest its income in the mode and manner prescribed under Section 11(5) can be treated as an object of charitable nature and whether investment in fixed deposit receipts (FDRs) constitutes application of income for charitable or religious purposes; (ii) Whether reassessment proceedings under Section 147/148 were validly initiated on the ground of failure to fully and truly disclose material facts and whether the reopening amounted to mere change of opinion.

Issue (i): Whether investment under the mode and manner of Section 11(5) or clause in memorandum of association permitting such investment constitutes application of income for charitable purposes.

Analysis: Section 11(1) deals with application of income for charitable or religious purposes and permits accumulation not exceeding fifteen percent under Section 11(2) subject to conditions; Section 11(5) prescribes the forms and modes in which money so accumulated or set apart may be invested or deposited. The legislative scheme distinguishes application of income (Section 11(1)) from accumulation or setting apart and the consequent permissible modes of investment (Section 11(2) read with Section 11(5)). An objects clause permitting investment "in a manner as provided under Section 11(5)" describes permitted investment of accumulated or set apart funds and does not, by itself, convert the mode of investment into an independent charitable object. Precedents cited on facts of accumulation where Form No.10 was furnished and funds were held for a specified charitable project are distinguishable from facts where there is a shortfall in application and no compliance with accumulation conditions.

Conclusion: Investment under the mode and manner prescribed by Section 11(5) is not itself an object of charitable nature and investment in FDRs does not constitute application of income for charitable or religious purposes.

Issue (ii): Whether reopening the assessments under Sections 147/148 was valid on the ground of failure to fully and truly disclose material facts and whether the reopening was a mere change of opinion triggered by audit objections.

Analysis: Reopening is permissible where there is material on which the assessing officer forms a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment; an audit objection may trigger but does not invalidate reassessment if the assessing officer applies mind and records reasons. The requirement of full and true disclosure extends to assessment proceedings; failure to furnish mandatory intimation regarding accumulation (Form No.10) and non-compliance with statutory conditions for accumulation are material facts. On the facts, original assessments did not record a concluded opinion on the impugned issue, mandatory intimation under Section 11(2)(a) was not filed, and the assessing officer recorded detailed reasons to believe based on audit information and non-compliance. Authorities establishing that reopening on discovery of new material or failure to disclose is valid were applied.

Conclusion: Reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/148 were validly initiated; reopening was not a mere change of opinion and was justified by failure to fully and truly disclose material facts.

Final Conclusion: The Special Bench answers the referred questions against the assessee: investment in the modes permitted by Section 11(5) is not an object of charitable nature and FDR investments do not amount to application of income; reassessment proceedings were validly initiated on account of failure to disclose material facts. Consequentially, the first appeal findings in favour of the assessee are reversed and the assessing officer's assessments are restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Where income falls short of the statutory application requirement and the statutory conditions for accumulation (including prescribed intimation and permissible investment modes) are not complied with, investments under the modes specified for accumulated income do not qualify as application of income for charitable purposes and provide material justifying valid reassessment under Sections 147/148.

Issues: (i) Whether the upward transfer pricing adjustment made by the Transfer Pricing Officer/DRP in respect of guarantee commission for Assessment Year 2020-21 (applying a benchmarking rate of 1.80%/1.55%) is sustainable.

Analysis: The question concerns benchmarking of guarantee commission charged by the assessee to an associated enterprise and whether the ALP adjustment effected by the TPO/DRP is justified. Relevant legal framework comprises transfer pricing provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961 including provisions for TPO/DRP directions and use of contemporaneous market data and accepted transfer pricing methods such as the comparable uncontrolled price method. The factual matrix shows that the assessee reissued a counter-guarantee received from its AE and performed limited functions (processing and execution), with risks and costs back-to-back with the AE. The Coordinate Bench earlier decided the identical issue for the assessee's Assessment Year 2018-19 after applying functional and risk analysis and accepting the assessee's allocation of the combined commission, thereby deleting the upward adjustment. The present appeal involves the same material facts and identical para in the TPO order; the earlier reasoned decision is directly on point and controls the present dispute.

Conclusion: The upward adjustment to the guarantee commission is deleted and the ground raised by the assessee is allowed; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reasoned decision of a coordinate bench addresses an identical transfer pricing issue on the same facts and applies functional and risk analysis to accept the assessee's allocation of commission, the identical adjustment in a subsequent assessment is to be set aside and the assessee's position upheld.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in declining to exercise writ jurisdiction against an order of confiscation and penalty when an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 is available.

Analysis: The petition challenges the High Court's refusal to entertain a writ petition impugning an order of confiscation and penalty under the Customs Act, 1962. The Court noted that a statutory appeal remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 exists for challenging orders of confiscation and penalty. The High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction on the ground that an appeal has been provided by statute. The Special Leave Petitions before this Court were considered in the context of whether discretionary writ relief should be granted despite the existence of the statutory appellate remedy and procedural pre-deposit requirements before the Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The High Court was right to decline to exercise writ jurisdiction; the issue is decided against the assessee (petitioner).

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appellate remedy is available to challenge orders of confiscation and penalty under the Customs Act, 1962, courts will ordinarily decline to grant writ relief and require the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy, subject to exceptional circumstances.

Issues: Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stayed attachment proceedings initiated under Section 8 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999; and whether the MPID Act yielded to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the ground of repugnancy or overriding effect.

Analysis: The record showed that the impugned proceedings were instituted under the MPID Act to attach properties alleged to have been transferred from investors' money through a fraudulent financial arrangement. The Court held that the MPID mechanism operates as a special public law remedy aimed at protecting innocent depositors and securing properties alleged to have been mala fide transferred, and not as a creditor's recovery action in a debtor-creditor relationship. The term 'debt' in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was held not to encompass the deposits involved in the MPID proceedings. The Court further held that the MPID Act falls within the State legislative field and that repugnancy with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code did not arise. The attachment provisions were treated as a form of civil forfeiture and not as an action protected by the interim moratorium.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 did not stay the MPID attachment proceedings, and the challenge to the rejection of the stay application failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to be without merit and the attachment proceedings under the MPID Act were allowed to continue, with costs imposed on the appellant for delay.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies only to legal actions in respect of a debt arising from a debtor-creditor relationship, and does not extend to MPID attachment proceedings that operate as civil forfeiture for protection of depositors.

Issues: Whether the Resolution Professional committed any irregularity in rejecting the appellant's belated claim submitted four days before the Committee of Creditors meeting, in light of Regulation 13(1B) and 13(1C) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.

Analysis: The appeal arises from dismissal of IA seeking admission of a Rs. 10,30,528 claim filed on 15.03.2024, four days before the CoC meeting fixed for 19.03.2024. Regulation 13(1B) permits verification and categorisation of claims received after the period under regulation 12 only up to seven days before the CoC meeting for voting on the resolution plan; Regulation 13(1C) prescribes intimation and placing acceptable claims before the committee and, where applicable, before the Adjudicating Authority for condonation. The Tribunal examined whether earlier decisions relied upon by the appellant applied, noting those precedents concerned claims filed before the insertion of Regulations 13(1B) and 13(1C). The Tribunal also considered Regulation 6A and the proviso deeming public announcement to constitute communication where individual notice cannot be sent. The reasoning emphasises the policy imperative of finality and timeliness in CIRP: permitting belated claims after the seven-day cutoff risks reopening the resolution process, undermining certainty and the fresh slate principle as recognised by higher courts.

Conclusion: The Resolution Professional did not commit any irregularity in rejecting the appellant's belated claim; the Adjudicating Authority's order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed against the appellant.