Issues: Whether an assessment order and recovery notice issued after the death of the registered person could be sustained, and whether proceedings could continue only by giving notice and hearing to the legal heirs within the limits prescribed by law.

Analysis: Section 93 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits continuation of assessment proceedings against a deceased registered person, but only upon intimation to the legal heirs and affording them an opportunity to object. The liability of the legal heirs is confined to the assets of the deceased. In the present case, the assessment order did not reflect awareness of the death of the registered person and appeared to have been passed against a dead person. The recovery notice was also consequential to such defective assessment. Since the statutory safeguard of notice and hearing to the legal heirs was not followed, the proceedings could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The assessment order and recovery notice were set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh assessment proceedings after notice to the petitioner and an opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The decision protects the statutory requirement that proceedings after the death of a registered person must proceed only in accordance with the notice and hearing safeguards, with liability confined to the deceased's estate.

Ratio Decidendi: Assessment proceedings against a deceased registered person are valid only if the legal heirs are notified and heard, and any order passed without such compliance is unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the assessment order and consequential recovery proceedings were liable to be quashed for breach of natural justice when no show cause notice was served after cancellation of registration.

Analysis: The registration had already been cancelled, and the petitioner was therefore not expected to keep checking the GST portal. In such a situation, service of notice had to be made by an alternative and proper mode. Since the show cause notice was not effectively served, the proceedings under Section 73 were vitiated. The reasoning was consistent with the principle that a person must be afforded a fair opportunity before an adverse order is passed.

Conclusion: The impugned order and the consequential recovery certificate were quashed and set aside for violation of natural justice, and the Department was permitted to issue a fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether exemption under section 11 could be denied on the grounds that the return wrongly recorded a change in objects and the audit report in Form 10B was filed after the due date but before filing the return, and whether, in the alternative, the income could still escape taxation if the assessee were treated as an association of persons.

Analysis: The denial of exemption was founded on two reasons: an alleged change in the objects of the charitable society and delayed filing of the audit report. The record, including the affidavit of the secretary, showed that the entry regarding change in objects was an inadvertent punching error and that there was in fact no change in the objects during the year. On the audit report, the Tribunal noted that Form 10B had been filed before the return was processed and before filing of the income-tax return, and therefore it ought to have been considered. The Tribunal also accepted the alternative contention that, even on the footing of an association of persons, the expenditure exceeded the gross receipts and no taxable income remained.

Conclusion: Denial of exemption under section 11 was unsustainable and the addition made in the assessment was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in obtaining relief against the impugned addition and the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the factual basis for denial of charitable exemption is shown to be a clerical or inadvertent error, and the audit report is available before return processing and filing, exemption cannot be refused on a purely technical ground.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made by treating the share sale proceeds as unexplained cash credit under section 68 was sustainable, and whether the claim of exempt long-term capital gains under section 10(38) was proved to be genuine.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made by treating the share sale proceeds as unexplained cash credit under section 68 was sustainable, and whether the claim of exempt long-term capital gains under section 10(38) was proved to be genuine.

Analysis: The assessee relied on allotment documents, demat records, contract notes and proof of STT payment to support the claim that the shares were acquired through preferential allotment and sold through the stock exchange. The record, however, showed that the script was a suspended or unlisted script for the relevant period, the purchase trail remained doubtful, and the material produced did not establish the genuineness of the transaction to the extent required to displace the finding of the Assessing Officer and the first appellate authority. Mere sale through the stock exchange was held insufficient where the initial acquisition itself was not satisfactorily proved.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was upheld and the claim of exemption under section 10(38) was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in substance, and the assessment addition was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the acquisition of shares is not satisfactorily established, subsequent sale through a recognised exchange and payment of STT do not by themselves prove a genuine exempt capital gain or displace an addition as unexplained cash credit.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the review petitions should be condoned and whether any ground for review was made out.

Analysis: The application sought condonation of delay of 167 days in filing the review petitions. On a consideration of the earlier order and the record, no ground warranting review was found. The petitions were therefore liable to fail both on account of delay and on merits.

Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay was rejected and the review petitions were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A review petition will not be entertained when the delay is not condoned and no reviewable error or sufficient ground for review is shown.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and whether the refund could be denied on grounds such as alleged lack of nexus, documentary deficiencies, and other procedural lapses.

Analysis: Refund claims under Rule 5 are to be decided on the basis of eligibility for export-related accumulated credit, and irregular availment or utilization of credit is a matter for recovery under Rule 14 by invoking Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, rather than for denying refund in Rule 5 proceedings. The objections raised were treated as procedural in nature, and the record disclosed substantive entitlement to the refund. A refund claim cannot be rejected merely for technical defects where the underlying claim is otherwise supported.

Conclusion: The refund was held admissible and the denial was unsustainable; the matter was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the refund appeals were allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, refund cannot be denied on the basis of procedural defects or alleged irregular credit availment, since recovery for irregular credit must be pursued under Rule 14 by applying Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: (i) Whether the bankruptcy application and consequent bankruptcy order could be sustained when the order under Section 114(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 had attained finality and was not challenged. (ii) Whether a separate show-cause notice and hearing were mandatory before proceeding under Section 121 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the bankruptcy application and consequent bankruptcy order could be sustained when the order under Section 114(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 had attained finality and was not challenged.

Analysis: The order passed under Section 114(1) was treated as the isive step in the insolvency process for personal guarantors. Since the appellants did not challenge that order, the subsequent steps under Sections 115(2), 121 and 123 were treated as flowing consequentially from an already final adjudication. The failure to assail the foundational order meant the appellants could not resist the later bankruptcy proceedings on the ground that the sequence of events was incomplete.

Conclusion: The challenge failed. The bankruptcy proceedings were held to be legally sustainable as a consequence of the unchallenged order under Section 114(1).

Issue (ii): Whether a separate show-cause notice and hearing were mandatory before proceeding under Section 121 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the process had already travelled through the stages under Sections 95, 99, 100, 112, 113, 114 and 115, and that the application under Section 121 was only a consequential step after rejection of the repayment plan. In that context, the requirements of Rule 37 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Section 420(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, and Article 14 of the Constitution of India were held not to mandate a fresh notice at the bankruptcy stage. The appellants were also held bound by waiver, having not challenged the foundational order.

Conclusion: No separate notice or additional hearing was held necessary before initiation of bankruptcy proceedings under Section 121.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were found to have no merit because the impugned bankruptcy order was only a consequential step following an unchallenged adjudication under Section 114(1), and the objections based on notice and hearing were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the foundational order in the insolvency process has attained finality, later bankruptcy proceedings that statutorily follow from it do not require a fresh show-cause notice or hearing merely because they are initiated under a consequential provision.

Issues: Whether the demand of central excise duty could be sustained when the goods were alleged not to have been sent to the named dealer, but duty had already been paid on the clearances.

Analysis: The respondent was found to have paid duty on the clearances in question. The Revenue's case proceeded on two inconsistent bases: if no goods were moved at all, no duty demand could arise on that premise; if the goods were diverted elsewhere, duty had already been discharged on the clearances. In view of this inconsistency, no sustainable basis remained for confirming the demand.

Conclusion: The demand was not sustainable and the respondent succeeded on the issue.

Issues: Whether the cost of Rs. 2 lakhs imposed on the appellant for the alleged dereliction of counsel in conducting the proceedings was sustainable.

Analysis: The impugned order arose in proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013. The cost was imposed because an application for placing additional documents had been permitted but was later not pressed, and the tribunal treated the conduct as a lack of diligence. The appellate tribunal found no basis to attribute such default to the litigant, and held that a party should not be made to suffer for slackness or dereliction on the part of counsel. It also found that the quantum of cost had not been supported by any adequate reasoning.

Conclusion: The imposition of cost was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the limited extent of removing the cost burden, while the company petition was left to proceed expeditiously before the tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: A litigant should not be penalised with costs for the lapse of counsel unless the order records a reasoned basis for fastening such liability on the party.

Issues: Whether, for computation of capital gains under Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the guideline value fixed in the probate proceedings should prevail over the stamp valuation adopted by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The property had been valued in probate proceedings and the Assessing Officer nevertheless adopted the higher stamp valuation for computing capital gains. The appellate authorities had upheld that approach. The Court followed the co-owner's case and the earlier decision of this Court, holding that the correct legal position required adoption of the guideline value as on the relevant date for working out capital gains in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee. The lower orders were set aside and the Assessing Officer was directed to adopt the guideline value as on 03.10.2006 and recompute the capital gains after giving reasonable opportunity.

Issues: (i) Whether the adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to disallow employees' contribution to provident fund under section 36(1)(va) was sustainable when, on the date of intimation, the jurisdictional High Court had taken a view in favour of the assessee and the issue was debatable.

Issue (i): Whether the adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to disallow employees' contribution to provident fund under section 36(1)(va) was sustainable when, on the date of intimation, the jurisdictional High Court had taken a view in favour of the assessee and the issue was debatable.

Analysis: The return had been processed under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 12 May 2020. On that date, the jurisdictional High Court decisions held that employees' contribution, though not deposited within the due date under the relevant labour statute, could still be allowed if paid up to the due date for filing the return. The issue had not then been settled against the assessee by the Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services, which came later. In that legal setting, the disallowance involved a debatable issue and could not be made by way of adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(iv).

Conclusion: The adjustment disallowing employees' contribution to provident fund was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the substantive disallowance issue, while the interest additions were treated as consequential, leaving the assessee with only partial relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A prima facie adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(iv) cannot be used to disallow a claim where, at the time of processing, the issue was debatable and the jurisdictional High Court had already taken a view in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a consolidated satisfaction note recorded for multiple assessment years, without year-wise satisfaction based on seized incriminating material, could sustain notices and assessments under section 153C.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the search yielded only one agreement and no other incriminating material linking distinct assessment years, while the satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer was common for all years from 2015-16 to 2020-21. It held that proceedings under section 153C require satisfaction to be recorded separately for each assessment year with reference to the seized material relevant to that year. The Tribunal relied on the binding jurisdictional view that a consolidated satisfaction note for different assessment years vitiates the proceedings, and distinguished the contrary view cited by the Revenue on the facts because the present case did not involve year-wise seized material covering all years.

Conclusion: The notices issued under section 153C and the consequential assessments were unsustainable, and the assessee succeeded on the legal ground.

Ratio Decidendi: For initiation of proceedings under section 153C, satisfaction must be recorded separately for each assessment year on the basis of seized material attributable to that year; a composite satisfaction note without such year-wise linkage invalidates the proceedings.

Issues: Whether amounts collected by a charitable club or association from its members towards subscriptions, membership fees, deposits and allied receipts were exigible to service tax under the category of club or association service.

Analysis: The appellant was registered as a charitable trust and the receipts in question arose from members for providing facilities, services and advantages to those members. The governing principle applied was that receipts collected by a body from its own members, in the context of club or association activity, are not taxable where the relationship is one of mutuality. The controlling legal position was taken from the Supreme Court's ruling that incorporated clubs or associations were not within the service tax net for the relevant period, and that member-to-club receipts used for providing services to members did not attract levy.

Conclusion: The amounts collected from members were not liable to service tax and the demand, interest and penalties could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) whether the outgoing liquidator had locus standi to challenge his replacement; and (ii) whether Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited was a related party of the corporate debtor so as to invalidate its participation in the stakeholder voting and the resulting replacement of the liquidator.

Issue (i): whether the outgoing liquidator had locus standi to challenge his replacement.

Analysis: The right to seek replacement of a liquidator lies within the statutory framework governing the Stakeholders' Consultation Committee, and the Adjudicating Authority retains supervisory jurisdiction over the liquidation process. A liquidator is an officer of the process and does not acquire a personal or vested right to continue in office. The precedents relied upon reinforce that replacement, by itself, does not confer a private legal grievance sufficient to maintain an appeal unless a statutory violation or jurisdictional error is shown.

Conclusion: The outgoing liquidator had no locus standi to maintain the appeal against his replacement.

Issue (ii): whether Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited was a related party of the corporate debtor so as to invalidate its participation in the stakeholder voting and the resulting replacement of the liquidator.

Analysis: The materials relied upon to show control-assignment of debt, pledged shares, escrow arrangements, appointment of advisors, monitoring mechanisms, and alleged influence over the resolution professional-did not establish management control or policy control in the statutory sense. Pledged shares did not vest ownership or voting rights until invocation, and lender oversight in a distressed account did not by itself make the lender a related party. The record also showed that the challenge was raised belatedly, long after CIRP and liquidation had commenced. On the facts, the statutory definition of related party was not satisfied.

Conclusion: Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited was not a related party, and its voting participation did not vitiate the replacement process.

Final Conclusion: The replacement of the liquidator was upheld and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A liquidator has no vested or personal right to continue in office, and a financial creditor engaged in ordinary lender oversight, without demonstrable management or policy control, does not become a related party under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid when the material forming the basis of reopening had already been examined in the original scrutiny assessment and the reopening amounted to a mere change of opinion.

Analysis: The return for the relevant assessment year had earlier been scrutinised under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after the assessee had furnished the relevant details, including material concerning the transaction later relied upon for reopening. The reasons recorded for reopening were founded on the same material already considered in the original assessment. Reassessment cannot be used as a power of review, and reopening is impermissible where it is based only on a reappraisal of already examined material. The concept of change of opinion operates as an in-built safeguard against arbitrary exercise of the power to reopen completed assessments.

Conclusion: The reassessment order and notice were invalid and were quashed; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the reopening proceedings were set aside, bringing the matter to a final end in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Completed assessments cannot be reopened on the basis of a mere change of opinion where the very material relied upon for reopening had already been examined in the original scrutiny assessment.

Issues: (i) Whether the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 had overriding effect over the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 in respect of the seized money. (ii) Whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to direct release of the seized amount for credit into the escrow account for the benefit of depositors.

Issue (i): Whether the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 had overriding effect over the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 in respect of the seized money.

Analysis: The subject money was found to have been received from the deposit-taking entity and was the very subject matter of the settlement placed before the Court. The Court held that the special State enactment was validly enacted for protection of depositors and, applying the constitutional principle of legislative competence and the federal structure, its provisions could not be subordinated to the later central enactments relied upon by the appellant in the facts of the case. The Court also accepted the view that the attachments and seizures under the other enactments did not displace the statutory scheme under the special depositors' legislation.

Conclusion: The Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 prevailed in the present facts, and the appellant's reliance on the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to direct release of the seized amount for credit into the escrow account for the benefit of depositors.

Analysis: The Court found that the money had been received in the course of the deposit-related transaction and that the settlement contemplated its routing to the escrow account for eventual payment to investors. Since the special court was acting within the scheme of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999, it was competent to determine the controversy and pass consequential directions for release of the assets so as to satisfy the depositors' claims.

Conclusion: The Special Court had jurisdiction to pass the direction for release of the seized amount.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the order granting relief under the depositors' protection regime failed, and the order directing release of the money for the benefit of investors was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A special statute enacted to protect depositors may, in the facts of the case, prevail over competing central enactments, and the court exercising jurisdiction under that statute may order release of seized assets to secure the depositors' interests.

Issues: Whether the assessment for the relevant year, in the case of a non-searched person, was required to be completed under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of the date of receipt of seized material or satisfaction note, and whether the assessment framed under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid.

Analysis: The block period for a non-searched person under Section 153C is to be computed from the date on which the jurisdictional Assessing Officer receives the seized books, documents, or assets, and not from the date of search on the searched person. Applying this settled position, the year under consideration fell within the six-year block linked to the date of satisfaction and receipt of seized material. The assessment was therefore required to be initiated under Section 153C, and not under the regular assessment route under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the assessment was framed without following the mandatory Section 153C procedure, it suffered from a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under Section 143(3) was rightly held to be bad in law, and the notice and consequential assessment order were liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: For a non-searched person, the six assessment years under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are reckoned from the date the seized material is received by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, and an assessment year falling within that block must be assessed under Section 153C rather than under Section 143(3).

Issues: Whether the reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with section 148, was valid on the basis of information from the Investigation Wing, bank account analysis, field enquiry and the statement recorded on oath, and whether the reopening was vitiated by borrowed satisfaction, absence of tangible material, or lack of live link between the material and the belief of escapement of income.

Analysis: The reasons recorded referred to the Investigation Wing report, the nature of transactions in the bank accounts of the two concerns, cancellation of VAT registration, field verification, the statement of Chandresh Vyas and the assessee's link with the entities alleged to be paper concerns providing accommodation entries. The record showed that the Assessing Officer considered the material before issuing notice under section 148 and formed a belief that income had escaped assessment. The objections raised by the assessee were dealt with by the Assessing Officer, and the Tribunal found that the reopening was founded on tangible and credible material, not on mere suspicion or borrowed satisfaction. The Tribunal also found a rational connection and live link between the material available and the belief recorded for reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were held to be valid, and the jurisdictional challenge under section 147 was rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stayed proceedings for making absolute the attachment of properties under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999; (ii) Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 overrides the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 on the ground of repugnancy.

Issue (i): Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stayed proceedings for making absolute the attachment of properties under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999.

Analysis: The attachment proceedings under the MPID Act were held to be aimed at protecting depositors and not at securing a debt owed by the appellants to the State. In the absence of a debtor-creditor relationship, the property attached under the MPID Act could not be treated as a debt for the purposes of Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The interim moratorium therefore did not apply to the MPID proceedings.

Conclusion: The moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 did not stay the MPID attachment proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 overrides the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 on the ground of repugnancy.

Analysis: The two enactments operate in distinct legislative fields. The MPID Act falls within the State List, while the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates in the Concurrent List. Repugnancy under Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India arises only where both laws occupy the Concurrent List and are inconsistent. Since the statutes operate in different spheres, Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 did not displace the MPID Act.

Conclusion: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not override the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 on the ground of repugnancy.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the requested stay of MPID attachment proceedings under the insolvency moratorium was legally unavailable, and the State enactment continued to operate unaffected by the insolvency law.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code does not apply to MPID attachment proceedings absent a debt-based debtor-creditor relationship, and no repugnancy arises where the two enactments operate in different legislative fields.

Issues: Whether the order passed under Regulation 17(7) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 was valid when it was issued beyond the stipulated period after the inquiry report.

Analysis: The dates relating to the offence report, show cause notice, inquiry report, representation and the impugned order were undisputed. The challenge was confined to the expiry of the 90-day period contemplated under Regulation 17(7). The Court followed its earlier view that the timelines prescribed in Regulation 17 of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 are mandatory and declined to treat the provision as merely directory on the basis of the cited contrary view from another High Court.

Conclusion: The impugned order, having been passed beyond the prescribed timeline, was set aside and the writ petition was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: The time limit prescribed under Regulation 17(7) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 is mandatory, and an order passed beyond that period is liable to be invalidated.