Issues: Whether the services rendered by the assessee in relation to clinical trials were support services to the overseas principal or clinical trial services liable to service tax in India, and whether the Revenue's demand could be sustained.

Analysis: The agreements and surrounding documents showed that the assessee did not itself have the manpower or infrastructure to conduct clinical trials and instead identified hospitals and doctors, arranged for third-party engagement, obtained regulatory permissions, and kept the overseas principal informed of progress and results. Under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and Schedule Y, the investigators or hospitals were the persons actually conducting and supervising the clinical trials, while the assessee acted as sponsor and facilitator. The services were therefore not intermediary services, as there was no tripartite arrangement of the kind urged by the Revenue, and the assessee was only providing support in connection with clinical trials conducted by others in India. The contrary plea that the assessee itself conducted clinical trials and that the activity should nonetheless be treated as export was rejected as inconsistent with the facts and beyond the proper scope of the export argument.

Conclusion: The assessee was held to be providing support services to its overseas principal and not taxable clinical trial services as alleged by the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed, and the demand was set aside as the assessee's role was confined to arranging and supporting clinical trials conducted by hospitals and doctors.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an Indian entity only sponsors, coordinates, and administratively supports clinical trials actually conducted by independent hospitals or doctors under the regulatory framework, the activity is to be characterised by its real substance and not as direct clinical trial service by that entity.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are valid where the Assessing Officer had earlier assumed jurisdiction and proceeded under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the deletion of addition of Rs. 3.5 crore (made u/s 69C) by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is unsustainable on the ground that the deletion contradicted the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court (Maharaji Education Trust) and related authorities.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are valid where the Assessing Officer had earlier assumed jurisdiction and proceeded under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the statutory scheme, the non obstante clause in section 153C and the ratio of the Delhi High Court in Navin Kumar Gupta. The Tribunal noted that once the Assessing Officer assumes jurisdiction under section 153C and proceeds to make assessment/reassessment for the relevant years, the Act does not contemplate parallel proceedings and recourse to section 147/148 thereafter is impermissible. The Tribunal applied paras 58-59 of the cited High Court decision and found that the Assessing Officer had exercised jurisdiction under section 153C earlier; consequently initiating proceedings under section 147/148 amounted to parallel proceedings.

Conclusion: The initiation of reassessment under sections 147/148 after having assumed jurisdiction under section 153C is invalid and therefore the reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148 are held bad in law (in favour of assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of addition of Rs. 3.5 crore (u/s 69C) by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is unsustainable because it allegedly ignored the jurisdictional High Court judgment (Maharaji Education Trust).

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the departmental contention based on the High Court judgment and noted that the High Court order relied upon had been the subject-matter of proceedings before the Supreme Court where review/related proceedings were pending, so it was not clear whether the High Court judgment had attained finality. On that basis the Tribunal found the Revenue's reliance on that High Court judgment to be misconceived. Further, since the assumption of jurisdiction under sections 147/148 was held impermissible, the question of the merits of deletion of the addition became academic and was not adjudicated.

Conclusion: The challenge to the deletion of the addition based on the cited High Court judgment is dismissed (in favour of assessee); the Tribunal confirmed the deletion on the ground that the Revenue's reliance was misconceived and the reassessment was invalid.

Final Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) deleting the addition of Rs. 3.5 crore is upheld; the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 are invalid in the facts of this case.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Assessing Officer has assumed jurisdiction under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and proceeded to make assessment/reassessment for the relevant years, recourse to sections 147/148 thereafter is impermissible because the Act does not permit parallel assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to suspension of sentence on the basis of insolvency and liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates only when the resolution plan has been approved and the statutory conditions for a change in management or control in favour of a person unconnected with the prior management are satisfied. The provision is intended to give a clean slate to a new management and not to absolve the wrongdoers. The moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is distinct and does not extinguish liability. As no resolution plan had been approved and the requisite conditions were not met, the appellant could not derive protection under Section 32A. The proceedings were also instituted prior to insolvency.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to suspension of sentence and the request was rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether filing of an application within the time provided under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is mandatory? (ii) If (i) answered in the affirmative, whether the assessee/registered person is left with no remedy to claim genuine refunds? (iii) What is the mechanism to condone the delay in filing the refund application under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017?

Issue (i): Whether filing of an application within the time provided under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is mandatory?

Analysis: Section 54 prescribes a two-year period from the relevant date for filing refund claims; the relevant date is defined in the Explanation to Section 54. The CGST scheme is time-bound with interconnected limitation periods (notably Sections 73 and 74) that enable remedial action by the proper officer. No provision in the Act vests the proper officer with power to condone or extend the two-year period for refund claims. Interpreting the two-year period as directory would undermine the statutory scheme and enable circumvention of remedies and time-limits under Sections 73 and 74. The contextual use of discretionary language cannot override the purpose and connected statutory timelines in a fiscal statute.

Conclusion: The period of two years prescribed under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is mandatory.

Issue (ii): If Point (i) is answered in the affirmative, is the assessee/registered person left with no remedy to claim genuine refunds?

Analysis: The CGST Act lacks an internal mechanism to condone belated refund claims. Where the statutory scheme does not provide an adequate remedy, constitutional writ jurisdiction remains available. Article 226 provides a forum to address genuine hardship arising from tax wrongly paid, subject to established principles governing writ relief and limitation. Precedents permit writ relief for refunds where statutory remedies are inadequate, while recognising limits such as avoidable laches and existing defences available to revenue.

Conclusion: The absence of a remedy under the CGST Act does not oust the writ jurisdiction under Article 226; a person may invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction to seek relief for genuine refund claims filed after the two-year period.

Issue (iii): What is the mechanism to condone the delay in filing the refund application under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017?

Analysis: Condonation of delay by the Court should be case-specific and balanced against the interests of revenue. If delay is condoned, corresponding extensions must be available to the proper officer to invoke Sections 73 and 74 where applicable, so that the revenue's remedial and investigatory rights are not foreclosed. Condonation should not operate to create unverifiable or prejudicial claims; it must enable fair consideration of the refund claim while preserving the availability of consequential actions by the authorities.

Conclusion: The Court may condone delay in filing refund claims under Section 54 in appropriate cases under Article 226; such condonation is subject to the condition that corresponding extension of time is granted to the proper officer to invoke and prosecute other applicable provisions (including Sections 73 and 74) as necessary.

Final Conclusion: The two-year limitation under Section 54 is mandatory, but where the Act provides no remedy for belated refund claims, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is available to seek condonation of delay; condonation must be granted on a case-by-case basis and, if granted, must be accompanied by corresponding extensions enabling the proper officer to exercise statutory powers under related provisions.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of statutory provision to condone time limits for refund claims under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the two-year period in Section 54 is mandatory for the proper officer, and writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked to condone delay in deserving cases provided that such condonation includes corresponding enablement for the proper officer to invoke and prosecute remedies under Sections 73 and 74 of the Act.

Issues: (i) Whether ad-interim relief in the form of a stay on the operation of the impugned order dated 31st December, 2025 under Section 92CA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and restraint on continuing assessment proceedings for assessment year 2023-24 should be granted pending disposal of the writ petition.

Analysis: The petition alleges that assessment proceedings were time-barred under Section 153(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as of 31st March, 2025 and that a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer was made after that date; there is also asserted confusion regarding issuing authorities and disputed compliance with document production despite voluminous filings. The Revenue was permitted to file an affidavit in reply and the petitioner to file a rejoinder; interim measures were considered necessary to preserve the status quo without prejudice to the parties' rights while these matters are addressed.

Conclusion: Ad-interim relief is granted in terms of prayer clause (e): the operation of the impugned order dated 31st December, 2025 under Section 92CA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is stayed and the respondents are restrained from taking any further steps, including continuing assessment proceedings for assessment year 2023-24. The ad-interim relief shall continue until further orders.

Issues: Whether the delay of 169 days in filing the return of income for Assessment Year 2022-23 should be condoned under section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the petitioner be permitted to upload the return on the e-filing portal as a return under section 139(4) of the Act.

Analysis: The petitioner admittedly has a history of timely filings for prior and subsequent assessment years, and the only default concerns AY 2022-23. The audit report was furnished late because financial statements could not be finalised due to internal disputes between directors which led to proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal. The audit report was ultimately filed and the petitioner sought condonation under section 119(2)(b) along with supporting documents. The revenue authority rejected the applications on the ground that the reasons did not amount to genuine hardship or reasonable cause and that relevant documents were not placed earlier. The petition record shows the delay and the NCLT-related disputes which prevented finalisation of accounts and thereby delayed the tax audit and return filing. Balancing the petitioner's otherwise consistent compliance, the nature of the cause of delay (internal disputes affecting finalisation of financial statements), and the prejudice that would follow from denial (loss of substantial tax claim), the delay is a matter fit for exercise of discretionary relief under section 119(2)(b). The impugned orders rejecting condonation are therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The delay of 169 days in filing the return for AY 2022-23 is condoned. The impugned orders dated 11th December, 2024 and 10th March, 2025 are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is permitted to upload the return within four weeks from the date of uploading of this order and the return shall be treated as a return under section 139(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the department is directed to open the e-filing window for that period.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 7,00,761 by treating part of the assessee's agricultural receipts as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified.

Analysis: The assessee declared agricultural receipts totaling Rs. 34,50,000 for cultivation on about 39 acres and furnished documentary evidence for sales to registered dealers amounting to Rs. 27,49,239. The impugned addition related to sales made directly in local markets for which formal bills were not produced. Invocation of provisions for unexplained money requires that the assessee be the owner of the money and fail to satisfactorily explain its nature and source. Given the undisputed ownership of agricultural land, the fact of cultivation, production of partial documentary evidence and bank entries, and the common practice of cash sales in rural agricultural markets, absence of formal bills alone does not demonstrate that the receipts are unexplained or originate from an unaccounted source. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal mainly on non-appearance without adjudicating the merits; adjudication on merits based on available material was required.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 7,00,761 treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not justified and is deleted; the assessee's grounds in this regard are allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Absence of formal bills for agricultural cash sales, when ownership of land, cultivation and substantial corroborative documentary evidence for major receipts are not controverted, is insufficient to classify such receipts as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the assessee, a cooperative society, is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of income arising from providing credit facilities to members, including deduction on provisions debited to profit and loss account; and consequential deletion of additions made by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the society's registration documents and byelaws placed on record and noted that clause 11 of the byelaws expressly provides that the society's objects include granting loans and advances to members. The authorities below denied deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) primarily by referring to the society's name and certain land acquisition objects without a complete reading of the byelaws. The Tribunal held that eligibility for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) depends on the nature of the income earned (i.e., income arising from providing credit facilities to members) rather than the society's name. Once it is established from the byelaws that the society carries on activities of providing credit facilities, income arising from such activities, including profits enhanced by disallowance of provisions, falls within the ambit of deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal therefore directed that deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) be allowed on the income determined in assessment and specifically on the amount of provisions debited in the profit and loss account, and deleted the additions made by the Assessing Officer by denying the deduction.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of income from providing credit facilities to members, including the amounts representing provisions debited to profit and loss account; the additions made by the Assessing Officer by denying the deduction stand deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of provision for interest payable to members survived taxability when the enhanced business income remained deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) whether interest income earned from deposits with scheduled banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of provision for interest payable to members survived taxability when the enhanced business income remained deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was a co-operative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members. The disputed disallowance only increased the business income arising from that activity. The enhanced amount retained the character of business income derived from providing credit facilities to members and was therefore deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i). Sustaining the disallowance would not create taxable income and would only result in a revenue-neutral adjustment.

Conclusion: The addition did not survive for taxation and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest income earned from deposits with scheduled banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The eligibility of deduction depended on a factual inquiry into the nature of the deposits, the source of the funds, and whether the deposits were made out of statutory reserves or funds integrally connected with the business of providing credit facilities to members in accordance with the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act. As these aspects had not been properly examined by the lower authorities, the matter required fresh verification.

Conclusion: The issue was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination, with the claim to be decided in accordance with law after verification.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on one issue and the other issue was restored for reconsideration, resulting in a partial allowance of the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the increased income itself arises from the business of providing credit facilities to members, it retains the same deductible character under section 80P(2)(a)(i); but interest on bank deposits requires proof of a direct business nexus and the relevant statutory source of the funds before deduction can be allowed.

Issues: Whether deduction claimed under section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be denied on the ground that verification of an electronically filed return was completed after 30 days, causing the return to be treated as belated.

Analysis: The return was electronically filed within the due date prescribed by section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but verification was completed after the 30-day period. Notification No. 5/2022 of the Central Board of Direct Taxes provides that where verification is not completed within 30 days the return may be treated as filed on the date of verification; section 80AC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 disallows certain chapter VI-A deductions if the return is not furnished within the due date under section 139(1). The issue requires assessment of whether delayed completion of the procedural step of verification, subsequently cured, defeats substantive entitlement to deduction under section 80P. The analysis considers the nature of verification as a procedural validation of an already filed return and reviews precedent treating delayed verification as a curable procedural lapse where the substantive filing occurred within the due date.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be denied solely on account of delayed verification of an electronically filed return when the return was furnished within the due date under section 139(1); the disallowance is set aside and the deduction is to be allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural lapse in completing verification of an electronically filed return that is subsequently cured does not convert a timely filed return into a belated return for the purpose of denying chapter VI-A deductions under section 80AC when the original electronic filing was within the section 139(1) due date.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant could seek disclaimer of the company's half share in the property and insist on execution of a registered conveyance on the basis of an unregistered agreement for sale; (ii) Whether leave should be granted to institute a suit or proceeding for specific performance of the agreement for sale.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant could seek disclaimer of the company's half share in the property and insist on execution of a registered conveyance on the basis of an unregistered agreement for sale.

Analysis: The claim was found to rest on an unregistered and insufficiently stamped agreement for sale, and the applicant had not established a clear proprietary right in the property. The applicant's presence was not reflected when possession was taken, municipal records did not recognise it, and the materials relied upon created serious doubt about the transaction. A mere agreement for sale was held not to confer title, and the relief of disclaimer under Section 535 of the Companies Act, 1956 could not be used to compel conveyance without first establishing an enforceable right.

Conclusion: The request for disclaimer and for execution of conveyance was not accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether leave should be granted to institute a suit or proceeding for specific performance of the agreement for sale.

Analysis: The prayer for leave was treated as a request only to enable the applicant to establish its rights in accordance with law. At that stage, the Court considered it inappropriate to refuse access to a civil remedy outright, especially since no right was being adjudicated or conferred by granting such liberty. The issue was considered in the context of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Conclusion: Leave to institute a suit or proceeding was granted.

Final Conclusion: The application seeking disclaimer and conveyance failed, but the applicant was permitted to pursue its claim for specific performance in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An unregistered agreement for sale does not by itself establish title or entitle the claimant to compel conveyance in liquidation proceedings, though liberty may be granted to seek adjudication of contractual rights in a proper forum.

Issues: Whether the ex parte demand order passed under Section 73 of the Meghalaya Goods and Services Tax Act, 2022 was liable to be set aside for want of proper service of the show cause notice and denial of opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The petitioner's GST registration had already been cancelled and there was nothing to show that it had been revived. The record did not disclose any physical or offline service of the show cause notice before passing the ex parte order. In the absence of material showing effective service or a fair opportunity to respond, the order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The ex parte order was quashed and the matter was sent back for consideration afresh after permitting the petitioner to file a reply and after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 by issuance of notice under section 148 were validly initiated; (ii) Whether the addition of unexplained money as unexplained cash under section 69A was properly sustained or requires fresh adjudication in view of the assessee's evidences and opportunity of hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the notice under section 148 issued on 28.03.2014 for A.Y. 2007-08 was within the period prescribed for reopening and thus whether reassessment proceedings under section 147 are valid.

Analysis: The assessment for A.Y. 2007-08 had earlier been completed under section 143(3) and reopened after survey; a subsequent notice under section 148 was issued on 28.03.2014. The Tribunal evaluated the timing of the notice in light of the relevant limitation period and the factual matrix leading to reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings and issuance of notice under section 148 were valid; this ground of appeal is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 51,19,000 as unexplained money under section 69A is sustainable without considering the assessee's documentary evidence and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication with an opportunity to the assessee.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer made the addition treating certain cash receipts as unaccounted and invoked section 69A. The CIT(A) sustained that addition but did not sufficiently address the documents and submissions filed by the assessee in the appellate proceedings. Principles of adequate opportunity and fair adjudication require that the assessee's evidences be considered before sustaining an addition of unexplained money.

Conclusion: The matter relating to the addition under section 69A is set aside and remitted to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee adequate opportunity of hearing; the grounds on this issue are allowed for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes, upholding the validity of the reassessment but remitting the quantification/verification of the unexplained cash addition for fresh consideration with opportunity to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment is valid if notice under section 148 is issued within the prescribed period based on relevant material; however, additions of unexplained cash require consideration of the assessee's documentary evidence and adequate opportunity before being sustained.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the customs broker under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 for alleged facilitation of overvaluation of export consignments to obtain excess drawback is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the appellant (customs broker) had any role in valuation of goods or whether there was a specific finding that any omission or commission by the broker rendered the goods liable to confiscation. The records showed that description and quantity in the shipping bills matched the physical goods and that valuation differences arose from a market enquiry re calculating FOB by revenue. The appellant acted on documents/instructions provided by the exporter and no evidence or adjudicatory finding identified a specific wrongful act by the broker affecting valuation. The Tribunal applied established precedents holding that the burden of correctness of export declarations, including valuation, lies on the exporter and that a CHA/ customs broker can be penalised under Section 114 only if there is a finding that its act or omission caused liability to confiscation or otherwise materially contributed to the offence.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the appellant under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 is not sustainable and is set aside; appeal allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the imported technical manuals, specification handbooks and reports are classifiable under CTH 49019900 (printed books/other similar printed matter) and therefore entitled to exemption under Notification No.12/2012-Cus dated 17.03.2012 and Notification No.50/2017-Cus dated 30.06.2017, or whether they are classifiable under CTH 49119990 (other printed matter) as held by the Commissioner.

Analysis: The competing headings are 4901 (printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter) and 4911 (other printed matter). The decision applies HSN explanatory notes and the principle that a specific heading (49.01) takes precedence over a residual heading (49.11). The imported items were examined for their content, format and purpose: they consist of textual matter, technical manuals, reports and management/system engineering documents containing textual descriptions, diagrams and procedural details used for operation, maintenance and integration of defence equipment, and are not mere drawings or plans forming part of capital plant. Relevant authority and precedents addressing classification of technical literature and the applicability of HSN notes were applied to determine whether the documents fall within the scope of printed books/manuals in bound or loose-leaf form. The Tribunal found the documents analogous to previously decided instances where technical and research-type printed matter were held to fall under Chapter 49.01, and noted that HSN notes include technical publications, textual matter for binding in loose-leaf binders and shorter scientific theses within heading 49.01. Having regard to these factors, the documents were held to satisfy the HSN description of printed manuals/technical publications rather than the residual description of 49.11.

Conclusion: The imported technical manuals, handbooks and reports are classifiable under CTH 49019900 and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of Notification No.12/2012-Cus dated 17.03.2012 and Notification No.50/2017-Cus dated 30.06.2017; the impugned adjudication ordering reclassification to CTH 49119990 and denial of notification benefits is set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

Issues: Whether bulk drugs or active pharmaceutical ingredients imported for manufacture of formulations or for testing, clinical trials, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies fall within "all drugs and medicines" under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate), and attract IGST at 5% rather than the general entries for Chapters 28 and 29.

Analysis: The rate notification did not define "drugs", so the meaning was derived from the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the related drug-control framework. The statutory definition of drug is broad and includes substances intended for use as components of a drug, while the definition of bulk drug in the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 2013 covers pharmaceutical or chemical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations. The licensing and regulatory framework for import of APIs under the New Drugs and Clinical Trials Rules, 2019 reinforced their treatment as drugs. The expression in Sl. No. 226 was held to be description-based and broad enough to cover APIs, and the reference to "or any Chapter" showed that coverage was not confined to finished formulations in Chapter 30. The specific entry for drugs and medicines was treated as prevailing over the generic chemical entries in Chapters 28 and 29. The purpose of import for clinical research or bioequivalence did not alter the statutory character of the goods as drugs.

Conclusion: Bulk drugs or APIs, including those imported for testing, clinical trials, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies, are covered by Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) and are liable to IGST at 5%, subject to not being covered by the nil-rate entry.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the governing tariff entry uses the broad expression "all drugs and medicines" and the applicable drug law defines drugs to include substances used as components of a drug, active pharmaceutical ingredients remain drugs for rate purposes even when imported for research or clinical-study purposes, and the specific drug entry prevails over general chemical entries.

Issues: Whether the Securities Appellate Tribunal was justified in setting aside the Adjudicating Officer's orders and exonerating the respondents for alleged violations of the SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations and provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, by relying on a post-facto shareholders' ratification and related amendments.

Analysis: The decisive legal framework comprises the SEBI Act, the PFUTP Regulations, the SCRA provisions on listing conditions, and disclosure rules under Regulation 73 of the ICDR Regulations and related company law rules. The PFUTP Regulations define fraud expansively and prohibit dealing in securities by employing manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent devices including concealment and promises without intent to perform. The statutory and regulatory regime requires fair disclosure of the objects for which issue proceeds are raised and imposes reporting obligations for deviations in utilization. The facts establish that proceeds from the preferential allotment were transferred out and utilised for investments and loans immediately after receipt, contrary to the objects disclosed in the explanatory statement to the notice for the meeting. A later amendment to the memorandum of association and a shareholders' resolution purportedly ratifying past utilisation occurred only after regulatory intervention and after the funds had been diverted. Where the conduct impacts multiple stakeholders and involves breach of public regulatory norms, private ratification cannot validate or sanitize an act incompatible with statutory disclosure obligations or that amounts to fraud under PFUTP Regulations. The regulatory scheme contemplates public law protections that cannot be undone by subsequent shareholder approval; illegality affecting public rights cannot be ratified. The parallel exercise of different SEBI powers by separate authorities in the period in question did not render the adjudication by the Adjudicating Officer impermissible.

Conclusion: The appellate order setting aside the Adjudicating Officer's penalty findings and relying on the post-facto shareholders' ratification is unsustainable; the Adjudicating Officer's order imposing penalties for violations of the PFUTP Regulations and related listing and disclosure obligations is restored in favour of the regulator.

Issues: (i) Whether the review petitions filed after a delay of 522 days are maintainable and whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained; (ii) Whether the review petitions disclose any error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground of merit warranting reconsideration of the impugned orders.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 522 days in filing the review petitions is satisfactorily explained and whether the petitions are maintainable.

Analysis: The review petitions were filed with an unexplained delay of 522 days; defects in the petitions identified in the Office Report remained uncured; the application for listing in open court was rejected. The absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay and failure to cure the communicated defects were considered in assessing maintainability.

Conclusion: The delay is not satisfactorily explained and the review petitions are not maintainable on the ground of delay.

Issue (ii): Whether the review petitions disclose an error apparent on the face of the record or any merit justifying review.

Analysis: A review requires an error apparent on the face of the record or other recognised grounds; on examination of the petitions, the impugned orders and annexed papers, no such error or merit was found. The petitions therefore do not satisfy the substantive threshold for review even apart from the delay.

Conclusion: The review petitions do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record or any other merit warranting review and are dismissed on merits.

Final Conclusion: The review petitions are dismissed both for inordinate and unexplained delay and for lack of merit; pending applications are disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: A review petition must be filed within a reasonably explained time and must demonstrate an error apparent on the face of the record or other recognised grounds; failure to satisfactorily explain delay or to show such an error warrants dismissal of the review.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal before the GST Tribunal; (ii) Whether the Court should grant protection from dismissal on limitation if an appeal is presented to the GST Tribunal by a specified date.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy before the GST Tribunal.

Analysis: The Court examined the availability of an appellate remedy before the GST Tribunal and found the High Court's view that an alternative remedy exists to be correct; the petition raised issues which are amendable to resolution by the statutory appellate forum rather than by writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy (in favour of Respondent).

Issue (ii): Whether the Court should protect an appeal from being dismissed on the ground of limitation if presented before the GST Tribunal by a specified date.

Analysis: The Court considered equitable treatment of limitation where an alternative statutory remedy is available and directed that, as a matter of discretion, an appeal presented before the Appellate Authority (GST Tribunal) by 1st April, 2026 shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation, thereby enabling the party to have the statutory remedy adjudicated on merits.

Conclusion: If the appeal is presented before the GST Tribunal by 1st April, 2026, it shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation (in favour of Petitioner on the limited procedural point of limitation protection).

Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is disposed of by dismissing the writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, while granting limited relief that any appeal filed before the GST Tribunal by 1st April, 2026 shall not be dismissed on limitation grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appellate remedy exists, writ jurisdiction is discretionary and may be refused; however, the Court may exercise its discretionary power to protect an appeal from dismissal on limitation where appropriate to enable adjudication by the competent appellate forum.

Issues: (i) Whether the carry forward capital loss of assessment year 2007-08 can be set off against capital gains for the assessment year under consideration; (ii) Whether deduction under section 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of interest income received on enhanced/ additional compensation.

Issue (i): Whether the carry forward capital loss of A.Y.2007-08 is allowable for set off against capital gains in the assessment year in question.

Analysis: Section 74 and specifically section 74(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 governs the carry forward and set off of capital losses and prescribes the period within which such losses can be set off. The material on record did not establish that the loss from A.Y.2007-08 remained eligible for set off beyond the statutory period; no adequate evidence or binding judicial precedent was placed to rebut the statutory limitation. The submissions asserting pendency of related litigation as a basis for extending the carry forward period were not supported by material that displaces the statutory scheme under section 74(2).

Conclusion: The claim for set off of the carry forward capital loss of A.Y.2007-08 is not allowable and the ground of appeal in this respect is dismissed (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under section 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of interest income on enhanced compensation received by the assessee.

Analysis: Interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources under section 56(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits a deduction equal to fifty percent of such interest income where the statutory conditions are satisfied. The assessing officer rejected the deduction on the ground of late filing of a revised return; the appellate authority admitted the claim but denied the deduction on merits. Consideration of the facts and the cited judicial authority indicates that interest on enhanced compensation qualifies as interest on compensation for delayed payment and that, subject to compliance with statutory conditions, fifty percent deduction under section 57(iv) is applicable.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of interest income on enhanced compensation is allowable and this ground of appeal is allowed (in favour of the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed, with the challenge to denial of carry forward loss dismissed and the challenge to denial of deduction under section 57(iv) allowed, resulting in a mixed outcome where one contested tax relief is granted and another is refused.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 74(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 limits the period for carry forward and set off of capital losses and cannot be extended by collateral litigation unless statutorily permitted; interest on compensation is taxable under section 56(2)(vii) and, where conditions are met, fifty percent of such interest is deductible under section 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.